Boss v. Town of Leverett

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SJC-12780
SUSAN BOSS vs. TOWN OF LEVERETT.
Franklin. December 9, 2019. - April 23, 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
Public Employment, Retirement benefits. Municipal Corporations,
Insurance, Allocation of insurance premiums, Town meeting,
Warrant for town meeting. Statute, Construction.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 28, 2016.
The case was heard by Mark D. Mason, J., on motions for
summary judgment.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Rosemary Crowley (Erin J. Meehan also present) for the
defendant.
Ryan P. Dunn for the plaintiff.
CYPHER, J. A retired town employee, Susan Boss, filed a
complaint to obtain a declaration that the town of Leverett
(town) was obligated to pay fifty percent of the full premium
cost for health insurance for retired town employees and their
2
dependent spouses. This is an appeal by the town from the grant
of summary judgment in Boss's favor by a judge in the Superior
Court. The town also appeals from the corresponding denial of
the town's cross motion for summary judgment. We transferred
this case sua sponte from the Appeals Court. There are two
issues presented here: first, whether the town's adoption of
G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, obligated it to contribute toward the
premiums associated with retirees' dependents; and second, if
G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, is interpreted to include these premiums,
whether it effectively was adopted at the town meeting on April
24, 2004.
We hold that by adopting G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, the town was
required to cover fifty percent of the premiums for both
retirees and the retirees' dependents. We further hold that the
town successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town
meeting held on April 24, 2004. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Background. 1. Legislative proceedings of the local town
meeting in 2004. The town is a municipal corporation located in
Franklin County that, pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, provides access
to group health insurance coverage for current and retired
employees of the Leverett public schools.
On April 24, 2004, the town convened its annual town
meeting, during which the town's citizens voted on proposed
3
bylaws and amendments.1 In accordance with G. L. c. 39, § 10, a
warrant was posted before the town meeting to inform the town's
citizens of the matters on which to be voted.2 Two of the
articles contained in the warrant, articles 2 and 4, concerned
retirement benefits. Article 2 of the warrant proposed (1) the
adoption of specific language regarding retiree health insurance
premiums and (2) a budget appropriation for specified insurance
premiums. It aimed "to raise and appropriate the sum of $23,500
to pay one-half the premium costs payable for life and medical
insurances in [fiscal year] 2005 for retired [town] employees."3
1 The process for proposing a bylaw or subsequent amendment
is detailed in chapter 11 of the town's code. Code of Leverett,
sections 11-1 to 11-9 (Apr. 2011). See Code of Leverett,
sections 1-2, 9-6. Under section 11-5 of the code, any ten
voters of the town may, through a written petition to the select
board, include an article in the warrant of a scheduled annual
town meeting. Under section 11-6, articles must be submitted to
the select board thirty days prior to the town meeting.
2 The requirements for a warrant are subject to G. L. c. 39,
§ 10. Notice must be given at least seven days before the
annual town meeting, and the warrant must state the time and
place of the meeting and the subjects on which to be acted.
3 The language adopted under article 2 was as follows:
"The town will pay [fifty percent] of the cost of an
individual health plan offered by the town for a retiree as
long as the retiree notifies the town of his/her choice to
enroll in a Leverett health insurance plan within [sixty]
days of retirement from the town or a qualifying event; the
individual was enrolled in a Leverett health insurance
program at the time of retirement; the retiree is older
than the eligible retirement age; and the retiree has a
minimum of ten (10) years of credible service with the
[town] in a beneficial position. Employees eligible for
4
Article 4 was a ballot question that used the language mandated
by G. L. c. 32B, § 9A: "Shall the town pay one-half the premium
costs payable by a retired employee for group life insurance and
for group general or blanket hospital, surgical, medical, dental
and other health insurance?"4
At the town meeting, article 2 was moved for a vote as
written. The motion for the vote was then seconded and carried
unanimously. Because article 2's passage was contingent upon
the affirmative vote of the ballot question presented in article
4, the polls were opened for voting on article 4. Attendees
cast their ballot for article 4, which passed with 184 ballots
in favor and twenty-one opposed. Therefore, both articles 2 and
4 passed.
Medicare shall be required to obtain such coverage and
comply with [G. L. c. 32B, § 18].
"A retiree, who has not reached Medicare-eligible age, can
apply [fifty percent] of the individual premium of his/her
chosen health plan to the family or employee-plus one
premium of the same health plan until the retiree reaches
Medicare-eligible age."
