A.S.R. v. A.K.A.

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17-P-1109 Appeals Court
A.S.R. vs. A.K.A.
No. 17-P-1109.
Middlesex. November 15, 2016. - September 22 , 2017.
Present: Trainor, Meade, & Hanlon, JJ.
Civil Harassment. Harassment Prevention. Intent. Evidence,
Intent. Criminal Harassment.
Complaint for protection from harassment filed in the
Cambridge Division of the District Court Department on May 27,
2015.
A hearing to extend the harassment prevention order was had
before James H. Wexler, J.
Ruth O'Meara-Costello for the defendant.
Martin F. Kane, II, & Joan E. Kolligian, for the plaintiff,
submitted a brief.
HANLON, J. After a hearing, a judge of the District Court
extended a harassment prevention order, pursuant to G. L.
2
c. 258E, against the defendant, A.K.A.1 She appeals, arguing,
among other things, that the judge failed to identify three acts
as the basis for the order, failed to make findings supporting
A.K.A.'s intent in contacting the plaintiff, A.S.R., and, based
on A.S.R.'s testimony that he was not placed in fear of physical
harm or property damage as a result of the contact, there was
insufficient evidence to extend the order. Finally, she argues
that, even if issuing the order was warranted under the statute,
the order was unconstitutional because it penalized
constitutionally protected speech. We affirm.
Background. At the beginning of the extension hearing, the
judge carefully reviewed A.S.R.'s initial affidavit and copies
of various voice mail, text, and electronic mail (e-mail)
messages admitted as an exhibit packet by agreement of the
parties.2 He then heard testimony from A.S.R. and A.K.A.; both
were represented by counsel.
The parties were in a dating relationship for a little more
than one year until September, 2013. They continued to have
1
Although the order at issue has now expired, the issue is
not moot and is properly before us. See Seney v. Morhy, 467
Mass. 58, 62 (2014).
2
The exhibit packet consists of a transcript of a message
left by A.K.A. on A.S.R.'s voice mail, and copies of text and e-
mail messages, some including photographic images, sent by
A.K.A. to A.S.R.; all are included in the record appendix.
A.K.A. admitted during cross-examination that she authored all
of the e-mails contained in the exhibit packet.
3
contact until January, 2014, because A.S.R. "tried to help
[A.K.A.] for a while," but then A.S.R. cut off contact and "made
it very clear that [he] didn't want any contact from her."
Afterwards, A.K.A. began sending A.S.R. "lots of e-mails, phone
calls, [and] appearing in person in an attempt to get [him] to
resume contact in a way that made [him] feel very afraid and
hurt and abused." Although in March, 2014, A.S.R. threatened to
obtain a restraining order, he resumed contact with A.K.A. for a
short time in June, 2014, "in an attempt to make things right,"
because she had sent him images of her having cut herself "and a
lot of desperate pleas."3 Eventually, however, A.S.R. cut off
communications again. At the time of the hearing, on June 5,
2015, A.S.R. had not responded to any of A.K.A.'s written
communications since June, 2014.
A.S.R. was aware that in July, 2014, A.K.A. had left the
country; he learned that she was back in Boston in January,
2015, when she attended a programming event where he was
working. However, even while A.K.A. was living out of the
country, A.S.R. was receiving "a pretty steady stream" of e-
mails from her, despite the fact that he had blocked her e-mail
accounts and telephone numbers. He testified that "she would
3
The images contained in A.K.A.'s e-mails showed scars on
her arms, neck, and chest area.
4
find ways around it."4 A.K.A. was able to skirt A.S.R.'s e-mail
filters by sending messages from new e-mail addresses, and she
would also call from unlisted telephone numbers so that her
calls would not be blocked. A.S.R. testified that, after he
broke off contact with A.K.A., he received "hundreds" of e-
mails, text messages, and voice messages from her. Some of the
messages purported to be from an imaginary friend; many were
rambling and only barely coherent.5 Sometimes, there would be a
series of e-mails with the message only in the title or subject
line, thus defeating any effort by A.S.R. to avoid them by not
opening the e-mail.6
4
A.S.R. testified that he was unclear about why A.K.A. was
asking to resume contact, "whether it was resuming a romantic
relationship or whether it was just wanting to have [his]
presence around for emotional support, [he was] not entirely
sure."
5
One e-mail sent from A.K.A.'s cellular telephone (cell
phone) said, "More than anything, I'm so, so sorry. I hope I
haven't destroyed everything. Any damage I do to myself is
temporary -- I know that because I know that I have endless
reserves of resilience, and will reinvent myself as soon as I
find a new home. My fear was that there were no more new homes
to be found, that I had been sent away from the last one and,
alone and unbound as Frankenstein's monster, had no choice but
to rage and destroy."
