Benoit v. City of Boston

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SJC-12204
BRIAN BENOIT vs. CITY OF BOSTON
(and a consolidated case1).
Suffolk. January 9, 2017. - May 16, 2017.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.
Workers' Compensation Act, Compensation, Public employee,
Decision of Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, Insurer.
Public Employment, Suspension, Worker's compensation.
Municipal Corporations, Officers and employees.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 24, 2014.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Linda E. Giles, J.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
November 3, 2015.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
John M. Becker for the plaintiff.
E. David Susich (Thomas A. Pagliarulo also present) for the
defendant.
1
The consolidated case involves the same parties.
2
LENK, J. On September 5, 2011, after working almost twenty
years as an emergency medical technician and paramedic for the
defendant city's emergency medical services (EMS), the plaintiff
suffered an incapacitating ankle injury while transporting a
patient. Unable to work, he received workers' compensation
payments for almost one year pursuant to G. L. c. 152, the
workers' compensation act.
Learning that the plaintiff had been indicted on
October 31, 2012, on charges relating to misuse of controlled
substances intended for EMS patients, the defendant suspended
him indefinitely without pay pursuant to G. L. c. 268A, § 25
(suspension statute). After the defendant, a self-insured
municipal employer, discontinued the plaintiff's workers'
compensation payments, he took the matter to the Department of
Industrial Accidents (DIA); the defendant was ordered to restore
those payments.
When the defendant did not comply with the DIA order, the
plaintiff sought enforcement in the Superior Court pursuant to
G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1). The defendant argued then, as now, that
the provision of the suspension statute requiring that suspended
public employees "shall not receive any compensation or salary
during the period of suspension" prevails over the requirements
of the worker's compensation act, and that the DIA order
requiring proscribed payments should accordingly not be
3
enforced. A Superior Court judge agreed and dismissed the
enforcement actions.2 We conclude that workers' compensation
benefits are not "compensation" as defined in the suspension
statute, because they are not payments made "in return for
services rendered." G. L. c. 268A, § 1 (a). The Superior Court
actions brought by the plaintiff to enforce the orders of the
DIA accordingly were dismissed in error.3
1. Background.4 The plaintiff began working for the city
of Boston as an emergency medical technician in 1996, and was
promoted to paramedic in 2004. On September 5, 2011, he
suffered a significant ankle injury while helping bring a
patient to his ambulance. As a result of the plaintiff's
2
The plaintiff brought two enforcement actions; one during
his suspension and one after his resignation from the
defendant's employment. He argued in the latter action that
G. L. c. 268A, § 25 (suspension statute), no longer precluded
him from receiving workers' compensation payments because he was
no longer suspended.
3
Given our conclusion, we do not reach the plaintiff's
contentions that attorney's fees, expenses, and court fees do
not constitute compensation under G. L. c. 268A, § 25, nor his
argument that he is entitled to workers' compensation for the
periods before and after his suspension.
4
We accept as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's
complaint. See Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass'n v. Kargman, 474
Mass. 107, 116 (2016).
4
incapacitation, the defendant paid workers' compensation
benefits to him from September 5, 2011, until August 4, 2012.5
In August, 2012, the defendant notified the plaintiff that
his workers' compensation payments would be terminated.6 The
plaintiff filed a claim contesting the termination of the
payments with the DIA on October 23, 2012. Just over a week
later, the plaintiff was indicted on seventy-three counts of
criminal misconduct involving controlled substances in his
ambulance. The defendant suspended the plaintiff's employment
shortly thereafter pursuant to the suspension statute.7
The DIA conducted a hearing regarding the plaintiff's
workers' compensation claim on September 30, 2013. On October
5
The defendant is obliged to make workers' compensation
payments to its employees who suffer job-related injuries
because it is a "self-insurer" under the workers' compensation
act. See G. L. c. 152, § 25A.
6
The defendant apparently contested the plaintiff's claim
that the injury was accidental. Upon the defendant's suspension
in connection with criminal charges, the defendant asserted that
the payments were also proscribed by virtue of the suspension
statute.
7
General Laws c. 268A, § 25, provides in relevant part:
"An officer or employee of a county, city, town or
district, howsoever formed, including, but not limited to,
regional school districts and regional planning districts,
or of any department, board, commission or agency thereof
may, during any period such officer or employee is under
indictment for misconduct in such office or employment or
for misconduct in any elective or appointive public office,
trust or employment at any time held by him, be suspended
by the appointing authority, whether or not such
appointment was subject to approval in any manner."
5
6, 2014, the DIA ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the
defendant to resume making workers' compensation payments. The
defendant appealed from the DIA's decision and did not comply
with the order.8 On November 24, 2014, the plaintiff brought an
action in the Superior Court to enforce the DIA's order against
the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1).9 A Superior
Court judge granted the defendant's subsequent motion to dismiss
on the ground that the suspension statute prohibited the
plaintiff from receiving workers' compensation payments while he
was suspended because it constituted "compensation" under the
statute. See G. L. c. 268A, § 25 ("Any person [suspended
pursuant to the statute] shall not receive any compensation or
salary during the period of suspension . . ."). The plaintiff
appealed from the decision.
On August 5, 2015, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to one
felony count and seventeen misdemeanor counts and resigned from
8
The review board of the DIA eventually affirmed the order.
9
The enforcement provision of the workers' compensation
act, G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1), provides, in relevant part:
"Whenever any party in interest presents a certified
copy of an order or decision of a board member or of the
reviewing board and any papers in connection therewith to
the superior court department of the trial court for the
county in which the injury occurred or for the county of
Suffolk, the court shall enforce the order or decision,
notwithstanding whether the matters at issue have been
appealed and a decision on the merits of the appeal is
pending."
6
his employment with the defendant. He then brought another
enforcement action in the Superior Court on the basis that the
suspension statute no longer barred his compensation payments
because he was no longer suspended. A different Superior Court
judge granted the defendant's subsequent motion to dismiss,
concluding that the suspension statute still barred the
plaintiff from receiving workers' compensation because his
suspension had not been lifted prior to his resignation. The
plaintiff appealed from the ruling; his request that both cases
be consolidated pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 3 (b), 365 Mass. 845
(1974), was allowed in the Appeals Court. We transferred the
case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.
2. Discussion. Given that all of the plaintiff's
objections to the two Superior Court judges' rulings concern
questions of law, our review is de novo. See Commonwealth v.
Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 81 (2016). The plaintiff advances three
claims in his appeal. His main contention is that the judges
erred in their determinations that workers' compensation
payments are proscribed by the suspension statute, and in
dismissing his enforcement actions on that basis. He also
contends both that G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1) ("the court shall
enforce the order"), by its terms, requires the Superior Court
to enforce his DIA order, and that the defendant waived its
argument under the suspension statute by failing to raise it
7
before the DIA. We first address only briefly the latter two
issues and then turn to the matter of chief concern, viz., the
apparent conflict between the workers' compensation act and the
suspension statute.
a. Required enforcement of the DIA order pursuant to G. L.
c. 152, § 12 (1). The plaintiff maintains that the Superior
Court judges were obliged to enforce the DIA's order pursuant to
the unambiguous terms of G. L. c. 152, § 12 (1), and were
required to do so irrespective of any potential conflict with
the suspension statute. This contention misses the mark. The
Superior Court, when asked to do so, must determine whether the
statutory enforcement mechanism it is to employ conflicts with
another potentially superseding statute. See Keenan,
petitioner, 310 Mass. 166, 179 (1941) (Superior Court "is a
court of original and general jurisdiction and possesses the
inherent powers of such a court under the common law, unless
expressly limited, as well as those conferred by statute"
[citation omitted]). Language in the enforcement statute
stating that a "court shall enforce" an order is not to the
contrary -- it means only that, when asked to enforce the order,
a Superior Court judge cannot second guess the merits of the
DIA's decision. That is not the situation here.
