Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Framm

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Rhonda I. Framm, Misc. Docket AG No. 73, September
Term 2014
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT —
Respondent, Rhonda I. Framm, violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.1; 1.2(a); 1.4(a) and (b); 1.5; 1.7; 1.15; 3.3(a); and 8.4(a), (c), and (d), as well
as Maryland Rule 16-606.1. These violations stemmed from Respondent’s representation
of a client with diminished capacity, specifically her failure to represent her client
competently, diligently, honestly, and with adequate communication. Respondent also
made numerous misrepresentations to the court for her own financial gain. Disbarment is
the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Case No. 03-C-14-013918 OF MARYLAND
Argued: February 4, 2016
Reargued: June 2, 2016 Misc. Docket AG No. 73
September Term, 2014
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
RHONDA I. FRAMM
Barbera, C.J.,
*Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
Hotten,
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, C.J.
Filed: August 24, 2016
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in the
initial hearing and conference of the case while
an active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, she also participated in the
rehearing, decision, and adoption of this opinion.
Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), filed
in this Court on December 15, 2014, a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against
Respondent, Rhonda I. Framm. The Commission charged Respondent with violating
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (competence); 1.2
(scope of representation); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4 (communication); 1.5 (fees); 1.7 (conflict of
interest); 1.15 (safekeeping property); 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal); 8.4(a), (c), and (d)
(misconduct), and Maryland Rule 16-606.1 (attorney trust account record-keeping)1.
Those charges arise from Respondent’s representation of Robert L. Wilson and her
subsequent suit against Mr. Wilson for attorney’s fees. On December 16, 2014, this Court
transmitted the matter to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and designated the
Honorable John J. Nagle, III (“the hearing judge”) to conduct an evidentiary hearing and
make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The hearing judge presided over a hearing on June 1, 2, and 3, 2015, at which
Respondent testified and presented evidence. On September 1, 2015, the hearing judge
issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Respondent violated
MLRPC 1.4, 1.7, 1.15, 3.3, 8.4(a) and (c), and Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a), but did not
violate MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, or 1.5. The hearing judge drew no conclusion on the charged
violation of MLRPC 8.4(d).
1
The Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct were revised and re-codified on
July 1, 2016. In that process Maryland Rule 16-606.1 was renumbered, without substantive
change, as Maryland Rule 19-407. Because we judge Petitioner’s conduct against the
extant law at the time of her actions, we refer to the now re-codified Maryland Rule 16-
606.1 throughout.
Both Petitioner and Respondent filed exceptions. Bar Counsel, on behalf of
Petitioner, excepted to the hearing judge’s failure to make certain findings of fact and
render a conclusion as to MLRPC 8.4(d). Petitioner also excepted to the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 and the hearing
judge’s failure to find the presence of certain aggravating factors. Respondent challenged
the hearing judge’s conclusions that she violated any of the charged rules of professional
conduct, aside from MLRPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a).
Following oral argument on February 4, 2016, we issued an Order of Remand
instructing the hearing judge to make additional findings of fact and clarify his conclusions
of law regarding MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). Thereafter, the hearing judge issued
Supplemental Findings and Conclusions of Law (“supplemental findings”), finding
additional facts as set forth in Petitioner’s exceptions, finding that Respondent’s actions
that constituted violations of MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) were done intentionally, and
concluding that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(d).
Petitioner and Respondent each filed responses to the supplemental findings.
Petitioner withdrew its exception to the hearing judge’s failure to make findings of fact and
render a conclusion as to MLRPC 8.4(d) and renewed its remaining exceptions.
Respondent renewed her previously filed exceptions and excepted to all of the additional
findings and conclusions made in the supplemental findings.
For reasons we shall explain, we agree with the hearing judge that Respondent
violated MLRPC 1.4; 1.7; 1.15; 3.3; and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); as well as Maryland Rule 16-
606.1(a), but did not violate MLRPC 1.3. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that
2
Respondent’s misconduct also violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, and 1.5.
I.
The hearing judge made the following findings of fact by clear and convincing
evidence.2 Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on
December 1, 1981, and maintains a solo law practice in Baltimore County. Respondent’s
interaction with Robert L. Wilson began subsequent to a then-recently entered judgment
of divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County before the Honorable Sherrie R.