4 General Laws c. 32B, § 9A, provides in part: "A town
shall provide for the payment by vote of the town at a town
meeting or if a majority of the votes cast in answer to the
following question which shall be printed on the official ballot
to be used at an election in said town is in the
affirmative: -- 'Shall the town pay one-half the premium costs
payable by a retired employee for group life insurance and for
group general or blanket hospital, surgical, medical, dental and
other health insurance?'"
5
2. Boss's employment history and health insurance
coverage. Boss worked as a teacher for Leverett public schools
from 1990 until her retirement in 2015. During her employment,
she subscribed to health insurance coverage through a group
plan. The "1+1" or "Employee Plus One" family group plan was
offered to all Leverett public school employees pursuant to
G. L. c. 32B. Before her retirement, the "1+1" plan covered
Boss and her dependent spouse.
Nearing her retirement, Boss was informed that after
retirement she would be able to continue with her family plan
but that the town would not pay fifty percent of her husband's
premium coverage. Boss consulted with the Leverett Education
Association (association) about this issue.5 The association
stressed to the town that the payments should be made for both
the retiree and his or her dependents.
Boss opted to continue participating in the group health
insurance plan offered by the town. However, since her
retirement, the town has paid fifty percent of Boss's premium
contribution based only on the premium cost for individual
coverage. Because the town has covered only fifty percent of
her contribution, Boss has been responsible for covering the
5 The Leverett Education Association is the sole agent for
the purposes of collective bargaining on behalf of the teachers
in Leverett public schools.
6
balance for the "1+1" plan premium in order to continue coverage
for her spouse. In November 2017, Boss became Medicare
eligible, and began to receive Medicare coverage, pursuant to
article 2 guidelines,6 with the town contributing one-half of the
premium cost of that coverage. Since that time, Boss has
continued to pay the full premium for her husband's individual
plan.
3. Provisions of G. L. c. 32B previously adopted by the
town. The town previously adopted G. L. c. 32B, §§ 7A, 9D, and
10, in 1968. Code of Leverett, Appendix, chapter A232,
section A (Apr. 2011). According to G. L. c. 32B, § 10, once
the local option or one of its sections is accepted, it cannot
be rescinded or revoked. Municipal employees will be covered
automatically unless they give written notice "indicating that
[they are] not to be insured for such coverages." G. L. c. 32B,
§ 4. In addition, § 7A clarifies that once the local option is
adopted, the municipal employee shall cover "fifty per cent of a
premium for the insurance of the employee and his dependents and
the government unit shall contribute the remaining fifty per
cent of such premium." G. L. c. 32B, § 7A (a). This includes
additional premiums for an employee's dependent child who is
Under article 2, adopted by the town, "[e]mployees
6
eligible for Medicare shall be required to obtain such
coverage."
7
nineteen years or older and is mentally or physically incapable
of earning his or her own living. Id. Further, G. L. c. 32B,
§ 9D, provides for the town's contribution of one-half of the
premiums payable by the surviving spouse of an employee or
retiree.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all
material facts have been established and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Galenski v. Erving,
471 Mass. 305, 307 (2015). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as
amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). In addition, "[b]ecause this
case involves questions of statutory interpretation, our review
is de novo." Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014).
2. Interpretation of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A. We first address
whether the adoption of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, requires that
municipal employers pay fifty percent of the premiums for both
retired employees and their dependents. The town argues that
the plain language of the statute does not include the word
"dependents," and that therefore § 9A does not require it to
contribute to the premium costs for a retired employee's
dependents. The town distinguishes § 9A from other sections in
c. 32B that do expressly include the word "dependents." See
8
G. L. c. 32B, §§ 7, 7A, 9E.7 Boss emphasizes that a town's § 9A
contributions encompass fifty percent of the total premium costs
of the retiree's insurance plan, not just an individual's
premium costs. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the
adoption of § 9A requires municipal employers to pay fifty
percent of the health insurance premiums for both retired
employees and their dependents.
In Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001), we
emphasized that "[a] fundamental tenet of statutory
interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect
consistent with its plain meaning." If the language is clear
and unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written. See
Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872 (1985). We look at the
statute in its entirety when determining how a single section
should be construed. See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532
(2015); Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012). In
addition, when ambiguities are present, the principles of
statutory construction require that we consider legislative
7 The town, in its memorandum in opposition to Boss's
summary judgment motion, contends that "because [§] 9A makes no
reference to payment of premiums on behalf of a retiree's spouse
but [§] 9E explicitly does [make such a reference], the
statutory maxim 'expressio[] unius est exclusio[] alterius,'
meaning 'the expression of one thing in a statute is an implied
exclusion of other things not included in the statute' applies.
Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev. LLC, 473 Mass. 580,
588 (2016), quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613,
619 (2013)."
9
intent when interpreting a statute. See Telesetsky, supra;
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328 (1983). See also
Chin, supra.
a. Plain meaning. We begin by examining the language of
the statute. General Laws c. 32B, § 9A, states in relevant
part: "[A town] may provide that it will pay one-half of the
amount of the premium to be paid by a retired employee under the
first sentence of [§] 9."8 The plain meaning of § 9A requires
that once the town has adopted the section, it "pay one-half of
the amount of the premium to be paid by a retired employee"
(emphases added). The phrase is clear: the town must
contribute fifty percent to that which the retired employee is
required to pay. The section does not address what type of
insurance plan it will cover; rather, it focuses on payment.9
8 The first sentence of G. L. c. 32B, § 9, states in
relevant part:
"The policy or policies of insurance shall provide that
upon retirement of an employee, . . . the retired employee
shall make payment of the full premium cost, subject to the
provisions of [§ 9A] or [9E], whichever may be applicable,
of the average group premium as determined by the
appropriate public authority for such insurance; and the
group general or blanket insurance . . . shall be continued
and the retired employee shall pay the full premium cost,
subject to the provisions of [§ 9A] or [9E] whichever may
be applicable of the average group premium as determined by
the appropriate public authority . . . ."
9 The town offers coverage for its employees through a
select number of insurance plans. All plans can be continued
10
Boss's premium payments are calculated based on her group family
plan -- a plan she opted into prior to her retirement. The fact
that this plan includes her husband is irrelevant to the amount
the town must contribute toward Boss's premium. The town must
cover fifty percent of the premium that Boss is to pay, not
fifty percent of the cost to cover her individually. It also is
clear in § 9A that the word "premium" refers to the total
premium an insured individual pays toward his or her selected
plan -- regardless of whether the plan is for individual or
family coverage -- and therefore, the town is required to pay
fifty percent of that total premium.
The town interprets the exclusion of the word "dependents"
from § 9A as intentional silence and a deliberate omission by
the Legislature. Based on our previous interpretations of
similar sections under chapter 32B, we disagree. In Galenski,
471 Mass. at 310-311, we invalidated the town of Erving's
retirement policy that it had adopted to limit § 9E10
contributions solely to retirees who worked for the town for a
upon retirement and will be subject to § 9A, so long as they are
within the group offered by the town.
10Municipalities that choose to adopt § 9E agree to pay
over fifty percent of a retiree's premium payments for his or
her health insurance.
11
minimum of ten years.11 Before her retirement, the plaintiff had
worked in the town of Erving for six years.12 Id. at 305.
Because she did not meet the ten-year requirement, the
retirement policy adopted by the town of Erving prevented her
from receiving her seventy-nine percent premium coverage
pursuant to § 9E. Id. at 305-306, 307 n.4. The court in
Galenski held that the plain language of § 9E did not impose
restrictions on which retirees could receive contributions, but
rather the plain language of § 9E required municipal coverage of
"employees retired from the service of the town." Id. at 309,
quoting G. L. c. 32B, § 9E. Therefore, so long as Galenski met
the c. 32B definition of a municipal employee, she was entitled
to coverage pursuant to § 9E.13 Galenski, supra at 310. The
11In 2001, the town of Erving adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9E.
The town's retirement policy was adopted in February 2006.
Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 306-307 (2015).
12The plaintiff in Galenski had been a public school
teacher for more than thirty years in Massachusetts. She spent
her last six years of service as a public school principal in
the town of Erving. She missed the ten-year teaching minimum,
imposed by the town of Erving's retirement policy, by four
years. Galenski, 471 Mass. at 307.
13 General Laws c. 32B defines an employee as
"any person in the service of a governmental unit or whose
services are divided between [two] or more governmental
units or between a governmental unit and the commonwealth,
and who receives compensation for any such service, whether
such person is employed, appointed or elected by popular
vote, and any employee of a free public library maintained
in a city or town to the support of which that city or town
12
court determined that a tenure-based requirement was not
explicitly stated in the statute. Id. at 310-311. By
concluding that the policy limiting § 9E payments to employees
who had worked for the town of Erving for ten years was
inconsistent with § 9E and with the Legislature's purpose in
enacting G. L. c. 32B, the court struck down the town of
Erving's attempt to limit the statute after choosing to adopt
it. Id. at 311. See G. L. c. 32B, § 9E.
