Commonwealth v. Loya

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SJC-12475
COMMONWEALTH vs. ADRIAN T. LOYA.
Barnstable. November 8, 2019. - February 6, 2020.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.
Homicide. Criminal Responsibility. Insanity. Practice,
Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Request for
jury instructions, Acquittal by reason of insanity.
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on July 1, 2015.
The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J.
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present)
for the defendant.
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
LENK, J. On February 5, 2015, the defendant broke into
Lisa Trubnikova's home. He confronted her in the bedroom, where
she lay beside her wife, Anna Trubnikova.1 The defendant shot
1 Because Lisa Trubnikova and Anna Trubnikova share a last
name, we refer to them by their first names.
2
both women, killing Lisa and wounding Anna. Before finally
surrendering to police, the defendant also shot and wounded a
responding police officer, Jared P. MacDonald.
For more than one year, the defendant had been obsessed
with killing Lisa, and in turn being killed by police. The
defendant eventually reduced this intended murder-suicide in a
detailed, written plan labeled "Operation Purple Rebel" in his
electronic files. At trial, the defendant argued that this
obsessive and self-destructive plot showed that the killing was
not born out of malice; rather, he was mentally disturbed.
Counsel unsuccessfully claimed that a mental disorder caused the
defendant to suffer delusions that compelled him to plan and
commit the crime. On appeal, the defendant contends that our
current law on criminal responsibility made this defense not
viable, and therefore, because he was deprived of his only
defense, a new trial is required. Alternatively, the defendant
asks us to reduce the verdict, pursuant to our authority under
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
We discern no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the
conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
1. Background. a. Facts. We recite the facts as the
jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for later discussion.
3
The defendant first met Lisa in 2011, when they served
together in the United States Coast Guard at a base in Kodiak,
Alaska. They worked together in an information technology
office, and they developed a fast friendship.
Their relationship took a dramatic turn in September of
2012 following an incident at Lisa's home. According to the
defendant, Lisa invited him over to have drinks and watch some
video recordings. While he was there, however, Lisa became
intoxicated and attempted to seduce him. Although Lisa had no
sexual contact with the defendant, this incident affected him so
deeply that he would later refer to it as a "rape of the mind."
The defendant eventually reported the encounter to his
superiors. In June of 2013, he was transferred from Kodiak to
Chesapeake, Virginia. On the day he arrived at his new base,
the Coast Guard issued the defendant a "Page 7" reprimand for
his role in the incident and ordered him to cut off all contact
with Lisa and her wife Anna. The defendant was shocked and
refused to sign the letter acknowledging the outcome of the
Coast Guard's investigation. He felt wronged, and this feeling
turned to anger.
These events coincided with a deterioration of the
defendant's mental health. He became depressed, started taking
Benadryl to help him sleep, and lost interest in the few
activities that previously had interested him, such as playing
4
video games. The defendant also began to harbor a hatred for
the woman he blamed for his misfortune: Lisa. As his life
seemed to unravel around him, the defendant ultimately decided
that he no longer wanted to live. He did not want to die,
however, without seeking vengeance. Therefore, he resolved to
take Lisa's life.
Over the following months, the defendant meticulously
planned his killing. Through the Internet, he learned that Lisa
and Anna had relocated to the town of Bourne on Cape Cod. In
October of 2014, he traveled to Massachusetts and set up hunting
cameras outside their new home to confirm that Lisa was living
there. When he returned home, he also began playing shooting
games with plastic replica weapons, using plastic bullets,2 to
gain more experience with wielding weapons in a combat
situation. In the midst of these preparations, the defendant
documented his troubled history with Lisa, the downward spiral
of his professional and personal life, and his plot to kill Lisa
in a 250-page manifesto entitled "The Wrath of Loya."3 After
2 The defendant obtained these weapons, sold for use in
casual and competitive games, from a commercial manufacturer.