Bailey (“the divorce case”). On June 17, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, through their
respective counsel, had negotiated the terms of a settlement agreement in the divorce case,
in which, relevant here, Mr. Wilson would pay Mrs. Wilson $55,000 plus interest over the
next five years or $50,000 within sixty days. Judge Bailey accepted the settlement
agreement and entered accordingly a judgment of absolute divorce.
Mr. Wilson first met Respondent for an initial consultation on June 23, 2010, to
assist him in vacating the divorce judgment because he did not understand the settlement
agreement and was dissatisfied with its terms. He retained Respondent on June 24, 2010.
Mr. Wilson signed a retainer agreement providing that he would pay an initial retainer of
$10,000 and Respondent would bill at an hourly rate of $425. On June 25, 2010, Mr.
2
We have combined the hearing judge’s initial findings and supplemental findings in this
discussion. In some instances the hearing judge’s findings are based on his having
discredited Respondent’s version of events over that of other witnesses whose testimony
the judge credited. We have also included additional information based upon the
undisputed evidence in the record. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 436 Md. 513,
517 n.3 (2014) (supplementing the hearing judge’s findings of fact with undisputed
information adduced at the disciplinary hearing).
3
Wilson paid Respondent $10,125. Respondent admitted that she failed to create and
maintain records of Mr. Wilson’s payments and consequently conceded that she violated
Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a).
Mr. Wilson typically sought and received help from his friend, Sandra McLean-
Stewart (“Ms. Stewart”), and his cousin, Kevin Griggs, in understanding complex
information, including legal documents. As described by Mr. Griggs, Mr. Wilson was able
to understand “not too complicated matters” if they were broken down and explained
slowly. Ms. Stewart accompanied Mr. Wilson to one of the three initial meetings with
Respondent, but not the meeting at which he signed the retainer agreement.
Divorce Case: Psychological Evaluation and Motion to Vacate
After consulting with Mr. Wilson, Respondent concluded that Mr. Wilson had
significant claims to a portion of Mrs. Wilson’s marital property. Respondent also
recognized that Mr. Wilson had a diminished capacity to understand information and
explained to him that, although vacating the settlement agreement underlying the divorce
judgment would be difficult, he might be successful if he could prove that he was
incapacitated. Respondent referred Mr. Wilson to a psychologist, Morris S. Lasson, Ph.D.,
P.A., to determine whether there were sufficient grounds for Mr. Wilson to file a motion
to vacate the settlement agreement on the ground of incapacity.
On June 28, 2010, Dr. Lasson conducted an initial evaluation of Mr. Wilson and
concluded in a written report that Mr. Wilson had a neuro-cognitive disorder that impaired
his ability to comprehend complex information. Dr. Lasson noted that Mr. Wilson suffered
a stroke around 1964 that affected his speech and memory. Dr. Lasson explained in his
4
report:
[Mr. Wilson]’s physical appearance was satisfactory. At the same time, his
orientation to time, person and place was erratic. He had difficulty absorbing
details and showed lapses of attention. He was unable to maintain
concentration explaining, “I need time to think it out.” Mr. Wilson recited
the alphabet incorrectly on his fingers. He did not know the name of the U.S.
president nor was he aware of today’s date. He showed both expressive and
receptive aphasia and speech stammering. His memory was flawed. He
showed difficulty with encoding, retrieval and focusing skills. This man
cannot process information fluidly and has sensory integration problems.
With reasonable psychological certainty, Robert Wilson has a neuro-
cognitive disorder and cannot be held responsible to fully understand
complex information and details.
On July 1, 2010, Respondent, on behalf of Mr. Wilson, filed a motion to vacate the
divorce judgment and attached Dr. Lasson’s report. In the motion, Respondent argued that
Mr. Wilson lacked the capacity to understand the settlement agreement and consequently
could not consent to it. Respondent further requested an extension of time for a complete
psychological evaluation of Mr. Wilson to determine whether he required a guardian. Mrs.
Wilson, through her attorney, Diana Denrich, filed a response in opposition to the motion
to vacate the judgment.
Dr. Lasson conducted a complete evaluation of Mr. Wilson and issued a report,
dated August 9, 2010, in which he opined that Mr. Wilson should have a legal guardian.
In the August 2010 report, Dr. Lasson explained that Mr. Wilson has a cognitive
impairment that affects “his ability to understand and comprehend both the written and
spoken word. He should be counseled constantly not to sign any documents and, even in
a verbal encounter, he should have guidance and direction to be absolutely certain that he
understands to the best of his ability[.]” Dr. Lasson also stated that, “[w]hen asked to count
5
from 20 to 0 backwards, [Mr. Wilson] forgot specific numbers.” On August 16, 2010,
Respondent wrote to Ms. Denrich to explain that she was in the process of having a
guardian appointed for Mr. Wilson. Respondent attached to that correspondence Dr.
