DocketNumber: No. 05-P-933
Citation Numbers: 67 Mass. App. Ct. 149, 852 N.E.2d 687, 2006 Mass. App. LEXIS 873
Judges: Smith
Filed Date: 8/17/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
In his findings in support of judgments of divorce nisi, a judge of the Probate and Family Court concluded, inter alla, that an antenuptial agreement executed by the parties was fair and reasonable at the time of its execution, was not the product of coercion or duress, and was not unconscionable at
1. Background and proceedings. At the time the parties began their dating relationship in mid-1991, the husband, a physician, was thirty-one years of age and the wife, a home economics teacher, was thirty-five years of age. The wife had three children by an earlier marriage. In late September or early October, 1992, the wife learned that she was pregnant and shortly thereafter informed the husband of the pregnancy. Upon receipt of the news, the husband told the wife that he would not marry her unless she signed an antenuptial agreement (agreement). Thereafter, the husband’s attorney prepared an agreement that the husband presented to the wife.
On December 31, 1992, the wife met at a restaurant with the husband and his attorney to discuss the agreement,
The antenuptial agreement (the pertinent provisions of which are set forth more fully in the margin) provides generally that the individual property of each party, as well as the appreciation thereon, shall remain the party’s sole and exclusive property, and that neither party shall have a claim to alimony from the other.
During their ten-year marriage, the parties had two children.
After a trial, the judge found that the antenuptial agreement was free from fraud, both parties having fully disclosed their assets at the time of execution, and neither party having unfairly taken “advantage of the confidential and emotional relationship that the party had with the other.” The judge further found that the parties had adequate opportunity to consult with independent counsel prior to signing the agreement, that the agreement indicated what rights the parties were giving up, that the wife (who had been through a prior divorce) would be aware of what rights she might have had absent the existence of an agreement, and that there had been “an adequate waiver.” Continuing, the judge found “that the [w]ife did not suffer from any duress and was not coerced into signing the agreement at the time of” its execution. Finally, the judge determined that the agreement was fair and reasonable at the time of its execution and was “not an unconscionable agreement” at the time of its enforcement. The judge concluded that the agreement was a binding contract and that there were no countervailing equities that would invalidate it.
By the terms of the judgment of divorce nisi (dated April 11, 2003) that was entered on the husband’s complaint, the parties were awarded joint legal and shared physical custody of the parties’ two minor children. The husband was allowed to retain his interests in assets worth approximately $1,962,000 (including his interest in the medical office building),
By orders dated September 29, 2003, the judge denied the wife’s motions for new trial and to alter and amend judgment and findings of fact. The judge allowed the wife’s motion to revoke the judgment dismissing her counterclaim for divorce. By a judgment dated September 29, 2003, nunc pro tune as of April 11, 2003, which was identical in all material respects to the judgment that was entered on the husband’s complaint, the wife was awarded a divorce for the cause of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The wife has appealed from the judgments of divorce nisi and the orders denying her postjudgment motions.
a. Coercion or duress. The wife argues initially that she was under duress at the time she executed the antenuptial agreement and “was coerced into signing it due to the circumstances in which she found herself.”
The problem with the wife’s argument is that the judge made no finding that any such oral agreement existed between the parties. (The husband vigorously disputed at trial that there was such an agreement.) Indeed, the judge denied the wife’s motion to amend findings of fact in which she sought to include findings with respect to the alleged oral agreement.
The wife also asserts, apparently apart from her argument concerning the alleged oral agreement between the parties, that the fact that she found herself, a pregnant single mother, presented with an agreement shortly before her scheduled wed
It is settled that a person who enters into a contract “under the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and judgment” may avoid the contract on the grounds of duress. Coveney v. President & Trustees of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 22 (1983), quoting from Avallone v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 344 Mass. 556, 561 (1962). See Cappy’s, Inc. v. Dorgan, 313 Mass. 170, 174 (1943). See also Vakil v. Vakil, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 530 n.7 (2006) (although the wife’s claim that she executed the antenuptial agreement under duress was not decided, we stated that there was “some support in the record” for the claim where, among other things, the husband was abusive to the wife throughout their marriages and the wife, by affidavit, averred that the husband had coerced her into signing the agreement by threatening to take their son to Iran and prevent her from ever again seeing the child). “Coercion sufficient to avoid a contract need not, of course, consist of physical force or threats of it. Social or economic pressure illegally or immorally applied may be sufficient.” International Underwater Contractors, Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 342 (1979), quoting from Struck Constr. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 186, 220 (1942). Here, we perceive nothing in the record that would cause us to disturb the judge’s finding that the wife’s execution of the ante-nuptial agreement was not the product of coercion or duress.