6
For example, on March 22, 2014, A.K.A. sent the following
series of e-mails with these "Subject[s]": at 6:28 P.M.,
"Please, please, please, talk to me. I beg you"; at 6:29 P.M.,
"This is more important to me than anything else in the world";
also at 6:29 P.M., "It's very near the only thing keeping me
alive"; at 6:30 P.M., "I cut my neck today. I can't keep doing
this"; and, at 8:17 P.M., "Please forgive me. I would do
anything you ask."
5
In March, 2015, A.K.A. appeared at a choral ensemble
concert where A.S.R. was singing; a few days later, she was at a
Cambridge restaurant where A.S.R. was meeting his new girl
friend and her parents for the first time. A.K.A. was seated at
a table by the window so he saw her immediately when he
approached the restaurant; she came outside and they had "a
short confrontation." A.S.R. "implored her to stop trying to
contact [him] and she implored [him] to resume contact with
her." The messages continued. A.K.A. also appeared at a Quaker
meeting she knew that A.S.R. sometimes attended.
A.S.R. testified that A.K.A.'s continuous contact made him
"extremely afraid a lot of times" to open his e-mails and text
messages, or to listen to his voice mail messages and, also,
afraid that A.K.A. was going to appear at places where he was
going to be. The constant contact caused him, and his family
when he talked to them about it, emotional distress, fear, and
anger. In many of her messages, A.K.A. spoke of killing herself
or said that she was "going to die" (e.g., an e-mail from
"throwaway account," "Subject: I want nothing more than to
stick a knife in the back of my neck"). The last communication
A.S.R. received from A.K.A. prior to the hearing was on May 12,
2015, an e-mail invitation to A.K.A.'s birthday party sent to a
group of people including him.
6
A.K.A. also testified. She stated that, in early 2014, she
was severely depressed; she agreed that she sent each of the e-
mails contained in the exhibit packet, including the images of
her having cut herself. She sent those e-mails and images to
A.S.R. because she "wanted his empathy and his help"; she stated
that she never threatened A.S.R. with physical harm or
threatened to damage his property. She never threatened to hurt
anyone other than herself. A.K.A. testified that, at the time
of the hearing, she was "doing much better" and was no longer
depressed; her continued attempts at contact with A.S.R. were
"much calmer and conciliatory," and her intention in sending
those communications was that they could "reach a resolution
between [them] that feels satisfactory." She stated that
between January and June, 2014, she did not actively seek out
physical contact with A.S.R.
During her testimony, A.K.A. further stated that she had
appeared at the Quaker meeting, the choral concert, and the
programming event for reasons that had nothing to do with A.S.R.
She did not know that A.S.R. was going to be at the Cambridge
restaurant where she saw him; she had made plans with a friend
to meet for lunch, and the friend had suggested that restaurant.
A.K.A. testified that, as to the phrase appearing in the
April 24, 2015, transcript of an audio file she sent to A.S.R.,
which read, "I've been thinking a lot about whether I can find
7
it in my heart to forgive you, or just thinking about an
alternative to violence that feels true," she was "referring to
the Quaker tradition of resolving conflicts through means other
than physical or spiritual violence"; it did not refer to
physical violence. She stated that the phrase, "I want it to be
something other than violence that you've done to me," referred
to "the fact that [A.S.R.] cut [her] off and tried to force
[her] into silence." She testified that the "violence" that she
was guilty of was her continued contact attempts with A.S.R.
after he specifically had asked her to stop. A.K.A. stated that
no matter the outcome of the hearing, she did not intend to
contact A.S.R. again.
During cross-examination, A.K.A. did not agree that she
continued to contact A.S.R. in an attempt to have him return to
a relationship with her; she stated that her intent was to work
out a "peaceful resolution" with him. She said that she was not
trying to make A.S.R. uncomfortable; she acknowledged that she
understood that, since June, 2014, A.S.R. did not want to have
any contact with her. However, after seeing A.S.R. at the
Cambridge restaurant, she sent an e-mail to his new girl friend;
she (A.K.A.) had obtained his girl friend's e-mail address by
checking A.S.R.'s OKCupid Internet dating account. She also
admitted that, at the time of the hearing, she was still
monitoring A.S.R.'s account.