Lasson’s August 2010 report.
Guardianship Case: The First Petition
On April 20, 2011, Respondent filed a Petition for Appointment of Guardian of the
Property of Robert Wilson in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the guardianship
case”). In that petition, Respondent listed Mr. Wilson as the Petitioner and named Mr.
Griggs as the person Mr. Wilson wished to be appointed as his guardian. Respondent
attached certificates from Dr. Lasson and Mr. Wilson’s treating physician, Beth Marcus,
M.D., to show that Mr. Wilson had capacity to consent to a guardian. Those certificates
were not verified and did not include the doctors’ full names, qualifications, history with
Mr. Wilson, or opinions as to the cause and extent of his disability.
Two days later, the Circuit Court rejected the petition because it did not comply
with Maryland Rule 10-301 and the certificates did not comply with Maryland Rule 10-
202. Before the hearing judge, Respondent testified that she did not receive the court’s
rejection until it was produced in the disciplinary investigation. Yet, by August 4, 2011,
Respondent had known that the petition (“the first petition”) had been rejected, as she
drafted a new petition for guardianship naming Mr. Griggs as the Petitioner. Mr. Griggs
signed and returned the new petition to Respondent on August 10, 2011. Respondent,
however, did not file that petition (“the second petition”) until November 2011.
Divorce Case: Petition for Civil Constructive Contempt
6
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2011, Mrs. Wilson, having received no communication
from Respondent for more than a year after the filing of the motion to vacate the judgment
of divorce, filed, through her counsel, Ms. Denrich, a Petition for Civil Constructive
Contempt seeking to advance the case and obtain a hearing before Judge Bailey on the
motion to vacate.
On November 2, 2011, the Circuit Court issued a Show Cause Order why Mr.
Wilson should not be found in contempt. Respondent mailed Mr. Wilson a copy of the
Order on November 8, 2011, and stated in a cover letter that Mr. Wilson had to pay her
$7,500 to answer the petition and defend him at the hearing. Mr. Wilson paid the requested
amount. Later that month, Respondent filed a motion to strike the petition for contempt
and, insofar as the record reflects, there was no further action taken on the petition and Mr.
Wilson ultimately was not held in contempt.
Guardianship Case: The Second Petition
On November 18, 2011, Respondent filed the second petition for guardianship, this
time naming Mr. Griggs as the Petitioner. A few days later, the Circuit Court rejected the
second petition because once again the physicians’ certificates failed to comply with the
applicable rules. On January 10, 2012, Respondent filed amended certificates. The court
thereafter accepted that petition.
On January 17, 2012, the court appointed Katherine Linzer, Esq. to represent Mr.
Wilson in the guardianship proceeding. On March 14, 2012, Ms. Linzer, on behalf of Mr.
Wilson, filed an answer in opposition to the petition. In the answer, Mr. Wilson denied
that he was disabled and requested that the petition be dismissed. Attached to the answer
7
was a certificate from Mr. Wilson’s treating physician, Dr. Marcus, attesting to his capacity
to understand certain legal documents.
On April 10, 2012, Respondent, on behalf of Mr. Griggs, filed an opposition to the
answer arguing that Mr. Wilson is incapable of making decisions on his own and requires
a guardian to act on his behalf. Respondent asserted that, “contrary to the assertions made
by attorney Katherine Linzer on Mr. Wilson’s behalf, Mr. Wilson suffers from a mental
disability that his psychologist states causes cognitive and processing deficiencies that
render Mr. Wilson incapable of both comprehending and making decisions on his own.”
Respondent also argued that “Mr. Wilson presently cannot sufficiently process nor make
decisions concerning the management of his property and investments when [the] same
involve holding several facts in [his] mind,” nor is it “clear that Mr. Wilson would even
have sufficient capacity to designate a power of attorney.”
The Circuit Court issued a writ of summons to Mr. Wilson and scheduled trial for
June 26, 2012. Respondent sent Mr. Griggs a letter dated May 16, 2012, informing him of
the guardianship trial and attaching the writ of summons.
Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson received conflicting advice from Ms. Linzer and
Respondent. Ms. Linzer advised them that, if a guardian were appointed, Mr. Wilson
would lose his ability to make financial decisions. In contrast, Respondent advised that
Mr. Wilson would retain some of his rights even if Mr. Griggs became his guardian. Mr.
