Nathan v. State

RAKER, Judge.

In this case, we again address the constitutional limitations on searches and seizures conducted during the course of a traffic stop. Petitioner Corinthious James Nathan and respondent Horace Shaw, Jr. were convicted of multiple drug possession and importation charges in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, following the court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence seized as the result of a traffic stop and search of the van that Nathan was driving and in which Shaw was a passenger.

The trial court denied the motions to suppress on the grounds that the scope of the initial investigative detention was reasonable, that Shaw consented to the search of the van, and that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion for the continued detention and investigation of Nathan and Shaw and probable cause for the search of the van’s ceiling. Because we agree that the initial traffic stop was valid and that the police had reasonable suspicion for the continued detention of Nathan and Shaw and probable cause for the search of the van’s ceiling, we shall hold that the search and seizure of the evidence from the vehicle was lawful.

I.

On July 14, 1999, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Nathan was driving a 1988 Dodge van owned by Shaw, who was a passenger in the van at the time. Nathan and Shaw were traveling south on U.S. Route 13 near Salisbury, Maryland, where Police Sergeant Mike Lewis and Trooper First Class Robert Penny were parked in an unmarked police cruiser.

While seated in the parked car, Sgt. Lewis heard what he described as the sound of a vehicle traveling at an apparent high rate of speed. Sgt. Lewis and Tfc. Penny pursued the vehicle along the Route 13 bypass, pacing it at approximately seventy miles per hour in a marked sixty-miles-per-hour zone. Sgt. Lewis testified that he observed the vehicle drift across the shoulder of the roadway on two occasions and that he noted that the left brake lamp was out on the van.¹

Sgt. Lewis activated his emergency equipment and stopped the van. While effecting the stop, Sgt. Lewis noticed that there was a passenger in the rear of the vehicle who raised and lowered his head.

Sgt. Lewis approached the vehicle on the passenger side and asked the driver, Nathan, for his license and registration. The officer testified that, when Nathan lowered the passenger side window, the odor of air freshener coming from the interior of the vehicle was overwhelming. He testified that he observed a conversion ceiling in the roof of the van that appeared to be lower than normal. The blue fabric around the ceiling of the eleven-year-old van appeared to be new and extremely tight, with no evidence of fading or sagging.

Sgt. Lewis observed the passenger in the back of the van, Shaw, lying beneath a couple of light travel bags and a blanket. Sgt. Lewis asked him to move to the front of the van. Sgt. Lewis testified that Shaw acted like he was asleep and that when asked if he had identification, Shaw provided him with the vehicle registration, which was in Shaw’s name, and some additional documentation.

Sgt. Lewis asked Nathan to exit the vehicle and to move to the rear of the van. Sgt. Lewis testified that he noticed that Nathan’s carotid artery was pounding on both sides of his neck, that his chest was palpitating, and that his hands were trembling. He testified that Nathan would not make eye contact with him and that he was unable to produce a driver’s license or other form of identification.

Sgt. Lewis questioned Nathan about the origin of his trip. Nathan first told him that he was coming from New York, then said that he actually was coming from New Jersey. Nathan said that he and Shaw were in New Jersey to pick up the van and that they were taking it back to get the oil checked. Sgt. Lewis testified that Nathan answered many of his questions with questions, which in his experience indicated deception.

Sgt. Lewis then questioned Shaw concerning the origin of his trip. Shaw responded that he and Nathan were coming from New York and that they had driven to New York in a rental vehicle to pick up the van. Sgt. Lewis testified that he noticed Shaw’s hands trembling while he was talking to him, his carotid artery pounding, and a nervous twitch above his eye. He asked Shaw if he would consent to a “quick check” of his vehicle for guns and drugs. Shaw agreed and stepped from the van.² Sgt. Lewis patted Shaw down for weapons.

Sgt. Lewis entered the van on the driver’s side. He hit the ceiling over the driver’s seat with his hand and observed that it was solid and hard, with no flexibility. Sgt. Lewis testified as to his experience with false compartments and their significance to him. The Court of Special Appeals summarized his testimony as follows:

“He stated that the fact that the ceiling was solid and had no ‘give’ at all suggested that it had been reinforced by steel. Sgt. Lewis testified that, since 1995, he had searched approximately nine to twelve hydraulically controlled false compartments in van ceilings. Although he found traces of narcotics in all of these compartments, he found a quantity of narcotics only in [Shawl’s. He located guns and currency in some cases, and he stated that ‘many were empty.’ In Sgt. Lewis’ experience, this type of construction is only used for hydraulic compartments, and these compartments are only used for transporting contraband. Sgt. Lewis believed that no one would have a legitimate reason to have such a reinforced ceiling put in a conversion van. Thus, once he had knocked on the ceiling of the van, he became quite convinced that there was a compartment.”