Even were we to assume that the wife was presented with a draft of the antenuptial agreement only one week prior to the parties’ wedding (as she claims, see note 1, supra), she still had sufficient time to review it, and did in fact seek the advice of independent counsel as to its terms. As we have stated, the wife rejected counsel’s opinion that she should not sign the agreement. The wife also acknowledged at trial that prior to executing the agreement and in response to a question posed by the notary, she informed the notary that her signing of the agreement was her “free act and deed.” While the wife’s pregnancy
Other jurisdictions have reached the same result on somewhat similar facts. See, e.g., Kilborn v. Kilborn, 628 So. 2d 884, 885 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (no error in the trial judge’s determination that an antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable and not the product of coercion where the wife, though pregnant, signed the agreement after full disclosure and against the advice of counsel); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 537 (1991) (antenuptial agreement not signed under duress where the wife, although “pregnant, unemployed, and probably frightened,” was represented by counsel and signed the agreement against his advice).
b. Validity of alimony waiver. The wife argues next that under the circumstances known and reasonably to be anticipated by the parties at the time of the execution of the antenuptial agreement, the waiver of alimony provision, as to her, was neither fair nor reasonable when it was made.
“Antenuptial agreements that waive alimony are not ‘per se
In determining whether an agreement was fair and reasonable at the time of execution, reference may be made to numerous factors, including “the parties’ respective worth,. . . ages,. . . intelligence, literacy, and business acumen, and prior family ties or commitments.” Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 672 (1979). Austin v. Austin, 445 Mass. at 604. See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. at 30 (reasonableness of the monetary provision in an antenuptial agreement “cannot ultimately be judged in isolation”). “It is only where the contesting party is essentially stripped of substantially all marital interests,” and indeed, the terms of the agreement “essentially vitiate the very status of marriage,” that an agreement is not fair and reasonable. Id. at 31.
Here, the judge did not err in concluding that the waiver of alimony provision of the antenuptial agreement was fair and reasonable at the time of its execution. The wife was an educated professional who had a demonstrated earning capacity at the time she executed the agreement in 1992. Although the parties agreed that the wife would leave her job in order to be a “stay-at-home” mother, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the wife would be incapable of working and earning income to support herself in the event of a divorce in the future.
The agreement (in the absence of any limitation or provision to the contrary) also permitted the wife an interest in marital assets accrued by the parties during the marriage. As the husband owned no home at the time the agreement was executed (and was residing with the wife and her three children in the wife’s home in Sandwich), and as the agreement specifically provided “that, in the event of their marriage, the parties expect to reside together in a location, style and manner mutually suitable to them”
At trial, the husband testified that he purchased the medical office building in August, 1999, for $350,000, using premarital assets that originated in a Vanguard fund. He testified further that although the parties took out a $240,000 mortgage on the marital home in July, 1999 (there was no mortgage on the house prior to that time), he did not believe that the proceeds were used for the purchase of the medical office building.
The judge’s findings with respect to the medical office building are, at best, unclear. Although the judge found, consistent with the husband’s testimony, that “[t]he [hjusband “paid $350,000.00 for [the medical office building] property which originated from the Vanguard [a]ccount,” he also found, consistent with the wife’s testimony, that the parties took out
In the circumstances, we vacate the order concerning the medical office building property and remand the matter to the Probate and Family Court so that the judge may better articulate
4. Alleged gift of real estate. In arguing that the judge erred in dividing the equity in the West Barnstable home, the wife asserts that the husband should not have received a credit in the amount of $93,700 for the value of the land on which the house was built as the husband had gifted an interest in the land to her when he executed, delivered, and recorded the deed conveying the West Barnstable property from himself to the parties as tenants by the entirety.
At the outset, it is doubtful that the wife’s brief assertions on the point, which are unsupported by citation to relevant authority, rise to the level of argument contemplated by Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). Even were we to overlook the deficiencies in the wife’s argument, however, we would not disturb the court’s judgment with respect to the “credit.”
