DocketNumber: 16–P–1499
Citation Numbers: 95 N.E.3d 298, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1116
Filed Date: 12/4/2017
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
Codefendants Luis Taveras and Daileen Cruz were each convicted of distribution of heroin and an accompanying school zone violation. On appeal Taveras argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to show that he engaged in a joint venture to distribute heroin. Cruz raises three arguments: her confrontation rights were violated when the judge allowed a substitute chemist to testify as to the identity of the substance that was tested; the judge erred by allowing a State trooper to testify as both a percipient witness and an expert witness; and the evidence was insufficient to establish that the substance was heroin. We agree with Taveras that there was insufficient evidence to prove his participation in a joint venture and therefore reverse his convictions.
Background. We summarize the facts, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
Sepulveda then crossed the street and approached Cruz, who was sitting next to Taveras on the front porch of a house. After a hand-to-hand exchange with Cruz, Sepulveda walked back across the street with his hand clenched and gave Anderson a small clear bag with a tan powdered substance inside. Anderson gave Sepulveda a twenty-dollar bill and a ten-dollar bill in exchange.
Trooper Brian O'Neil was surveilling the transaction from a nearby undercover vehicle. He saw Sepulveda separate the bills and place one in his pocket while walking back across the street. Sepulveda then gave Taveras the bill that was in his hand. After Sepulveda left the area, O'Neil approached Cruz and Taveras, who were still sitting on the porch. O'Neil searched Taveras and found a ten-dollar bill but nothing else. Cruz was never searched, and no evidence was presented that the twenty-dollar bill was recovered.
Discussion. 1. Taveras's appeal. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Mendez,
To convict a defendant as a joint venturer, the Commonwealth must prove "that [he] knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged, and that [he] had or shared the required criminal intent." Commonwealth v. Zanetti,
Here, the evidence does not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Taveras consciously acted together with Cruz and Sepulveda before or during the crime with the shared intent to distribute heroin. Certainly, as the Commonwealth argues, the jury could have inferred that the ten-dollar bill Sepulveda gave to Taveras was the same one Trooper Anderson gave to Sepulveda in exchange for the heroin. But while this established a possibility, maybe even a probability, that Taveras had the requisite knowledge and criminal intent, it did not allow a rational jury to so conclude beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Russell,
Our conclusion is consistent with past decisions in which we reversed convictions for drug distribution based on insufficient evidence of a joint venture. The evidence in those cases was demonstrably stronger than, or comparable to, the evidence here.
2. Cruz's appeal. We reject each of the arguments raised by Cruz. She first contends that her confrontation rights were violated when the judge allowed a substitute chemist to testify that, after reviewing the report generated by the original chemist,
Next, Cruz argues that the judge abused his discretion by allowing Trooper O'Neil to testify as both a percipient witness and an expert witness, over Cruz's objection. Although it is not preferred practice, "[a] percipient police witness may also testify as an expert witness, though care should be taken in presenting such expert testimony." Commonwealth v. Ortiz,
Here, O'Neil's expert testimony was confined to explaining how certain undercover operations are conducted and what is customary in street-level narcotics transactions. The testimony was explanatory and did not cross the line into expressing a direct opinion about Cruz's guilt. Contrary to Cruz's characterization, O'Neil did not testify that "it was 'a fact' that a drug transaction had taken place." Rather, he testified that he did not conduct a fingerprint analysis on the bag given to Anderson because he knew for a fact "where it had come from" based on his observations as a percipient witness. We discern no abuse of discretion in the admission of his testimony.
Finally, Cruz argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the substance in the bag was heroin. We disagree. As discussed above, the judge properly admitted the substitute chemist's opinion that the substance contained heroin. Moreover, O'Neil testified that he has "seen heroin packaged for sale thousands of times" and the substance in the bag "was consistent in the packaging and the color and the texture of all the other heroin [he has] dealt with." Anderson similarly testified that he believed that the "off-white, tan type powdered substance" he received was heroin and that it was consistent with the appearance of heroin he had seized in the past. The jury could also infer that Anderson received what he requested from Sepulveda, via Cruz. See Commonwealth v. Resende,
Conclusion. As to Cruz, the judgments are affirmed. As to Taveras, the judgments are reversed, the verdicts are set aside, and judgments are to enter for Taveras.
So ordered.
Affirmed as to one defendant; reversed and judgments entered for other defendant.
Given our ruling, we do not address Taveras's other arguments except to the extent they overlap with those of Cruz.
Anderson testified that "brown" is street terminology for heroin.
See Saez,
The original chemist had taken a new job in Canada by the time of trial.