Sgt. Lewis testified that some of the hidden compartments that he had searched concealed guns and currency, and some were empty, but each one contained traces of narcotics. He attempted to shift the console and found that he was unable to pull it down. He testified that he believed that it was affixed permanently with steel plates or rods.

Sgt. Lewis testified that he left the van to get a flashlight to examine the ceiling. Upon returning, he tried and failed again to move the console. He left the van again and returned with a screwdriver to attempt to pry open the console. When he was unable to move the console, he returned to his vehicle and called for backup and requested information on the vehicle and its occupants.

Sgt. Lewis went over to Nathan and Shaw to tell them that the tags on the van indicated that it was stolen. He handcuffed Nathan and Shaw and placed them in “investigative detention.” Sgt. Lewis admitted that he had no information that the vehicle was stolen and that his only purpose in securing Nathan and Shaw was to prevent a physical confrontation. Once he had placed handcuffs on Nathan and Shaw, Sgt. Lewis told them that he knew that there was a secret compartment in the van and asked them for the code to open it. He advised both men that, if they did not tell him the code, he would have to rip open the ceiling. Nathan and Shaw did not respond, and Sgt. Lewis then tore open the ceiling where he subsequently discovered a secret compartment containing 4.8 kilograms of cocaine and 193 grams of pure heroin wrapped in gray duct-taped packages. At approximately 8:34 p.m., nineteen minutes after stopping the vehicle, Sgt. Lewis placed Nathan and Shaw under arrest, advised them of their Miranda rights, and transported them to the Maryland State Police Barracks in Salisbury.

Prior to trial, Nathan and Shaw filed motions to suppress the physical evidence found at the scene of the traffic stop on the grounds that it was seized illegally in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The trial court denied their motions to suppress on the grounds that the scope of the initial investigative detention of Nathan and Shaw was reasonable, that Shaw freely and voluntarily consented to the search of the van, and that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion for the continued detention of Nathan and Shaw in order to investigate possible criminal activity at the time that Shaw was asked to exit the vehicle and probable cause to believe that weapons and drugs were present in order to search the van’s ceiling.

Following separate jury trials, Nathan and Shaw were found guilty of ten counts relating to the importation and possession of cocaine and heroin. Both men noted appeals to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Nathan’s convictions in an unreported opinion. Judge Ellen Hollander, writing for the panel, found that, by the time the detention had been prolonged beyond the permissible scope of the initial traffic stop, Sgt. Lewis had the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to prolong his investigation, in light of his observations and training, which led him to believe that he had detected a hidden compartment that was being used for an illicit purpose. The intermediate appellate court also found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Sgt. Lewis had probable cause to believe that the roof of the van contained contraband, which rendered his warrantless search of the van lawful.

A different panel of the Court of Special Appeals reached a contrary conclusion and, in an unreported opinion, reversed Shaw’s convictions. Thé intermediate appellate court found that, by the time that Sgt. Lewis began his extensive questioning of Nathan and Shaw regarding their travel plans, his focus had shifted from a traffic stop to a narcotics investigation and that he did not possess the articulable suspicion required for their continued detention. With regard to the search of the van, the court found that Shaw initially had consented voluntarily to the search, but that, by the time Sgt. Lewis had begun to dismantle the ceiling of the van, the consent had “expired” and Sgt. Lewis did not have the necessary probable cause to continue without it.

In dissent, Judge Moylan wrote:

“[0]n the facts of this case based on the evidence before the suppression hearing judge in this case, the discovery of a hydraulically-controlled and reinforced hidden ceiling compartment in the conversion van ipso facto generated probable cause to believe that the van may have contained contraband so as to justify a warrantless, and perhaps painstakingly thorough, search of it under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).”

Although Judge Moylan would find probable cause based on the presence of this “unexplained ‘vehicular hidden bank vault,’ ” he concluded by noting that, when he considered the other factors surrounding this stop in addition to the hidden compartment, his probable cause determination became even stronger.

We granted certiorari in both cases primarily to determine whether the stop and detention of Nathan and Shaw violated the Fourth Amendment and whether the police had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the occupants of the van were trafficking in guns or drugs. State v. Shaw, 365 Md. 266, 778 A.2d 382 (2001); Nathan v. State, 364 Md. 534, 774 A.2d 408 (2001). We shall affirm Nathan and reverse Shaw.