The antenuptial agreement does not prohibit the parties from “giving, devising, or bequeathing any of his or her property to the other by will, gift, or otherwise.” Even assuming that the husband’s deeding of the West Barnstable property to himself and the wife as tenants by the entirety created a presumption that there was a gift to the wife of an interest in the land, such a presumption is rebuttable. See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass, at 602; Ross v. Ross, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 508-509 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975). Here, the husband took a position at trial that is inconsistent with the view that he intended to make a gift to the wife of an interest in the value of the land itself. He testified essentially to his understanding that the value of the West Barnstable land that he brought into the marriage and later “commingled” with the assets belonging to him and the wife was protected under the terms of the antenuptial agreement and that he was entitled to reacquire the value of the land as of the date that he “signed it over [as] a marital asset” in 1995.
Although the judge did not make a specific finding concem-
5. Failure to grant divorce on grounds of cruel and abusive treatment. Upon consideration of the arguments raised by the wife, and in view of the wife’s request for a divorce, alternatively, on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment or an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, we cannot say that the judge erred by failing to grant the wife a divorce on the grounds of cruel and abusive treatment.
6. Additional challenges to findings and judgments. It is clear that the judge, on conflicting evidence, rejected the wife’s claim that the parties agreed that in exchange for the wife paying the majority of the household expenses, the husband would accumulate funds to be used for the education of all the children, including her children from her first marriage. We perceive nothing in the wife’s other arguments that would cause us to disturb further the judgment.
7. Conclusion. So much of the judgments of divorce nisi as allow the husband to retain title to the medical office building in South Dennis (paragraph 25 of each of the judgments) are vacated and the matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court with instructions that the judge articulate the rationale for his treatment of the property and enter a new (or, if appropriate, revised) order with respect to the property.
So ordered.
The husband testified that he raised the subject of an antenuptial agreement shortly after learning of the wife’s pregnancy and that he presented the wife with the draft agreement approximately two months prior to the parties’ wedding on January 2, 1993. The wife testified that the husband broached the subject of an antenuptial agreement in November, 1992, but that she did not see the agreement until approximately one week before the parties’ wedding.
It is undisputed that the wife, who at times was crying at the meeting, stated initially that she did not wish to sign the agreement. The husband testified that there were no negotiations concerning the terms of the agreement.
The wife’s income consisted of her salary as a teacher ($660 per week) as well as Social Security and workers’ compensation benefits ($500 per week and $515 per week, respectively) she received on behalf of the three children of her first marriage after the death of her first husband in 1992. The Social Security benefits received by the wife for the benefit of the children were to be reduced proportionately as each child attained the age of eighteen years. The workers’ compensation benefits were to be reduced proportionately as each child completed his or her education.
The agreement provides, inter alia:
“1. Except as otherwise may be expressly provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the individual property of each of the parties, both real and personal, now owned by him or her, or which he or she may hereafter acquire or become entitled to, shall remain and be the sole and exclusive property of the owner, subject to his or her individual control and use as if he or she were unmarried. Neither shall acquire by reason of the marriage any interest in the separate property, now or hereafter acquired, of the other or the right to the control thereof, or any interest in the income or any increase in value arising therefrom. . . .
“2. In the event that the marriage of [the husband] and [the wife] shall terminate by reason of their divorce, or if action for legal separation is initiated by either of them, the parties hereby agree that, in view of their respective ages, existing families and issue, and individual assets and income available to each therefrom, neither party shall make any claim against the other for alimony, separate maintenance, or support, or a division or assignment of income or assets of the other as a*152 part of, or in lieu of, such alimony under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or any other jurisdiction.
“3. Each party hereby acknowledges that the agreements contained herein shall constitute a reasonable resolution of any rights they may acquire in the income, asset, or estate of the other in all foreseeable circumstances, including legal separation and termination of the marriage by divorce, giving consideration to their current and future ages, the length of the marriage, and other factors cognizable under Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 208, Section 34, or similar laws of other jurisdictions.”
At the time of the marriage, title to the home was in the wife’s name. Shortly after the marriage the wife conveyed the property to herself and the husband as tenants by the entirety and the husband contributed $7,500 to the home (roughly the same amount as the wife’s down payment on the home).
This figure was reduced at some point when the wife’s oldest child from her previous marriage became emancipated and the wife stopped receiving Social Security benefits on his behalf.
At the time of the divorce, the wife was employed part-time as a teacher’s assistant at an elementary school at a salary of $236.40 per week. The wife also received Social Security benefits on behalf of one remaining eligible child of her first marriage in the amount of $255.80 per week and workers’ compensation benefits on behalf of her three older children in the amount of $604.65 per week. Although the judge found that the husband’s income as reflected on his financial statement was $2,302.60 per week, the judge stated that it is unlikely that the husband, who did not work on Fridays, was suffering the loss he was claiming from his medical practice. The husband presently lives with a female companion who is the facility manager at his medical office clinic and who earns approximately $60,000 per year.
