Grimm v. State

Angela Ann Grimm v. State of Maryland, No. 49, September Term 2015, Opinion by
Greene, J.
CRIMINAL LAW — EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION — CORROBORATION
RULE
An extrajudicial confession must be corroborated by independent evidence relating to or
establishing the corpus delicti. Under § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article, the corpus delicti
for the crime of sexual abuse of a minor is evidence of sexual molestation or exploitation of
a minor. No independent evidence was offered to establish the corpus delicti. Accordingly,
the extrajudicial confession of the defendant was neither adequately corroborated, nor a
proper substitute for the corpus delicti of the crime charged. As a result, there was
insufficient evidence presented to enter a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
CRIMINAL LAW — PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES — DISBELIEF OF NON-
PARTY WITNESS’S TESTIMONY
The general rule is that disbelief of a witness does not ordinarily permit the fact-finder to
conclude that the opposite of what the witness testified to is true. If a fact-finder disbelieves
the testimony of a witness, the fact-finder must discredit that testimony, and assign it no
weight in consideration of the ultimate issue. An exception, however, applies to a party
witness. If the fact-finder disbelieves a party witness’s denial of scienter, i.e., guilty
knowledge, a permissible inference of scienter may be drawn based on other additional
evidence. It may not be drawn based solely on the party witness’s denial.
Circuit Court for W ashington County
Case No. 21-K-13-048610
Argued: January 8, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 49
September Term, 2015
ANGELA ANN GRIMM
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Barbera, C.J.
*Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Hotten,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Watts, J., dissents.
Filed: May 4, 2016
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, she also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
In this case, we address the rule requiring corroboration of a defendant’s extrajudicial
confession, as well as what permissible inferences a fact-finder may deduce based on
testimony from a non-party witness in the event the fact-finder disbelieves that testimony.
Quentin Anthony Grimm (“the alleged victim” or “Quentin”) moved in with his
biological father, John Grimm, and his stepmother, Angela Ann Grimm (“Petitioner”), in
2009 when Quentin was sixteen years old. In early 2013, a deputy assigned to a local high
school came into possession of an anonymous letter that raised concerns about the
relationship between Quentin and Petitioner. At this time, Quentin was nineteen years old.
The letter was turned over to Detective Casey Nogle of the Washington County Sheriff’s
Office. Detective Nogle initiated an investigation and interviewed Quentin. That
conversation prompted further concerns. Detective Nogle called Petitioner, and requested
she come to the Sheriff’s Office for an interview.
On February 6, 2013, Detectives Nogle and Jared Barnhart interviewed Petitioner.
The session was audio and video recorded. When Detective Nogle showed Petitioner the
anonymous letter, she immediately confessed that she did not know the paternity of her two
year old son, Logan. Petitioner admitted that she had had a sexual relationship with her
stepson, which began shortly after he moved in when he was sixteen years old, and that the
relationship ended a couple months prior to the interview. As a result of that relationship,
Petitioner stated that she was unsure of the paternity of her two youngest children, but that
she suspected Quentin was Logan’s father. Petitioner further confessed that she had sexual
intercourse five to ten times with her stepson. The detectives provided Petitioner with
several pages of Facebook communications between Quentin and “Faith Evans.” When
asked whether Petitioner was Faith Evans, she responded affirmatively.
The Circuit Court for Washington County (“Circuit Court”) returned an indictment
against Petitioner charging her with, among other things, three counts of sexual abuse of a
minor pursuant to Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article.1
At trial, the State offered into evidence the testimony of Detective Nogle and Quentin as
witnesses, and Petitioner’s recorded confession. Detective Nogle discussed his investigatory
process, which resulted in Petitioner’s confession on the day of the interview. The State
immunized Quentin and obtained a court order compelling him to testify in the State’s case.
On direct examination, Quentin answered a few preliminary questions, but when asked about
pertinent details of the investigation, including whether he had ever had a sexual relationship
with Petitioner, he responded that he did not recall the details or events. Defense Counsel
elected not to cross-examine Quentin. When the State rested its case in chief, Defense
Counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. The Circuit Court denied Petitioner’s motion.
The Defense Counsel rested, and, at the end of the introduction of all the evidence, renewed
the motion for a judgment of acquittal. The motion was again denied, and, after closing
arguments, jury deliberations began. Petitioner was convicted of two of the three counts of
sexual abuse of a minor. Petitioner appealed to the intermediate appellate court. In an
1
Specifically, Petitioner was charged with violating § 3-602(b)(2) of the Criminal Law
Article, which states “[a] household member or family member may not cause sexual abuse
to a minor.” Sexual abuse is defined, under § 3-602(a)(4)(i), as “an act that involves sexual
molestation or exploitation of a minor, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.”
Examples of sexual abuse include, but are not limited to, incest; rape; sexual offense in any
degree; sodomy; and unnatural or perverted sexual practices. See § 3-602(a)(4)(ii) of the
Criminal Law Article.
2
unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. We granted
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Grimm v. State, 444 Md. 638, 120 A.3d 766
(2015). For the reasons explained below, we hold there was insufficient evidence to sustain
the convictions, because the rule of corroboration of an extrajudicial confession was not
satisfied. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, Quentin moved in with his father, John, stepmother, Petitioner, and brother,
Derrick. At this time, Quentin was sixteen years old. In early 2013, Troy Lipenski, a deputy
assigned to a local high school as a School Resource Officer, contacted Detective Nogle, and
released to him an anonymous letter, which raised concerns about the nature of the
relationship between Quentin and Petitioner. Further concerns were raised when Detective
Nogle spoke with Quentin about the anonymous letter. This prompted the detective to
continue the investigation, and he called Petitioner in order to arrange an interview at the
Sheriff’s Office.
On February 6, 2013, Detectives Nogle and Barnhart conducted the interview. After
being read her Miranda rights, Petitioner signed a Miranda waiver, and consented to the
session being audio and video taped. Preliminary questioning revealed that Petitioner, in
addition to her stepson, had three biological children with her husband, Mr. Grimm: Derrick,
age thirteen; Logan, age two; MacKenzie, seven weeks old. After being shown the
anonymous letter, Petitioner confessed that she previously had sexual intercourse with
Quentin five to ten times, beginning when he was sixteen years old. She stated that their
3
relationship ended a few months before the date of the interview; Quentin was nineteen years
old at this time. Petitioner further confessed that she was unsure of the paternity of her two
youngest children, but that she suspected Quentin was Logan’s father. When the detectives
showed Petitioner fourteen pages of Facebook communications between Quentin and “Faith
Evans,” she admitted that Faith Evans was her Facebook alias. Specifically, Petitioner stated
that Faith Evans was the name “we were going to name Logan if it was a girl. So we made
it up.”
The State filed an indictment in the Circuit Court. Petitioner was charged with three
counts of sexual abuse of a minor by a household member under
§ 3-602(b)(2) of the Criminal Law Article, and two counts of third degree sexual offense
pursuant to Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 3-307 of the Criminal Law Article.