In the present case, the town's interpretation of the § 9A
language of "premium costs payable by a retired employee" as
distinguishing between individual and family coverage is at odds
with the core of the holding in Galenski that a town may not
limit its obligations in conflict with the language in c. 32B
after adopting it. In Galenski, the municipal policy was
preempted by State law;14 the court concluded that a town could
annually contributes not less than one-half of the cost;
provided, however, that the duties of such person require
not less than [twenty] hours, regularly, in the service of
the governmental unit during the regular work week of
permanent or temporary employment."
G. L. c. 32B, § 2.
Under Massachusetts's Home Rule Amendment, municipal
14
action is presumed valid unless preempted by State law. Connors
v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 35 (1999). See art. 89, § 6, of the
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. This court, on
multiple occasions, has reiterated that a municipality may not
enact a policy that is inconsistent with State law. See Cioch
v. Treasurer of Ludlow, 449 Mass. 690, 699 (2007) (citing to
multiple cases in which local laws were invalidated as
13
not read coverage limitations into the statute where not
explicitly stated. Galenski, 471 Mass. at 312. Similarly, here
we cannot read a payment limitation into the statute when it is
not explicitly mentioned in § 9A or in other sections of
c. 32B.15
Further, the court has held that when two or more statutes
relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed
together "so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with
the legislative purpose." Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315,
319 (1997), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368
Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975). The same principles of statutory
interpretation apply here, where two or more sections within a
statute relate to the same subject matter.
The plain text of § 1 identifies c. 32B's purpose as that
of providing health insurance16 for "certain persons in the
inconsistent with State law). The court in Galenski concluded
that the policy at issue was in direct conflict with §§ 9 and
9E. Galenski, 471 Mass. at 312 n.9.
15 Boss raised in her brief an argument that article 2 of
the warrant places an additional impermissible limitation on
§ 9A. The town did not respond. Specifically, Boss argues that
article 2 creates an impermissible ten-year minimum work
requirement, similar to the one this court held was invalid in
Galenski. Actions limiting the provisions within a statute are
preempted by State law. Cioch, 449 Mass. at 698-699. The
article 2 limitations are inconsistent with the language in
G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, and precluded by our holding in Galenski,
471 Mass. at 310-311. See G. L. c. 32B, § 9E.
16 Chapter 32B encompasses hospital, surgical, medical, and
dental insurance, as well as other health insurance coverage.
14
service of . . . towns and districts and their dependents"
(emphasis added). G. L. c. 32B, § 1. This language indicates
an over-all intent to provide coverage for municipal employees
and their dependents. Section 9 merely extends these
protections to retired employees and accounts for payment; it
does not change the purpose of the chapter. Section 9 states
that "upon retirement of an employee . . . the group general or
blanket insurance . . . shall be continued and the retired
employee shall pay the full premium cost, subject to the
provisions of [§ 9A] or [9E]" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 32B,
§ 9. The phrase "shall be continued" indicates that there is no
change in an insured's plan coverage. Therefore, a municipal
employee's insurance plan continues after the insured retires;
it is not altered or modified.
In addition, § 9 offers a town three payment options. A
town can choose to have retirees pay their full premium
coverage, to pay one-half of a retiree's premium coverage, or to
pay more than one-half of a retiree's premium coverage. See
G. L. c. 32B, §§ 9, 9A, 9E. However, once a town has adopted
its payment plan, it "will pay" -- as §§ 9A and 9E both state --
the insured's chosen plan's premium cost. G. L. c. 32B, §§ 9A,
9E. The town, by adopting § 9A, chose to cover fifty percent of
retirees' premiums.
15
b. Legislative history. The legislative history of c. 32B
also supports our conclusion that under § 9A the town is
obligated to cover one-half of Boss's premium costs. We
interpret a statute
"according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained
from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved
usage of the language, considered in connection with the
cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end
that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."
Galenski, 471 Mass. at 309, quoting Worcester v. College Hill
Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 139 (2013). To resolve whether
there is an ambiguity regarding the use of the word "dependents"
in §§ 9 and 9E, but not in § 9A, requires appropriate
consideration of the relevant history and intent of the
Legislature. See Yeretsky, 424 Mass. at 319.
