Shea v. Cameron

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16-P-1479 Appeals Court
SUSAN SHEA vs. MICHAEL CAMERON.
No. 16-P-1479.
Essex. October 4, 2017. - February 9, 2018.
Present: Agnes, Sacks, & Lemire, JJ.
Practice, Civil, Report, Summary judgment, Stipulation, Fraud.
Divorce and Separation, Annulment, Jurisdiction. Probate
Court, Divorce. Jurisdiction, Divorce proceedings. Fraud.
Emotional Distress. Undue Influence. Unjust Enrichment.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
July 24, 2014.
The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on a motion
for summary judgment, and the case was reported by him to the
Appeals Court.
John Taylor for the plaintiff.
Mikalen E. Howe (Alan K. Posner also present) for the
defendant.
LEMIRE, J. This appeal concerns whether a defendant's
alleged fraudulent inducement to marry constitutes a valid civil
cause of action. The plaintiff, Susan Shea, and the defendant,
Michael Cameron, were married before receiving a judgment of
2
annulment which incorporated their joint stipulation of
Cameron's fraud. Following the annulment, Shea filed a civil
action relating to Cameron's marriage fraud in Superior Court.
Cameron filed counterclaims alleging fraud by Shea regarding
entry of the stipulation and annulment. Cameron moved for
summary judgment on all of Shea's claims. After granting
Cameron's motion for summary judgment, the judge reported his
order to this court pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a), as amended,
423 Mass. 1403 (1996), and stayed Cameron's counterclaims. We
affirm.
Background. Shea began a consensual romantic relationship
with Cameron in June, 2005. By October, 2005, Cameron had moved
into Shea's home, and soon thereafter, the two became engaged.
Shea and Cameron married on September 22, 2007. In 2010, Shea
transferred title to her home from herself individually to Shea
and Cameron as joint tenants and Cameron was added to the
mortgage. Over the course of their relationship, Shea and
Cameron exchanged money, shared bank accounts, and worked
together professionally.
In 2011, Shea discovered that Cameron was having an affair
and subsequently filed for divorce on the grounds of
irretrievable breakdown. On April 30, 2012, Shea withdrew her
complaint for divorce and filed a complaint for annulment. At a
deposition related to the annulment proceeding, Cameron admitted
3
to being "unable to love [Shea] very early in the marriage" and
that he did not ever believe that Shea was his "one true love."
On June 7, 2013, Shea and Cameron entered into a joint
stipulation of annulment based on Cameron's fraud, ending the
marriage ab initio.1 Unbeknownst to Cameron, Shea filed a
complaint in Probate and Family Court on June 6, 2013, related
to this stipulated fraud. Immediately following the entry of
the judgment of annulment, Shea served Cameron with her
complaint as he left the court room.
Shea's complaint was dismissed by the Probate and Family
Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Shea then filed
the same claims in Superior Court. Shea's theory of recovery on
all claims is related to Cameron's false claims of love,
Cameron's emotionally harmful conduct during their relationship,
and Cameron's improper use of their shared finances. Cameron's
counterclaims allege that but for Shea's deliberate concealment
of her claims, he would not have entered into the stipulation of
annulment.
The judge entered summary judgment in favor of Cameron on
all eight of Shea's claims. In his memorandum and decision, the
judge accepted that Cameron made misrepresentations "about the
1
The complete joint stipulation reads as follows: "The
parties, Susan E. Cameron, Plaintiff, and Michael J. Cameron,
Defendant, agree to an annulment of marriage on the grounds of
Defendant's fraud as provided by M.G.L. Chapter 207, § 14."
4
genuineness of his love and commitment to Shea," but concluded
as a matter of law that the court was unable to intrude into
private and personal relationships and provide remedy for the
alleged harms. Following the entry of summary judgment the
judge reported his decision to this court under Mass.R.Civ.P.
64(a) as an interlocutory finding and stayed Cameron's
counterclaims.
Report. As a threshold matter, we consider the propriety
of the report on which this case comes before us. A Superior
Court judge is authorized to report a case when "an
interlocutory finding or order made by [him] so affects the
merits of the controversy that the matter ought to be determined
by the appeals court before any further proceedings in the trial
court." Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a). "Interlocutory matters should be
reported only where it appears that they present serious
questions likely to be material in the ultimate decision, and
that subsequent proceedings in the trial court will be
substantially facilitated by so doing." John Gilbert Jr. Co. v.
C.M. Fauci Co., 309 Mass. 271, 273 (1941). See Cooney v.
Compass Group Foodservice, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (2007).
Facially, Shea's eight claims in her amended complaint and
Cameron's five counterclaims appear inextricable. However, a
closer inspection into the underlying factual circumstances show
that the reported question as to Shea's claims is not material
5
to the stayed counterclaims. Shea's claims rest on the factual
circumstances surrounding Cameron's alleged amatory torts,
alleged emotional harm, and alleged unjust dispossession of
property. On the other hand, Cameron's counterclaims are based
almost entirely on allegations regarding the parties'
stipulation of fraud and the resulting judgment of annulment.2
Any guidance to the Superior Court on the reported issue will
not materially impact the decision on the stayed counterclaims
and we have some doubt as to whether this case is appropriate
for a report under Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a).3 See Cusic v.
Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 291, 293-294 (1992). However, as the
parties have fully briefed the issue and the answers are
reasonably clear, this court can express its view. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Guerrier, 390 Mass. 631, 632-633 (1983); Morrison v.
Lennett, 415 Mass. 857, 859 (1993).
Standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate where
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
2
Cameron's pending counterclaims are (1) fraud by omission,
(2) misrepresentation, (3) breach of fiduciary duty and duty to
act in good faith with fair dealing, (4) unjust enrichment, and
(5) partition of real estate.
3
We do not question the judge's finding that an appellate
decision will affect how the parties proceed on the
counterclaims. However, courts should be circumspect in
reporting a civil interlocutory question. See Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. Retirement Bd., 412
Mass. 770, 772 (1992).
6
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). See
also Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716
(1991). We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo,
construing all facts in favor of the nonmoving party. See
Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007). "[A] party moving
for summary judgment in a case in which the opposing party will
have the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary
judgment if [it] demonstrates, by reference to material
described in Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), unmet by countervailing
materials, that the party opposing the motion has no reasonable
expectation of proving an essential element of that party's
case." Kourouvacilis, supra. See Flesner v. Technical
Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991). Hence, the
moving party may satisfy its burden either by submitting
affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the
opposing party's case or by demonstrating that the opposing
party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential
element of his case at trial. Flesner, supra at 809.
Discussion. 1. Stipulation of fraud.4 Before reaching
Shea's substantive claims, we address the effect, if any, of the
4
Any argument that the judgment of annulment has preclusive
effect on the current litigation is in error. See Heacock v.
Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 n.2 (1988) (explanation of
terminology and doctrines of claim and issue preclusion that
7
prior stipulation of fraud on our de novo review. Generally,
stipulations of fact serve an important function for the
efficiency of the court in ruling on motions for summary
judgment. See Mitchell v. Walton Lunch Co., 305 Mass. 76, 80
(1940). "[S]uch stipulations are binding on the parties . . .
and respected by the courts, unless a court determines that to
do so would be improvident or not conducive to justice."
Goddard v. Goucher, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45 (2016), quoting
from Loring v. Mercier, 318 Mass. 599, 601 (1945). See Mass. G.
Evid. § 611(g)(1) (2017). Factual stipulations from prior
trials may even be considered as evidence in subsequent
litigation. See Household Fuel Corp. v. Hamacher, 331 Mass.
653, 656-657 (1954), citing Wigmore on Evidence § 2593 (3d ed.
1940).
In contrast to stipulations of fact, courts are not bound
by stipulations of law, especially when the legal stipulations
comprise res judicata). Here, we decline to consider the
doctrine of claim preclusion when the underlying claim is an
action for annulment for the same reasons justifying the Supreme
Judicial Court's analysis declining to apply claim preclusion in
a tort suit when the underlying action is a divorce proceeding.
