DocketNumber: 18-P-501
Citation Numbers: 122 N.E.3d 1100, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1118
Filed Date: 1/22/2019
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
Augustus Laface appeals from the summary judgment entered in Superior Court enforcing a settlement agreement between Laface and Youssef Matar in settlement of a prior action by Matar. The motion judge held that a memorandum of understanding (MOU) detailing the terms of the settlement, filed with the court in the prior action, was binding as a matter of law and ordered the entry of judgment for Matar. We affirm
Background. In 2005, Matar filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in connection with Matar's land purchase from Laface.
When Matar moved for summary judgment, the motion judge agreed that it was warranted, concluding that the MOU was an enforceable contract, and he ordered the entry of judgment for Matar. On appeal, the sole argument raised by Laface is that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the parties intended to be bound by the MOU. In support of this argument Laface relies on his affidavit stating that he did not intend to be bound by the MOU, but only by the settlement agreement, which was never executed.
Discussion. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Juliano v. Simpson,
Here the issue before us is whether the MOU representing the settlement agreement reached by the parties is an enforceable contract. "The interpretation of a contested written contract is a question of law ordinarily appropriate for disposition by summary judgment. See Lumber Mut. Ins. v. Zoltek Corp.,
While our review is de novo, we have the benefit of the motion judge's thorough and thoughtful decision. After independently considering the record and the applicable law, we reach the same conclusion. Here the MOU contained all of the essential terms of a contract. The language of the MOU, that the parties "have agreed to settle" the case and that Laface "will pay" the amount specified in the MOU in accordance with a payment plan, was not conditional or contingent and reflected the parties' intent to be bound. See Dominick v. Dominick,
Judgment affirmed.
The action concerned alleged misrepresentations about the buildability of the lot.