II.

Nathan and Shaw argue that Sgt. Lewis violated their Fourth Amendment rights by immediately suspending the ostensible traffic stop in favor of an investigatory detention. They argue that the police clearly detained them beyond the permissible scope of a traffic stop. They also argue that the fact that their vehicle was a conversion van, when coupled with other innocuous facts, did not give the police reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause to believe that they were trafficking in guns or drugs. Finally, they argue that Shaw’s assent to Sgt. Lewis’ request to conduct a “real quick check” for guns and drugs did not authorize him to rip open the ceiling of the van.

The State argues that Sgt. Lewis’ conduct during the initial traffic stop, including ordering Nathan out of the vehicle and questioning Nathan and Shaw regarding their destination and purpose, was reasonable. The State also argues, based on the totality of the circumstances after the initial conversations with Nathan and Shaw, that Sgt. Lewis had reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter. Finally, the State argues that, once Sgt. Lewis had made an initial inspection of the van’s ceiling, he had probable cause to conduct his more thorough search, and that Shaw’s consent to the search of the van was voluntary.

III.

Our review of the Circuit Court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment is based solely upon the record of the suppression hearing. See In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 529, 789 A.2d 607, 610 (2002). In Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 774 A.2d 420 (2001), we reiterated the standard of review of a ruling upon a motion to suppress:

“In our review of the trial court’s denial of [a] motion to suppress, we are limited to the record of the suppression hearing. We review the facts found by the trial court in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.... We extend great deference to the fact finding of the suppression court and accept the facts as found by that court unless clearly erroneous. We will review the legal questions de novo and based upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and the applicable law, we then make our own constitutional appraisal.”

Id. at 569, 774 A.2d at 429 (internal citations omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, including seizures that involve only a brief detention.³ See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, -, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1875, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 369, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Generally, seizures of persons require probable cause to arrest, and investigative detentions violate the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny created a limited exception to the probable cause requirement for investigative detentions, because the balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in those cases. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Under Terry, certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); David S., 367 Md. at 532, 789 A.2d at 612; Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433, 572 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1990). For Fourth Amendment purposes, a police officer who has reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime may detain that person briefly in order to investigate the circumstances that provoked suspicion. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for questioning limited to the purpose of the stop. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 499, 103 S.Ct. at 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed is made by looking at the totality of the circumstances in each case to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegal activity. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at -,-, 122 S.Ct. at 749, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621; Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 408, 601 A.2d 131, 136 (1992).

The stop of an automobile and detention of the occupants inside constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 571, 774 A.2d at 430; Ferris, 355 Md. at 369, 735 A.2d at 497. Thus, temporary detentions for traffic violations must not be unreasonable under the circumstances. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89. In Ferris, we said:

“[T]he officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d at 499 (internal citations omitted).

In this case, it is undisputed that the initial traffic stop of Nathan and Shaw by the Maryland police for traveling in excess of the posted speed limit was justified. See Wilkes, 364 Md. at 572, 774 A.2d at 431. Nathan was speeding on the public highway, and Sgt. Lewis had probable cause to stop the vehicle.

With the above principles in mind, we turn to the first question that we must address — that is, whether the officer’s conduct during the traffic stop was sufficiently related to the legal basis for the stop, namely the moving violation. See Ferris, 355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d at 499. It is clear that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance papers, run a computer check, and issue a citation or a warning. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 578, 774 A.2d at 434.⁴

In order for the continued detention of Nathan and Shaw to be permissible, therefore, there had to exist reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the seizure, and the limits of a Terry stop must not have been exceeded. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 498-99, 103 S.Ct. at 1324-25, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; Ferris, 355 Md. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506. Under Ferris, in order to justify a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic stop, the totality of the circumstances known to the police officer must establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support the intrusion. See United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3rd Cir.1995); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 574, 774 A.2d at 432; Ferris, 355 Md. at 372, 735 A.2d at 499. Absent consent, the officer may only detain the driver and conduct further questioning if, during the traffic stop, the officer acquires an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of further illegal activity supported by independent facts sufficient to justify the additional intrusion. See People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Colo.1995); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del.2001); Ferris, 355 Md. at 372-73, 735 A.2d at 499; Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638, 642 (1997). This involves an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer at the time. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Ferris, 355 Md. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506; Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 588, 611 A.2d 592, 595-96 (1992). Fundamentally, in determining whether the search and seizure of Shaw’s automobile was reasonable, our initial inquiry is a dual one — whether Sgt. Lewis’ action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.

Reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch but is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has most recently discussed the concept of reasonable suspicion in Arvizu. Noting that the concept is somewhat abstract and elusive, not finely tuned, the Court has deliberately avoided reducing it to a uniform set of legal rules. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740; Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S.Ct. at 1661, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Nonetheless, we do know that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. See David S., 367 Md. at 532, 789 A.2d at 612. The Supreme Court has made clear that otherwise innocent behavior may constitute reasonable suspicion when analyzed as part of the totality of the circumstances. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S.Ct. at 1586-87, 104 L.Ed.2d 1; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335 n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Ferris, 355 Md. at 386, 735 A.2d at 507. In this regard, the Court stated:

“When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at - - -, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (internal citations omitted).

Even though each of a series of acts is innocent standing alone, taken together they can constitute reasonable suspicion. See id. at-, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740; Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1. Furthermore, a determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 753, 151 L.Ed.2d 740; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 677, 145 L.Ed.2d 570.

In Arvizu, the Supreme Court also discussed the application of the totality of the circumstances test to otherwise “innocent” conduct, stating:

“We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. The court’s evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ as our cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared to believe that each observation by [the border patrol agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to ‘no weight.’ Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis. The officer in Terry observed the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was ‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ we held that, taken together, they ‘warranted further investigation.’ ”

534 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (internal citations omitted). Thus, Arvizu makes clear that courts must not view in isolation factors upon which police officers rely to create reasonable suspicion.

The fact that Nathan, the driver, was unable to produce identification, in combination with Sgt. Lewis’ observations of Nathan and Shaw’s extreme nervousness,⁵ Shaw’s apparent pretense of sleep when the vehicle was initially stopped, Nathan’s evasive answers regarding his travel plans, the inconsistent versions of the trip itinerary and purpose provided by Nathan and Shaw, the “overwhelming” odor of air freshener, and the altered ceiling that led the officer to believe that the van had a hidden compartment, as well as the police observations prior to the traffic stop (the passenger’s head bobbing up and down in the rear window), were sufficient grounds, taken together, reasonably to warrant an investigative detention. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S.Ct. at 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; United States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Springer, 946 F.2d 1012, 1017 (2nd Cir.1991); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 758 (11th Cir.1988). Therefore, Sgt. Lewis had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Nathan and Shaw were engaged in criminal activity, and that suspicion was sufficient to support their continued detention.

We turn next to the question of whether the police had grounds to search the van. As we have indicated supra, we need not consider whether the police conduct exceeded the scope of Shaw’s consent to search because we find that Sgt. Lewis had probable cause to search the vehicle and the hidden compartment. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

Police officers who have probable cause to believe that there is contraband or other evidence of criminal activity inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road may search it without obtaining a warrant. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381, 104 S.Ct. 1852, 1852-53, 80 L.Ed.2d 381 (1984); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). If supported by probable cause, every part of a vehicle that may conceal the object of the search may be searched. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir.1995).

The significance of a vehicle alteration or hidden compartment in a vehicle is an issue of first impression for this Court. Every court that has considered the question has concluded that evidence of a hidden compartment can contribute to a finding of probable cause to search. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 723-24 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Martel Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir.1993). We need not decide in this case whether a false ceiling or hidden compartment alone would constitute probable cause to believe that drugs or contraband are secreted in a vehicle because, in the case sub judice, that factor is only one part of the mosaic.

By the time Sgt. Lewis began his extensive search and dismantling of the van’s ceiling, he had probable cause to believe that the van contained contraband and, therefore, he was justified in searching it without a warrant under the well-established “automobile exception” enunciated in Carroll. 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Sgt. Lewis’ observations of the van’s ceiling, in combination with Nathan and Shaw’s suspicious behavior, were sufficient to constitute probable cause to search the van, including the ceiling. Before Shaw consented to any search, Sgt. Lewis had noticed that the height of the ceiling in the van was lower than normal and that the fabric was new and taut, not as one would normally expect in an eleven-year-old van. The ceiling of the van was solid, hard, with no flexibility, and the map lights would not move, indicating to the officer that there was a false hydraulic compartment containing contraband similar to one that he found in a conversion van four weeks earlier. Sgt. Lewis testified that the console felt like it was affixed with steel plates and that, in a normal van ceiling, the screws would be removable in the center section to allow for the replacement of bulbs and vents dealing with air conditioning and heating. These factors, taken together, clearly amounted to sufficient probable cause for his search of the van’s ceiling.

