HEIDI A. CONNELLY, Trustee, & Others v. JODEE C. DOYLE, Trustee, & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-1049
HEIDI A. CONNELLY, trustee, 1 & others 2
vs.
JODEE C. DOYLE, trustee, 3 & others. 4
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Defendant JoDee C. Doyle, trustee of the Four Ninety-Four
NEB Realty Trust (Doyle), owns an oceanfront parcel of
registered land (locus) in Salisbury. In consolidated actions
pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 114, a Land Court judge concluded
that each of the lots owned by the plaintiffs benefits from an
implied easement to pass and re-pass over the locus by foot, and
that the easement appurtenant to the lot owned by plaintiffs
1 Of the Girls' Realty Trust.
2 Natalie S. Lucas and Donna M. Bates, trustees of the 5-D Realty
Trust; Diane M. LaRocque, trustee of the Diane M. LaRocque
Revocable Living Trust; Michael C. Faro; and Elizabeth Ann Faro,
individually and as trustee of the Navanod Revocable Living
Trust under declaration of trust dated January 9, 2004.
3 Of the Four Ninety-Four NEB Realty Trust.
4 Alfred Fisichelli, Joseph Fisichelli, and Steven A. Fisichelli,
none of whom participated in this appeal.
Natalie S. Lucas and Donna M. Bates, trustees of the 5-D Realty
Trust (Lucas and Bates), also permits passage over the locus by
vehicle. Doyle appeals, arguing that the judge erred in
concluding that the plaintiffs' lots benefit from those
easements. We affirm.
Background. "Because the judge issued h[is] decision on a
case stated basis, we review it de novo, drawing our own
inferences of fact and reaching our own conclusions of law."
Hickey v. Pathways Ass'n, 472 Mass. 735, 743 (2015). We set
forth the facts found by the judge, supplemented by our own
review of the documentary evidence.
In Doyle v. Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 686, 687-690 (2005), a
case involving among others these same parties, the court set
forth in detail the development by the Salisbury Beach
Associates (SBA), a trust, of the properties involved in this
case. As relevant here, in 1913 the Land Court issued a decree
of registration to the SBA for a tract of land along Salisbury
Beach, as depicted on twenty-seven sheets comprising Land Court
Plan 3200A. That plan depicted the locus as a single numbered
lot -- lot number 344 on sheet 3.
In 1920, the SBA filed a series of plans which removed
particular lots and replaced them with a consistent pattern of
side streets running east and west from the State highway. The
eastern streets led to the sandy beach and Atlantic Ocean, and
2
the western streets led inland. One of those plans, numbered
3200XV (1920 plan), depicted certain numbered lots in Blocks G,
P, and Q that became the plaintiffs' lots. The 1920 plan bore
an instruction that "[s]eparate certificates of title may be
issued for . . . the numbered lots in Blocks G, H, O, P & Q as
shown hereon." As to the locus, the 1920 plan did not depict it
as a lot, but as "8th St. East," one of the side streets leading
to the beach from the State highway. On the 1920 plan, the
locus had no lot number and was between blocks G and H and not
within any block.
In 1992, Doyle bought the locus from the SBA for $25,000.
The deed denoted the locus as "8th Street East," and stated that
its boundaries were located as shown on the 1920 plan. The 1920
plan depicts the northern boundary of the locus as abutting a
lot fronting on the State highway that is now owned by plaintiff
Heidi A. Connelly, trustee of the Girls' Realty Trust
(Connelly), as well as the oceanfront lot now owned by Lucas and
Bates. As depicted on the 1920 plan, the locus had no eastern
boundary, but faces Salisbury Beach and the Atlantic Ocean. To
the south the locus abuts lots now owned by Alfred Fisichelli,
Joseph D. Fisichelli, and Steven A. Fisichelli (the
Fisichellis). As depicted on the 1920 plan, the locus had no
western boundary, but faces the State highway.