8
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge stated in oral
findings that he did not find A.K.A.'s testimony to be credible,
and that, although he found it a close question whether the e-
mails fell within A.K.A.'s rights under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, in his view the communications
were "very violent"; he extended the harassment prevention order
that had been issued ex parte.7
Discussion. In reviewing a civil harassment order under
G. L. c. 258E, we consider whether the judge could find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible
inferences, that the defendant committed acts that constituted
7
The judge stated:
"Counsel for the defendant, there's language in the
communications that I find very violent. 'Restorative
justice has worked in places where people actually killed.
There's no reason it shouldn't work for us when our
injuries are so much more abstract. It's been long enough
--' and then you merge that with the letter that she wrote,
the April 24 letter -- 'I'm trying to think about an
alternative to violence that feels true.' The term
violence is used. What am I to take from that?"
The judge continued:
"The United States Supreme Court just ruled on this issue
in a case involving language over the Internet, and it is a
complex issue and there are First Amendment issues that
have been raised; however, I do not find the defendant
credible in her testimony, and I think it is done with the
-- it does meet the standard that it set out in the case
that has been given to me -- in the O'Brien case [O'Brien
v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (2012)]. It's a close question,
and there are freedom of speech issues, but the
communication is a very violent communication, and I'm
going to extend the order for one year."
9
one of the enumerated forms of harassment. See O'Brien v.
Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 420 (2012); Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass.
58, 60 (2014).
"Harassment" is defined in G. L. c. 258E, § 1, in several
ways, and a plaintiff who proves any one of the various forms of
harassment qualifies for an order prohibiting the harassment.8
The first definition is "(i) [three] or more acts of willful and
malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the
intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property
and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage
to property." G. L. c. 258E, § 1 (definition of "harassment,"
subsection [i]) (hereinafter, the first definition). This is
the form of harassment most discussed in recent case law. See,
e.g., O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. at 425-428; Seney v. Morhy,
467 Mass. at 63-64; Smith v. Mastalerz, 467 Mass. 1001, 1001-
1002 (2014); A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 535-536
(2015); Gassman v. Reason, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7-8 (2016); V.J.
8
Specifically, in G. L. c. 258E, § 1, inserted by St. 2010,
c. 23, the statute's definition of harassment provides:
"'Harassment', (i) [three] or more acts of willful and
malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with
the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to
property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation,
abuse or damage to property; or (ii) an act that: (A) by
force, threat or duress causes another to involuntarily
engage in sexual relations; or (B) constitutes a violation
of section 13B, 13F, 13H, 22, 22A, 23, 24, 24B, 26C, 43 or
43A of chapter 265 or section 3 of chapter 272."
10
v. N.J., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 22, 25-27 (2017); C.E.R. v. P.C., 91
Mass. App. Ct. 124, 125-129 (2017).
This court, in F.A.P. v. J.E.S., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 595,
598-599 (2015), discussed subsection (ii) of the definition of
harassment under G. L. c. 258E, § 1 (hereinafter, the second
definition). "Under this definition [of harassment], a
plaintiff can establish the need for a harassment prevention
order in either of two ways that largely overlap. First, a
plaintiff can show that a defendant 'by force, threat or duress
cause[d the plaintiff] to involuntarily engage in sexual
relations.' Second, a plaintiff can prove that a defendant
committed any of [ten] specifically enumerated sex crimes,
including -- as relevant [there] -- rape of a child, G. L.
c. 265, § 22A." (Footnote omitted.) F.A.P. v. J.E.S., supra at
599.9
The present case addresses yet another definition of
harassment. Two of the enumerated crimes in subpart (B) of the
second definition of civil harassment are G. L. c. 265, §§ 43
(stalking) and 43A (criminal harassment). The definition of
civil harassment relevant here under this subpart is "an act
9
However, the second paragraph of one of the ten enumerated
crimes, G. L. c. 265, § 13F, as amended by St. 2010, c. 239,
§§ 71 & 72, also provides that "[w]hoever commits an assault and
battery on a person with an intellectual disability knowing such
person to have an intellectual disability shall . . . be
punished."
11
that . . . (B) constitutes a violation of section . . . 43A of
chapter 265 [criminal harassment]."
In Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 475 Mass. 554, 558-559 (2016),
the Supreme Judicial Court stated:
"The criminal harassment statute punishes 'whoever
willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of
conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at
a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress.' G. L. c. 265, § 43A (a). The statute
specifies that conduct or acts qualifying as criminal
harassment under its terms 'shall include, but not be
limited to, conduct or acts conducted by mail.' Id."