General Laws c. 32B derives from a session law passed in
1956. St. 1956, c. 730, § 1. From 1956 through 1965, § 9 of
the statute stated that "the employee shall pay the entire
average group premium . . . for the hospital, surgical and
medical benefits for such employee or for such employee and his
dependents." Id. In 1959, § 9A was added to give towns the
option of covering fifty percent of retired municipal employees'
premium payments. St. 1959, c. 595. The first paragraph of § 9
was amended in 1966, and the phrase "for such employee and his
dependents" was removed from the opening sentence of the
16
statute.17 St. 1965, c. 841, § 5. However, when § 9A had been
added to c. 32B in 1959, the language in § 9 still included
"dependent," and §§ 9 and 9A remained in effect for six years
before the 1965 amendments. See St. 1956, c. 730, § 1;
St. 1965, c. 841, § 5. There is little doubt that, in those six
years, any town that adopted § 9A would cover one-half of a
retiree's premiums, including those of his or her dependents.
Legislative history also shows that on May 18, 1959, the
Senate committee on bills in the third reading introduced 1959
Senate Doc. No. 635, which detailed a new draft of § 9A.18 The
Senate considered for a title, "An Act providing that certain
governmental units having contributory group general or blanket
insurance for persons in the service thereof and their
dependents contribute one half the premium for said insurance
for persons retired from service." Although the title of an act
does not control the language in the act, it provides some
guidance regarding the intent of the Legislature at the time.
17The lower court judge found that this likely occurred
because the language "for such employee and his dependents" was
redundant. Further, the 1965 amendment removed both the words
"employee" and "dependent." This does not signify a purposeful
omission. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend to stop
coverage for employees, it being the very purpose of the
statute.
18The substance of the draft is similar to the version that
is in effect today. Compare 1959 Senate Doc. No. 635 to G. L.
c. 32B, § 9A, as amended through St. 2003, c. 46, § 13.
17
Hemman v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct.
70, 73 (1984), superseded on another ground by St. 1989, c. 653,
§ 37. See United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818).
In drafting the sections of c. 32B, the Legislature intended to
provide access to insurance for dependents, and as reflected in
§ 9A, this access included partial payments of premiums.
c. Conclusion. After considering the plain language of
the statute and the legislative history, we conclude that the
total premium costs would include those of a retiree and his or
her dependents if they were previously covered under the plan
while the retiree was employed. Section 9A requires the town to
contribute fifty percent of the total premium for whatever
continued coverage the retiree has adopted. If the retiree has
continued with a family group plan, town contributions would
cover the premium for the retiree and his or her dependents.
3. The validity of the town meeting vote on April 24,
2004. We next address the accompanying issue whether the town
successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, when it took a vote on
articles 2 and 4 presented at the town meeting on April 24,
2004. The town argues that the warrant for the April 24 town
meeting was defective and misleading and that therefore the town
never validly adopted § 9A. Boss contends that not only did the
town validly adopt § 9A, but the town also is barred from
raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised in the
18
court below. We hold that the town did not sufficiently raise
the issue below and is therefore barred from raising it on
appeal. We further hold that even if the issue were not waived,
the town successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town
meeting.
a. The town is barred from raising the issue. This court,
on numerous occasions, has held that issues not raised below
cannot be argued for the first time on appeal. See e.g., Carey
v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006); M.H.
Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 386
Mass. 64, 67 (1982); Henchey v. Cox, 348 Mass. 742, 747 (1965).
"The reason for this fundamental rule of appellate practice is
well established: it is important that an appellate court have
before it an adequate record and findings concerning a claim to
permit it to resolve that claim properly." R.W. Granger & Sons,
Inc. v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 435 Mass. 66, 74 (2001).
The inquiry into whether an issue has been raised is fact
specific. See M.H. Gordon & Son, Inc., 386 Mass. at 67 (looking
at record to determine whether issue had been raised for first
time on appeal). See also R.W. Granger & Sons, 435 Mass. at 74
(finding issue was raised for first time on appeal where party
did not introduce any evidence on issue or raise it during any
argument at bench trial or in any of its posttrial motions).
While the town does not dispute that a vote was taken on April
19
24, 2004, it argues that the vote was invalid due to the
fundamentally misleading nature of the warrant articles. Boss
argues that the issue was not raised below and is therefore
waived. The town offers two examples as evidence that the
argument was raised sufficiently: its cross motion for summary
judgment and the ruling by the motion judge. The only mention
that the cross motion for summary judgment and the lower court
judge made regarding this issue was in relation to the town's
statutory interpretation argument.19 Further, the motion judge
never mentioned the warrant requirement statute, and his
statement, standing alone, would not be enough. See M.H. Gordon
& Son, Inc., supra (considering judge's statement as factor in
deeming issue raised below, but noting that this statement
absent other evidence would not be enough).
The town's limited references to the warrant issue were
never addressed in the context of the warrant actually being
void, but rather in furtherance of the town's statutory
interpretation of § 9A. We therefore determine that the town's
argument is insufficient and hold that the issue was not
properly raised in the lower court.
19References to article 4 potentially containing misleading
language were only offered as part of the town's statutory
interpretation argument. They were offered to explain how
voters could only interpret § 9A in one way -- as not including
payment coverage for dependents.
20
b. The town validly adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, during the
town meeting on April 24, 2004. Because G. L. c. 32B is a local
option statute, and a similar situation may arise at a future
town meeting, we next address whether, even if the issue of the
town's adoption of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, were not waived, the town
successfully adopted it at the April 24, 2004, town meeting.
Under G. L. c. 39, § 10, "[t]he warrant for all town meetings
shall state the time and place of holding the meeting and the
subjects to be acted upon thereat." This court previously has
stated that "[t]his means only that the subjects to be acted
upon must be sufficiently stated in the warrant to apprise
voters of the nature of the matters with which the meeting is
authorized to deal." Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 219,
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945). Only in limited
circumstances can a town invalidate a vote. A town may find a
vote invalid if the language in the warrant is misleading, if
the language included or excluded in the warrant substantially
alters the article's meaning, or if the warrant fails to
sufficiently state the nature of the matter. See id. at 218-
219; Coffin v. Lawrence, 143 Mass. 110, 112 (1886); Coonamessett
Inn v. Chief of Falmouth Fire Dep't, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634-
635 (1983). However, once a section is validly adopted through
a town meeting vote, c. 32B does not permit the section to be
rescinded or revoked. G. L. c. 32B, § 10.
21
The town rests its argument on the allegedly misleading
language of article 2. It contends that because the adoption of
article 2 was contingent upon the passage of the article 4
ballot question, the voters were misled into thinking that the
meaning of both articles was connected. Article 2 states in
relevant part, "[t]he town will pay [fifty percent] of the cost
of an individual health plan offered" (emphasis added). The
town argues that this language misled voters into thinking that
the article 4 ballot question adopting § 9A only included
coverage for individual health plans. Such a discrepancy, they
argue, is sufficient to invalidate the warrant. Nevertheless,
the town provides no evidence that the voters were confused by
the language in the warrant when they voted on April 24, 2004.
Cf. Wolf v. Mansfield, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 58-59 (2006) ("The
plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that confusion
over a town meeting vote empowers a judge to order that a new
vote be conducted . . . [and] the record fails to support the
plaintiffs' claim that voters were confused. On the face of the
town meeting transcript, the residents understood [what] they
were being asked to vote on"). In fact, the minutes from the
town meeting demonstrate that the voters decisively adopted
article 4, which had the exact language required under G. L.
c. 32B, § 9A -- language we have held already, supra, includes
coverage of family plans. The warrant included all of the
22
required elements: it specified the time, date, and location of
the town meeting, and it provided a copy of the language of all
relevant articles. G. L. c. 39, § 10. See Coffin, 143 Mass. at
112 ("Warrants are held sufficient if they indicate with
substantial certainty the nature of the business to be acted
on"). Absent evidence to the contrary, there is no reason for
us to conclude that the town voters did not clearly understand
the language in the warrant when they adopted it. See
Burlington, 318 Mass. at 219 ("[G. L. c. 39, § 10,] does not
require that the warrant contain an accurate forecast of the
precise action which the meeting will take upon [announced]
subjects"). Therefore, we hold that the town successfully
adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town meeting on April 24,
2004.
Conclusion. By adopting G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, the town was
required to cover fifty percent of the premiums for both
retirees and the retirees' dependents. Furthermore, the town
successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town meeting
held on April 24, 2004. We affirm the order granting summary
judgment for Boss and denying the town's cross motion for
summary judgment.
So ordered.