PETER CUOZZO & Another v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF WESTWOOD & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
21-P-861
PETER CUOZZO & another.1
vs.
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF WESTWOOD & others.2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The zoning board for the town of Westwood (board) appeals
from a Land Court judgment annulling a retroactive variance the
board granted to Christopher and Joy Colby (Colbys). See G. L.
c. 40A, § 17. On appeal, the board claims that the Colbys'
abutters, Mary and Peter Cuozzo (Cuozzos), lacked standing to
challenge the variance and that the trial judge erred as a
matter of law in determining that no rational view of the facts
supported the board's determination. For the reasons set forth
in the trial judge's well-reasoned decision, we affirm.
Background. We summarize the judge's factual findings,
none of which are challenged on appeal. The Cuozzos purchased
their property in 1997. The Colbys bought their 6,000 square
1 Mary G. Cuozzo.
2 Joy F. Colby and Christopher M. Colby.
foot property in 1999. The rear yard of the Cuozzos' property
abuts the rear yard of the Colbys' property. At the time of the
Colbys' purchase, the structures on their property consisted of
a home, a fourteen by twenty-eight foot inground swimming pool,
and a shed, which was located within the rear setback
requirements specified under the town bylaws. In 2006,
following the issuance of a special permit, the Colbys renovated
the house. Apparently, they also renovated the shed, which
measured approximately six feet four inches by eight feet five
inches. The shed sat one and eight tenths' feet from the rear
setback, an area where there was a six-foot setback requirement
under the applicable bylaw.
In 2007, the Colbys replaced the shed with a new shed.
They did not obtain a variance. The new shed measured eight
feet by fourteen feet, was nine feet tall, and sat thirteen
inches from the rear fence and fifteen inches from the side
fence. The judge found that the new shed violated the rear lot
line dimensional setback provisions of the bylaws (six feet),
and the side lot line dimensional setback of the bylaws (fifteen
feet).
In July of 2015 the Colbys hired a tree service to trim a
large tree located on the Cuozzos' property; the tree limbs
crossed the property line. As a result, the view from the
Cuozzo property to the Colby property was no longer screened,
2
and the shed became visible from all areas of the Cuozzo home
and property. The judge found that the loss of the "tree
barrier," and the "now exposed shed" had a "substantial impact"
on the Cuozzos' use of the property, halted the use of their
yard for outdoor activities,3 and resulted in a "crowding" of
their property and a decrease in the Cuozzos' reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In 2015, the Cuozzos asked the building inspector to
enforce the dimensional setback requirements of the zoning
bylaw. The inspector declined to do so. The Cuozzos appealed
the building inspector's decision to the board. The board
determined that the Colbys' shed violated the bylaw, but
ultimately granted the Colbys a retroactive dimensional
variance.4 The Cuozzos appealed the board's decision, and a
judge of the Land Court found in the Cuozzos' favor on both
issues.
1. Standing. "Standing to challenge a decision by a
zoning board of appeals is limited to persons who are 'aggrieved
by [the] decision.' G. L. c. 40A, § 17. . . . While a
plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of establishing standing,
he or she may be assisted in that burden by a rebuttable
3 In addition, the Cuozzos have not installed a firepit because
of its proximity to the shed.
4 The Colbys applied for retroactive relief in 2017.
3
presumption of standing granted to parties qualifying as parties
in interest [under G. L. c. 40A, § 11]" (citations and
quotations omitted). Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Sherborn, 485 Mass. 209, 212-213 (2020). It is undisputed that
the Cuozzos were abutters to the Colbys' property. "As
abutters, [the Cuozzos] are entitled to notice of board hearings
under G. L. c. 40A, § 11, and qualify as 'parties in interest'
under the statute." Id. at 213. The Cuozzos therefore enjoyed
a rebuttable presumption that they were aggrieved parties. Id.
"[A]n adverse party can challenge an abutter's presumption
of standing by offering evidence warranting a finding contrary
to the presumed fact [of aggrievement]. . . . If a defendant
offers enough evidence to warrant a finding contrary to the
presumed fact, the presumption of aggrievement is rebutted, and
the plaintiff must prove standing by putting forth credible
evidence to substantiate the allegations" (citations and
quotations omitted). 81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of Brookline, 461 Mass. 692, 700-701 (2012). We review