3 The electronic file containing the manifesto was titled
"The Loya Wars." The titles were references to the science
fiction television and movie series Star Wars and Star Trek,
respectively. Both series featured prominently in other aspects
of the crime, including insignia the defendant wore during the
5
months of planning, he ultimately decided to carry out the
killing on February 5, 2015, his thirty-first birthday.
On February 1, 2015, the defendant left his home in
Chesapeake, Virginia, and began making his way to Massachusetts.
He arrived on February 3, 2015, checked into a local hotel, and
prepared for the fatal encounter. His original plan was to
attack Lisa at her house, force her to confront what he had
become, and stab her in the heart.4 He did not intend to harm
Anna. The defendant originally planned to cover Anna's ears
with "ear protection" so that she would not have to hear any
sounds that Lisa might make as she was dying. Once Lisa was
dead, the defendant then would provoke a firefight with police
so that they would shoot and kill him.
The defendant arrived at Lisa's house shortly before 2 A.M.
on February 5, 2015.5 He parked his vehicle across the road
approaching her house, and set it on fire to obstruct police
shooting. Dr. John Daignault identified these references as
further evidence of the defendant's delusional disorder.
4 Many details of the defendant's planning and the
commission of the crime come from his statements to police. As
Dr. Martin Kelly, an expert called by the Commonwealth, noted,
the defendant's recollection of these events was unusually
precise. Kelly identified this "Eidetic memory" as further
evidence of the defendant's mental disorder.
5 Most of the following encounter was captured on video
recording by a body camera that the defendant strapped to his
chest. An edited version of this recording was played at trial,
and the entire recording was entered as an exhibit.
6
access. He also set up smoke grenades, noise makers, and fake
explosive devices to further delay first responders. Having
staged the scene, the defendant breached the door to Lisa's
house by shooting the lock off with a shotgun. Once inside, he
made his way up the stairs to her bedroom.
The defendant found Lisa and Anna in their bed. He ordered
them to separate, threw handcuffs at them, and demanded that
they put on the cuffs. The women screamed and asked who he was
and why he was in their house. The defendant pulled off his
mask, revealing his identity. Lisa and Anna recognized him, and
Lisa shouted his name. The defendant responded, "See what you
did to me" and "This is what I've become because of you."
Lisa apologized to the defendant and said that she never
meant to hurt him. Both women pleaded with the defendant and
promised that they would not tell anyone if he left them in
peace. Face-to-face with Lisa, the defendant froze, unsure of
how to proceed.
With the defendant momentarily distracted, Lisa and Anna
attempted to shield themselves with their mattress. The
defendant exclaimed, "What do you think you're doing?" Now
refocused on completing his "mission," he drew his pistol and
fired fifteen shots through the mattress in Lisa's direction.
Eleven bullets struck Lisa, killing her in a matter of seconds.
7
Four bullets struck Anna. The defendant heard gurgling sounds
from Lisa's direction, and he concluded that she was dying.
With his primary objective completed, the defendant
intended to die at the hands of the police. He went back
outside, retrieved a rifle that he previously stashed in a snow
bank, and prepared to engage with responding officers. Soon
thereafter, he saw the silhouette of an approaching police
officer, Jared MacDonald. The defendant fired four shots at
MacDonald; one struck him in the spine.
The defendant then retreated behind the victims' house to
wait for more officers to come and end his life. As the minutes
slipped by, however, the defendant's resolve to kill himself
weakened, and he decided to give himself up. He discarded his
weapons, approached the officers with hands raised, and was
taken into custody.
b. Procedural history. On July 1, 2015, the defendant was
indicted on thirty counts, including murder in the first degree
for the shooting death of Lisa.6 Trial commenced on August 28,
6 The other indictments against the defendant were three
counts of assault with intent to murder; three counts of
aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon;
two counts of armed home invasion; two counts of armed assault
in a dwelling; three counts of using a firearm in the commission
of a felony; two counts of armed kidnapping with bodily injury;
one count of burglary and assault on an occupant; one count of
burning a motor vehicle; one count of possessing a hoax device;
8
2017. From the beginning of the trial, defense counsel
acknowledged that this case was not a "whodunit."7 Rather, the
key issue at trial was whether the defendant was criminally
responsible for his actions.