The case proceeded as a trial by jury. The State entered nolle prosequi to the two
counts of third degree sexual offense. At trial, the State called Detective Nogle as a witness,
and he testified about his investigation. He explained how he came into possession of the
anonymous note, and that the content of the letter prompted him to speak with Quentin. That
conversation, in turn, caused him to investigate further. He stated that on the day of the
interview, he and Detective Barnhart read Petitioner her Miranda rights, obtained a Miranda
waiver, and her consent to record the interview. A portion of the audio and video recording
of Petitioner’s confession was then played for the jury. The recording was stopped at the
point when Petitioner was questioned about the Facebook communications. On cross-
examination, Detective Nogle stated that he did not request a search warrant to obtain a
4
paternity test, because Petitioner admitted that she did not know the paternity of Logan. On
redirect, Detective Nogle stated that paternity was not an element of the crime of sexual
abuse of a minor.
The State called Quentin as its next witness. In preliminary questioning, Quentin
stated that he moved in with his father and Petitioner in the Fall of 2009. He also identified
Petitioner as his stepmother.2 In pertinent part, the following colloquy ensued between the
State prosecutor and Quentin:
Q. Now, after moving back to Maryland into a residence with the Defendant
and other persons did there come a time when you began a relationship, sexual
relationship, with Angela Grimm?
A. I don’t remember.
Q. You don’t remember anything?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Well do you remember speaking with Detective Nogle and Detective
Barnhart earlier this year?
A. No.
Q. You don’t remember that?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember telling them you thought Logan was your child?
A. No.
Q. Okay. But you remember Logan, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Who is Logan?
A. My little brother.
Q. Okay. So now he’s your little brother and earlier this year he was possibly
your son. Is that what you said?
A. No, I don’t remember saying that.
Q. So, the only answers you’re going to give today is you don’t remember
anything about your relationship with Angela Grimm back in 2010, 2009,
[and] 2011?
2
At this point, the jury was excused for a brief recess. The State offered Quentin immunity,
filed a motion to compel his testimony, and the Circuit Court granted the motion. The jury
was then seated.
5
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you ever had sexual intercourse with Angela Grimm?
A. No, I don’t remember.
Q. You said no. Is that – – You never had sexual intercourse with Angela
Grimm?
A. I don’t remember.
Q. Mr. Grimm, are you telling us the truth today?
A. Yes.
Q. Um hum. Court’s indulgence. How would you describe your relationship
with Angela Grimm?
A. I don’t remember
***
Q. What’s your relationship with Angela Grimm like today?
A. Mother.
Q. You remember that?
A. Remember what?
Q. How about yesterday? Do you remember what your relationship was like
then?
A. A mother.
Q. Have you ever engaged in Facebook postings?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you posted things back and forth with Angela Grimm?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you – – Did she use her real name?
A. No.
Q. What name [did] she use?
A. Faith.
Q. Why did she use that?
A. I don’t know.3
***
Q. Okay. Did you use your real name Quentin A. Grimm on your Facebook?
A. Yes.
***
Q. Do you recall on Facebook sending a, whatever it’s called to Faith, the
person you identified as the Defendant, that you love her, want to be with her,
and that she is the only one you want in life?
A. I don’t remember that.
3
At this point, the State asked the trial judge for permission to treat Quentin as a hostile
witness. The judge granted the request, and the direct examination continued.
6
Quentin stated that he moved out in December 2012. The State completed its direct
examination of Quentin, and Defense Counsel elected not to cross-examine him. The State
rested its case, and the jury was excused.
Defense Counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State failed
to make a prima facie showing as to each element of each count. Defense Counsel
maintained that the only evidence of the corpus delicti4 —sexual act(s) between Petitioner and
Quentin—was derived from Petitioner’s confession, and was not corroborated by
independent evidence, namely, Quentin’s testimony. Moreover, Defense Counsel argued,
“Based upon [Quentin’s] answers there’s never been an admission or a concession by him
which would serve as the corroboration for the body of that crime.”
The State disagreed, and asserted that there was sufficient corroboration, because
Quentin’s testimony proved beyond a reasonable doubt two of the three elements of the crime
of sexual abuse of a minor: Petitioner was a “household member,” and Quentin was sixteen
years old at the time the sexual relationship began. The State argued, “All we have to [do]
is show opportunity and we showed two elements.”
The Circuit Court denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal, because it found
4
The Latin term “corpus delicti” translates into the “body of the crime” and refers to “[t]he
fact of a transgression; A CTUS R EUS.” B LACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY 419 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
10th ed. 2014). The corpus delicti for the crime of sexual abuse of a minor, pursuant to
§ 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article, is evidence of sexual molestation or exploitation of a
minor. The “corpus delicti rule” is a “doctrine that in order to secure a conviction, the
prosecution must establish the corpus delicti with corroborating evidence. [] The doctrine
prohibits the prosecution from proving the corpus delicti based solely on a defendant’s
extrajudicial statements.” B LACK’S, supra note 4, at 420.
7
sufficient corroboration. The trial judge stated “there has to be some corroboration but not
some corroboration of each and every element of a crime.” After Petitioner elected not to
testify, Defense Counsel rested, and renewed its motion for judgment of acquittal. The
Circuit Court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to two counts of sexual
abuse of a minor by a household member.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on the issue of whether her
confession was sufficiently corroborated in order to sustain her convictions. In an unreported
opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the convictions. It stated: “Quentin’s
testimony was, to be sure, independent of the confession and significantly bolstered its
credibility, as it directly concerned the corpus delicti, i.e., whether he and [the Petitioner]
were engaged in a sexual relationship.” The intermediate appellate court cited to Larocca
v. State, 164 Md. App. 460, 883 A.2d 986 (2005), and stated that Quentin’s “preposterous
testimony” was sufficient to corroborate Petitioner’s confession. It held that the trial court
did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, or sending the case to the jury.
We granted certiorari, Grimm v. State, 444 Md. 638, 120 A.3d 766 (2015), to answer
the following questions:
(1) May a witness’s testimony that he does not remember whether an act
occurred constitute sufficient corroboration of an extra-judicial confession by
the defendant that the act in fact occurred?
(2) Can a criminal defendant’s uncorroborated confession constitute sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor?
For the reasons stated below, we shall answer both questions in the negative. Accordingly,
8
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily, “[t]his Court reviews a question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
in a jury trial by asking whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630, 656–57, 28 A.3d 687, 702–03
(2011) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
“In determining whether evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate
court ‘defer[s] to any possible reasonable inferences [that] the trier of fact could have drawn
from the . . . evidence[.]’” Jones v. State, 440 Md. 450, 455, 103 A.3d 586, 589 (2014)
(quoting Hobby v. State, 436 Md. 526, 538, 83 A.3d 794, 801 (2014)). “We defer . . . and
need not decide whether the jury could have drawn other inferences from the evidence,
refused to draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different inferences from the
evidence.” State v. Mayers, 417 Md. 449, 466, 10 A.3d 782, 791–92 (2010) (citing State v.
Smith, 374 Md. 527, 557, 823 A.2d 664, 682 (2003)). In Jones v. State, we stated:
In performing its fact-finding role, the trier of fact decides which evidence to
accept and which to reject. Therefore, in that regard, it is not required to
assess the believability of a witness’s testimony on an all or nothing basis; it
may choose to believe only part, albeit the greatest part, of a particular
witness’s testimony, and disbelieve the remainder.
343 Md. 448, 460, 682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996) (citing Muir v. State, 64 Md. App. 648, 654,
498 A.2d 666, 668–69 (1985)).
DISCUSSION
9
It is settled law that “Maryland follows the general rule that, as a matter of substantive
law, a criminal conviction cannot rest solely on an uncorroborated confession.” Miller v.