3
The 1920 plan also depicts the lots now owned by plaintiffs
Diane M. LaRocque, trustee of the Diane M. LaRocque Revocable
Living Trust (LaRocque), and Michael C. Faro and Elizabeth Ann
Faro, trustee of the Navanod Revocable Trust (the Faros), which
are on the other side of the State highway, also called North
End Boulevard. Each of the five plaintiffs' certificates of
title describes their lots with reference to the 1920 plan.
None of the plaintiffs' certificates of title contain express
language documenting an easement across the locus.
Apparently based on Doyle's 1992 deed and without
examination of the 1920 plan, an assistant recorder issued a
transfer certificate of title for the locus. See Doyle, 444
Mass. at 688-689 & n.5. The Land Court subsequently determined
that the transfer certificate of title was "clearly erroneous"
because it purported to set forth boundaries for the locus based
on the 1920 plan, which did not delineate any eastern or western
boundaries. Id. at 690. The Supreme Judicial Court concurred.
Id. at 696-697.
On July 8, 1998, a new plan was registered (1998 plan) that
depicts the locus with eastern and western boundaries and the
lot number 843, and bears an instruction, dated February 5,
2016, that "[s]eparate certificates of title may be issued for
land shown hereon as Lot 843." On February 16, 2016, the
recorder issued a new transfer certificate of title to Doyle
4
which describes the locus with reference to the 1998 plan and
states that Doyle's ownership of the locus "is subject to the
rights of others, if any, to pass and re-pass over said land."
Connelly, Lucas, and Bates then petitioned the Land Court
pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 114, to amend Doyle's certificate of
title to reflect their rights "to pass and repass and to utilize
the [locus] as a road." LaRocque and the Faros filed a similar
petition, seeking to amend Doyle's certificate of title to
recognize their right "to pass and re-pass over the Locus to
access Salisbury Beach and the Atlantic Ocean," without
reference to vehicular access.
By agreement of the parties, the consolidated cases were
tried on the documentary evidence. The judge also took a view.
After trial, the judge allowed the plaintiffs' motion to
supplement the record with documents including a 1917 pamphlet
advertising the SBA development. The judge determined that the
plaintiffs had proven that they had implied easements to pass
and re-pass over the locus by foot. 5
5 The judge concluded that the lots owned by the Fisichellis, who
were named as defendants in the action brought by Connelly,
Lucas, and Bates, which abut the locus to the south, also
benefited from easements over the locus. Doyle moved for
reconsideration of that ruling on the grounds that the
Fisichellis had voluntarily terminated their easement over the
locus. The judge allowed the motion, concluding that the
Fisichellis' lots were excluded from the group of lots which
enjoy easement rights over the locus. The Fisichellis have not
appealed, and so we do not consider that issue.
5
Abutters Connelly, Lucas, and Bates moved for relief from
the judgment, or in the alternative to amend the judgment,
arguing that their lots' easements should permit vehicular as
well as pedestrian access over the locus. After Doyle filed a
proposed order that would limit pedestrian access to two four-
foot wide pathways along either side of the locus, LaRocque and
the Faros objected to that proposed layout and supported the
abutters' motion for reconsideration. The judge allowed the
abutters' motion in part, amending the judgment to provide that
the lot owned by plaintiffs Lucas and Bates is benefited by an
appurtenant right to pass and re-pass over the locus both by
foot and by vehicle, but not including the right to park
vehicles on the locus. As to the lots owned by Connelly,
LaRocque, and the Faros, the judge concluded that they enjoy "an
appurtenant right to pass and re-pass by foot over" the locus.
Doyle appealed.
Discussion. Implied easements over the locus appurtenant
to plaintiffs' lots. As those claiming the benefit of easements
over the locus, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the
existence of the easements appurtenant to their lots. Hickey,
472 Mass. at 753-754, citing Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 452,
458 (2006). Generally, a holder of a certificate of title to
registered land takes "free from all encumbrances except those
noted on the certificate." G. L. c. 185, § 46. See Doyle, 444
6
Mass. at 693. Massachusetts courts have recognized two
exceptions to this rule: "(1) if there were facts described on
[Doyle's] certificate of title which would prompt a reasonable
purchaser to investigate further other certificates of title,
documents, or plans in the registration system; or (2) if the
purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior unregistered
interest." Id., quoting Jackson v. Knott, 418 Mass. 704, 711
(1994). In the Land Court, the parties agreed that the second
Jackson exception did not apply, and the judge did not consider
it. 6 We similarly focus on the first Jackson exception.
