CITY OF HOLYOKE v. IPBO LOCAL 388 & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-266
CITY OF HOLYOKE
vs.
IPBO LOCAL 388 & another. 1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The city of Holyoke (city) appeals from a Superior Court
judgment on the pleadings, which confirmed an arbitration award
in favor of IPBO Local 388 (union) and Eliezer Garcia (Garcia).
On appeal, the city claims that the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of her authority, and that she ignored or failed to apply
the unambiguous language of the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between the city and the union regarding the payment of
"injured on duty" (IOD) benefits under G. L. c. 41, § 111F, to
Garcia. We affirm.
"A matter submitted to arbitration is subject to a very
narrow scope of review." School Comm. of Hanover v. Hanover
Teachers Ass'n, 435 Mass. 736, 740 (2002), quoting Plymouth-
1 Eliezer Garcia.
Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass. 1006,
1007 (1990). "Courts inquire into an arbitration award only to
determine if the arbitrator has exceeded the scope of [her]
authority, or decided the matter based on 'fraud, arbitrary
conduct, or procedural irregularity in the hearings.'" School
Comm. of Hanover, supra, quoting Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch.
Dist., supra. See G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3). "An arbitrator
exceeds [her] authority by granting relief beyond the scope of
the arbitration agreement . . . by awarding relief beyond that
to which the parties bound themselves . . . or by awarding
relief prohibited by law." School Comm. of Hanover, supra,quoting Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist., supra.Here, the question before the arbitrator was whether the
city violated the CBA, which incorporated the provisions of
G. L. c. 41, § 111F, when it terminated Garcia's IOD benefits.
Section 111F permits termination of such benefits only on a
determination that the incapacity no longer exists (it appears
undisputed that Garcia remains incapacitated), or when the
officer is retired or pensioned. Nothing in the CBA permitted
termination of those benefits in a manner inconsistent with the
statute.
The city, after a period of IOD benefit payments, filed an
application to have Garcia retired under G. L. c. 32, § 16
(involuntary accidental disability retirement). However,
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because Garcia previously withdrew his accumulated retirement
deductions, he was not eligible for retirement under § 16 until
he repaid his withdrawn contributions with interest. See G. L.
c. 32, § 3 (6) (c). Because Garcia did not have the means to
repay the funds, he could not be "retired or pensioned," and, in
accordance with the CBA, the city could not cease IOD benefits.
Thus, the arbitrator determined that the city violated the CBA
and ordered it to immediately reinstate Garcia's IOD status and
benefits, make Garcia whole for all compensation and benefits
lost due to the wrongful termination thereof, and pay him
interest on all compensation owed. The Superior Court judge
confirmed the arbitrator's order.
On appeal, the city claims that the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of her authority by effectively ordering the city to pay
IOD benefits for a permanent injury, in contravention of G. L.
c. 41, § 111F, and a provision of the CBA indicating the city is
not obligated to pay § 111F benefits for permanent injuries
("Each injury shall have a shelf life and should not be
construed as a permanent injury with an indefinite period of
disability"). The city also argues that, given the CBA
language, the arbitrator lacked authority to require it to pay
IOD benefits for an indefinite period of time.
The CBA's paragraph 19.4(f) provides that an arbitrator has
authority to review and apply the "terms and provisions" of the
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CBA. The CBA incorporated and specifically included G. L.
c. 41, § 111F, into the "terms and provisions" of their contract
in paragraph 11.2, which states, "Injuries and/or illnesses
sustained in the performance of duty shall be handled in
accordance with [G. L. c. 41, § 111F], except as specified in
[the CBA]." These provisions put within the scope of the
arbitrator's authority the ability to review and apply § 111F.
The city claimed that it did not violate the CBA because it
was not required to pay IOD benefits indefinitely because
paragraph 11.2 states that "[e]ach injury shall have a shelf
life and should not be construed as a permanent injury with an
indefinite period of disability." In her construction of § 111F
and the CBA, the arbitrator rejected this claim because there
was no support to the city's claim that after some period of
time it can terminate the benefits of an officer who became
disabled while on duty, unless the officer has been retired,
pensioned, or no longer suffers from his disability. See G. L.
c. 41, § 111F.
The arbitrator further determined that under paragraphs
11.2 and 11.3, the city had to continue Garcia's IOD status and
benefits unless and until Garcia is cleared by the city's
physician to return to duty or light duty. Importantly, under
11.6, if an independent physician clears an officer for light
duty, "such light duty shall be effective immediately, or if no
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light duty tasks are indicated, the officer shall continue to be
carried on [IOD] status" (emphasis added). There is no
exception in the CBA or § 111F that permits the city to
terminate benefits when a disabled officer has not repaid
pension payments that were previously withdrawn.
The arbitrator was given the authority to apply the
language of the CBA, which included G. L. c. 41, § 111F. She
did not act beyond the scope of that authority. Her
interpretation differs from the city's, and even if we accepted
the city's argument that the arbitrator's view was incorrect,
the question of contract interpretation is ultimately not one
for our resolution. See Boston v. Professional Staff Ass'n, 61
Mass. App. Ct. 105, 112 (2004) (courts have "no business
overruling an arbitrator because [they] give a contract a
different interpretation"). "It was the arbitrator's
interpretation of the bargained-for language that the [city] and
the union had agreed to accept, not the interpretation by a
court acting upon a subsequent application under G. L. c. 150C,
§ 11." Sheriff of Suffolk County v. AFSCME Council 93, Local
5
419, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 222, 226 (2007).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Meade &
Walsh, JJ. 2),
Clerk
Entered: November 14, 2023.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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