b. Waiver. The plaintiff also contends, similarly without
merit, that the defendant waived its argument concerning the
8
suspension statute by failing to raise it at the administrative
level. The DIA's jurisdiction, however, is limited to the
interpretation and application of the workers' compensation act,
and the defendant thus could not have raised the issue of G. L.
c. 268A, § 25, before the DIA. See Hayes's Case, 348 Mass. 447,
452-453 (1965), quoting Levangie's Case, 228 Mass. 213, 216-217
(1917) ("The [Industrial Accident Board, a predecessor to the
DIA,] 'is not a court of general or limited common[-]law
jurisdiction; . . . it is purely and solely an administrative
tribunal, specifically created to administer the [workers']
compensation act in aid and with the assistance of the Superior
Court . . . , and as such possesses only such authority and
powers as have been conferred upon it by express grant or arise
therefrom by implication as necessary and incidental to the full
exercise of the granted powers'"). Accordingly, the defendant
appropriately raised the issue in the Superior Court.
c. Whether the suspension statute prohibits suspended
employees from receiving workers' compensation. The plaintiff
contends that workers' compensation does not constitute
"compensation" within the meaning of the suspension statute.
That statute states, in relevant part, that any employee
suspended pursuant to it "shall not receive any compensation or
salary during the period of suspension." G. L. c. 268A, § 25.
The term "compensation" is in turn defined as "any money, thing
9
of value or economic benefit conferred on or received by any
person in return for services rendered or to be rendered by
himself or another." G. L. c. 268A, § 1 (a). We first set
forth an overview of the relevant statutes.
i Statutory overview. 1. The suspension statute. The
suspension statute, "which applies to county, municipal, and
district officers, is identical in its operative language to
G. L. c. 30, § 59, . . . which applies to officers and
employees of the Commonwealth." Springfield v. Director of Div.
of Employment Sec., 398 Mass. 786, 788 (1986), quoting
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth. Retirement Bd., 397 Mass. 734, 739 n.8 (1986). The
suspension statute was enacted in 1972, see St. 1972, c. 257, to
"remedy the untenable situation which arises when a person who
has been indicted for misconduct in office continues to perform
his public duties while awaiting trial . . . by allowing for the
temporary removal of such employees from office, and by
precluding the payment of compensation . . . during the period
of their suspension." Springfield, supra at 788-789, quoting
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra at 739. Because the
statute does not include any exception, it "is dominant in its
purpose and its terms" [quotation omitted]. Springfield, supra
at 789.
10
We have interpreted the term "compensation," as it appears
in the suspension statute, as encompassing "a broader meaning
than the word 'salary.'" Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790. The
term is to be "read in light of" the purpose of the suspension
statute, i.e. to effect "a complete severance of the
relationship between public employer and employee." See id.,
quoting Brown v. Taunton, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 614, 620 (1983).
2. The worker's compensation act. The workers'
compensation act, originally enacted in 1911, guarantees workers
certain benefits as the exclusive remedy for injuries they
suffer in the course of employment, regardless of the employer's
fault. See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 483
(2014), citing St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 1, § 5, and pt. 5, § 1.
The act "was intended to guarantee that workers would receive
payment for any workplace injuries they suffered, regardless of
fault; in exchange for accepting the statutory remedies, the
worker waives any common-law right to compensation for
injuries." Estate of Moulton, supra. The workers' compensation
scheme "provides predictability for both employee and employer,
balancing protection for workers with certainty for employers."
Id.
