DocketNumber: 17-P-1093
Filed Date: 9/28/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
On March 30, 1988, the defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of rape of a child under the age of sixteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23. A Superior Court judge (sentencing judge) sentenced the defendant to nine to fifteen years in State prison, "[t]hree (3) years to be served, balance suspended." The sentencing judge separately imposed five years of probation.
In 2017, two qualified examiners determined that the defendant was no longer a sexually dangerous person. The defendant was subsequently released from civil confinement. On April 18, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to terminate his probation, arguing that his probation ran concurrently with his civil commitment and therefore his probation has been served.
On appeal the defendant argues that the motion judge erred for two reasons. First, the defendant argues that the sentencing judge intended for the defendant's civil commitment to run concurrently with his imposed probation. Second, the defendant argues that the motion judge's order commencing the defendant's probation after his civil commitment violates his due process rights. We disagree and affirm the motion judge's order for the same reasons set forth in Commonwealth v. Sheridan,
Order entered April 27, 2017, denying motion to determine probation status affirmed.
On the lower court docket, the State prison sentence was listed under "SENTENCE" and the probation term was listed separately under "PROBATION."
That indictment charged the defendant with the four counts of rape of a child under the age of sixteen.
The defendant's motion was labeled "Motion to Determine Probation Status," which the motion judge treated as a motion to terminate probation.