[Footnote omitted.]10
The court also stated:
"A conviction under [G. L. c. 265,] § 43[,] requires proof
that '(1) the defendant engaged in a knowing pattern of
conduct or speech, or series of acts, on at least three
separate occasions; (2) the defendant intended to target
the victim with the harassing conduct or speech, or series
of acts, on each occasion; (3) the conduct or speech, or
series of acts, were of such a nature that they seriously
alarmed the victim; (4) the conduct or speech, or series of
acts, were of such a nature that they would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress;
10
The text of the statute continues:
"The conduct or acts described in this paragraph shall
include, but not be limited to, conduct or acts conducted
by mail or by use of a telephonic or telecommunication
device or electronic communication device including, but
not limited to, any device that transfers signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-optical system,
including, but not limited to, electronic mail, internet
communications, instant messages or facsimile
communications."
G. L. c. 265, § 43A, as appearing in St. 2010, c. 92, § 10.
12
and (5) the defendant committed the conduct or speech, or
series of acts, willfully and maliciously.' [Commonwealth
v.] Johnson, 470 Mass. [300,] 307 [2014], quoting
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 240 (2012)."
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, supra at 561.
Judging by the test set out in Bigelow, A.K.A.'s actions
reasonably can be described as criminal harassment. It is clear
that she targeted the plaintiff with a knowing pattern of
conduct and speech; she intended to target him with the
harassing conduct or speech on each occasion; her conduct and
her speech, taken as a whole, seriously alarmed him; her actions
were such that they would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress; and she committed the acts and
speech wilfully and maliciously.
A.K.A. argues that the judge did not specify three specific
acts of harassment. She is correct that three acts are
required. See id. at 559 n.9. However, in this civil
proceeding where the judge was the fact finder and there clearly
was evidence supporting a conclusion that there were many more
than three harassing acts, the judge was not required to make
written findings specifying the three acts.
Similarly, A.K.A. argues that the judge did not state
explicitly that her conduct was malicious and intentional;
however, the judge is not required to do so, and his decision to
extend the order is supported by the evidence. Contrary to
13
A.K.A.'s argument, the decision in Smith v. Mastalerz, 467 Mass.
at 1001, is easily distinguished. There, the defendant drove
past his former roommate "while she unpacked her vehicle at the
front of her home, stopped a few houses away on that street,
turned around, drove past her again, and a few seconds later
drove by the home again." Ibid. As the court explained,
"[W]here there was no evidence refuting the defendant's
claim that he lived down the street from the plaintiff, we
conclude that driving by the plaintiff's home within a very
short period of time was one continuous act. Moreover, the
judge made no explicit findings, and the record does not
permit us to infer, that the defendant's driving by the
plaintiff's home was wilful and malicious, directed at the
plaintiff, and intended to cause, and in fact did cause,
fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property."
Id. at 1001-1002.
The present case is very different, with hundreds of
communications sent over many months, despite A.S.R.'s pleas
that A.K.A. stop. The fact that A.K.A. used a number of
different names and addresses to trick A.S.R. into receiving the
communications despite his efforts to avoid them is clear proof
of the maliciousness and wilfulness of her behavior. In
addition, as noted, the judge explicitly disbelieved the
defendant's testimony that she appeared entirely by coincidence
at various locations where the plaintiff was working or
socializing.
A.K.A. also contends that, read in context, her actions do
not support a finding that the communications were harassing.
14
However, as the court in Commonwealth v. Bigelow noted, "In the
usual case, whether a communication constitutes a threat or a
true threat is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact."
475 Mass. at 567, quoting from United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d
287, 298 (3d Cir. 2013).
It is true that A.S.R.'s testimony about his fear of
physical harm was somewhat equivocal. In response to the
question, "When you say fear, it's not a physical fear of harm
to you, is it?" he said, "Not that much of one. A little
bit . . . ." Counsel then asked, "Has she ever been physical
with you?" and A.S.R. responded, "She told me once that she
fantasized about killing me, but that's it. She's never been --
she's never physically -- I don't think she would physically
harm me. I don't think that would happen."11,12 However, in
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. at 420, the court explained that,
for criminal harassment, the elements are different from those
required for the definition of civil harassment contained in the
first definition of harassment under G. L. c. 258E, § 1.
"Both [the first definition of] civil [harassment] and
criminal harassment require proof of three or more acts of
wilful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person.
See Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 89 (2005) . . .
11
A.S.R. did testify that A.K.A. had threatened many times
to hurt herself "[a]nd that continue[d]" at least until the time
of the hearing.
12
The parties agree that there was no threat of damage to
A.S.R.'s property.