State, 380 Md. 1, 46, 843 A.2d 803, 829 (2004). The rule of corroboration requires
independent substantiation of an extrajudicial confession made by a defendant. In Bradbury
v. State, we stated:
It is, of course, well settled that an extrajudicial confession of guilt by a person
accused of crime, unsupported by other evidence, is not sufficient to warrant
a conviction. We have therefore consistently held that the extrajudicial
confession must be supported by evidence, independent of the confession,
which relates to and tends to establish the corpus delicti, i.e., the facts that are
necessary to show that a crime has been committed.
233 Md. 421, 424, 197 A.2d 126, 127 (1964) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore,
“independent evidence . . . need not be full and positive proof of the corpus delicti and may
be small in amount, if such proof, when considered with the confession, convinces the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.” Bradbury, 233 Md. at 425, 197 A.2d
at 128 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he corpus delicti may be proved
by circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available . . . .” Bradbury, 233 Md.
at 424–25, 197 A.2d at 128. See also Ballard v. State, 333 Md. 567, 577, 636 A.2d 474, 479
(1994) (discussing the “national overview of the corroboration requirement”).
Petitioner was convicted under § 3-602(b)(2) of the Criminal Law Article of sexual
abuse of a minor by a household member.5 “Sexual abuse” is defined, in § 3-602(a)(4)(i),
5
A “household member” is defined as “a person who lives with or is a regular presence in
a home of a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.” Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol. , 2015
Cum. Supp.), § 3-601(a)(4) of the Criminal Law Article.
10
as “an act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation 6 of a minor, whether physical
injuries are sustained or not.” The corpus delicti of this crime is sexual abuse. Sexual abuse
includes, but is not limited to, incest, rape, sexual offense in any degree, sodomy, and
unnatural or perverted sexual practices. See § 3-602(a)(4)(ii) of the Criminal Law Article.
“This list is not exhaustive. To constitute sexual abuse, the conduct underlying the charge
need not be among the exemplars listed in § 3-602(a)(4)(ii) . . . .” Schmitt v. State, 210 Md.
App. 488, 497, 63 A.3d 638, 643 (2013).
At trial, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Petitioner was
a household member; (2) Quentin was a minor; and (3) that Petitioner sexually molested or
exploited the alleged victim by means of a specific act. See § 3-602 of the Criminal Law
Article. As evidence, the State placed into evidence a portion of Petitioner’s confession,
which included her admission that she had a sexual relationship with her minor stepson, and
that as a result of that relationship, she was unsure of Logan’s paternity. To corroborate that
testimony, the State called the alleged victim to testify. Although Quentin acknowledged that
he lived with his father and Petitioner from the Fall of 2009 until December 2012, he did not
remember details relating to the corpus delicti, i.e., sexual abuse. Quentin asserted that he
did not remember: (1) whether he had a sexual relationship or intercourse with Petitioner,
(2) whether he spoke to Detectives Nogle and Barnhart, and (3) whether he told the
detectives of his belief that he was Logan’s father. Furthermore, Quentin replied, “I don’t
6
“[E]xploitation requires that the defendant ‘took advantage of or unjustly or improperly
used the child for his or her own benefit.’” Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587, 622, 69 A.3d 1066,
1087 (2013) (quoting Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 426, 722 A.2d 887, 900 (1999)).
11
know” when the prosecutor asked whether he knew why Petitioner selected Faith Evans as
her Facebook alias. In other words, Quentin did not affirmatively testify that sexual abuse,
as defined by the statute, occurred.
Petitioner argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, because
her confession of sexual abuse of a minor was not corroborated by independent evidence.
It is her position that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that Quentin’s
testimony provided sufficient corroboration. That ruling, she argues, “ignores the holding
of decades of case law” requiring corroboration of an extrajudicial confession. She correctly
identifies that the State did not attempt to impeach Quentin with any prior inconsistent
statement he made to the detectives. Likewise, the State did not present other corroborating
documentation, such as medical or physical evidence, to support its contention that Petitioner
sexually abused the alleged victim. Petitioner points out that the rule of corroboration of an
extrajudicial confession requires independent evidence of the corpus delicti, and that the
State failed to satisfy this rule, because it provided no evidence that an act involving sexual
molestation or exploitation of a minor occurred. Furthermore, Petitioner asserts that
Quentin’s testimony concerning his inability to recall whether he had a sexual relationship
with Petitioner did not establish independent evidence of the corpus delicti. In regard to what
inferences may be drawn from Quentin’s testimony, Petitioner stated: “Even if the Court
found it incredulous that Quentin could not remember . . . it does not logically follow that the
appropriate conclusion is that the event necessarily occurred.” In her brief, Petitioner states
that if a fact-finder does not believe the testimony of a non-party witness—here,
12
Quentin—the jury must discredit that testimony, because, as a matter of law, “[n]o other
inferences or speculation are permitted.”
It is the State’s position that the Court of Special Appeals was correct, in its reliance
on Larocca v. State, 164 Md. App. 460, 485, 883 A.2d 986, 1001 (2005), to hold that
Quentin’s testimony was so “preposterous” that it corroborated the confession. In its brief,
the State discusses the history of the corpus delicti rule, and posits that “the rule was
designed only to preclude confessions to, and convictions for, fictitious crimes . . . .” (citing
David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 O HIO S T. L.J. 817, 836 (2003)).
As such, the State argues that “there was no danger here that [Petitioner] was being convicted
of a crime that did not occur” because Quentin’s testimony “was so obviously false, and so
devoid of logic or credibility, that it served to bolster the credibility of [Petitioner’s]
confession with regard to the corpus delicti of the crime with which she was charged.”
Acknowledging the general rule that “[o]rdinarily disbelieving evidence is not the same thing
as finding evidence to the contrary” the State argues that the scienter7 exception—“on
questions of scienter[,] reason for disbelieving evidence denying scienter may also justify
finding scienter”—is applicable in the instant case. Hayette v. State, 199 Md. 140, 145, 85
A.2d 790, 792 (1952) (citing Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 411, 84 A.2d 76, 80 (1951)). For
7
The term “scienter” is defined as a “degree of knowledge that makes a person legally
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having
been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.” B LACK’S,
supra note 4, at 1547.
13
support, the State cites to cases where this Court held it was permissible for a fact-finder to
disbelieve the testimony of a defendant who denied scienter, and instead infer scienter due
to additional considerations. See Kolker v. State, 230 Md. 157, 186 A.2d 212 (1962); Young
v. State, 220 Md. 95, 151 A.2d 140 (1959); Hayette v. State, 199 Md. 140, 85 A.2d 790
(1952). The State disagrees with Petitioner that the scienter exception has limited
application, and can only be used against testifying defendants or co-defendants. Citing to
Larocca, 164 Md. App. at 485, 883 A.2d at 1001, the State asserts that “it is not whether the
witness is a party that makes the difference, rather it is whether the witness is ‘neutral,’ i.e.[,]
whether the witness has an established bias or relationship with the parties.”
The Corroboration Rule and Sufficiency of Evidence
There was insufficient evidence on the record to submit this case to the jury for a trial.