Griggs and Mr. Wilson decided that they no longer wanted to pursue the guardianship. On
June 1, 2012, Mr. Griggs faxed Respondent a hand-written letter notifying her that he
wanted to withdraw the guardianship petition immediately. Upon receiving Mr. Griggs’s
8
letter, on June 19, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to withdraw the guardianship petition,
which was granted. Respondent never told Mr. Griggs or Mr. Wilson that there was a
potential for a conflict of interest.
Ms. Linzer subsequently filed a request for attorney’s fees, which Respondent did
not oppose. On October 19, 2012, the court ordered Mr. Wilson to pay Ms. Linzer
$1,120.06 in attorney’s fees. Respondent took no further action to pursue the guardianship.
Divorce Case: Dr. Lasson’s Deposition
Meanwhile, in December 2011, Judge Bailey scheduled a hearing on the motion to
vacate the settlement agreement and judgment of divorce to be held on February 24, 2012.
On January 5, 2012, Respondent informed Mrs. Wilson’s counsel, Ms. Denrich, that she
intended to introduce Dr. Lasson’s reports at that hearing. Ms. Denrich objected to the
introduction of Dr. Lasson’s reports without his testimony. Respondent then unilaterally
scheduled Dr. Lasson’s deposition for February 7, 2012. On January 13, 2012,
Respondent’s paralegal sent an email to Ms. Denrich, informing her of the scheduled
deposition and asking her to provide other dates if she was unavailable.
Ms. Denrich responded on January 16, 2012, advising that she was not available on
February 7, 2012, and proposing six alternate dates prior to the hearing. Respondent
refused to reschedule the deposition because Dr. Lasson was only available on February 7,
2012. On January 24, 2012, Ms. Denrich served by first-class mail a motion for a protective
order seeking to stop Dr. Lasson’s deposition and a motion to shorten time to respond. On
February 2, 2012, Respondent opposed the motion for a protective order, but the court had
no opportunity to rule on it prior to the scheduled deposition because the motion had not
9
been docketed.
On February 7, 2012, Respondent took Dr. Lasson’s de bene esse deposition in Ms.
Denrich’s absence. Dr. Lasson testified that Mr. Wilson lacks the cognitive capacity to
understand basic information. Dr. Lasson emphasized that Mr. Wilson had difficulty
processing “basic information much less complicated ones.” He explained that:
[I]f you said, sign here, he would be able to do it. But if you tell him, now,
before you sign here, I just want to explain to you what this is, and you get
involved in some type of detailed explanation, I believe he would lose you
and not understand. He may even be embarrassed to say that he doesn’t
understand at times. . . . But he would not be able to retain basic information
that you have given him and just not understand what he has to do.
As to legal matters, Dr. Lasson said that, “if something is involved either legally or any
other way with a lot of different facts and information, [Mr. Wilson] would have extreme
difficulty processing that and understanding it.”
At the hearing on February 24, 2012, Judge Bailey granted the motion for a
protective order, prohibiting Respondent from using Dr. Lasson’s deposition and
postponing the matter to allow the parties to retake the deposition. The court did not enter
a written order to that effect at that time. Between February 2012 and May 2012,
Respondent did not reschedule Dr. Lasson’s deposition, as she did not believe that she was
obligated to do so because that responsibility was borne by Ms. Denrich at Mrs. Wilson’s
expense.
On May 4, 2012, upon Ms. Denrich’s request, Judge Bailey entered an order that
prohibited the use of Dr. Lasson’s deposition, ordered Dr. Lasson to be deposed within
sixty days at Ms. Denrich’s convenience, required Mr. Wilson to pay the costs of the
10
deposition, and ordered that the failure to comply with the order would result in Dr.
Lasson’s being precluded from testifying at trial.
Mr. Wilson asked Respondent for clarification regarding that order. By letter dated
May 31, 2012, Respondent wrote to Mr. Wilson: “As Dr. Lasson has to be paid before the
deposition is to occur, and as Ms. Denrich was given at least one month’s notice of [Dr.
Lasson’s] deposition (with no objection ever noted from her), I took Dr. Lasson’s
deposition as planned and sent her a copy of my questioning and Dr. Lasson’s responses.”
The hearing judge found that this was an intentional misrepresentation to Mr. Wilson.