Four medical professionals testified concerning the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the shooting. Each
expert opined as to whether the defendant met the standard to
establish a lack of criminal responsibility set out in
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546–547 (1967): "A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law" (citation omitted).
Two witnesses testified that the defendant had been
criminally responsible, and two testified that he had not. Dr.
David W. Holtzen, a forensic psychologist at Bridgewater State
Hospital, was asked by the Commonwealth to perform competency
one count of assault and battery on a police officer; and ten
counts of possessing a large capacity feeding device.
7 Indeed, defense counsel stated the same in an extensive
interview he gave to the Cape Cod Times on the day before trial
began. The judge took pains to comment on this interview during
empanelment, and to make sure that the article was preserved in
the record. Exposure to media coverage was, appropriately, a
subject of individual voir dire.
9
and criminal responsibility examinations of the defendant. He
testified that the defendant had not been suffering from any
mental disorder or illness at the time of the killing. Dr.
Judith Edershein, a forensic psychiatrist based at a large
teaching hospital,8 was engaged by the Commonwealth to reach a
determination whether the defendant had been criminally
responsible by reviewing the records and other experts'
opinions, but she was precluded from speaking with the
defendant.9 She testified that although the defendant had at
least one personality disorder, it did not render him incapable
of conforming his conduct to the law or appreciating the
wrongfulness of his actions.
Another of the Commonwealth's witnesses, Dr. Martin Kelly,
a practicing psychiatrist also at a large teaching hospital,
interviewed and examined the defendant three times, and reviewed
records and the police reports. Kelly testified that the
defendant had high functioning Asperger's Syndrome, a disorder
on the "autism spectrum," and that the condition was "hardwired"
8 Dr. Judith Edershein also testified that she had graduated
from Harvard Law School and become an attorney prior to entering
psychiatry and ultimately becoming an assistant professor of
psychiatry.
9 Edershein was retained in December of 2016, after the
Commonwealth's first expert, Kelly, completed his report.
Edershein did not formally request to interview the defendant
until May of 2017, at which point her request was denied by
defense counsel.
10
in the brain, not something that is acquired, readily amenable
to treatment, or "episodic." Kelly considered and rejected
diagnoses of schizoid personality disorder, major depressive
disorder, and delusional disorder. Based on his evaluation of
the defendant and having examined the records, including the
police reports, Kelly concluded that the defendant "suffered
from a mental disease; and that as a result of that mental
disease, he lacked the substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law."
The defendant called a single expert, Dr. John Daignault, a
forensic psychologist, who previously had been the clinical
director of Bridgewater State Hospital. Daignault determined
that the defendant had not been criminally responsible for his
actions on the night of the shooting, but concluded as well that
the defendant suffered from a delusional disorder and did not
suffer from Asperger's Syndrome.
After deliberating over the course of three days, the jury
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or
cruelty. The jury also found the defendant guilty of twenty-
eight of the twenty-nine other indictments. He was found not
guilty of armed assault with intent to murder. The defendant
filed a notice of appeal in September 2017.
