Commonwealth v. Colon

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us
14-P-1525 Appeals Court
COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERT COLON.
No. 14-P-1525.
Essex. September 22, 2015. - October 26, 2015.
Present: Berry, Grainger, & Sullivan, JJ.
Search and Seizure, Protective sweep, Warrant. Firearms.
Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Search and
seizure.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lynn Division of the
District Court Department on February 19, 2013.
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Matthew
J. Machera, J.
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory
appeal was allowed by Ralph D. Gants, J., in the Supreme
Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was
reported by him to the Appeals Court.
Scott F. Gleason for the defendant.
Quentin Weld, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
GRAINGER, J. The defendant appeals from the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search
2
of his apartment conducted at the time of his arrest on an
outstanding warrant.1 A judge of the District Court concluded
that the search was permissible as a "protective sweep."
The facts found by the motion judge after an evidentiary
hearing are undisputed for purposes of our consideration of the
motion to suppress. The salient findings are these:2 The
1
A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the
defendant's motion to file an interlocutory appeal.
2
Trooper Babbin was the only witness to testify at the
suppression hearing. Neither the arrest warrant nor any other
documentary evidence was introduced. The judge recited his
findings in full as follows:
"On February 15, 2013, [m]embers of the Massachusetts
State Police, led by Sgt. Timothy Babbin, along with
members of the Lynn Police Department, executed an arrest
warrant for one Robert Colon at 159A Essex Street in Lynn,
Massachusetts. Sgt. Timothy Babbin, a highly experienced
trooper with over twenty years of experience in a variety
of roles within the state police, led the arrest. When the
officers arrived, they knocked on the front door. The[]
officers could hear the voice of a man and a woman in
conversation. The officers continued to knock and
announced their office without any response from the
occupants inside. The officers continued to knock and at
some point heard running water and heard people moving
about the apartment. The officers waited several minutes
while continuing to knock and announce their office. At
one point, a female voice told police that she had to get
dressed before opening the door. After a significant
delay, the door to apartment 159A opened, revealing the
defendant, full[y] dressed. The officers asked the
defendant who he was and he answered that his name was
Robert Colon. The officers immediately smelled a strong
odor of fresh marijuana. The defendant appeared anxious
and nervous and stated to the police 'let's go' and
attempted to walk out of the apartment. The officers
directed the defendant back into the apartment and cuffed
him. After speaking to the defendant, the officers could
3
officers were made to wait several minutes after they knocked
and announced their presence. During that time they heard a man
and woman in conversation, running water, and a woman's voice
informing them she needed to get dressed. The defendant opened
the door and the officers "smelled a strong odor of fresh
marijuana." The defendant said "let's go" and attempted to
leave with the officers, who instead brought him back inside the
apartment, handcuffed him, and conducted the protective sweep.
Discussion. Both United States Supreme Court and
Massachusetts cases have recognized that a limited protective
sweep of premises may be conducted incident to an arrest in
order to ensure the safety of the arresting officers if they can
demonstrate a "reasonable belief based on 'specific and
articulable facts' that the area could harbor a dangerous
individual." Commonwealth v. Matos, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 159
(2010), quoting from Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 334
not say with certainty that his voice was the voice that
they heard while they were waiting for the apartment door
to open. Based on the significant delay in opening the
door, the smell of fresh marijuana, the sound of running
water, the sound of people moving about[,] and not knowing
if the voice heard was that of the defendant, the officers
decided to conduct a protective sweep. Inside one of the
bedrooms, the officers observed three large bags of
suspected marijuana located on a shelf inside an open
closet. Also found during the protective sweep of the
apartment were drug paraphernalia and US currency."
4
(1990). We conclude that the evidence in this case falls short
of that standard.
We are unpersuaded by the Commonwealth's argument, based on
facts not found by the judge,3 that the warrant-related charge,
illegal possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number,
describes a "prior violent felony" that justified entry and
search of the apartment under these circumstances. Illegal
possession of a firearm is certainly troubling, and clearly
justifies caution. But possession alone is not per se a violent
act. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 114,
120 (2007) (articulable facts justifying protective sweep can be
found in a defendant's "record of violent felonies and firearm
possession charges" [emphasis supplied]). Accordingly, while
the charge to which the warrant relates is generally a relevant
factor bearing on our consideration of the appropriate conduct
of arresting officers, it must be viewed in context.
As stated, here the defendant opened the door, said, "let's
go," and attempted to leave with the officers. The only
individual claimed to represent a threat was cooperating with
the police, had submitted to custody and, from all appearances,
was completely compliant. The police had achieved their
3
The arresting officer was asked by the prosecutor, "Do you
know whether [the underlying] charges were tried or untried?"
and replied, "I don't." The judge's findings (see note 2,
supra) refer only to an "arrest warrant." See Commonwealth v.
Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 436-438 (2015).
5
objective without conflict and in fairly short order. For this
reason it would be irrelevant to our consideration even had the
judge made the findings about the warrant-related charge
asserted by the Commonwealth. In sum, the Commonwealth's claim
that a danger posed by the charge of previous illegal possession
of a firearm justified entering the premises after the defendant
had surrendered, and then conducting a search, does not
withstand scrutiny.
