DocketNumber: 17-P-965
Citation Numbers: 122 N.E.3d 1101, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1119
Filed Date: 1/29/2019
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
A jury convicted the defendant, Robert J. Perron, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), G. L. c. 90, § 24D.
Discussion. Testifying for the Commonwealth at trial, State Trooper Paul Bertozzi stated that on the night of his arrest, the defendant admitted to drinking "two small bottles of red wine" and assessed his level of intoxication at a "two" on a scale of one to ten, with one being completely sober. The defendant contends that these statements were inadmissible under Miranda, and we agree.
We review decisions on motions to suppress with deference "to the motion judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous," but "independently apply constitutional principles to the facts." Commonwealth v. Leahy,
Absent exceptions inapplicable here, police must administer Miranda warnings when suspects are in custodial interrogations. See Commonwealth v. Simon,
At the motion hearing, Bertozzi testified that he orally administered the warnings to the defendant upon his arrest and, further, that the defendant "indicate[d] that he understood those rights." However, on cross-examination, Bertozzi contradicted himself, testifying that the defendant never "indicated to [me] at all that he understood those rights," that "he was waiving those rights," or "that he wanted to speak to [me] about the incident." No one gave the defendant Miranda warnings at any other time or in any other form.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the motion judge "credit[ed] the trooper's statements that he made relative to the issues that [were] raised," but he did not resolve the glaring conflict in the trooper's testimony and, thus, we cannot conclude that this unresolved conflicting testimony rises to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare Commonwealth v. Flynn,
Accordingly, in the absence of a supportable finding that the defendant understood the Miranda warnings and knowingly waived them, we cannot conclude that the defendant waived his Miranda rights beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell,
We turn now to "whether the admission of the defendant's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Hoyt,
Here, the defendant's impaired ability to drive safely was the only contested issue at trial. The Commonwealth introduced testimony as to the defendant's slurred speech, glassy eyes, and the odor of alcohol coming from his breath. However, absent the defendant's statement, there was no evidence as to the amount or type of alcohol the defendant had consumed. The Commonwealth also introduced evidence of the defendant's poor performance on his field sobriety tests but, again, absent the defendant's admission to consuming two small bottles of wine, the jury might have accepted the defendant's explanation that a prior back injury resulting in two broken bones and not alcohol interfered with his ability to perform these tests properly. In our view, therefore, the Commonwealth's evidence, which may have been sufficient -- see Commonwealth v. Connolly,
So ordered.
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
The jury also convicted the defendant of negligent operation and failing to stop for police. The trial judge found the defendant responsible for a marked lanes violation. None of these is before us in this appeal.
Concluding as we do, we need not separately address the defendant's sufficiency claim, which would require, in any event, that we include the improperly admitted statements in our analysis. See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto,