DocketNumber: 18-P-41
Citation Numbers: 122 N.E.3d 1098, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1115
Filed Date: 1/2/2019
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the defendant, Elizabeth A. Santos, was convicted of negligent operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain witness testimony, and statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument. We affirm.
Background. We summarize the facts the judge could have found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore,
The crash occurred on Mill Road, which is a residential street with a posted speed limit of thirty miles per hour. It is undisputed that Mill Road is a public way. Trees and mailboxes line the road and it is near a wildlife preserve. After the paramedics arrived, Mahoney looked for the cause of the crash. Mahoney testified that he believed there was "paint transfer" on a tree down the road and he observed skid marks in the path of travel. The scene was consistent with the defendant hitting the brakes hard to swerve and hitting a tree, resulting in the vehicle turning onto its side.
The defendant was charged with two criminal offenses -- operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs (OUI), G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1), and negligent operation of a motor vehicle -- and two civil infractions, including a marked lanes violation, G. L. c. 89, § 4A, and speeding, G. L. c. 90, § 17. At trial the judge, over objection, permitted Mahoney, Martel, and Schlageter to testify about their previous encounters with the defendant, including prior overdoses.
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty, which was denied. The judge acquitted the defendant of OUI and convicted the defendant of negligent operation.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (quotation omitted). Latimore,
To sustain a conviction of negligent operation, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle (2) on a public way, (3) negligently, so as to endanger the lives or safety of the public. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ). Only the third element is at issue in this appeal. The statute requires proof that the defendant's conduct might have endangered the safety of the public, not that it, in fact, did. See Commonwealth v. Duffy,
The defendant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove negligence beyond a reasonable doubt because the judge found that the Commonwealth had not shown the defendant was under the influence of drugs. Accordingly, the defendant argues, the only remaining evidence of negligence is the crash itself, which the defendant contends is insufficient to prove negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. See Aucella v. Commonwealth,
The flaw in the defendant's argument is that the acquittal of OUI does not preclude consideration of impairment in determining guilt of negligent operation. See Commonwealth v. Woods,
2. Admission of prior bad acts testimony. The defendant also argues that the judge erred in permitting Mahoney and the paramedics to testify to their observations of the defendant during prior alleged overdoses, as it constituted improper prior bad acts evidence. Where, as here, the testimony was objected to at trial, we review for prejudicial error. Commonwealth v. Cruz,
We need not determine whether the judge erred in admitting the testimony, as we conclude that if there was error, it was not prejudicial. A judge in a jury-waived trial is presumed to have "correctly instructed himself" on the law, absent contrary indication. Commonwealth v. Kerns,
3. Closing argument. The defendant further argues that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden to the defendant during closing argument when he asked for a guilty finding because there was "no other evidence that ... shows that the vehicle was caused to exit from the roadway." The defendant did not object to this comment at trial; thus, we review for substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Martinez,
Even if there was error, it was harmless when viewed in context of the entire case. Moreover, this was a jury-waived trial and "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, a trial judge acting as trier of fact is presumed to apply correct legal principles" when assessing a prosecutor's misstatements.
Judgment affirmed.
It does not seem to be disputed that the defendant had a prescription for Klonopin. In addition, Mahoney found a prescription bottle in the defendant's name labeled Trazadone in the defendant's vehicle. The defendant is a diabetic and suffers from seizures.
Mahoney testified that he had previously seen the defendant in "an altered state of mind or not thinking clearly" and behaving oddly. Martel testified that he had observed the defendant sleeping in her vehicle in several public locations. Schlageter testified that he had treated the defendant for drug use, including Klonopin, on multiple occasions, including when the defendant called for help and reported that she had overdosed. During those encounters, Schlageter had observed the defendant with a bright blue substance around her mouth.
Martel also opined that the crash occurred because the defendant was "under the influence of some sort of substance." Schlageter testified that the circumstances surrounding the accident were consistent with a Klonopin overdose.
The judge also found the defendant not responsible for the marked lanes violation and speeding.
Even though the defendant failed to renew her motion for a required finding of not guilty, we still consider "whether the Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it closed its case" (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Alden,