The judge determined that based on the 1920 plan referenced
in the deed for the locus, Doyle "would have and should have
[been] prompted . . . to consider whether the [SBA] had intended
to give rights to others in the subdivisions over the land she
was buying from the successors to the [SBA] -- a parcel plainly
labeled on the guiding Land Court plan as a street." The judge
concluded, "The inference is strong, and I draw it, that in this
6 We note that, by the time her valid certificate of title was
registered in 2016, Doyle certainly knew that the plaintiffs
claimed easements over the locus: they had objected to her
petition to register her prior invalid certificate of title.
See Doyle, 444 Mass. at 687. Moreover, the 2016 certificate of
title noted that the locus "is subject to the rights of others,
if any, to pass and re-pass over said land." As neither the
parties nor the judge relied on the second Jackson exception, we
do not reach the question whether it would have required proof
of Doyle's actual knowledge in 1992 when she obtained the deed
for the locus, or in 2016 when her certificate of title was
registered.
7
community of lots sold for beach-focused vacation and
recreational residential use, proximate and convenient beach
access afforded to all the nearby lots was a driving factor in
the development and sale of all the lots shown on the 1920
Plan."
Doyle contends that the judge erred, arguing strenuously
that G. L. c. 185, § 46, prohibits an easement over registered
land unless the easement is shown on the certificate of title.
That is generally true, but the judge concluded that this case
fell within the first Jackson exception, and we agree. Based on
the information in the registration system, including the 1920
plan referenced in Doyle's deed, Doyle would have been expected
to investigate whether others had easement rights over the
locus. See Hickey, 472 Mass. at 759. The 1920 plan on its face
would have given a purchaser reason to believe that others had
easement rights over the locus. The 1920 plan labeled the locus
as "8th St. East." The 1920 plan depicted, as the judge
described it, "a network of roads, including a ladder-like
carefully patterned system of side streets, at regular intervals
interrupting the sequence of private lots and extending from the
state highway to the beach"; the judge concluded that the layout
was "akin to an easement by common scheme." Cf. Conway v.
Caragliano, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 783-784 (2023) (in context
of plans depicting development of lots with evenly spaced ways
8
to the beach, deed referring to lot as benefiting from easement
rather than being encumbered by it sufficient to put purchaser
on notice of others' easement rights). The 1920 plan included
the instruction that "[s]eparate certificates of title may be
issued for . . . the numbered lots in Blocks G [and] H . . . as
shown hereon," which would have led prospective buyers,
including Doyle and the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-
title, to believe that the locus was not subject to the issuance
of a certificate of title because it was depicted on the 1920
plan as lying between Blocks G and H and had no lot number.
Doyle argues that because none of the plaintiffs'
certificates of title mention an easement over the locus, they
cannot meet their burden. 7 "[E]ven on registered land, there is
no requirement that easements appurtenant, benefiting a lot,
must be listed on the certificate of title." Hickey, 472 Mass.
at 753 n.26. General Laws "c. 185 requires only easements to
which the registered land is subject be set out in the
7 For similar reasons, Doyle argues that an implied easement
across the locus would violate the statute of frauds, which
requires "an instrument in writing signed by the grantor" to
assign an interest in land "unless . . . by operation of law."
G. L. c. 183, § 3. The argument is unavailing. The 1920 plan,
which was incorporated by reference into the deed for the locus
and the deeds and certificates of title for the plaintiffs'
lots, was "an instrument in writing"; further, implied easements
were permitted "by operation of law" under cases including
Hickey.
9
certificate of title. Easements [benefiting] the property need
not be noted." Id., quoting Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 56-
57 (1927).
