SYLVIE SINAPAH v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (And a Consolidated Case).

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
20-P-650
SYLVIE SINAPAH
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (and a
consolidated case1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Sylvie Sinapah, appeals from orders and a
judgment of the District Court, and an order by a single justice
of this court, stemming from two separate decisions by the
Department of Unemployment Assistance Board of Review (DUA). We
affirm.
In the first case, DUA deemed Sinapah ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Five months later, Sinapah filed a
complaint for judicial review in the District Court, accompanied
by a motion for leave to file a late appeal. See G. L. c. 151A,
§ 42 (establishing thirty-day appeal period). A judge denied
Sinapah's motion, and the complaint was dismissed. Sinapah did
not appeal. Instead, she filed a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P.
1 The consolidated case involves the same parties.
60 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), to vacate the judge's order
denying her request to appeal late. A different judge denied
the motion, and Sinapah appealed that decision.2
In a second case, DUA allowed recoupment of money from
Sinapah's State income tax refund because she had received
benefits to which she was not entitled. A different judge
denied Sinapah's petition for review and Sinapah appealed.3
After the record was assembled for the appeal, Sinapah filed a
"Motion to Impound Some Materials." The judge endorsed the
motion "No action taken as file has been transferred to Appeals
Court." Sinapah's request for reconsideration of that ruling
was denied and she appealed. Sinapah also moved in the District
Court to proceed under a pseudonym in both cases. When her
motions were denied, Sinapah appealed.4 The two appeals were
consolidated in this court. Sinapah's subsequent application
for a stay of the consolidated appeal was denied by a single
justice, and her appeal of that order was also consolidated into
this appeal.
2 That appeal, from the order in Northampton Dist. Ct. No.
1645CV000252, was docketed in this court as case no. 20-P-650.
3 That appeal, from the judgment in Northampton Dist. Ct. No.
1745CV000062, was docketed in this court as case no. 20-P-452.
4 The appeal of the orders in no. 1745CV000062 were consolidated
with 20-P-452; the appeal of the order in no. 1645CV000252 was
consolidated with 20-P-650.
2
Discussion. 1. Rule 60 (b) motion. In December 2016, a
judge denied Sinapah's motion to file a late appeal of the DUA's
determination of ineligibility as untimely, pursuant to G. L.
c. 151A, § 42. In February 2020, a different judge denied
Sinapah's motion for relief from that order, stating "[t]he
Order was from a decision against the Plaintiff on 12/31/16.
Now more than 4 (four) years later, the Plaintiff once again
attempts to reverse the decision. This lapse of time cannot be
construed as reasonable and is just another effort by the
Plaintiff to overturn a judgment she disagrees with." Although
the judge mistakenly indicated the motion was filed four years
after the initial decision instead of just over three years
later, a lapse of three years to file the motion still cannot be
construed as reasonable in these circumstances. See Owens v.
Mukendi, 448 Mass. 66, 77 (2006). Accordingly, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the judge's decision.5 See id. at 72;
Franzosa v. Franzosa, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 179, 182 (2020).
2. Ineligibility.6 Sinapah contends that the judge erred
in affirming the DUA's decision deeming her ineligible for
5 We also note that Sinapah did not request an evidentiary
hearing on the motion to vacate and it was in the judge's
discretion to deny the motion without a hearing. See Cicchese
v. Tape Time Corp., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 75 (1989).
6 On July 19, 2017, two months after the judgment entered,
Sinapah filed an extension request to enlarge the time to file
an appeal that a judge allowed for thirty days beginning July
20, 2017. Sinapah then filed a notice of appeal on August 18,
3
unemployment benefits. Our review of the board's decision is
governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L. c. 151A, § 42.
We accord deference to the expertise of the agency and will set
aside DUA's decision only if it is "unsupported by substantial
evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or not in accordance with law." Coverall N. Am., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447 Mass. 852,
857 (2006).
Here, the review examiner's conclusion that Sinapah did not
have work authorization, and thus was legally unavailable to
work and ineligible for benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 24
(b), was supported by substantial evidence. To be eligible for
benefits under § 24 (b), the individual must be "capable of,
available, and actively seeking work." The hearing examiner
found that Sinapah "entered the United States on a J-1 Visa
valid from December 23, 2013 to December 22, 2018 in a research
program that was scheduled to end on February 1, 2015."
Although the program was eligible for an extension, the
university declined to extend the program "beyond February 1,
2015 and thus, it effectively pulled [Sinapah's] sponsorship and
2017. Although the extension granted exceeded the judge's
authority, see G. L. c. 151A, § 42; Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019), we decline to dismiss the
appeal as untimely where Sinapah, proceeding pro se, adhered to
the enlargement of time permitted by the judge.
4
work authorization." Despite Sinapah's attempt to rectify the
situation and obtain another sponsor, at the time of the
hearing, she had not successfully procured another sponsor and
thus was not authorized to work in the United States past the
expiration of her program on February 1, 2015. We thus discern
no grounds for disturbing DUA's decision under G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14 (7). See Kelley v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec.,
374 Mass. 823, 823 (1978).
3. District Court motions. Sinapah asserts that the
decision to take no action on her motion to impound the
administrative record was error. The motion to impound was
filed after the record was already assembled for Sinapah's
appeal of the judgment in that case. Relying on G. L. c. 151A,
§ 46 (a), Sinapah asserted that impoundment was required because
§ 46 mandates strict confidentiality of materials related to the
unemployment hearings. However, § 46 (b) (1) permits the
inclusion of the materials in proceedings where the DUA is a
necessary party. See G. L. c. 151A, § 46 (b) (1). Thus, even
if the motion to impound was timely, see Rule 2 (a) (1) of the
Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (motion "must be filed
and ruled upon prior to submission of the actual material sought
to be impounded"), we are satisfied that the judge did not abuse
her discretion. See New England Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of
5
Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County, 462
Mass. 76, 83 (2012).
Likewise, we discern no error in the denials of Sinapah's
motions to litigate using a pseudonym, as well as her motions to
reconsider those decisions. "We have reviewed the materials
. . . and nothing in them compels us to conclude that the
petitioner has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the
customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness
in judicial proceedings" (quotations omitted). Singer v.
Rosenkranz, 453 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2009), quoting Doe v. Bell
Atl. Business Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass.
1995).7
4. Single justice order. A single justice lifted stays of
both appeals before they were consolidated, reasoning that
Sinapah could not demonstrate that the outcome of Federal
litigation would impact her appeals where DUA was not a party to
the Federal case. Because there was no reason to wait to
address Sinapah's claims, it follows that the second single
justice correctly denied Sinapah's motion for a stay of the
consolidated appeal.8
7 To the extent the plaintiff now complains that the judge denied
her requests without a hearing, we note that she did not request
a hearing on these motions.
8 We decline to address Sinapah's cursory and unsubstantiated
contentions that various judges of the District and Appeals
6
Conclusion. The order in the first District Court case,
dated February 25, 2020, is affirmed. The judgment in the
second District Court case, dated May 22, 2017, is affirmed.
The orders in both District Court cases, dated March 9, 2020,
are affirmed. Finally, the single justice order dated June 6,
2022, is affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Rubin,
Englander & Brennan, JJ.9),
Clerk
Entered: June 21, 2023.
Courts are biased against her. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9)
(A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
7