See id. at 23-25. Additionally, where the only basis for the
judgment of annulment is the stipulation between the parties,
that final judgment cannot have preclusive effect under
collateral estoppel. See Hartford v. Hartford, 60 Mass. App.
Ct. 446, 451 (2004), quoting from Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 27, comment e (1982) ("[a]n issue is not actually
litigated if it is the subject of a stipulation between the
parties").
8
are based on incomplete and misleading facts, incorrect
applications of the law, or are self-serving. See Goddard,
supra at 46-47. Accordingly, treating the stipulation of
Cameron's fraud in the annulment case as a legal conclusion
would not be binding in the instant case. See Swift & Co. v.
Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917) ("The duty of
this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to
determining rights of persons or of property . . . . No
stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the case before
the court or in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect
the duty, of the court in this regard" [quotation omitted]).
Even if the prior stipulation is a mixed issue of fact and
law, any factual component here must also be disregarded. See
Goddard, supra at 45-46. Factual stipulations are context
specific and "[t]he scope of the stipulation is determined by
the circumstances in which it is made and the nature of the
proof required by the issues raised." Costello v. Commissioner
of Rev., 391 Mass. 567, 570 (1984). Here, the one-sentence
stipulation omits all necessary information or context
concerning the fraud. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that any factual component to the stipulation must also be set
aside as "improvident or not conducive to justice." Children's
Hosp. Medical Center v. Boston, 354 Mass. 228, 233 (1968). See
Huard v. Forest St. Housing, Inc., 366 Mass. 203, 208-209
9
(1974). Therefore, neither the legal nor factual components of
the parties' stipulation to Cameron's fraud impact our de novo
review of the judge's grant of summary judgment.
2. Shea's substantive claims. Shea's amended complaint
asserts eights claims which can be categorized by their
underlying factual basis. First, the claims of fraud and deceit
(count II), misrepresentation (count IV), and battery (count
VIII) are each based on alleged false professions of love which
induced Shea to enter into the romantic relationship and
annulled marriage. The claims of negligent infliction of
emotional distress (count III) and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (count V) are each based on conduct allegedly
committed by Cameron during the annulled marriage which caused
Shea emotional and mental harm. Finally, the claims of exertion
of undue influence (count I), money had and received (Count VI),
and unjust enrichment (count VII) are each based on Cameron's
use of the parties' shared finances. We address each type of
claim in turn.
a. Count II, count IV, and count VIII. General Laws
c. 207, § 47A, inserted by St. 1938, c. 350, § 1 (also referred
to as the Heart Balm Act),5 states that a "[b]reach of contract
5
The Heart Balm Act refers to both G. L. c. 207, § 47A, and
G. L. c. 207, § 47B. This opinion primarily addresses § 47A.
However, the legislative policy that underlies § 47B, which
abolished the common law actions for alienation of affection and
10
to marry shall not constitute an injury or wrong recognized by
law, and no action, suit or proceeding shall be maintained
therefor." The term "heart balm" itself reflects the
Legislature's public policy decision to no longer consider
judicial remedy appropriate for what is only "an ordinary broken
heart." Conley v. Romeri, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 799, 805 n.5
(2004), quoting from Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit
Actions, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1770, 1778 (1985).6 The Heart Balm Act
marks a turning point in our view of marriage as primarily a
property transaction where breach of a promise to marry can
result in monetary damages, to instead recognizing that the
decision to marry is a fundamental right that can be declined
without sanction. See Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584,
2595-2596 (2015). See also Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass.
153, 154-155 (1973) (providing history of heart balm actions in
Massachusetts).
criminal conversation, is the same as the stated policy that
underlies § 47A, and many States do not separate the provisions.
See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 43.5 (West 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:23-1 (West 2010); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-a (McKinney
2009); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 768.01 (West 2009). For a detailed
discussion on the history of Heart Balm Acts and the prohibition
of amatory torts in the United States, see The Legal Ways of
Seduction, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 817 (1996).
6
Shea's argument that this court's Conley decision was in
error because it relied on overturned California case law is
without merit. See Conley, supra at 806 n.7.