The judge found that the bulk of the assets could be traced to the husband’s premarital assets.
As we have stated, the West Barnstable home was worth $1,075,000 at the time of trial. Because the home had been built on a lot for which the husband had paid $93,700 prior to the marriage, the judge deducted that amount from the value of the property (resulting in a sum of $981,300). The judge determined that the husband was entitled to twenty percent of the $981,300 value of the property (based on his twenty percent “contribution” or payment of the household’s operating expenses), or $196,260, as well as reimbursement for his payment of $19,543 toward the college costs of one of the wife’s children from her first marriage. The judge ordered the husband to transfer his interest in the West Barnstable property to the wife and to pay off the existing mortgage on the property before May 1, 2003. In consideration of the transfer, the judge ordered the wife to execute an unassignable noninterest bearing promissory note in the amount of $309,503 ($93,700 plus $196,260 plus $19,543), secured by a first mortgage, which was to “be due and payable [to the husband] upon the emancipation of the children [of the marriage], the sale of the real estate, or the [w]ife’s remarriage, whichever first occurs.”
In her brief and in her oral argument to this court, the wife made no attempt to distinguish legally between the terms “coercion” and “duress” and appears to use them synonymously. See Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 406 n.7 (1989).
The wife claims, in essence, a “prior agreement to marry” where she “completed her obligation [thereunder] by becoming pregnant.”
The wife makes no argument on appeal that her religious or moral beliefs contributed to the alleged coercive atmosphere at the time the antenuptial agreement was executed.
For additional cases upholding, against claims of coercion, duress, or undue influence, a trial judge’s determination that an antenuptial agreement executed by a woman who was pregnant was valid, see In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 355 (1976); Herrera v. Herrera, 895 So. 2d 1171, 1173, 1175 (Fla. App. 2005); Mallen v. Mallen, 280 Ga. 43, 45-46 (2005); Osomo v. Osomo, 76 S.W.3d 509, 511 (Tex. App. 2002) (reasoning that because duress consists of a threat to do something a party has no legal right to do, and because the father had no legal duty to marry the pregnant mother, “[h]is threat to do something he had the legal right to do is insufficient to invalidate the premarital agreement”). Other appellate cases we have located in our research, in which courts have found coercion or duress (or that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there was coercion) in circumstances where, among other factors, an antenuptial agreement was executed by a pregnant woman, are distinguishable from the case at bar. In Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 266-268 (Ct. App. 2005), the court, in concluding that the wife, who was from the Ukraine, did not enter into the premarital agreement freely and voluntarily, noted that not only was the wife pregnant at the time she executed the premarital agreement, but her visa was about to expire (thus requiring her to leave the United States unless she married), she could not understand the agreement, and she had no money of her own to retain or consult with an attorney or a translator. In Williams v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Ala. 1992), the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate as the testimony in the case created genuine issues of material fact as to whether, among other things, the “the father’s conditioning the marriage on the pregnant mother’s signing the antenuptial agreement, joined with the mother’s moral objection to abortion and the importance of legitimacy in a small town, created a coercive atmosphere in which the mother had no viable alternative to accepting the father’s condition for marriage, i.e., signing the agreement.”
There is no merit in the wife’s additional arguments that she had no way to verify the husband’s disclosures concerning the existence and values of his assets in exhibit A to the parties’ agreement (or to correct errors concerning her own assets listed in exhibit B), and that she was coerced into signing the exhibits. As to the former point, the wife does not argue that the husband’s disclosures were incorrect in any material respect, and in fact, her attorney stated at trial: “We’ll stipulate that the [husband’s] assets as listed, we have no reason to dispute their value except [in minor respects] for the ring.” It is also not clear why the wife was unable to correct the value of her own assets appearing in exhibit B if they were, in fact, incorrect. In any event, the wife indicated during cross-examination at trial that the assets and values in exhibit B were substantially correct; her primary complaint was that her furniture, appliances, and other miscellaneous personal property were worth less than the $10,000 figure reflected in the exhibit. As to the latter point, we cannot say that the wife’s execution of the exhibits was the product of coercion or duress. We note also that the wife’s terse and sketchy assertions in the initial section of her brief that touch on the fairness and reasonableness of the agreement do not constitute argument within the meaning of Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). We address the fairness and reasonableness of the agreement in our discussion, infra, of the validity of the wife’s waiver of alimony.