11
2. Discussion. Before us, the defendant argues that a new
trial is required because our current law regarding criminal
responsibility deprived him of a meaningful defense. The
defendant contends that the trial judge committed reversible
error by denying two motions the defendant filed to remedy these
flaws. One motion proposed a verdict slip that presented the
jury's decision in a series of yes-or-no questions, in addition
to a general verdict of "guilty," "not guilty," or "not guilty,
lack of criminal responsibility." The other motion asked the
judge to instruct the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but
not criminally responsible" rather than "not guilty, lack of
criminal responsibility." As appellate counsel acknowledged at
oral argument, both motions advocated for a departure from our
current law regarding the defense of a lack of criminal
responsibility. We decline to adopt the defendant's recommended
changes, and discern no error in the trial judge's decision to
deny these motions.
a. Verdict slips. At the beginning of trial, counsel
filed a motion requesting that the verdict slips include several
yes-or-no questions on whether the Commonwealth had met its
burden.10 Ultimately, however, the defendant expressed
10By way of illustration, the defendant suggested the
following language:
12
satisfaction with the verdict slips, drafted by the judge, that
omitted these questions. Therefore, as the parties agree, any
error in the judge's decision to deny the motion is unpreserved
and would be reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a
"1. Has the government proven that the Defendant committed
the act of an unlawful killing of a human being without
justification?
"__________Yes __________No
"If the answer to the above is yes, proceed to Question 2.
"2. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable
doubt that the Defendant, at the time of such killing, was
not suffering from a mental disease or defect?
"__________Yes __________No
"If the answer to this question is no, proceed to Question
3. If the answer is yes, proceed to Question 4.
"3. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable
doubt that such mental disease or defect did not affect the
Defendant so that [he] was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of [his] conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law?
"__________Yes __________No
" . . .
"4. Has the government proven beyond every reasonable
doubt that at the time of the killing that the Defendant
was not suffering from a mental disease or Defect that
reduced his capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the
requirements of the law?
"__________Yes __________No"
13
miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 Mass.
24, 40 (2014).
"[W]e review these claims to determine whether there was
error and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of
a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass.
805, 814–815 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018). "In
analyzing a claim under the substantial likelihood standard, we
review the evidence and case as a whole and consider whether any
error made in the course of the trial was likely to have
influenced the jury's conclusion." Commonwealth v. Berry, 457
Mass. 602, 618 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014). Where there
is no error, this court need not reach the question of
prejudice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 207
(2011) (analysis stops at determination there was no error).
The defendant's motion most fairly is read as a motion for
special questions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (c), 378
Mass. 897 (1979).11 Special questions are "rarely resorted to in
criminal trials." Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs.,
11Alternatively, the defendant's motion could be
interpreted as a motion for a "special verdict," i.e., one that
"involves no determinative, ultimate verdict from a jury but
only a statement of facts the jury have found from which the
judge determines the appropriate judgment." Commonwealth v.
Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 675 (1982). Only general verdicts are
permitted in criminal trials. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 27 (a), 378
Mass. 897 (1979); Licciardi, supra (recognizing that
Massachusetts rules of criminal procedure eliminated special
verdicts in criminal trials).
14
Inc. (No. 1), 389 Mass. 902, 916 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v.
Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 94 (1955). Although they sometimes may
"aid in the disposition of a case," Commonwealth v. Licciardi,
387 Mass. 670, 676 (1982), the decision to issue them typically
is "discretionary with the judge." Dane Entertainment Servs.,
Inc. (No. 1), supra, quoting Lussier, supra. We have required
special questions only where they are necessary to ensure that,
should a jury convict a defendant of an offense, they are
unanimous as to the theory of that offense. Compare
Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 287–288 (2003) (where
Commonwealth pursues multiple theories of murder in first
degree, verdict slip must indicate unanimous theory of
culpability), with Commonwealth v. Shea, 460 Mass. 163, 175
(2011) (no special question necessary where Commonwealth pursued
only one theory of murder in first degree), and Commonwealth v.
Arias, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 429, 433 (2010) (no special question
required on different methods of committing assault by means of
dangerous weapon).
We discern no compelling reason to require special
questions when the jury consider criminal responsibility.12
Although the criminal responsibility defense presents special
12We do not decide whether, in other circumstances, special
questions may be required for some purpose other than to ensure
the unanimity of a verdict.