15
('phrase "pattern of conduct or series of acts" [in G. L.
c. 265, § 43A,] requires the Commonwealth to prove three or
more incidents of harassment'). But the definitions of
[the first definition of] civil and criminal harassment
differ in three respects. First, there are two layers of
intent required to prove [the first definition of] civil
harassment under c. 258E: the acts of harassment must be
wilful and '[m]alicious,' the latter defined as
'characterized by cruelty, hostility or revenge,' and they
must be committed with 'the intent to cause fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage to property.' G. L. c. 258E,
§ 1. Only the first layer of intent is required for
criminal harassment under c. 265, § 43A. Second, the
multiple acts of [the first definition of] civil harassment
must 'in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to
property,' while the multiple acts of criminal harassment
must 'seriously alarm[]' the targeted victim. Third,
criminal harassment requires proof that the pattern of
harassment 'would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress,' but [the first definition
of] civil harassment has no comparable reasonable person
element."
Ibid. This analysis of criminal harassment, therefore, also
applies to civil harassment, when the civil harassment alleged
consists of acts that constitute a violation of G. L. c. 265,
§ 43A. G. L. c. 258E, § 1, second definition of harassment,
subpart (B).
This record is clear that A.S.R. was seriously alarmed by
A.K.A.'s behavior. He testified that "[i]t's made me extremely
afraid a lot of times. I don't know if she's going to show up
at places. You know, afraid to check my e-mail or anything like
that. It's caused me a lot of emotional distress. It's caused
my family, you know, who hear about it, a lot of distress, fear,
anger. It's been very painful." When asked, "[I]n those
16
hundreds of e-mails that you say you received -- texts, e-mails,
voice messages -- how many times did she threaten to kill
herself if you don't come back to her?" A.S.R. responded, "I
don't know the exact number. You know, I don't know if it's
always phrased in exactly those terms, but it -- a lot of
times." Counsel asked, "Freezing to death, cutting herself?"
and A.S.R. responded, "Yeah. Things like that. 'I'm going to
die.' You know, just a lot of things like that."
On this evidence, the judge was also warranted in finding
that A.K.A.'s actions, given the volume and the nature of the
messages, combined with her unexpected appearances in person,
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress. Indeed, on these facts a reasonable person would have
been warranted in fearing for his physical safety. As noted,
the judge found the behavior to be harassing, disbelieving
A.K.A.'s testimony that she intended no threat. There certainly
was enough evidence to support that conclusion -- particularly
under the civil standard of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Finally, we reject the argument that the defendant's
actions constitute protected speech under the First Amendment
and under art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Her communications were not directed at an elected official or
even a public figure, but at a private individual. Contrast
17
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 475 Mass. at 562-563. Nor do they
express political speech directed to the public at large. In
Bigelow, supra at 568 n.21, the court noted that "because the
letters were anonymous, [the victim] would have been unable to
halt their arrival at her home, such as requesting a block at
the post office or, perhaps, seeking a civil restraining order
pursuant to G. L. c. 258E." Here, A.K.A. repeatedly evaded
A.S.R's efforts to stop communications from her by using other
names, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses and, as noted, by
putting the content of her e-mail message into the subject line
of the unwanted e-mail, making it impossible not to see it.
In addition, we are satisfied that the evidence was
sufficient for the judge to find that A.K.A.'s behavior
constituted a true threat. As the court in Commonwealth v.
Bigelow explained, reiterating language from O'Brien v.
Borowski,
"[a] true threat does not require an explicit
statement of an intention to harm the victim as long
as circumstances support the victim's fearful or
apprehensive response. . . . Nor does a true threat
threaten imminent harm; sexually explicit or
aggressive language directed at and received by an
identified victim may be threatening, notwithstanding
the lack of evidence that the threat will be
immediately followed by actual violence or the use of
physical force. . . .
"[T]he 'true threat' doctrine applies not only to
direct threats of imminent physical harm, but to words
or actions that —- taking into account the context in
which they arise —- cause the victim to fear such harm
18
now or in the future and evince an intent on the part
of the speaker or actor to cause such fear."
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, supra at 566-567, quoting from O'Brien
v. Borowski, 461 Mass. at 424-425. A.K.A.'s harassment was
relentless, carried on over a period of months, and frequently
contained explicit references to violence, and it therefore
satisfies that definition.
Undoubtedly there are many instances of unwelcome contact
from a romantic partner (or would-be romantic partner) that
would not support the issuance of a harassment prevention order
pursuant to G. L. c. 258E. However, in this case, given the
extraordinary number of communications, and the defendant's
persistent manipulations over months to have them reach the
plaintiff, combined with their frequently violent content, we
cannot say that the judge erred in finding the defendant's
conduct to be harassing and in extending the order that she stop
it.
Order dated June 15, 2015,13
affirmed.
13
We note that, although the extension order is dated June
15, 2015, the docket sheet and the transcript reflect that the
order was extended on June 5, 2015.