Doyle urges us to interpret Hickey, 472 Mass. at 760, to
preclude a finding of implied easements across the locus for the
benefit of the plaintiffs' lots unless there is proof of at
least one express easement granted to a lot owner somewhere in
the subdivision. 8 The judge declined to "read Hickey as taking
such a narrow pathway through this fraught issue." After noting
that, in Hickey, there was evidence that certain lots did enjoy
8 The record before us does show at least two instances in the
registration system where the SBA seems to have recognized
easement rights over the locus to access the beach. First, in
1933, when the Commonwealth took title to the length of
Salisbury Beach, its certificate of title referred to a plan
numbered 3200-46 and specified that the Commonwealth's title to
the beach was "subject to rights of way thereover between the
respective lots shown on said plan and the Ocean." That plan is
not in the record before us, but the Supreme Judicial Court
noted that it depicted "8th St. East," the locus, as lying
"between the respective lots . . . and the Ocean." Doyle, 444
Mass. at 688 n.4.
Second, in 1965, the SBA granted to the Willows Realty
Trust "the right to use in common with others any ways to the
beach which are in the vicinity or adjacent to . . . Eighth
Street West," which would include the locus. At argument before
the Land Court judge, the parties disputed whether the Willows
Realty Trust property was within the SBA development, and the
record before us contains no deed or certificate of title
showing what property the Willows Realty Trust owned. Because
we agree with the judge's interpretation of Hickey and with his
conclusion that the evidence of the SBA's intent to convey
easements over the locus appurtenant to the plaintiffs' lots was
"strong," we need not rely on these instances.
10
some express easement rights upon other lots, the judge went on
to point out that there also existed a plan depicting "an
integral scheme of ways in a neighborhood, providing access to
the waterfront, every three or four lots." Hickey, 472 Mass. at
749. The judge then went on to observe that, in Hickey, the
purpose of that "integral scheme" -- "to provide waterfront
access to inland lots" -- was deemed by the Supreme Judicial
Court to be "obvious on the face of the plans, and would have
been [obvious] to those purchasing" the lots at issue there.
Id. After making these observations, the judge concluded that
in this case the SBA's intention to create easement rights
across the locus for the benefit of the plaintiffs' lots was
"even more obvious on the face of the plans" than in Hickey
(quotation omitted). See Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 241
Mass. 417, 423 (1922) (where land conveyed by reference to plan,
easement may be created if "shown to be intended by the parties
to the deed," considering "the entire situation at the time of
the conveyance"). We concur with the judge's interpretation of
Hickey and his analysis of the documentary evidence in this
case.
Easements appurtenant to abutters' lots, including
vehicular access for lot owned by Lucas and Bates. Doyle argues
that the judge erred in concluding that the lots owned by
Connelly, Lucas, and Bates enjoy pedestrian easements over the
11
locus, and the easement appurtenant to the beachfront lot owned
by Lucas and Bates also permits vehicular access.
As discussed above, we have concluded that all five
plaintiffs' lots benefit from implied easements for pedestrian
access over the locus. As to Doyle's arguments that the lots
owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates do not enjoy easements over
the locus, we further note as follows. As abutters to the
locus, Connelly, Lucas, and Bates have even stronger claims than
the other plaintiffs to implied easements over the locus. 9 Where
"a seller conveyed registered land abutting a way, the
conveyance described the ways as a boundary, and the deed
referenced a subdivision plan on file in the land registration
office showing the way," a subsequent purchaser such as Doyle
may be estopped from "deny[ing] the existence of such street or
way." Hickey, 472 Mass. at 758 n.30, quoting Murphy v. Mart
Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 677-678 (1965). See
Duddy v. Mankewich, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 70 n.13 (2009); Lane
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Falmouth, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 437
9 Connelly, Lucas, and Bates do not contend that they own a fee
to the midline of the locus. The judge concluded that when the
SBA sold the lots, it retained the fee in the locus. We note
that at the time of the 1920 plan, the legal question whether a
deed to land bounded by a way was presumed to extend to the
midline of the way or only to its edge was somewhat uncertain.