The wife made clear at oral argument that she was challenging the fairness and reasonableness of the agreement at the time of its execution and not its conscionability at the time of enforcement (the so-called “second look” during which a judge determines whether “due to circumstances occurring during the course of the marriage, enforcement. . . would leave the contesting spouse ‘without sufficient property, maintenance, or appropriate employment to support’ herself.” DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass, at 37, quoting from 1 Clark, Jr., Domestic Relations in the United States § 1.9 [2d ed. 1987], Austin v. Austin, 445 Mass. at 604. Korff v. Korff, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 97 [2005]).
The wife had shown the ability to work full time prior to the parties’ mar
It seems implicit in this provision of the agreement that the parties anticipated residing in a location other than the home in Sandwich. We note that the agreement further provides: “If separation or divorce proceedings are commenced by either party against the other at a time when either is living in any house or apartment that had been initially obtained by the other, then at the request of the party who had initially obtained such residence, he or she thereupon will immediately vacate the same and remove all of his or her personal possessions therefrom.”
Although the agreement in the present case contains no provision, as in Austin, that the husband would assist the wife with support if there were no jointly owned marital home at the time of the divorce, we think the circumstances in this case, in their entirety, support the finding that the agreement was fair and reasonable.
As to the two remaining factors set out in Austin v. Austin, 445 Mass. at 604, the wife, as we have indicated, was fully informed of the husband’s worth at the time of the execution of the agreement, and the agreement sets forth a waiver by the wife of various spousal rights.
At the commencement of trial, the judge read into the record an agreed statement of facts prepared by the parties. One of the agreed facts was that the mortgage on the marital home “was originally taken out for $90,000 and the proceeds of which were used in part to fund the husband’s purchase” of the medical office building. After the wife’s attorney informed the court that the original mortgage was $240,000, the husband’s attorney indicated that the stipulation could be revised, stating his belief (with apparent agreement of the husband) that “what happened was $240,000 was used to purchase the [medical office] building and it was then paid down to $90,000 and they refinanced it to get a lower interest rate.” The judge then stated that the stipulation would read that the mortgage on the West Barnstable property “was originally taken out in the amount of $240,000. Currently $90,000.” The wife’s attorney responded: “That’s correct and the proceeds were used at least in part and that’s a matter of contention” (emphasis supplied). At trial, the husband testified that to the extent the stipulation stated that the proceeds of the mortgage were used in part to fund the purchase of the medical office building, he did not believe it was accurate.
The judge found, in addition, that the net profits of $25,000 from the sale of the Sandwich home in 1995 “went into the marital home,” that the money for the construction of the marital home was generated by the parties during the marriage from their respective incomes, and that the $240,000 mortgage on the marital home (which was reduced to $86,000 at the time of trial) was paid by the husband from his “income” and “rental income.” (The husband testified, among other things, that he aggressively paid the mortgage down through his “earnings”; the wife testified that the mortgage was paid with rental income received from the medical office building).
It is undisputed that both the husband and the wife signed the mortgage documents. “[I]n Massachusetts, the granting of a mortgage vests [legal] title in the mortgagee to the land placed as security for the underlying debt,” while equitable title is retained by the mortgagor. Maglione v. BancBoston Mort. Corp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 90 (1990). See Teschke v. Keller, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 627, 634 (1995); McLaughlin v. Amirsaleh, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 873, 883 (2006). The husband testified that he did not remember why he did not put the wife’s name on the medical office building property.
On appeal, the husband does not appear to argue that the disposition of the medical office building turns on his sole ownership of the property. Rather, while acknowledging that the mortgage was taken out and used (together with “other premarital funds”) to fund the purchase of the medical office building, he justifies the court’s award on the ground that the building “was purchased with his own premarital funds whether characterized as a mortgage on the marital home or through his investment accounts” and that “[i]t is a fiction to suppose that the marital home, found to be a marital asset, was anything more than a convenient vehicle for [him] to fund the purchase without dedicating his investment monies to this enterprise, which he could have done.” He also asserts that the wife failed to contribute in any way to the financing of the purchase of the medical office building and that it has never been part of the marital estate.
Although the husband opined at trial that the West Barnstable land was worth $200,000 in 1995, the judge credited him with the value of the property as of the date the antenuptial agreement was signed.
That part of the order requiring the husband to be solely responsible for the “homeowner’s” insurance and real estate taxes on the medical office