Ardaneh v. Commonwealth

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SJC-13368
HAMID REZA ARDANEH vs. COMMONWEALTH.
August 8, 2023.
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
The petitioner, Hamid Reza Ardaneh, appeals from a judgment
of a single justice of this court denying his petitions pursuant
to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and associated motions (collectively,
petitions). We affirm.1
In August 2016, Ardaneh was indicted on several counts of
rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22; strangulation or
suffocation, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15D (b); and other
charges. See Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 1005, 1005
(2020) (Ardaneh [No. 1]). In 2017, he "was committed for
observation to Bridgewater State Hospital for a determination
whether he is competent to stand trial pursuant to G. L. c. 123,
§ 15 (a). He was subsequently found incompetent to stand trial
and was committed to the hospital pursuant to G. L. c. 123,
§ 16." Id. In August 2022, Ardaneh was determined to be
competent to stand trial, and the proceedings in the Superior
Court are ongoing.
1 "Where, as here, the single justice exercises discretion
not to reach the merits of a petition, the appeal to the full
court 'is strictly limited to a review of that ruling.'"
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 484 Mass. 1047, 1049 (2020), quoting
Commonwealth v. Samuels, 456 Mass. 1025, 1027 n.1 (2010). We
decline to consider "issues, arguments and requests for relief
that were not before the single justice." Milton v. Boston, 427
Mass. 1016, 1017 (1998) (declining to address additional
"issues, arguments, and requests for relief that were not before
the single justice").
2
In his petitions, Ardaneh claims very generally and among
other things that he has been falsely accused of the criminal
conduct for which he was indicted; that he has exculpatory
evidence to prove his innocence; that the evidence does not
support the indictments; that his constitutional rights,
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, have
been violated; and that he has been improperly detained. On
appeal, he essentially asks the court to intervene in the trial
court proceedings to correct the claimed errors and violations,
and for relief including a declaration that he is not guilty of
the charged criminal conduct, dismissal of the criminal
indictments, and orders expunging his criminal and mental health
records, requiring the return of certain documents, and damages.2
The single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion
in declining to reach the merits of the petitions and denying
relief. See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 25 (2019).
The court's "general superintendence power under G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a
substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide
an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process
has run its course. Fennick v. Kittredge, 460 Mass. 1012(2011), quoting Votta v. Police Dep't of Billerica, 444 Mass.
1001, 1001 (2005)." Bishay v. Land Court Dep't of the Trial
Court, 477 Mass. 1032, 1033 (2017). Predicate to its exercise,
a party seeking extraordinary relief must demonstrate both
"'error that cannot be remedied under the ordinary review
process' and a 'substantial claim of violation of [his]
substantive rights.' Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc.
v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706 (1990), quoting Dunbrack
v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502, 504 (1986)." Care & Protection
of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 277-278 (2009). Where interlocutory
rulings in the trial court are challenged and S.J.C. Rule 2:21,
as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), applies, that rule similarly
requires a showing that "review of the trial court decision
cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse
judgment in the trial court or by other available means."
S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).
2 This is the third time that Ardaneh has sought
extraordinary relief in this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, arising out of the same criminal proceedings against him in
the Superior Court. This court affirmed the judgments denying
the two prior petitions. See Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass.
1030, 1031 (2021); Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 1005, 1006
(2020).
3
Regardless of whether the "[b]rief and [e]xculpatory
[i]nformation" and "[a]ppendix of the [e]xhibits of the
[e]xculpatory [m]aterial [e]vidence[]" that Ardaneh has filed in
the full court were intended as a memorandum and appendix
pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, or an appellate brief pursuant to
Mass. R. A. P. 16, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019),
Ardaneh failed to demonstrate that review of his claims cannot
adequately be obtained in the trial court or on appeal from any
conviction. To the extent he claims that the evidence before
the grand jury did not establish probable cause, or that the
grand jury proceedings otherwise were flawed, "the evidence
before the grand jury may be reviewed in the ordinary course of
appeal" following a conviction on any of the indictments.
Bateman v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1024, 1025 (2007). To the
extent he seeks review of the denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictments, see Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006 n.4,
"[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is not
appealable until after trial, and we have indicated many times
that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent that rule.
Unless a single justice decides the matter on the merits or
reserves and reports it to the full court, neither of which
occurred here, a defendant cannot receive review under G. L.
c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his motion to dismiss." Jackson
v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002), and cases cited.
Likewise, Ardaneh's claims that he has received ineffective
assistance of counsel, or that other of his constitutional
rights have been violated, may be raised on appeal or in a
motion for postconviction relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). See Doyle v. Commonwealth,
472 Mass. 1002, 1003 (2015).
Where Ardaneh failed to demonstrate that his claims cannot
adequately be reviewed on appeal from any conviction or by other
means in the trial court, there was no error in the single
justice's judgment denying the petitions. See Sabree v.
Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000) ("relief under G. L.
c. 211, §3, is properly denied where there are other routes by
which the petitioning party may adequately seek relief"). See
also Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. at 1030 (Ardaneh [No.
2]), quoting Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006 ("to the extent
that Ardaneh seeks relief 'from what he perceive[s] to be
general injustices done to or imposed on him' in the trial
court, '[h]is claims [do] not present a situation warranting
extraordinary superintendence relief directly from this
court'").
4
As noted supra, this is the third time that Ardaneh has
sought some form of extraordinary relief from this court arising
from the same underlying criminal proceedings. See Ardaneh (No.
2), 487 Mass. at 1030; Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006. Each
time, we have concluded that he is not entitled to extraordinary
relief to correct errors that may be reviewed in the ordinary
process of trial and appeal. Ardaneh is on notice that further
attempts to obtain such relief in similar circumstances may
result in the imposition of sanctions.
Judgment affirmed.
The case was submitted on briefs.
Hamid Reza Ardaneh, pro se.
Ryan Rall, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.