See Erickson v. Ames, 264 Mass. 436, 442-445 (1928) (collecting
cases). See also Conway, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 780-781.
12
(2006). The lots owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates fit that
description.
To try to rebut the easement by estoppel theory as to the
abutting lots owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates, Doyle makes
two arguments. First, she contends that because the two lots
now owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates were deeded by the SBA
in 1936 to a single owner, Albert Alexander, who had access
across those lots both to the beach and to the road, the SBA
could not have intended also to grant him a "duplicate" easement
over the locus. Until 1997, both of those lots were owned by
William and Natalie Donahue, the parents of Connelly, Lucas, and
Bates, and during the Donahues' ownership each of those lots had
access both to the beach and to the road by crossing the other
lot, if necessary. 10 As the judge noted, in the 1920 plan the
SBA chose to lay out the two lots as distinct lots, with
different restrictions for each, and contemplating the
construction of a house and garage on each, which "naturally
implies an intention to treat each lot, from the time of their
creation, as separate for the purpose of access." The mere fact
that two lots were previously owned in common, or that the
10In the Land Court, Doyle argued that by separating the lots
and conveying them to different daughters, Natalie Donahue
"caused" the "problem," "effectively landlocking" the oceanfront
lot owned by Lucas and Bates. Doyle does not raise that
argument on appeal, and so we do not consider it.
13
owners may have had other ways to access the beach, does not
preclude the lots from enjoying easements over the locus. See
Melrose Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 89
Mass. App. Ct. 594, 597 (2016). "A way created by
estoppel . . . 'is not a way by necessity, and the right exists,
even if there be other ways, either public or private, leading
to the land.'" Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 91 (1949),
quoting New England Structural Co. v. Everett Distilling Co.,
189 Mass. 145, 152 (1905).
Second, Doyle argues that the Donahues abandoned any
easement they may have had over the locus when they erected a
chain-link fence on the boundary between their lots and the
locus. In their answers to interrogatories, Connelly and Lucas
averred that the "fence was erected in the early to mid 1980's."
The judge found that the fence was erected "in the mid-1980s,"
and that "approximately a decade" passed between its
installation and 1996, when the first case contesting Doyle's
title to the locus was filed. The judge concluded that period
was not long enough to show extinguishment of the easement by
abandonment. Having reviewed de novo the documentary evidence,
we concur.
For the construction of a fence by the owner of a lot
benefiting from an easement to cause abandonment, the fence must
be in place long enough to "conclusively and unequivocally
14
manifest[] either a present intent to relinquish the easement or
a purpose inconsistent with its further existence." Dubinsky,
261 Mass. at 57. As the judge pointed out, even the longest
duration argued by Doyle in the Land Court -- fifteen
years -- fell short of the lengths of time held sufficient by
Massachusetts courts to show abandonment. 11 See Lasell College
v. Leonard, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 390-391 (1992) (fence in
place for twenty-three years resulted in abandonment). See also
Cianciulli v. Marlowe, 330 Mass. 410, 413 (1953) (right of way
to pond extinguished by nonuse for more than twenty years,
coupled with adverse use of servient estate). Contrast 107
Manor Ave. LLC v. Fontanella, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 155, 160 (2009)
(easement abandoned, where easement holders never took steps to
remove stone wall blocking access to it since at least 1940,
engaged in conduct inconsistent with their right to use it, and
it was "useless" and "[did] not provide access to anything").
As for Doyle's claim that the judge erred in determining
that the beachfront lot owned by Lucas and Bates benefits from
an easement over the locus for vehicular access, it is
11On appeal, Doyle argues that the fence was in place for "at
least 30 years," apparently counting all of the time until 2015,
when certain photographs were taken that were admitted in
evidence at trial. We agree with the judge that by 1996, when
the first action contesting Doyle's title was filed, Doyle was
on notice that the fence was not a conclusive and unequivocal
manifestation of the abutting plaintiffs' intent to abandon the
easement. See Dubinsky, 261 Mass. at 57.