The worker's compensation act operates by requiring each
employer in the Commonwealth to obtain workers' compensation
coverage from an insurer that will make workers' compensation
11
payments to injured employees or, alternatively, to obtain a
license "as a self-insurer" -- i.e., an employer that makes
workers' compensation payments to its employees. See G. L.
c. 152, § 25A. Failure to do so may result in, among other
things, the imposition of civil penalties upon employers, who
also may forfeit immunity from suits by employees. See G. L.
c. 152, § 25C (11). An employee may opt out of the workers'
compensation scheme and retain the right to sue the employer in
tort by making such an intention clear in writing upon hire.
See G. L. c. 152, § 24; Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom
Bldg. Ltd., 459 Mass. 768, 773 n.6 (2011).
Under the worker's compensation act, an employee who
suffers an injury arising out of employment is entitled to an
array of benefits depending on the nature of the injury. In
general, an employee who suffers such an injury will recover
medical expenses arising out of the injury, G. L. c. 152, § 30,
and receive, for some period of time,10 weekly payments based
10
The period of time during which the injured employee will
receive payments is dependent upon the extent and duration of
the employee's incapacity for work. See G. L. c. 152, § 35
(compensation for partial incapacity extends to 260 weeks or to
520 "if an insurer agrees or an administrative judge finds that
the employee has, as a result of a personal injury under [the
act], suffered a permanent loss of seventy-five percent or more
of any bodily function or sense specified in" G. L. c. 152,
§ 36); G. L. c. 152, § 34 (compensation for total incapacity
extends to 156 weeks); G. L. c. 152, § 34A (compensation for
total and permanent incapacity extends for entirety of
employee's life).
12
upon the employee's salary prior to her injury. In the event of
certain specific and debilitating injuries, employees are also
to receive an additional lump sum payment. See G. L. c. 152,
§ 36. Should an employee succumb to a work related injury,
certain survivors will receive weekly payments in the employee's
stead. See G. L. c. 152, § 31.
ii. Analysis. The question before us is whether the
meaning of the statutory term "compensation" in the suspension
statute encompasses such workers' compensation benefits. It is
axiomatic that "a statute must be interpreted according to the
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language,
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may
be effectuated." Yeretsky v. Attleboro, 424 Mass. 315, 319
(1997), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester,
368 Mass. 511, 513 (1975). "In interpreting the meaning of a
statute, we look first to the plain statutory language."
DiCarlo v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 473 Mass. 624, 629 (2016),
quoting Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134,
138 (2013). Applying these principles to the present case, we
conclude that workers' compensation benefits do not fall within
the ambit of the suspension statute.
13
While the statutory term "compensation" is defined broadly,
see Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790, its scope is not unbounded.
The Legislature defined "compensation" as "any money, thing of
value or economic benefit conferred on or received by any person
in return for services rendered" (emphasis added). G. L.
c. 268A, § 1 (a). The phrase "in return for services rendered,"
given its plain meaning, denotes a reciprocal relationship
between the benefits received and the services provided. See,
e.g., Killoran v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 709 F.2d 31,
31-32 (9th Cir. 1983) (taxicab driver's tips were paid "in
return for services rendered" and were therefore income for
Federal income tax purposes). In order for a benefit to qualify
as compensation that a suspended public employee may not
receive, it must be provided as recompense for the employee's
services, i.e., in return for services rendered.
How strictly that requisite reciprocity is to be understood
is central to the question before us: whether workers'
compensation benefits are received in return for services the
injured employee rendered. If reciprocity means only payments
akin to wages, the broad meaning of "compensation" intended by
the Legislature would be vitiated. On the other hand, if
reciprocity could mean, as the defendant seems to suggest, any
benefit stemming from a "but for" nexus formed by the employee
relationship itself -- i.e., any benefit arising from even a
14
tangential connection to employee services -- the phrase "in
return for services rendered" effectively would be written out
of the statutory definition. See Chatham Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 362 Mass. 216, 219 (1972) ("every word of a legislative
enactment is to be given force and effect").