On May 30, 2012, Ms. Denrich and Respondent agreed to reschedule Dr. Lasson’s
deposition for August 8, 2012, despite being outside of the court’s sixty-day timeframe.
Yet, on June 18, 2012, Respondent noted Dr. Lasson’s deposition by written questions.3
On July 3, 2012, Ms. Denrich filed a motion to strike the deposition by written
questions. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion to strike, in which she claimed
that she had tried to schedule a date for Dr. Lasson’s second deposition after the court’s
May 4, 2012, order but “Ms. Denrich again would not supply dates on which she would
commit to being available for [Dr. Lasson’s] deposition.” The hearing judge found that
this statement was an intentional misrepresentation to the court because Ms. Denrich
responded to Respondent and the parties agreed upon a new date. On July 24, 2012, Judge
Bailey granted the motion to strike, ordered that Mr. Wilson was prohibited from using Dr.
3
The deposition by written questions posed only two questions to Dr. Lasson. The first
question asked whether the exhibits from the February 7, 2012, deposition were true and
correct. The second question asked whether the opinions Dr. Lasson expressed during his
deposition on February 7, 2012, were held to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
11
Lasson’s deposition or calling Dr. Lasson at trial, and awarded Mrs. Wilson $600 in
attorney’s fees, for which Respondent and Mr. Wilson were jointly and severally liable.
On August 2, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to vacate and reconsider the court’s order
prohibiting Dr. Lasson’s testimony and issuing sanctions.
Divorce Case: Motion to Withdraw and Court Psychiatrist
On August 21, 2012, Mr. Wilson discharged Respondent. In response, Respondent
sent Mr. Wilson a letter informing him of her intent to withdraw as counsel in the divorce
case. Respondent mailed to the court a motion to withdraw, but neither the court nor Ms.
Denrich received the motion.
On September 14, 2012, Judge Bailey held a hearing on Respondent’s motion to
vacate the divorce judgment and her motion to vacate and reconsider Judge Bailey’s order
dated May 4, 2012.4 At the outset of the hearing, Respondent gave Judge Bailey a copy of
her motion to withdraw. In support of that motion, Respondent explained that Mr. Wilson
has a diminished capacity and that, pursuant to MLRPC 1.14,5 she had obtained a medical
report stating that Mr. Wilson requires a guardian, and she had attempted to have one
appointed. Respondent further argued, “I cannot represent Mr. Wilson because I do not
4
The record before the hearing judge included the transcripts of all of the hearings in the
divorce case and, as we later discuss, a trial conducted on Respondent’s subsequent suit
against Mr. Wilson for attorney’s fees. The record reflects that the guardianship proceeded
and concluded on the papers.
5
MLRPC 1.14 governs the attorney-client relationship when the client has a diminished
capacity. MLRPC 1.14 provides in pertinent part that “the lawyer may take reasonably
necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the
ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment
of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.”
12
have any source of competent explanation of what he wants and if he has even understood
what it is that he wants me to do for him.” Respondent called Ms. Stewart and Mr. Griggs
to testify that Mr. Wilson lacks capacity to handle his medical and financial decisions. Mr.
Wilson, evidently changing his mind, testified that he still wanted Respondent to represent
him. Judge Bailey stayed ruling on the motion to withdraw and ordered Mr. Wilson to be
evaluated by a court psychiatrist within the Office of the Court Psychiatrist, Stephen W.
Siebert, M.D., M.P.H.
On January 4, 2013, Dr. Siebert filed his evaluation with the court and reported that
Mr. Wilson was not competent to enter into the settlement agreement. Dr. Siebert
explained that Mr. Wilson has cognitive and memory impairments that affect his short-
term memory and that Mr. Wilson “is unable to explain, in lay terms, the nature of the
current legal dispute.” Dr. Siebert further opined that,
Mr. Wilson cannot retain verbal information and then repeat the content of
the information after several minutes. My opinion is that this impairs his
competency to understand and sign an agreement, even after this has been
discussed or explained to him. My opinion is that he is not competent, at this
time, to sign a settlement agreement regarding his property or alimony.
On February 13, 2013, at a hearing before Judge Bailey, Respondent renewed her
motion to withdraw from the representation. Respondent stated: “I can’t work with Mr.