An extrajudicial confession must be corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus
delicti: the body of the crime. The corroboration rule plays a critical role in maintaining the
integrity of our criminal justice system. “Generally an uncorroborated confession does not
establish as a matter of law the commission of [a] crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The
purpose of the rule requiring corroboration of confessions is to guard against convictions
based upon untrue confessions alone.” Bollinger v. State, 208 Md. 298, 305, 117A.2d 913,
916 (1955) (citing Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 61 S. Ct. 603, 85 L. Ed. 876
(1941)). “The thrust of the principle is to prevent mentally unstable persons from confessing
14
to, and being convicted of, crimes that never occurred.” Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391,
403, 335 A.2d 142, 150 (1975). See also Riggins v. State, 155 Md. App. 181, 234, 843 A.2d
115, 146 (2004) (“[T]he limited purpose of the corroboration requirement is to prevent a
mentally unstable person from confessing to and being convicted of a crime that never
occurred.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Wood v. State, we again stated the
importance of this rule:
The courts, in recalling cases in which false confessions have been made
through duress or psychopathic aberration, have considered the danger of
accepting a confession of an accused person without any evidence other than
the confession that the crime in question has been committed. The character
of the evidence to prove the corpus delicti, and its sufficiency for that purpose,
depend largely upon the circumstances of each particular case. It may be
stated as a general proposition that it is essential in all criminal prosecutions
to prove the element that constitutes the crime.
192 Md. 643, 649–50, 65 A.2d 316, 319 (1949). In sum, the corroboration rule serves
important policy purposes.
“This Court reviews a question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial
by asking whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630, 656–57, 28 A.3d 687, 702 (2011) (citations
and internal quotations marks omitted). “In determining whether evidence [is] sufficient to
support a conviction, an appellate court ‘defer[s] to any possible reasonable inferences [that]
the trier of fact could have drawn from the . . . evidence[.]’” Jones v. State, 440 Md. 450,
455, 103 A.3d 586, 589 (2014) (quoting Hobby v. State, 436 Md. 526, 538, 83 A.3d 794, 801
15
(2014)).
Here, the evidence before the jury consisted of an excerpt of Petitioner’s recorded
confession as well as Quentin’s testimony. Petitioner confessed to having sexual intercourse
with her minor stepson at least five to ten times. The confession relates to the corpus delicti
of sexual abuse of a minor, however, an extrajudicial confession by itself is insufficient to
establish the corpus delicti. The corroboration rule requires additional corroborating
evidence:
There is no question that an extrajudicial confession of guilt by a person
accused of crime, uncorroborated by any other evidence, is not sufficient to
warrant a conviction. The law requires that a jury be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, and generally an uncorroborated
confession does not as matter of law establish the commission of crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Wood, 192 Md. at 649, 65 A.2d at 319 (internal citations omitted). The independent
evidence offered by the State to corroborate the confession was Quentin’s testimony. The
State is correct that the alleged victim’s testimony corroborated two of the three elements of
the crime of sexual abuse of a minor: Petitioner was a household member, and Quentin,
during the relevant times, was a minor.8 The State posits that Quentin’s inability to recall
details, such as whether he and Petitioner had a sexual relationship, is “preposterous” and
that the inconceivability of such testimony allowed the jury to infer that a sexual act—the
8
On direct examination, Quentin identified the time period he lived with his father and
Petitioner; he identified Petitioner as a household member from 2009 to 2012; he identified
Logan as his younger brother; he confirmed that he communicated with Petitioner on
Facebook; and he identified their respective Facebook names.
16
corpus delicti—did, in fact, occur. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, and stated
“Quentin’s testimony was, to be sure, independent of the confession and significantly
bolstered its credibility, as it directly concerned the corpus delicti, i.e., whether he and
[Petitioner] were engaged in a sexual relationship.” We disagree. “[T]he extrajudicial
confession must be supported by evidence, independent of the confession, which relates to
and tends to establish the corpus delicti, i.e., the facts that are necessary to show that a crime
has been committed.” Bradbury v. State, 233 Md. 421, 424, 197 A.2d 126, 127 (1964)
(citations omitted). To be sure, on the direct examination of Quentin, the State asked
questions concerning the corpus delicti, but Quentin’s responses—he did not remember—did
not “relate to” or “establish” the corpus delicti. The excerpt of Petitioner’s recorded
confession was the only evidence of the alleged sexual relationship between Quentin and
Petitioner. This without more cannot satisfy the corroboration rule. In Bradbury, we
explained:
The rules governing the substantiation of extrajudicial statements in this State
. . . recognize that the supporting or substantiating circumstances need not
establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt; that the corpus delicti
may be proved by circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not
available; that proof of the corpus delicti need not be full and positive but may
be established by the circumstances of each particular case; and that the
supporting evidence is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti if, when
considered in connection with the confession or admission, it satisfies the
trier of facts beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense charged was
committed and that the accused committed it. It is clear, therefore, that the
independent evidence necessary to support the confession need not be full and
positive proof of the corpus delicti and may be small in amount, if such proof,
when considered with the confession, convinces the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused.
17
233 Md. at 424–25, 197 A.2d at 128 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). In Ballard v. State, 333 Md. 567, 577–78, 636 A.2d 474, 478–79 (1994),
we dedicated significant time to discussing the corroboration rule. In pertinent part, we
focused on the analysis of the corroboration rule made by M CC ORMICK ON E VIDENCE:
To establish guilt in a criminal case, the prosecution must ordinarily show that
(a) the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred; (b) this injury or harm
was done in a criminal manner; and (c) the defendant was the person who
inflicted the injury or harm. Wigmore maintains that corpus delicti means only
the first of these, that is, “the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained,”
and does not require proof that this was occasioned by anyone’s criminal
agency . . . . Most courts, however, define corpus delicti as involving both (a)
and (b). This means that the corroborating evidence must tend to show the
harm or injury and that it was occasioned by criminal activity.
***
The traditional approach has been to require that the elements of the offense
be carefully distinguished and that the corroborating evidence tend to show
each of those elements. A growing number of courts, however, are
abandoning the strict requirement that the corroborating evidence tend to prove
all elements of the corpus delicti. Thus the corroborating evidence need
only tend to show the “major” or “essential” harm involved in the offense
charged and not all of the elements technically distinguished.
Ballard, 333 Md. at 577–78, 636 A.2d at 479 (citing 1 M CC ORMICK ON E VIDENCE 557–59
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
A fact-finder could not reasonably infer from Quentin’s testimony that Petitioner sexually
abused Quentin. Absent from his responses was the “major” or “essential” harm involved
in the offense charged: evidence of sexual abuse.
In Lemons v. State, the Court of Special Appeals reversed a conviction of first-degree
murder, because, although the defendant confessed, the State’s evidence was too slim to
18
corroborate that crime. 49 Md. App. 467, 433 A.2d 1179 (1981). “A confession simply
cannot fortify its own truth.” Lemons, 49 Md. App. at 473, 433 A.2d at 1183. The
circumstantial evidence only proved that the alleged victim failed to return to work. The
State failed to corroborate the corpus delicti of murder. “[E]vidence is only ‘corroborative,’
. . . if it touches or concerns the corpus delicti and—in that way—fortifies the truth of the
accompanying confession. Evidence that may fortify the confession without relation to
the corpus delicti will not be deemed ‘corroborative.’” Lemons, 49 Md. App. at 472, 433
A.2d at 1182–83 (emphasis added). Like Lemons, there is insufficient corroborating
evidence of the corpus delicti. Quentin’s responses—“I don’t remember”—to pertinent
questions concerning the alleged sexual abuse did not corroborate the body of the crime
alleged.