15
unavailing. 12 The judge concluded that the SBA would not have
intended to create a beachfront lot without vehicular access
over the locus it abutted and which was labeled on the 1920 plan
as a "street," "a term which naturally and traditionally implies
passage by vehicle." The record does not support Doyle's
argument that the SBA did not intend for the lot now owned by
Lucas and Bates to have vehicular access over the locus. See
Conway, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 787 n.13 (evidence supporting
easement for vehicular access included the "width of the
shoreway, its proximity to the ocean, . . . and the fact that
vehicular use was common when the right of way was granted").
Admission of 1917 advertisement. Doyle also contends that
the judge erred in admitting in evidence a 1917 advertisement
for the SBA development because it was not contained within the
registration system.
At trial, Doyle argued that cases interpreting whether
implied easements existed for beach access turned on whether
12Connelly, who owns the lot abutting the locus that fronts the
State highway, joins Lucas and Bates in arguing that the fifty-
foot width of the locus and the "1920 . . . advent of the State
Highway and the affordable automobile" show that the SBA
intended for the easement appurtenant to her lot to include
vehicular as well as foot access over the locus. However,
Connelly did not appeal from the judge's denial of her motion to
reconsider so much of his order as denied her vehicular access.
"As [Connelly] failed to file a cross appeal, we will not
consider [her] arguments in this regard." Scott v. Boston Hous.
Auth., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 695 (2005).
16
there were advertisements for the property that mentioned the
beach. See Reagan, 446 Mass. at 459 (easement based on evidence
including advertisements); Houghton v. Johnson, 71 Mass. App.
Ct. 825, 832-835 (2008) (no easement; no advertisements in
evidence). In response, the plaintiffs argued that the
information in the registration system, including the word
"beach" in the name of the development and the depiction of the
Atlantic Ocean on the 1920 plan, sufficed to prove that the SBA
intended to provide lot owners with beach access across the
locus.
After trial, the plaintiffs moved for leave to supplement
the record with documents including a 1917 advertisement. After
a hearing, the judge allowed the motion. Neither the
plaintiffs' motion nor the transcript of the hearing is included
in the appendix, and so the record before us does not contain
any evidence as to where that advertisement came from. 13 The
1917 advertisement described the SBA development as "[f]our
miles of brilliant, dazzling surf on clean white sand. Hundreds
of summer cottages with waves breaking almost at the doorsteps."
The judge quoted that language in his memorandum of decision.
13As appellant, it was Doyle's obligation under Mass. R. A. P.
18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019), to include
materials "which are essential for review of the issues raised
on appeal." Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 84
(1995), quoting Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 30 Mass.
App. Ct. 371, 372-373 (1991), S.C., 411 Mass. 807 (1992).
17
We review the judge's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
discretion, i.e., "a clear error of judgment in weighing the
factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls
outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and
citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185
n.27 (2014). Even assuming that the 1917 advertisement came
from outside the registration system, we cannot say that the
judge abused his discretion in admitting it in evidence. See
St. George's Ebenezer Primitive Methodist Church of Methuen v.
Primitive Methodist Church of the U.S. of Am., E. Conference,
318 Mass. 723, 725-726 (1945) (to rebut claim that former
owner's conveyance of registered land was scrivener's error,
Land Court properly admitted letter from former owner stating
his intent for use of locus). See also Mass. G. Evid.
§ 803 (17), (20) (2023). In any event, the 1917 advertisement
was not particularly prejudicial. It conveyed, in somewhat more
flowery language, what was apparent from the face of the 1920
plan: that the SBA was selling hundreds of lots in proximity
18
to -- and with access to -- the Atlantic Ocean and Salisbury
Beach.
Decision entered October 15,
2019, affirmed.
Order on motions for
reconsideration entered
July 1, 2022, affirmed.
By the Court (Sacks, Grant &
Smyth, JJ. 14),
Clerk
Entered: September 6, 2023.
14 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
19