The facts of the case sub judice are strikingly similar to those in United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir.1997). In that case, a Kansas Highway Patrol officer stopped Anderson’s vehicle because he was following the car in front of him too closely. During the course of the traffic stop, the trooper made the following observations: the driver of the car and his passenger gave slightly conflicting versions of their travel itinerary, the trooper detected the scent of air freshener in the car, the driver was carrying a pager, the car’s gas tank had been tampered with, and there appeared to be a hidden compartment in the gas tank. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that those factors together constituted sufficient probable cause to search the car’s gas tank. Id. at 1066.

United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716 (5th Cir.1994), is likewise instructive. In that case, border patrol agents stopped a pick-up truck exiting a ranch after triggering directional vehicular sensors set up to detect narcotics smugglers attempting to circumvent checkpoints along a major drug smuggling artery. See id. at 719-20. When the agents spotted the truck, several factors aroused their suspicions: they were unfamiliar with the vehicle, it had no company logos, tools, or pipe racks typical of oil field trucks, the agents were unaware of any oil activity in the area, and Reyes’ (the driver) clothes appeared to be too clean for him to have been working in the oil field. Id. at 720. Based on their suspicions, the agents stopped the truck for an immigration inspection. While questioning Reyes, one agent noticed signs of a false compartment in the bed of the truck — the back of the truck was higher than normal, and there was fresh paint and undercoating around and underneath the bed of the truck. Following a search of the truck, the agents recovered approximately 300 pounds of cocaine from a false compartment in the bed of the truck and, as a result, they arrested Reyes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that reasonable suspicion for the immigration stop existed. Id. at 723. The court also concluded that Reyes’ nervousness, conflicting statements explaining his presence on the ranch and his inability to read oil charts and graphs, together with the agents’ observations regarding the existence of a false compartment, created sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle. Id. at 724.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir.1993). In that case, police stopped the truck that Martel-Martines was driving for speeding. Id. at 856. During the course of the traffic stop, Martel-Martines consented to allow the police to search the truck. Id. at 857. While walking around the rear of the truck, the patrol officer observed a custom-cut plywood board covering the length of the truck bed. When he lifted the board, he saw two lines of caulking in the metal bed. Looking underneath the truck with his flashlight, the trooper could observe that the truck bed recently had been reconstructed to support a concealed compartment. The officer had the truck taken to the police headquarters garage where a small hole was made in the hidden compartment, through which the officers could smell chemicals and observe cellophane wrapping around a brown object. At that point, the police arrested Martel Martines, and the police ultimately discovered a large quantity of cocaine during thorough searches of the vehicle. Although the court found that Martel Martines had consented to the search of his truck, the court, assuming arguendo that the search exceeded the scope of the consent given, held that, by the time that the officers punched the hole in the truck compartment, .they had sufficient probable cause to support a warrantless search of the concealed compartment, based on Martel-Martines’s evasive and inconsistent answers to routine questions and their visual observations of the hidden compartment. Id. at 858-59.

For all of the above stated reasons, we find that the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the evidence from within were lawful.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN NO. 42 AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER NATHAN. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN NO. 61 REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO CONSIDER REMAINING ISSUES PREVIOUSLY RAISED BUT NOT DECIDED. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT SHAW AND COSTS IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.

1 . Defense counsel presented to the suppression court, as well as this Court, a videotape of the traffic stop, recorded by the camera affixed to Sgt. Lewis’ cruiser.

2 . Because probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the search of Shaw's vehicle, the validity of the search did not depend upon Shaw’s purported consent. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).

3 . The Fourth Amendment provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

4 . A police officer may order a driver and occupants out of a lawfully stopped vehicle incident to a traffic stop. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332-33, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); Ferris, 355 Md. 356, 382 n. 9, 735 A.2d 491, 505 n. 9.

5 . In Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999), we cautioned against "placing too much reliance upon a suspect's nervousness when analyzing a determination of reasonable suspicion." Id. at 389, 735 A.2d at 509. Nonetheless, we also characterized Ferris's nervousness as being "unexceptional." Id. We concluded that "Ferris's unexceptional nervousness, in reaction to encountering Trooper Smith, was simply too ordinary to suggest criminal activity.” Id. In the instant case, however, Nathan and Shaw's nervousness was characterized by Sgt. Lewis as extreme. As indicated supra, the fact that conduct may be innocent does not immunize it from consideration in determining reasonable suspicion. Nonetheless, we reiterate that a claim that ordinary nervousness indicates complicity in criminal activity must be treated with caution. Id.