A comparison with Commonwealth v. Matos, supra, and
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, supra, is useful. In Matos the
suspect, who the police knew had been previously arrested for a
firearms offense, ran into a bedroom and shut the door when they
arrived to execute an arrest warrant on drug distribution
charges. 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 157. A divided panel of this
court concluded that, under those facts, officers on the third
floor of the house "could reasonably continue" a protective
sweep while the defendant was in the custody of officers on the
second floor. Id. at 159. In DeJesus, the arrest on a warrant
for armed carjacking likewise occurred inside the apartment.
"An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is
more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar
surroundings." DeJesus, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 119, quoting from
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333. Here, by contrast, the
defendant made it unnecessary to effectuate the arrest in the
6
apartment and there was no evidence of danger to be expected
from the apartment.
The motion judge obviously could infer from the evidence
that the defendant's cooperation with the police and his
eagerness to be taken away from the premises was intended to
avoid discovery of the marijuana in the apartment. But the
Commonwealth's argument on appeal is explicitly limited to the
protective sweep exception; consequently we do not address the
exception to the warrant requirement based on preventing the
imminent destruction of evidence of a crime.4
Order denying motion to
suppress evidence reversed.
4
For this reason we also do not address whether the strong
smell of fresh marijuana in particular would have justified a
protective sweep to preserve evidence of a crime after the
enactment of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Pacheco, 464 Mass. 768 (2013); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 472
Mass. 767 (2015).
BERRY, J. (concurring). The only reason I concur in this
decision reversing the denial of the suppression motion
concerning the protective sweep is that the motion judge entered
only limited and inchoate findings of fact. The abbreviated
findings concerning what would constitute specific and
articulable facts to justify a protective sweep were as follows:
"the significant delay in opening the door, the smell of
fresh marijuana, the sound of running water, the sound of
people moving about[,] and [the police] not knowing if the
voice heard was that of the defendant[]."
These limited findings do not support the protective sweep in
this case. Therefore, the majority, with which I concur,
reverses the denial of the suppression motion.
I write separately, however, because I believe there was
additional and uncontroverted testimony by the officer that
might very well have justified the protective sweep. However,
under Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 436-438
(2015), an appellate court is constricted in supplementing the
motion judge's findings of fact with uncontroverted testimony.
In this case, there was such uncontroverted testimony, not
addressed in the findings of the motion judge. For example, the
arresting officer's testimony included the following:
Prosecutor: "All right. Do you remember the nature of the
warrant for [the defendant]?"
Trooper Babbin: "Yes. It was a WNS warrant for illegal
possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm with a
defaced serial number; I believe it was distribution of
2
[c]lass A; and possession with intent to distribute of
class B. . . ."1
The defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to suppress
describes the warrant as relating to a probation violation.
Furthermore, Trooper Babbin testified that there was a
"Mass[achusetts] probation parole officer" present at the time
of the warrant execution. However, none of this warrant
background appears in the findings, which refer only to an
"arrest warrant" without particularization. This is important
because knowledge of a defendant's "record of violent felonies
and firearm possession charges" may yield a reasonable and
articulable basis supporting a protective sweep. Commonwealth
v. Matos, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 159 (2010), quoting from
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 114, 120 (2007)
1
When the prosecutor asked Trooper Babbin whether he was
aware of the disposition of the underlying charges, Trooper
Babbin acknowledged that he did not know whether the charges
were "tried or untried." However, that it was a probation
violation warrant is indicated in the defendant's memorandum
supporting his motion to suppress: "On February 15, 2013, the
Lynn police appeared at 159A Essex Street to execute an arrest
warrant for [the defendant] (probation violation)." It should
also be noted that defense counsel indicated the following at
the motion hearing: "the record will reflect that the warrant
which issued in this case is a warrant that was issued in -- and
I'd ask you to take judicial notice of that -- of that probation
record -- would indicate that the warrant was issued in 2011."
Motion counsel went on to state that the officer "had knowledge
of there being an issue of violence regarding older charges, as
you will note, and charges which had already been adjudicated in
your review of the record."
3
("[A]n objective concern for [officers'] safety [can be] rooted
in the articulable facts of the defendant's criminal history").
Again applying the Jones-Pannell rule, not to be considered
in appellate review is the uncontroverted testimony of the
officer that reflects other aggravating factors which may have
justified the protective sweep. By way of example, the motion
judge's findings only vaguely recounted that the officers heard
the voices of a man and a woman following a significant delay
before the defendant opened the door and came out. The findings
do not address any risk that the woman within the apartment may
have posed and do not address the possibility of a second,
unaccounted-for man, where the officer testified that the police
did not recognize the male voice as that of the defendant (whose
voice they would have heard when the defendant came out of the
apartment).
A protective sweep affords officers an invaluable tool to
protect their safety when effectuating an arrest in the home, a
place where "[t]he risk of danger . . . is as great as, if not
greater than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside
investigatory encounter." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333
(1990). "Moreover, unlike an encounter on the street or along a
highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage
of being on his adversary's 'turf.' An ambush in a confined
4
setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is
in open, more familiar surroundings." Ibid.
Given the important safety concerns that may underlie a
protective sweep such as in this case, I join the majority in
reversing the denial of the suppression motion, but do so only
because the motion judge's findings of fact fail to reflect
additional, and key, aggravating factors set forth in the
uncontroverted testimony -- which falls outside appellate review
under Jones-Pannell.