In Duncan v. State, the State’s failure to corroborate an extrajudicial confession led
to a reversal of convictions for child abuse and second degree sexual offense due to the
insufficiency of evidence. 64 Md. App. 45, 494 A.2d 235 (1985). The State alleged that the
defendant had sexually abused his five year old son. At trial, the State introduced the
defendant’s extrajudicial confession, and called the trooper and the child’s mother to testify;
the minor’s out-of-court accusatory statement came in through the mother’s testimony.
Duncan, 64 Md. App. at 54, 494 A.2d at 239. After being convicted, the defendant
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The intermediate appellate court reversed the
convictions, because of the lack of independent corroborative evidence of the defendant’s
19
extrajudicial confession. The out-of-court accusatory statement was admissible only in
conjunction with the defendant’s implied admission of guilt, but the statement was “not
substantive evidence of the fact asserted by the child.” Duncan, 64 Md. App. at 54, 494 A.2d
at 239. But see Bradbury v. State, 233 Md. 421, 197 A.2d 126 (1964) (holding there was
sufficient evidence to uphold a sodomy conviction, based, in part, on the minor victim’s
testimony against the defendant).
In the case sub judice, the State failed to satisfy the rule of corroboration for
extrajudicial confessions. As mentioned above, Quentin’s testimony corroborated two
elements of the crime of sexual abuse of a minor, but his responses did not corroborate the
major or essential element: sexual abuse. Quentin’s assertion that he could not recall, among
other things, whether he had ever had a sexual relationship or intercourse with Petitioner, was
not sufficient evidence to corroborate that the alleged act(s) did, in fact, occur. In other
words, the alleged victim’s responses did not constitute substantive evidence that Petitioner
had sexually abused him. Fatal to the State’s case is the absence of any other independent
circumstantial or direct evidence corroborating the “essential” harm to Quentin, i.e., sexual
abuse. See Ballard, 333 Md. at 578, 636 A.2d at 479 (approving the rule requiring
independent corroboration of “only the major or essential harm involved in the charged
offense”). Because the State introduced no other corroborating evidence, there was
insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner
sexually abused Quentin. The trial judge erred in denying Petitioner’s motion for a judgment
20
of acquittal. See Morgan v. State, 134 Md. App. 113, 126, 759 A.2d 306, 313 (2000) (“It is
the judge’s role to determine whether the evidence that the State has presented is legally
sufficient to warrant sending the case to the jury.”). Furthermore, even if the jury disbelieved
Quentin’s inability to recall certain details, the jury could only discredit that testimony. It
could not assign weight to discredited testimony, and infer that sexual abuse did, in fact,
occur.
Assessing What Inferences, If Any, a Fact-Finder May Draw From the Disbelief of
the Testimony of a Non-Party Witness
A. General Rule Governing a Fact-Finder’s Disbelief of a Testifying Witness
We have already held that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the convictions of
sexual abuse of a minor, because the State failed to corroborate Petitioner’s extrajudicial
confession. We feel it is necessary, however, to address the State’s argument that Quentin’s
inability to recall details, such as whether he and Petitioner had a sexual relationship, is so
“preposterous” that it allowed the jury to infer that the corpus delicti—a sexual act—did, in
fact, occur. Such an inference, under the circumstances, is inconsistent with Maryland law.
We have often stated that “the fact-finder possesses the unique opportunity to view
the evidence and to observe first-hand the demeanor and to assess the credibility of witnesses
during their live testimony . . . .” Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587, 614, 69 A.3d 1066, 1082
(2013) (quoting State v. Mayers, 417 Md. 449, 466, 10 A.3d 782, 791 (2010)). A fact-finder
“decides which evidence to accept and which to reject.” Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 460,
682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996). “In its assessment of the credibility of witnesses,” a fact-finder
21
is “entitled to accept—or reject—all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, whether
that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence.”
Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 659, 12 A.3d 96, 105 (2011) (emphasis in original).
We have long recognized the general rule that if a trier of fact disbelieves part or all
of a witness’s testimony, that discredited testimony is assigned no weight and plays no role
in the consideration of the ultimate issue. In other words, disbelief is not evidence in and of
itself. Therefore, a trier of fact cannot infer scienter, i.e., guilty knowledge, based solely on
a defendant’s denial of such knowledge. The part(s) of the testimony disbelieved must be
discredited by the fact-finder. See VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 Md. 693, 711,
715 A.2d 188, 196 (1998) (“The jury’s prerogative not to believe certain testimony, however,
does not constitute affirmative evidence of the contrary.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d 174, 179 (1990) (“A refusal to believe evidence of
a respondent, however, does not, of itself, supply affirmative evidence of the dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation charged.”); Carter v. State, 10 Md. App. 50, 53, 267 A.2d
743, 745 (1970) (“Generally, disbelieving evidence provides no basis for finding evidence
to the contrary . . . .”); Hayette v. State, 199 Md. 140, 145, 85 A.2d 790, 792 (1952)
(“Ordinarily disbelieving evidence is not the same thing as finding evidence to the
contrary.”).
B. Under a Narrow Exception, Additional Evidence May Permit an Inference
of Scienter
Many jurisdictions, including Maryland, recognize “the doctrine that disbelief of
22
testimony may not alone support a finding” in civil and criminal litigation.9 Olin Guy
Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 C ORNELL L. R EV. 1075, 1102 (1991). The application of the
“disbelief-is-not-evidence rule” is as follows:
Assume that plaintiff must prove X. No witness testifies X, nor does sufficient
circumstantial evidence appear from which to infer X. A witness who knows
about X testifies “not X.” May the jury, on the basis of disbelief of the
witness’s testimony, find X? Hundreds of cases say no. Mere disbelief of
testimony is not proof of facts of an opposite nature or tendency.
Wellborn III, supra, at 1101–02 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). The
disbelieved testimony carries no weight in the fact-finder’s consideration of the issue(s)
before it. The application of the rule has been consistent in many jurisdictions.
But courts, including the Supreme Court, have generally been hostile to
accepting the probative value of the antithesis inference, especially without
other evidence in support of the party carrying the burden of proof. For
example, in 1891, the Court in Bunt v. Sierra Butte Gold Mining Co.[, 138
U.S. 483, 11 S. Ct. 464, 34 L. Ed. 1031 (1891),] held that a plaintiff could not
meet his burden of proof by calling the defendant’s employees as witnesses in
the hope that the jury would disbelieve them. Over the years, numerous cases
have similarly rejected the antithesis inference as an adequate basis for
submitting a case to the jury. The First Circuit explained that the danger of
permitting the antithesis inference was “obvious,” as it would allow a plaintiff
to prove its case solely through impeachment.