15
problems for a jury, see part 2.b, infra, it is unclear how yes-
or-no questions on the Commonwealth's burden would help the jury
to deliberate fairly on this issue. Indeed, such questions are
at least as likely to steer the jury towards a verdict of
guilty. See Licciardi, 387 Mass. at 676, quoting Commonwealth
v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 260-261 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1039 (1978) (special questions "must avoid any 'tendency to
lead the jurors step by step to a verdict of guilty'"). See
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969)
("There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict
of guilty than to approach it step by step"). To the extent
that a jury may require additional guidance on how to consider
whether a defendant lacked criminal responsibility, the proper
source of that guidance is the jury charge. See Commonwealth v.
Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 152 (2017) (Lowy, J., dissenting) ("the
long-standing principle that the jury are presumed to follow the
judge's instructions . . . lies at the very heart of our justice
system" [citation omitted]).
Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
defendant's motion for special questions to which he was not
entitled.
b. Jury instructions. In addition to his motion for
special questions, the defendant filed a "Motion to Permit the
Jury to Consider Whether the Defendant is Guilty But Insane."
16
Through this motion, he requested that the jury consider a
verdict of "guilty but not criminally responsible," rather than
the verdict set forth in the then-existing model instruction,
"not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility." See
Model Jury Instruction on Homicide 11 (2013).
At the charge conference, however, defense counsel did not
renew this request, and ultimately declared himself satisfied
with the judge's instructions on criminal responsibility. We
therefore review the judge's decision to deny this motion for a
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See Brown,
477 Mass. at 814–815.
The defendant argues that the option of finding him "guilty
but not criminally responsible" was necessary in order for the
jury fairly to consider the role that mental illness played in
his crimes. The defendant maintains that, to the average juror,
a finding of "not guilty" is tantamount to a finding of factual
innocence. In addition to potentially confusing the jurors, the
defendant argues, this formulation requires them to
compartmentalize their knowledge of the defendant's actions and
separately to consider if he nonetheless was not guilty. The
defendant contends that, given the particularly egregious acts
17
in this case, asking the jury to equate the defendant with the
term "not guilty" was simply unrealistic.13
Without discounting these concerns, we conclude that the
instruction the defendant requested was not warranted.
Instructing the jury to consider a verdict of "guilty but not
criminally responsible" would be inconsistent with our long-
standing jurisprudence on criminal responsibility. As the
defendant acknowledged at trial, he can point to no
Massachusetts authority that supports his requested language.
Furthermore, the defendant's requested instruction would
invite unnecessary confusion. A verdict of "guilty but not
criminally responsible" is an oxymoron: if the Commonwealth is
unable to prove a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a
13"[E]xperience in this Commonwealth has shown that it is
most difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of
insanity." Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 854 (1999),
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass.
806 (2016). Jurors' objections to the criminal responsibility
defense, particularly in the homicide context, are well-
documented outside the Commonwealth as well. See Brooks, Guilty
by Reason of Insanity: Why a Maligned Defense Demands a
Constitutional Right of Inquiry on Voir Dire, 20 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 1183, 1202-1203 (2013); Grachek, The Insanity Defense in
the Twenty-First Century: How Recent United States Supreme
Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 Ind. L.J. 1479, 1487-
1488 (2006). This resistance may stem from suspicions that
defendants malinger, and that the expert testimony on which a
criminal responsibility defense depends is susceptible to bias.
See Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1539,
1575-1577 (2007). In any event, it is clear that jurors do not
easily reach the "chilling determination that the defendant is
an insane killer not legally responsible for his acts."
Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822 (1975).
18
reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty. See Commonwealth
v. Bruneau, 472 Mass. 510, 517 (2015); Golden, petitioner, 341
Mass. 672, 674 (1961) (affirming "the undoubted premise that one
acquitted by reason of insanity has been found guilty of no
crime"). To make sense of this instruction, the jury would have
to parse the difference between factual "guilt" in the context
of criminal responsibility and legal "guilt" as it applies to
the charges as a whole. Particularly in light of the other
complications that the jury face when considering criminal
responsibility, it would be unwise to add this complexity to the
equation.