11
Not only does G. L. c. 207, § 47A, preclude claims of pure
breach of a marriage contract, it also "abolished any right of
action, whatever its form, that was based upon such a breach,"
including "[a]ctions in tort for fraud." Thibault v. Lalumiere,
318 Mass. 72, 75 (1945). This broad reading of § 47A furthers
the legislative intent that courts should not "explore the minds
of" consenting partners in order to "determine their sincerity."
A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See Thibault,
supra at 74-75; Quinn v. Walsh, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 705
(2000).
Unlike in a traditional heart balm action, Shea does not
assert that Cameron wronged her by not marrying her; rather, she
asserts that Cameron wronged her in fraudulently inducing her to
marry him. This argument rests on the principle that Cameron's
express and implied promises of love were knowingly false, and
that but for these professions, she would not have entered into
the romantic relationship which resulted in the alleged harm
suffered. Without the contract of marriage that followed the
alleged false statements, Shea's claims of fraud would have no
basis. We conclude that Shea's artful pleadings fail to hide
the fact that these claims, based on events that occurred prior
12
to the marriage, are precluded under G. L. c. 207, § 47A, as a
matter of law.7 See A.B., supra.
Additionally, Shea's claim of battery, while not precluded
under the Heart Balm Act, fails because any alleged fraud by
Cameron was legally insufficient to vitiate Shea's consent to
sexual intercourse. See Conley, supra at 805-806. We review
Shea's remaining claims de novo under different factual and
legal theories.
b. Count III and count V. Shea also alleges that the
conduct of Cameron during the course of their romantic
relationship caused Shea emotional distress. Construing all
facts and inferences in favor of Shea, she fails to prove an
essential element of both intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
i. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. A claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires: "(1)
that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress, or
knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely
7
The Heart Balm Act and this opinion do nothing to abrogate
the abolition of spousal immunity in Massachusetts. See Lewis
v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 621-622 (1976). For example, G. L.
c. 209 specifically authorizes rights of action based on
contract between spouses so long as the contract is not the
marriage itself. See, e.g., Okoli v. Okoli (No. 2), 81 Mass.
App. Ct. 381, 390-391 (2012) (allowing claim of fraud to survive
motion to dismiss against former spouse for entry into in vitro
fertilization contract).
13
result of his conduct, . . . (2) that the defendant's conduct
was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, (3)
[that] the actions of the defendant were the cause of the
plaintiff's distress, and (4) [that] the emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff was severe and of such a nature that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Quinn,
supra at 706, quoting from Tetrault v. Mahoney, Hawkes &
Goldings, 425 Mass. 456, 466 (1997). Given the high standard
required to show "extreme and outrageous" conduct, there is
nothing in this record, viewed in the light most favorable to
Shea, that can defeat the summary judgment motion. See Conway
v. Smerling, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 8 (1994) (outrageous conduct
means "a high order of reckless ruthlessness or deliberate
malevolence that . . . is simply intolerable").
As previously noted by this court, an adulterous affair
like the one alleged here, "even one which is intended to, or
which the actor should have known would, cause emotional harm"
cannot be deemed "extreme and outrageous." Quinn, supra at 708.
Equally unavailing of legal remedy is a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on failure to disclose or
intentional concealment of past sexual or romantic history to a
consensual romantic partner prior to entry into the
relationship, "even if the defendant had created false
14
expectations about his future relationship with the plaintiff."
Conley, supra at 804-805. A thorough review of the record
reveals no other conduct which could not be categorized as
"ingratitude, avarice, broken faith, brutal words, and heartless
disregard of the feelings of others," which although
blameworthy, are not legally compensable. Id. at 805, quoting
from Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 4, at 23 (5th ed. 1984). We
conclude that Cameron was entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
ii. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. "To
recover for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must prove: '(1) negligence; (2)
emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm manifested
by objective symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person
would have suffered emotional distress under the circumstances
of the case.'" Conley, supra at 801, quoting from Payton v.
Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982). "[P]laintiffs must
corroborate their mental distress claims with enough objective
evidence of harm to convince a judge that their claims" were
likely genuine. Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129, 137-
138 (1993). The record here is bereft of physical harm
manifested by objective symptomatology, and thus, summary
15
judgment on this count was properly granted to Cameron.8 See
Garrity v. Garrity, 399 Mass. 367, 369 (1987).
c. Count I, count VI, and count VII. Shea brings three
individual claims to attempt to recover damages for the exchange
of money and her home between Shea and Cameron over the course
of their relationship. The underlying factual basis for the
three claims is that Shea would not have relinquished ownership
rights of her real or personal property if not for the coercive
or fraudulent conduct of Cameron. The record fails to provide a
sufficient basis for either theory, even viewed in the light
most favorable to Shea.
i. Money had and received and unjust enrichment.9 "Unjust
enrichment is defined as 'retention of money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity
and good conscience.'" Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass. App. Ct.
324, 329 (2005), quoting from Taylor Woodrow Blitman Constr.
8
Both Conley, supra at 806 n.7, and Doe v. Moe, 63 Mass.
App. Ct. 516, 521 n.6 (2005), contemplate the possibility of a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based upon the
negligent transmission of a sexually transmitted disease between
consensual sexual partners. Without further discussion, we note
that by Shea's own testimony she admits to receiving an
inconclusive diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease.
9
Money had and received was originally an equitable claim
for unjust enrichment specific to money and credit. See Cobb v.
Library Bureau, 268 Mass. 311, 316 (1929). The current doctrine
of unjust enrichment is identical and applies equally. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 464 Mass. 623, 643 (2013).
16
Corp. v. Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F. Supp. 340, 347 (D. Mass.
1982). Unjust enrichment is also recognized as the traditional
claim for a party who has been deprived of land through fraud.
See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Beale, 353 Mass. 103, 105
(1967). We have extended this principle to fraud between former
spouses for conduct during the marriage. See Demeter v.
Demeter, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 860 (1980). However, "[t]he fact that
a person has benefited from another is not of itself sufficient
to require the other to make restitution therefor." Keller v.
O'Brien, 425 Mass. 774, 778 (1997) (quotation omitted). Here,
none of the exchanges of money or property between Shea and
Cameron can be considered unjust. See Santagate, supra at 336
(standard for unjust enrichment is based on reasonable
expectations of party). Simply showing that Cameron's tax
payments, son's tuition payments, and other expenses came out of
the parties' joint accounts is insufficient context to satisfy
the elements of unjust enrichment especially when those same
records show payments to shared interests. Accordingly, Shea
could not have satisfied her burden at trial and the claims were
properly disposed of on summary judgment.
ii. Undue influence. "In order adequately to establish a
claim . . . for undue influence, a plaintiff must establish that
the defendant overcame the will of the grantor. . . . Undue
influence involves some form of compulsion which coerces a
17
person into doing something the person does not want to do."
Tetrault, 425 Mass. at 464. We find nothing in the record
before us to show dominion over Shea's mind suggestive of undue
influence. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Shea was
in full command of her personal affairs and was neither ill,
dependent, nor enfeebled at the time of the transfer of real or
personal property to Cameron. See Collins v. Huculak, 57 Mass.
App. Ct. 387, 394 n.8 (2003). Without any basis for the claim
of coercion or fraud sufficient to overcome her will, the judge
properly granted summary judgment.
3. Conclusion. As evidenced here, not all human actions
in the context of the dissolution of a marriage have an avenue
for legal recourse, no matter how much anger, sorrow, or anxiety
they cause. See Okoli v. Okoli (No. 2), 81 Mass. App. Ct. 386,
389 (2012). This court respects the difficult work done by the
Probate and Family Court in disentangling marital relationships.
The process of divorce provides an avenue for alimony and the
equitable distribution of property. By voluntarily withdrawing
her complaint for divorce and entering into a stipulation and
judgment of annulment, Shea chose to forgo that process and her
claims could not survive in Superior Court. For the reasons
stated above, we uphold the judge's grant of summary judgment
against Shea on each count.
Judgment affirmed.