9
There is not a uniform way in which federal and state courts refer to this doctrine. “Judges
frequently instruct juries that they may disbelieve a witness and thereby reject all or part of
the witness’s testimony. This well-accepted premise, however, raises a more controversial
question: whether a jury may go a step further and infer, from a belief that the witness’s
testimony is not true, that the truth is the opposite—or what one might call the ‘antithesis
inference’ . . . . [I]n the last fifty years, [federal] courts have almost uniformly rejected the
antithesis inference.” Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. R EV. 435, 461,
465 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
23
Pollis, supra note 9, at 461–62 (footnotes omitted). Because of these and other concerns,
“[t]he extent of permissible inferences drawn from the presentation of particular false
testimony is analogous to the weight given to a party’s extrajudicial fabrication, suppression,
spoliation, or subornation of evidence.” Wellborn III, supra, at 1104. The general rule is
designed to maintain effective appellate review.10 Furthermore, it ensures the integrity of the
trial process.11
There is a narrow exception to the general rule, but it requires that a permissible
inference be drawn from other admissible evidence, and not just solely from the disbelief of
a witness’s testimony. “In appropriate circumstances” a permissible inference may be drawn
“where the judgment of falsity reasonably derives not from demeanor, but from the
testimonial content or other record evidence. To this extent, the doctrine that disbelief of
testimony can never alone support a finding of fact should be qualified.” Wellborn III,
10
As Judge Learned Hand explained, if a fact-finder disbelieved testimony based solely on
the witness’s demeanor, meaningful appellate review would be negatively impacted. For
example, “there could not be an effective appeal from the judge’s disposition of a motion for
a directed verdict. He, who has seen and heard the ‘demeanor’ evidence, may have been
right or wrong in thinking that it gave rational support to a verdict; yet, since that evidence
has disappeared, it will be impossible for an appellate court to say which he was. Thus, he
would become the final arbiter in all cases where the evidence of witnesses present in court
might be determinative.” Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
11
“The party with the burden of proof does not make an issue for the jury’s determination
by relying on the hope that the jury will not trust the credibility of the witnesses. If all of the
witnesses deny that an event essential to the plaintiff’s case occurred, the plaintiff cannot get
to the jury simply because the jury might disbelieve these denials. There must be some
affirmative evidence that the event in question actually occurred.” 9B C HARLES A LAN
W RIGHT & A RTHUR R. M ILLER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 2527 (3d ed. 2008).
24
supra, at 1104. As such, the exception is narrowly applied.12
In Maryland, we have at times referred to this exception as the “scienter exception,”
and we have often stated that, under certain circumstances, it may be utilized by a fact-finder
when a party witness’s testimony is disbelieved. The application of the scienter exception
is limited, and permits a fact-finder to infer scienter from other sources of evidence, but only
when a party witness’s testimony is inherently improbable. The exception is applicable only
when the following conditions are present: (1) a party witness, i.e., usually a defendant or co-
defendant,13 (2) the denial of scienter by a party witness, and (3) other additional evidence
from which a fact-finder may rationally deduce that a party witness had scienter.14 See
Carter, 10 Md. App. at 53, 267 A.2d at 745 (“[T]here is an exception involving scienter or
12
In federal courts, for example, the exception may apply in employment-discrimination suits
and criminal cases. There, the trial court “impose[s] an important limitation: the plaintiff or
prosecutor must still meet the initial burden of proof without the inference . . . . In criminal
cases, a defendant who chooses to testify does not do so until after the prosecution has rested
its case, meaning the prosecution has presumably adduced sufficient evidence without the
defendant’s testimony.” Pollis, supra note 9, at 469.
13
Under the scienter exception, when referring to a party witness, the term “party” is broader
than the caption of the case. It refers not only to the parties of a case, but it also includes any
co-defendants, because co-defendants are also accused of being a participant in the criminal
activity at issue. For example, in Larocca v. State, 164 Md. App. 460, 883 A.2d 986 (2005),
co-defendant Hinkle entered into a plea bargain with the State, and was then called to testify
in his co-defendant’s trial. Under the scienter exception, Hinkle was considered to be a
party witness. The Court of Special Appeals held that the jury could infer the defendant’s
scienter, based on other additional supporting evidence, including Hinkle’s “preposterous
testimony.” Larocca, 164 Md. App. at 485, 883 A.2d at 1001.
14
“An inference is a factually permissible presumption.” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 538,
823 A.2d 664, 670 (2003) (quoting Rowe v. State, 41 Md. App. 641, 643, 398 A.2d 485, 487
(1979)).
25
guilty knowledge, i.e., reasons for disbelieving a denial of scienter may provide a basis for
finding scienter.”). See also Wild v. State, 201 Md. 73, 77, 92 A.2d 759, 761 (1952) (“[I]t
is nevertheless clear that knowledge may be inferred from circumstances, even where there
is positive denial.”); Ferraro v. State, 200 Md. 274, 278, 89 A.2d 628, 630 (1952) (“Several
times recently we have remarked that reason for disbelieving evidence denying scienter may
also justify finding scienter.”); Hayette, 199 Md. at 145, 85 A.2d at 792 (“But on questions
of scienter[,] reason for disbelieving evidence denying scienter may also justify finding
scienter.”).
In Carter, the Court of Special Appeals further explained the role of the scienter
exception within our criminal justice system:
The rule concerning finding scienter in no way affects other aspects of
criminal law. The State still has the burden of proof; and the defendant is
still presumed innocent and does not have to prove his innocence. He may
remain silent without comment on that silence. The defendant may, if he
wishes, testify in his defense. If he does so, ordinarily, disbelieving his
testimony is not the same as finding positive evidence to the contrary, except
the permissibility of finding scienter based on the defendant’s denial of
scienter.
In order to find a defendant’s story so inherently improbable as to justify
finding scienter from defendant’s denial, there must be some additional
circumstance establishing the inherent improbability of defendant’s
denial. If defendant merely denied all guilty knowledge and no evidence,
from either the defense or the State, put that denial in the position of being
more than merely disbelievable, a finding of scienter from such a denial will
not be allowed to stand. Since the finding of scienter from a denial of it is a
concept of some subtlety, it must appear in the record what circumstances the
trial court relied upon in elevating a denial by the defendant from being merely
disbelievable to the status of justifying a finding of scienter.
26
10 Md. App. at 54, 267 A.2d at 745–46 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, we reject the State’s attempt to expand the exception to also apply
in cases involving a testifying “non-neutral” non-party witness. The State did not cite to, nor
could we find, a case where the scienter exception also applied to the disbelief of a non-party
witness’s testimony. The reason is self-evident: “The rule concerning finding scienter in no
way affects other aspects of criminal law.” Carter, 10 Md. App. at 54, 267 A.2d at 745. “It
is well settled that the jury’s disbelief of a non-party witness does not permit the jury to find
that the opposite of what the witness testified to is true.” King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 710,
967 A.2d 790, 807 (2009) (Murphy, J., dissenting). In his treatise, Judge Joseph F. Murphy
explains, in pertinent part:
Disbelief of a witness does not ordinarily permit the factfinder to conclude that
the opposite of what the witness testified to is true. For example, if a nonparty
witness testifies that the light was green for northbound traffic, but the jurors
are persuaded that this testimony is false, they cannot turn their disbelief into
a finding that the light was actually red for northbound traffic. If the witness
is not believed on that point, the jurors “erase the blackboard.”
