DocketNumber: [No. 29, April Term, 1937.]
Judges: Offutt
Filed Date: 5/25/1937
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This is an appeal from a judgment on a directed verdict for the defendant, in an action brought in the Baltimore City Court by Helen Chalmers against the Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company, to recover for injuries said to have been caused by a fall over a carton of canned goods, placed in an aisle in a store operated by the defendant, where she was present as a patron and business visitor. The single question submitted is whether the evidence was legally sufficient to permit a recovery.
There was in the case evidence legally sufficient to permit the following finding of fact: At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 23rd, 1936, the plaintiff went to a grocery and provision store operated by the defendant at the corner of Calhoun and Baltimore Streets, in the City of Baltimore, to make purchases. She first purchased articles at the grocery counter, and then, with her packages in her arms, went to the meat counter, which was in the back of the store, and made purchases there. After making those purchases, as she turned "to move in the passage way," she "fell over" a box "sitting there," and was injured. The box was a pasteboard carton, contained canned goods, it was brown, about the same color as the floor, and "sitting" just far enough for her to take "one step from the meat counter." To go from the meat counter to the grocery counter, or the door, it was necessary for her to pass the point where the box was placed; there was no other way to get out, "it was right in the passage way out in front." There was light in the store.
These facts furnish an analogy by no means complete to such cases as Benesch Sons v. Ferkler,
In Benesch Sons v. Ferkler, supra, the injury resulted from slipping on a greasy floor, in Grzboski v. Bernheimer-LeaderStores, supra, from slipping on an orange peel, in Moore v.American Stores Co., supra, from slipping on a greasy floor, inEyerly v. Baker, supra, from a defective revolving door, and inDickey v. Hochschild, Kohn Co., supra, from a defective step in a stairway. In those cases the injury was caused by some abnormal and dangerous condition of the premises which the inviter negligently permitted, and which the visitor could not reasonably be expected to anticipate. So far from being an incident of the business, they were wholly inconsistent with the care and foresight which its nature required its proprietors to exercise. But while a somewhat different case is presented here, it must be true that the proprietor of any store which the public are invited to patronize is under a duty to use ordinary care to see that persons coming into the store as business visitors to purchase or inspect goods, while using it in the only manner permitted by its arrangements, are not *Page 556
exposed to the risk of injury through conditions, not necessarily incident to the business, which they could not reasonably be required to anticipate or discover. Benesch Sons v. Ferkler,supra; Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn Co., supra; Grzboski v.Bernheimer-Leader Stores, supra; Moore v. American Stores Co.,supra; Eyerly v. Baker, supra; O'Neill Company v. Crummitt,
Accordingly it would seem that, even in a grocery and provision store, where the articles offered for sale are irregularly placed about the floor, since it is intended that purchasers will inspect and select such articles as they desire to purchase from those offered for sale, the owner is under a duty to provide reasonably safe passageways to afford access to different parts of the store, where customers are expected to go.
The general rule embodying that principle is thus stated in theRestatement of Torts, Am. Law Inst. sec. 343: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care should discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and (b) has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or realize the risk involved therein, and (c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without relinquishing any of the services which they are entitled to receive, if the possessor is a public utility."
In the application of that principle it was held in Williamsv. Liberty Stores,
Turning again to the facts, it cannot be said, in view of this volume of precedents, as a matter of law, that the conduct of the defendant in placing the carton over which the plaintiff fell in the only passage way provided for access to the meat counter, or in permitting it to remain there, afforded no evidence of negligence. It is consistent with the evidence that the passage way was narrow, for the demurrer prayer concedes that plaintiff in turning from the counter took only one step before she fell over the box. It may also be inferred that she did not see the box, for she said, "It wasn't high enough for me to see, and I fell," and, while she must have passed it on her way to the meat counter, it cannot be conclusively presumed that she saw it then, and she herself said "I did not see it before I fell." It was about the color of the floor, and it "was sitting right in the passage way." Since defendant did maintain a meat department and a meat counter, it must have intended that patrons desiring to make purchases at that counter should use the only passage way which gave access to it, and was therefore under a duty to use ordinary care to see that it was kept safe for such use. Whether under the circumstances its conduct in placing the box in the aisle, or permitting it to remain there, was consistent with due care, was peculiarly a jury question.
Nor for the reasons stated in Reed v. Baltimore,
It follows that there was error in granting the defendant's "A" prayer, directing a verdict for the defendant, which is the subject of the only exception submitted, and the judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed.
Judgment reversed with costs, and new trial awarded.
Isaac Benesch & Sons, Inc. v. Ferkler ( 1927 )
Grzboski v. Bernheimer-Leader Stores ( 1928 )
Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co. ( 1929 )
O'Neill Company v. Crummitt ( 1937 )
Moore v. American Stores Co. ( 1936 )
Brinkworth v. Sam Seelig Co. ( 1921 )
Reed v. Mayor of Baltimore ( 1936 )
Smith v. Emporium Mercantile Co. Inc. ( 1933 )
Ralph v. MacMarr Stores ( 1936 )
Finnegan v. the Goerke Co. ( 1929 )
State Ex Rel. Peach v. Cavey ( 1938 )
Biggs v. Hutzler Brothers Co. ( 1942 )
Cador v. YES Organic Market ( 2022 )
Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc. ( 1960 )
Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse MD Corp. ( 1997 )
Ambassador Apartment Corp. v. McCauley ( 1943 )
Dalmo Sales of Wheaton, Inc. v. Steinberg ( 1979 )
Mary Ellen Kelley v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ( 1959 )
William J. Hewitt v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ( 1968 )
Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain ( 1966 )
Mondawmin Corporation v. Kres ( 1970 )
Diffendal v. Kash and Karry Service Corp. ( 1988 )
McManamon v. High's Dairy Products Corp. ( 1963 )
Morrison v. Suburban Trust Co. ( 1957 )
Provost v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ( 1963 )
Meader v. Paetz Grocery Co. ( 1966 )
Hagan v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission ( 1974 )