DocketNumber: No. 06-P-949
Citation Numbers: 69 Mass. App. Ct. 860
Judges: Cypher
Filed Date: 8/27/2007
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/25/2022
The school committee of Hull (committee) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming an arbitrator’s award. The arbitrator concluded that the committee had violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by failing to comply with certain requirements for the evaluation of Alice Haseltine,
Background. Haseltine had been employed full time by the committee since 2001. She divided her time forty per cent as a technology instructor and sixty per cent as a guidance counsel-lor at Hull High School. On May 30, 2003, she was called to the office of the principal, Russell Goyette, and given a letter which stated: “Pursuant to . . . General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 41, I am sorry to inform you that we will not be renewing your contract for the 2003-2004 school year.” No reason was given. The Hull Teachers Association (association) filed a grievance on Haseltine’s behalf. When that procedure did not resolve the grievance, the association sought arbitration of the grievance. The stipulated issues presented to the arbitrator were: “Did the School Committee violate Article VI, Sections 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and Article XLIH of the Association’s collective bargaining agreement in the manner in which it evaluated the Grievant prior to the decision not to reappoint her for the 2003-04 school year? If so, what shall be the remedy?”
The arbitrator concluded that the committee had failed to comply with certain requirements for the evaluation of Haseltine, as stated in the parties’ CBA. In the award, the arbitrator ordered that Haseltine be reinstated to her position. The committee sought to vacate the arbitrator’s award in the Superior Court. G. L. c. 150C, § 11. The association sought an order confirming the award. G. L. c. 150C, § 10.
A judge concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his
Discussion. We proceed under familiar principles governing judicial review of decisions of arbitrators. See Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass. 1006, 1007 (1990) (courts inquire into arbitration only to determine if arbitrator has exceeded scope of authority or decided matter based on fraud, arbitrary conduct, or procedural irregularity in hearings).
We first examine the statutory framework established by the Act, applicable to this case, to determine if the arbitrator correctly determined that the scope of his authority in considering the grievance was not limited by the Act. Such a determination belongs with the courts. Cf. School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 230 (2001) (responsibility for interpreting statute and arbitrator’s authority thereunder remains with court).
The committee relies on a provision in G. L. c. 71, § 42, that teachers without professional teacher status “shall otherwise be deemed employees at will.”
Section 42 was rewritten by St. 1993, c. 71, § 44. The ver
While the Act significantly gave principals “primary responsibility for hiring, disciplining, and terminating teachers [and other assigned personnel],” G. L. c. 71, § 59B, the “Legislature did not grant principals unfettered discretion . . . .” School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 761 (2003). They must follow the strict procedural and substantive provisions in G. L. c. 71, § 42, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 71, § 44. Cf. ibid. “[B]y enacting § 59B, the Legislature carefully balanced school-based management reforms with the district-wide needs of school systems and the collective bargaining rights of school employees over the terms and conditions of their employment.” Id. at 762. In fact, G. L. c. 71, § 38, mandates that a superintendent of schools “shall require the evaluation ... of teachers without professional teacher status every year,” and that the procedures for conducting those evaluations “shall be subject to the collective bargaining provisions of [c. 150E].” G. L. c. 71, § 38, third par., as amended through St. 1993, c. 71, § 40 (essentially unchanged from version of statute in effect prior to 1993).
The central issue in Haseltine’s grievance, and the subject of arbitration, was her claim that the committee dismissed her without following the evaluation procedures set forth in the CBA.
For these reasons, we conclude that nothing in the Act prohibited arbitration of Haseltine’s grievance, and that the arbitrator properly derived his power and authority from the CBA. Compare School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. at 230-231. See generally School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 372 Mass. 106, 113 (1977) (school committee may not surrender its authority to make tenure decisions but may bind itself to follow certain procedures).
The relevant facts underlying the grievance indicate that during her first year (2001-2002) Haseltine was never formally observed in the classroom and received no written observation reports or a summative evaluation by the principal then in office, as required by the CBA. After Goyette became principal in February, 2002, Haseltine asked about observations and evaluation, but was told they would not be done. Haseltine was reappointed by Goyette to a second year. There were no formal observations in her second year (2002-2003) until May, when three observations were made, but no post observation reports or summative evaluations were prepared. No observations or evaluations of Haseltine’s performance as a guidance counselor were made.
The arbitrator properly could conclude that there had been a violation of the CBA from the failure to perform the evaluations.
In his award, the arbitrator ordered Haseltine reinstated.
We conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by ordering reinstatement of Haseltine in these circumstances. Because Haseltine’s nonrenewal was not based on a conclusion drawn from an evaluation of her performance as a teacher, the order did not impinge on the ultimate authority of the principal or the committee. The order of reinstatement simply required the principal and the committee to follow the procedures agreed to in the CBA. There is ample authority and precedent for such a reinstatement.
“The agreement to follow certain procedures preliminary to exercising its right to decide a tenure question, and to permit ar
Judgment affirmed.
The Education Reform Act of 1993, St. 1993, c. 71, § 43, “replaced the concept of ‘tenure’ with ‘professional teacher status.’ ” Lyons v. School Comm. of Dedham, 440 Mass. 74, 76 n.3 (2003).
The Act, which contains some 105 provisions, significantly altered the management of public schools. See generally School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 759-760 (2003).
General Laws c. 71, § 42, second par., inserted by St. 1993, c. 71, § 44, states: “A teacher who has been teaching in a school system for at least ninety calendar days shall not be dismissed unless he has been furnished with written notice of intent to dismiss and with an explanation of the grounds for the dismissal in sufficient detail to permit the teacher to respond and documents relating to the grounds for dismissal, and, if he so requests, has been given a reasonable opportunity within ten school days after receiving such written notice to review the decision with the principal. . . , and to present information pertaining to the basis for the decision and to the teacher’s status. . . . Teachers without professional teacher status shall otherwise be deemed employees at will.”
Article XLIII of the CBA, § 43.2, provides that all Tier I nonprofessional status teachers, such as Haseltine, “shall receive a written summative evaluation based upon a minimum of three (3) formal observations.” Section 43.3
Section 43.5 states that “[t]he right to appeal is a critical element of the Hull Teacher Evaluation Process,” and describes a four-step procedure of appeal to the superintendent of schools.
The committee complains that the arbitrator’s decision requires it to comply with an “elaborate set of conditions,” contradictory to its assertion of at-will status, and to meet a standard for nonrenewal which is higher than the “just cause” standard applicable to dismissal of teachers with professional status. There is no merit in these complaints. The arbitrator only ordered the committee to follow the procedures it agreed to in the CBA. The arbitrator’s decision does not in any way direct how the teaching standards in Appendix E of the CBA are to be substantively applied.
The arbitrator’s award stated: “The School Committee violate[d] [several provisions] of the Association’s collective bargaining agreement in the manner in which it evaluated the Grievant prior to the decision not to reappoint her for the 2003-04 school year. Haseltine is to be reinstated to her position in the Hull School system and made whole retroactive to the end of her prior contract. Upon her reinstatement, she will be considered a Tier [I] teacher without professional teacher status. I retain jurisdiction for purposes of remedy only."