Disbelief of a party, however, is sometimes treated differently. The
finding that a party has deliberately furnished false information permits
the inference that the party did so because he knew that his cause should
not prevail. The criminal defendant who furnishes false exculpatory
information to investigating officers or who has threatened the other side’s
witnesses is treated differently from the non-party witness whose testimony is
simply not given any credit. Under certain circumstances, false information
can be treated as an admission by conduct that the opposing party’s case is
truthful and would prevail but for the falsity.
Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., M ARYLAND E VIDENCE H ANDBOOK § 409, at 167 (4th ed. 2010)
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). This explanation conforms with decades of
27
Maryland case law. We hold that an expansion of the scienter exception is unnecessary and
unwarranted. The State ignores evidentiary tools, such as the turncoat witness rule,15 that are
already at its disposal to prove its case in chief. The burden remains with the State to present
the requisite substantive evidence, and here it failed to meet that burden.
The scienter exception does not apply, because the facts in the instant case do not
satisfy the requirements of the exception. First, the testimony at issue is that of a non-party
witness, i.e., the alleged victim, rather than that of a party witness. Second, Petitioner did not
deny scienter; she confessed to having sexual intercourse with her stepson five to ten times.
Third, other than the extrajudicial confession, no additional evidence was presented to allow
the jury to permissibly infer that sexual act(s) occurred between Petitioner and the alleged
victim. Petitioner confessed to sexual abuse of a minor, but the State failed to produce any
15
At common law, a witness’s prior inconsistent statement could only be admissible for
impeachment purposes. In Nance v. State, we expanded the rule, and held that such a
statement could also be admissible as substantive evidence. 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633
(1993). “We hold that the factual portion of an inconsistent out-of-court statement is
sufficiently trustworthy to be offered as substantive evidence of guilt when the statement is
based on the declarant’s own knowledge of the facts, is reduced to writing and signed or
otherwise adopted by him, and he is subject to cross-examination at the trial where the prior
statement is introduced.” Nance, 331 Md. at 569, 629 A.2d at 643 (footnote omitted). This
ruling has been codified in Md. Rule 5-802.1: “The following statements previously made
by a witness who testifies at the trial or hearing and who is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement are not excluded by the hearsay rule: (a) A statement that is
inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, if the statement was (1) given under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (2) reduced
to writing and was signed by the declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion
by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement
. . . .”
28
evidence to adequately corroborate the crime. Therefore, the general rule would apply in the
absence of the corroboration rule. If the jury disbelieved the alleged victim’s testimony, the
fact-finder was obliged to discredit the part(s) disbelieved.
In sum, we reject the State’s argument, and conclude that it amounts to no more than
a misapplication of the scienter exception. We also distinguish Larocca v. State, 164 Md.
App. 460, 883 A.2d 986 (2005) from the case sub judice, because the issue there did not
involve the application of the corroboration rule. Additionally, that case involved the
testimony of a co-defendant who the State impeached using the co-defendant’s prior
inconsistent statement.
We note that in Larocca the Court of Special Appeals, in dicta, drew a distinction
between a neutral non-party witness and a non-neutral non-party witness.16 As stated above,
the applicability of the scienter exception turns on the status of the witness and whether the
witness is a party or non-party. To the extent the Court of Special Appeals in Larocca
suggested that the applicability of the scienter exception is contingent on whether the witness
is neutral or non-neutral, we disavow that distinction to the degree it conflicts with the
general rule and the scienter exception as articulated herein.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Quentin’s
16
“In addition, disbelief of Hinkle . . . is hardly the same as disbelief of a neutral nonparty
witness, whose testimony, when disbelieved, is merely erased from the fact-finder’s mind.”
Larocca, 164 Md. App. at 485, 883 A.2d at 1001.
29
testimony did not relate to or establish the corpus delicti of sexual abuse of a minor. Because
the State did not produce independent evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial confession,
the rule of corroboration was not satisfied, as a matter of law. The evidence was legally
insufficient to warrant a jury verdict.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS IS REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
DIRECTIONS TO R EVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR W ASHINGTON COUNTY.
RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS.
30
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-K-13-048610
Argued: January 8, 2016
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 49
September Term, 2015
______________________________________
ANGELA ANN GRIMM
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Barbera, C.J.
*Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Hotten,
JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J.
______________________________________
Filed: May 4, 2016
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, she also participated in the decision and
adoption of the majority opinion.
Respectfully, I dissent. I would hold that, under this particular case’s circumstances,
a witness’s extraordinary lack of credibility was sufficient to serve as corroboration of the
defendant’s confession.
In Jones v. State, 440 Md. 450, 454-55, 103 A.3d 586, 589 (2014), this Court
explained the standard of review for challenges to sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. In determining whether evidence was sufficient to support a
conviction, an appellate court defers to any possible reasonable inferences
that the trier of fact could have drawn from the evidence.
(Brackets, citations, ellipsis, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 46, 843 A.2d 803, 829 (2004), this Court explained
what is sometimes known as the “corpus delicti rule” as follows:
[A] criminal conviction cannot rest solely on an uncorroborated confession.
. . . [I]t is not necessary for the corroborating evidence to be full and
complete[,] or that it establish the truth of the corpus delicti either
beyond a reasonable doubt or [even] by a [mere] preponderance of
proof. The supporting evidence . . . may be small in amount[,] and is
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti if, when considered in connection
with the confession or admission, it satisfies the trier of fact[] beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offense charged was committed and that the
[defendant] committed it.
(Emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, I would conclude that
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the alleged victim, Quentin, was lying
when he testified that he could not remember whether he had had sexual intercourse with
the defendant, Angela Ann Grimm (“Grimm”), Petitioner. Absent evidence of a faulty
memory or mind-altering substances, no rational twenty-year-old could possibly forget
whether he or she had had sexual intercourse with a stepparent within the previous five
years.1 Indeed, it strains all credulity that Quentin could remember exchanging messages
with Grimm on Facebook, and could even remember Grimm’s username on Facebook
(“Faith”), yet could not remember whether he had had sexual intercourse with Grimm.
After the prosecutor asked the simple question “How would you describe your
relationship with [] Grimm?”, Quentin repeated what he had already said four times: “I
don’t remember.” Quentin’s answer was not only non-responsive and nonsensical, but also
demonstrably false; after the prosecutor asked “What’s your relationship with [] Grimm
like today?”, Quentin replied: “Mother.” The jury could easily reasonably infer that
Quentin was reflexively falsely responding “I don’t remember” to almost every question,
including questions about whether he had had sexual intercourse with Grimm. In short, I
wholeheartedly agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Quentin’s testimony about his
lack of memory was “preposterous.”
Having concluded that the evidence was more than sufficient to demonstrate that
Quentin was lying when he testified that he could not remember whether he had had sexual
intercourse with Grimm, I would hold that, as a matter of law, Quentin’s false testimony
could serve as corroboration of Grimm’s confession to having had sexual intercourse with
Quentin. Again, Quentin made the preposterous claim that he could not remember whether
1
Grimm confessed to a detective that she had begun a sexual relationship with
Quentin in 2009, and that the sexual relationship ended in either 2012 or 2013. Quentin
testified in 2014.
-2-
he had had sexual intercourse with Grimm. Given that Quentin would have certainly
denied the allegation if it were false, a reasonable inference is that the allegation was true.
The Majority states that “disbelief is not evidence in and of itself” and cites: Hayette
v. State, 199 Md. 140, 145, 85 A.2d 790, 792 (1952), a sixty-four-year-old case; Carter v.