the Land Court judge's factual findings on the issue of standing
for clear error. Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham,
459 Mass. 115, 119 (2011).
The judge found that the size of the Colbys' shed increased
lot density in violation of the setback requirements of the
bylaws, and that the prominence of the shed, particularly after
4
the loss of the tree limbs, deprived the Cuozzos of the
enjoyment of their yard and infringed on their reasonable
expectation of privacy. Density and privacy are interests
protected by setback requirements in zoning bylaws. Murchison,
485 Mass. at 214. The Colbys offered no contrary evidence.
Instead, relying on Murchison, 485 Mass. at 214, the board
claims that the injury to the Cuozzos was purely speculative and
thus de minimus. This case is distinguishable from Murchison,
however. In Murchison, supra at 214-215, the Supreme Judicial
Court found that neighbors lacked standing to challenge a
foundation permit to build a single-family home that (1)
satisfied the town's three-acre zoning and substantial frontage
requirements, (2) significantly exceeded all applicable
setbacks, and (3) was on a wooded lot with a buffer of trees,
simply because their irregularly-shaped lot did not satisfy the
town's lot width requirements at all points. The Supreme
Judicial Court held that any objection lacked factual foundation
and was speculative. Here, by contrast, the nonconforming shed
has been built. The crowding posed by the shed's incursion into
the setback area was evident from the photographs and testimony
in the record, as was the incursion on the Cuozzos' privacy
interests. The Cuozzos established the type of "injury
particular to the plaintiffs" that was lacking in Murchison,
supra at 214. The judge permissibly found that the presumption
5
was not rebutted, and properly concluded that the Cuozzos had
standing.
2. Variance. "In an appeal from a trial court's review of
a decision of a municipal board under G. L. c. 40A, 'we defer to
the factual findings of the trial judge unless they are clearly
erroneous. We review the judge's determinations of law,
including interpretations of zoning by-laws, de novo, but we
remain highly deferential to a board's interpretation of its own
ordinances.'" Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Lenox, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 873 (2015), quoting Grady v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Peabody, 465 Mass. 725, 728-729 (2013).
Westwood's zoning bylaw "authorizes a board of appeals to
grant a variance from the local zoning ordinance only where it:
'specifically finds [1] that owing to circumstances relating to
the soil conditions, shape, or topography of such land . . . and
especially affecting such land . . . but not affecting generally
the zoning district in which it is located, [2] a literal
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance or by-law would
involve substantial hardship, financial or otherwise, to the
petitioner or appellant, and [3] that desirable relief may be
granted without substantial detriment to the public good and [4]
without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent
or purpose of such ordinance or by-law.' Each of the
requirements of the statute must be met before a board may grant
6
a variance."5 Furlong v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Salem, 90
Mass. App. Ct. 737, 740 (2016), quoting G. L. c. 40A, § 10.
Here, the Colbys' shed, which sits fifteen inches from the
side property line and thirteen inches from the rear property
line, admittedly violates the zoning bylaw that requires
structures to be, at a minimum, fifteen feet from the side
property line and six feet from the rear property line. The
board claims that the variance was warranted because the
presence of the inground pool was a circumstance that related to
the topography of the land, and enforcement of the bylaw would
create a substantial hardship to the Colbys because it would
force them to find alternative storage solutions.
We agree with the Land Court judge's rejection of these
arguments, stating "[n]o rational view of the facts justifie[d]
the Board's conclusion that the Colbys satisfied the conditions
required under the statute or bylaw." "[N]o person has a legal
right to a variance and they are to be granted sparingly."
Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 81 Mass. App. Ct.
394, 398 (2012), quoting Damaskos v. Board. of Appeal of Boston,
359 Mass. 55, 61 (1971). As the judge found, there was no
legally cognizable hardship. "The hardship in this case is not
5 The town of Westwood has incorporated the statutory conditions
set forth in G. L. c. 40A, § 10.
7
'owing to the topography of the land.' . . . Rather, the
hardship arises solely from the fact that the lot is too small"
to accommodate the shed that the Colbys have built without
violating the bylaws.6 Mitchell v. Board of Appeals of Revere,
27 Mass. App. Ct. 1119, 1120 (1989). See also McGee v. Board of
Appeal of Boston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 931 (2004) ("An
undersized lot is not a basis for a variance"). Inconvenience
alone will not suffice, particularly when the Colbys purchased
the home with full knowledge of the swimming pool. See Gamache
v. Acushnet, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217 n.6 (1982) ("The
hardship may not be merely a personal hardship to the
owner . . . or because a need exists for the proposed use").
The Colbys may still make use of the lot in a manner permitted
by the zoning bylaw. See Steamboat Realty, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeal of Boston, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 603-605 (2007). The
swimming pool, as a voluntary addition to the property, does not
justify the variance. Cf. Lamb v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
6 The judge reasoned that "the inability to fit the shed
elsewhere on their lot while maintaining compliance with the
bylaw relates not to the shape, soils, or topography of the
Colbys' property, but rather to its size."
8
Taunton, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 513, 515-516 (2010) ("A property
owner cannot obtain a variance by creating his own hardship").
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Sullivan,
Desmond & Singh, JJ.7),
Clerk
Entered: June 26, 2023.
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
9