The nomenclature the judge used, "not guilty by lack of
criminal responsibility," was proper. This language has deep
roots in our common law. See Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass.
515, 515 (1822) (defendant "found not guilty, by reason of
insanity").14 We recently affirmed this formulation in our Model
Jury Instructions on Homicide. See Model Jury Instructions on
Homicide 10-11 (2018). The Legislature similarly has employed,
and thereby sanctioned, this language. See G. L. c. 123, § 16
(establishing commitment procedures for those found "not guilty by
14 We since have moved away from the formulation "by reason
of insanity," see Commonwealth v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 738
(1996) (Appendix), in favor of "by reason of a lack of criminal
responsibility." See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 10-11
(2018).
19
reason of mental illness or mental defect"). It was not error for
the judge to rely upon this well-established formulation.
Viewing the entire jury charge in light of the evidence at
trial, it is clear that the issue of criminal responsibility was
properly and fully before the jury. The judge accurately
explained the law on criminal responsibility before commencing
to instruct on the numerous specific offenses with which the
defendant had been charged. When discussing each offense, the
judge again reminded the jury that even should they find that
the elements were met, they still had to consider whether the
defendant was criminally responsible.15 These instructions
informed the jury that they could recognize that the defendant
had committed unlawful acts, but still find him not guilty by
reason of lack of criminal responsibility.16
15The judge also informed the jury that they could consider
the role that mental illness might have played in the
defendant's ability to form the requisite intent for certain
offenses.
16To the extent that a defendant may seek further
clarification in future cases, a better practice would be for
the judge to provide an additional instruction on the
relationship between criminal responsibility and factual guilt.
An appropriate instruction would mirror the language we
sanctioned in Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 52 (2019):
"If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the
defendant committed a crime, you must decide whether the
Commonwealth . . . prove[d] that the defendant was criminally
responsible beyond a reasonable doubt." This language would
clarify that a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of
criminal responsibility necessarily includes a conclusion that
20
With these instructions in hand, the jury were well
equipped to consider the evidence from both sides that bore on
the defendant's responsibility: the opinions of four expert
witnesses;17 the video recording of the defendant's planning and
commission of the offense; the defendant's recorded statements
to police; and the defendant's manifesto. The jury deliberated
over a period of three days before reaching their verdicts. In
sum, the defendant was not deprived of a meaningful defense; the
jury rejected it.
c. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Having reviewed the
entirety of the record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E, we are left with no doubt that mental illness played a
central role in this crime. Nonetheless, although the defendant
presented "substantial evidence supporting his insanity
defense," Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 773 (2007), we
discern no reason to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E. Mental illness does not equate with the absence of
criminal responsibility. The jury could properly credit the
opinions of Edershein and Holtzen that, assuming the defendant
the defendant committed the act that constitutes the charged
offense. See id. at 52-53; Commonwealth v. Bruneau, 472 Mass.
510, 517 (2015) (not guilty by reason of criminal responsibility
verdict "is unlike an acquittal because it includes a finding
that the defendant committed the criminal act").
17 In addition to the witnesses' testimony, by agreement of
the parties, each expert's report was introduced as an exhibit.
21
suffered from a qualifying mental disorder, he nonetheless was
able to conform his actions to the law and to understand the
wrongfulness of his brutal actions. Their testimony provided
sufficient support for the jury's verdict. On similar facts, we
have concluded that, "[s]ince the issue of the defendant's
criminal responsibility was fully and fairly before the jury[,]
. . . justice does not require that their verdict be
disturbed.'" Brown, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390
Mass. 42, 50 (1983). We likewise conclude that this verdict was
consonant with justice.
Judgments affirmed.