In determining that certain benefits constitute
compensation under the suspension statute, our cases suggest a
middle course, one which takes the phrase to mean a reciprocity
where the benefits in question are interwoven with, and received
primarily as a result of, services rendered. Benefits in this
category include sick pay, Brown, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 620
(entitlement received as part of compensation package and
provided in lump sum upon termination if not used); return on an
investment received in exchange for technical advice given,
Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 497 (1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 933 (1978) (investment opportunity in exchange for
engineering advice by city engineer constituted compensation);
and unemployment benefits, Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790-791
(employer obliged to pay such benefits as result of employee
having rendered wage earning services to employer). In each
instance, the reason the employee received the benefit was
primarily as the result of services he rendered as an employee.
The receipt of workers' compensation benefits differs from
these because, while such benefits are triggered by injuries
15
that arise in the course of employment, see Derinza's Case, 229
Mass. 435, 441-442 (1918), they are not in exchange for services
rendered during that employment. The reciprocal exchange that
occurs in the workers' compensation context is not between
services and benefits, but between the waived right to sue the
employer in tort for injuries and the guarantee of benefits when
injured. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep't. of Labor,
449 U.S. 268, 282 n.24 (1980) ("Employees . . . give up the
right of suit for damages for personal injuries against
employers in return for the certainty of compensation payments
as recompense for those injuries" [citation omitted]); Estate of
Moulton, 467 Mass. at 483 ("in exchange for accepting the
statutory remedies [of the workers' compensation act], the
worker waives any common-law right to compensation for tort
injuries"). The various payments, medical and otherwise,
provide comprehensive recompense for "lost wages and lost
earnings capacity and medical expenses resulting from work-
related injuries." Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't. of Indus.
Accs., 421 Mass. 70, 75 (1995). Such payments are in the nature
of insurance benefits received pursuant to a policy taken out by
the employer for the employee's benefit, see Derinza's Case, 229
Mass. at 441; the policy is, in effect, purchased in
consideration for the employee's waiver of his or her right to
16
sue the employer. Moreover, the workers' compensation act does
not implicate the employer-employee relationship -- it concerns
the relationship between an employee and her insurer. See
Insurance Co. of the State of Penn. v. Great Northern Ins. Co.,
473 Mass. 745, 750 (2016) ("although the employer purchases the
workers' compensation policy, a workers' compensation insurer is
directly liable to an injured employee for the workers'
compensation benefits provided by law; the insurer does not
reimburse the employer for its payment of these benefits").11
Our decision in Springfield, 398 Mass. at 790-791, is not
to the contrary, notwithstanding certain superficial
similarities between unemployment and workers' compensation
benefits. Enacted in 1935, the unemployment compensation
statute, G. L. c. 151A, § 24,12 serves as a temporary economic
stabilization mechanism for terminated employees who meet the
statutory criteria. See id. (describing statutory criteria for
benefits). The over-all "purpose of the law is to provide
temporary relief for those who are realistically compelled to
11
The defendant's obligation to make workers' compensation
payments to its employees stems from its role as a self-insurer
under the worker's compensation act rather than its position as
an employer.
12
At that time, Federal law required for the first time
that each State enact and administer a worker's compensation
program. See Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation,
55 Yale L.J. 21, 32-35 (1945) (describing development and
implementation of "[F]ederal-[S]tate system of unemployment
compensation").
17
leave work through no 'fault' of their own, whatever the source
of the compulsion, personal or employer-initiated." See
Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 364
Mass. 593, 596 (1974); G. L. c. 151A, §§ 29, 30. Employers fund
this mechanism, G. L. c. 151A, § 14, which is administered by
the department of unemployment assistance, and employees do not
contribute to it in any manner. The employee gives up neither
rights nor money to receive such benefits, which are, in effect,
a statutorily mandated temporary extension of his or her
compensation package beyond the employee's termination. The
receipt of such benefits is primarily as the result of services
rendered during employment.
Because workers' compensation benefits do not constitute
compensation for purposes of the suspension statute, that
statute accordingly does not proscribe the receipt of such
benefits by suspended employees.
3. Conclusion. The judgment is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.