State, 10 Md. App. 50, 53, 267 A.2d 743, 745 (1970), a forty-six-year-old case; Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d 174, 179 (1990), an attorney
discipline case; and VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 Md. 693, 711, 715 A.2d
188, 196-97 (1998), a civil case.2 See Maj. Slip Op. at 22-23; see also In re Gloria H., 410
Md. 562, 579, 979 A.2d 710, 719 (2009) (“For the reasons stated in VF Corp.[] and
Clements, [] the [juvenile c]ourt erred in drawing th[e] impermissible inference” that the
2
In VF Corp., 350 Md. at 703, 715 A.2d at 192, this Court held that “there was
insufficient evidence of fraud for [a fraud] count to have been submitted to [a] jury[.]” In
this Court, in arguing that there was sufficient evidence of fraud, the plaintiff conceded that
there was no direct evidence that the defendant’s employee knew that the statements that
the defendant’s employee had made were false. See id. at 711, 715 A.2d at 196. However,
the plaintiff contended “that the jury ‘reasonably disbelieved [the defendant’s employee]
when he denied that he knew [that] his representations were false.’” Id. at 711, 715 A.2d
at 196. This Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention, stating:
The jury’s prerogative not to believe certain testimony, however, does not
constitute affirmative evidence of the contrary. As . . . pointed out . . . in
[]Clements, 319 Md. [at] 298, 572 A.2d [at] 179[], “[a] refusal to believe
evidence of a [defendant], however, does not, of itself, supply affirmative
evidence of the dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation charged. The
issue is whether [the plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence of the charge to
meet the clear and convincing standard of proof.”
VF Corp., 350 Md. at 711, 715 A.2d at 196-97 (some alterations in original).
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opposite of the juvenile’s mother’s testimony was true.).3
None of these five cases applies here. Both Hayette and Carter concerned the issue
of whether an inference from a trier of fact’s disbelief of a witness can establish scienter,
or the mental element of a crime.4 See Hayette, 199 Md. at 145, 85 A.2d at 792
(“Ordinarily[,] disbelieving evidence is not the same thing as finding evidence to the
contrary. But[,] on questions of scienter[,] reason for disbelieving evidence denying
scienter may also justify finding scienter.” (Citation omitted)); Carter, 10 Md. App. at 53,
267 A.2d at 745 (“Generally, disbelieving evidence provides no basis for finding evidence
to the contrary; however, there is an exception involving scienter or guilty knowledge,
i.[]e., reasons for disbelieving a denial of scienter may provide a basis for finding scienter.”
(Citations omitted)). By contrast, this case concerns the issue of whether an inference from
3
In Gloria H., 410 Md. at 565, 979 A.2d at 712, this Court held that a juvenile’s
mother was “entitled to a new trial on the issue of whether she was ‘involved’ in” her
daughter’s truancy. In the juvenile court, the juvenile and her mother “testified that,
although [the juvenile] arrived at her school on a regular basis, [the juvenile] rarely
attended the classes to which she was assigned.” Id. at 569, 979 A.2d at 714 (emphasis
omitted). If believed, the testimony of the juvenile and her mother would have established
that the juvenile’s mother was not involved in her daughter’s truancy, because the
juvenile’s mother had done all that she had needed to do—namely, simply ensure that her
daughter arrived at school. However, the juvenile court found that, “because [the juvenile’s
mother]’s ‘incomprehensible’ testimony lacked credibility, the opposite of her exculpatory
testimony must [have] be[en] true.” Id. at 579, 979 A.2d at 719. This Court concluded
that, “[f]or the reasons stated in VF Corp.[] and Clements, [] the [juvenile c]ourt erred in
drawing th[e] impermissible inference” that the opposite of the juvenile’s mother’s
testimony was true. Gloria H., 410 Md. at 579, 979 A.2d at 719.
4
“Mens rea [is] the guilty mind or mental state accompanying a forbidden act. . . .
[M]ens rea [is] interchangeable with the terms ‘guilty mind,’ ‘scienter[,]’ and ‘criminal
intent[.]’” State Cent. Collection Unit v. Jordan, 405 Md. 420, 425 n.7, 952 A.2d 266, 269
n.7 (2008) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted).
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a trier of fact’s disbelief of a witness can serve as corroboration of a defendant’s confession.
In other words, this case involves corroboration of the actus reus, not proof of the mens
rea.5
In all three of the other cases—VF Corp., Clements, and Gloria H.—this Court
concluded that a party with the burden of proof could not rely on a fact-finder’s disbelief
of a witness’s testimony alone to establish the party’s case. Specifically, in VF Corp., 350
Md. at 711, 715 A.2d at 196, without any direct evidence of fraud, the plaintiff relied on
the jury’s discrediting the defendant’s employee’s testimony that he did not know that “his
representations were false.” In Clements, 319 Md. at 298, 572 A.2d at 179, in an attempt
to establish dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, the Attorney Grievance
Commission relied on the hearing judge’s discrediting the respondent’s testimony. And,
in Gloria H., 410 Md. at 579, 979 A.2d at 719, the State had no direct evidence of the
juvenile’s mother’s involvement in the juvenile’s truancy, and the juvenile court based its
verdict in the State’s favor on the circumstance that the juvenile court discredited the
juvenile’s mother’s testimony.
The lesson of VF Corp., Clements, and Gloria H.—that a party with the burden of
proof could not rely on a fact-finder’s disbelief of a witness’s testimony alone to establish
the party’s case—does not apply where, as here, the issue is whether there was
corroboration of a confession. By definition, in such a case, the party with the burden of
5
“[G]enerally[,] there are two components of every crime[:] the actus reus[,] or
guilty act[,] and the mens rea[,] or the guilty mind[.]” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 499,
61 A.3d 794, 807 (2013) (citation omitted).
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proof—namely, the State—is not relying on a fact-finder’s disbelief of a witness’s
testimony alone to establish the State’s case. In this case, the State offered not only
evidence of Grimm’s confession, but also independent evidence, in the form of Quentin’s
testimony, that, in relation to Quentin, Grimm was both a “family member” and a
“household member,” as those terms are defined by Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002,
2012 Repl. Vol.) (“CR”) § 3-601(a)(3) (“‘Family member’ means a relative of a minor by
blood, adoption, or marriage.”) and CR § 3-601(a)(4) (“‘Household member’ means a
person who lives with or is a regular presence in a home of a minor at the time of the
alleged abuse.”), respectively. The only issue in a case such as this is whether there is
corroboration of the confession—and that corroboration “may be small in amount” and
need not “be full and complete or . . . establish the truth of the corpus delicti[, not even] by
a [mere] preponderance of proof.” Miller, 380 Md. at 46, 843 A.2d at 829 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In accordance with the easy-to-meet standard of proof for corroboration of
confessions, and in accordance with viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, I would hold that evidence of a witness’s extraordinary lack of credibility may serve
as corroboration of a confession. Examining this case’s circumstances, I would conclude
that Quentin’s extraordinary dishonesty—in the form of testifying that he could not recall
whether he had had sexual intercourse with Grimm, a woman with whom he has a mother-
son relationship—was sufficient to corroborate Grimm’s confession that she had had
sexual intercourse with Quentin.
For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent.
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