Wilson because there is no consistent strategy nor understanding of a strategy nor a
continued ability to remember what decisions were made even five minutes ago[.]” Judge
Bailey accepted Dr. Siebert’s report and found that “Mr. Wilson is incompetent to enter
into a legal agreement, a contractual agreement, or to enter into a settlement agreement or
to even file a petition for divorce.” Consequently, Judge Bailey granted Respondent’s
13
motion to withdraw as well as the motion Respondent had filed on Mr. Wilson’s behalf to
vacate the judgment of absolute divorce. Judge Bailey, recognizing Mr. Wilson’s
incapacity, reconsidered and vacated her earlier award of sanctions against him.
The Fee Case
On July 30, 2013, after the divorce and guardianship cases had concluded,
Respondent filed suit against Mr. Wilson for attorney’s fees in the District Court of
Maryland, sitting in Baltimore County (“the fee case”). Respondent testified before the
District Court that Mr. Wilson owed her $30,000 plus pre-judgment interest—an amount
reduced by $10,261.27, allegedly to satisfy Mr. Wilson’s complaints about the
guardianship case and to comply with the jurisdictional limit of the District Court.
From June 2010 to February 2013, Respondent had billed Mr. Wilson for a total of
$58,748.77 in attorney’s fees. And, from June 2010 to November 2011, Mr. Wilson paid
Respondent $19,125. Although Respondent presented all of her invoices to the District
Court, she claimed that she was not seeking payment of her fees from the guardianship
case as a conciliatory gesture to Mr. Wilson given his complaints about her handling of
that matter.
On August 8, 2013, Mr. Wilson, representing himself, filed a Notice of Intention to
Defend. On August 20, 2013, Respondent asked Mr. Wilson to sign a Consent Judgment,
which represented that Mr. Wilson was “of sound mind.” Mr. Wilson refused.
Ms. Stewart and Mr. Griggs assisted Mr. Wilson in his defense. In response to an
interrogatory question propounded by Respondent, Mr. Wilson answered that, in the
divorce case, “Judge Bailey ruled that Mr. Wilson is incompetent to enter into a legal
14
agreement, a contractual agreement, or to enter into a settlement agreement or even file a
petition for divorce.”
The Honorable Marsha L. Russell presided over the trial concerning Respondent’s
claim for attorney’s fees, which occurred on October 22, 2013. After hearing testimony,
Judge Russell entered judgment in favor of Respondent for $30,000 with prejudgment
interest of $5,029.93. To satisfy that judgment, Respondent garnished Mr. Wilson’s
accounts.
The hearing judge accepted Respondent’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing
concerning the reasonableness of her fees and expenses because Petitioner had not offered
any evidence to the contrary. He found, though, that Respondent, who had testified at the
trial before Judge Russell, had misrepresented Dr. Lasson’s opinion of Mr. Wilson’s mental
capacity by testifying in the fee case that Dr. Lasson had concluded that Mr. Wilson “can
certainly deal with his day-to-day events and simple contracts,” and that Dr. Lasson’s
“report didn’t indicate he couldn’t understand normal contracts he entered into.”
Respondent also misrepresented that she “was aware that not only does Mr. Wilson have a
fairly good capacity to understand agreements . . . but he has people who have resources[.]”
The hearing judge found that Respondent in her testimony in the fee case, at best,
“continually understated the extent to which Wilson had a serious and permanent cognitive
disorder.” The hearing judge found that Respondent’s failure to testify specifically that
Judge Bailey had found Mr. Wilson incompetent further contributed to her
misrepresentation as to Mr. Wilson’s capacity. The hearing judge rejected Respondent’s
argument that Judge Russell was made fully aware of Judge Bailey’s finding because Mr.
15
Wilson had informed Judge Russell of this fact in his interrogatory answer.
The hearing judge also found that Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Judge
Russell the circumstances surrounding Dr. Lasson’s deposition. Respondent had testified
in the fee case that she
told the opposing counsel that since she didn’t show up, if she wants to ask
any questions, she certainly can and we’ll be glad to reschedule. Opposing
counsel then filed a motion for protective order asking not only that it not be
included but that Mr. Wilson and I be sanctioned for going ahead with the
deposition when she was not available. The court ordered that we retake the
deposition with her present, and that we do that before the hearing occur[ed].
Respondent further misrepresented to Judge Russell that she usually provided Mr. Wilson
with advice both orally and in writing to allow him to confer with Ms. Stewart or Mr.
Griggs, and that Ms. Stewart was present when Mr. Wilson signed the retainer agreement,
when she in fact was not.
The hearing judge found that “Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Judge
Russell that she filed various ‘motions in supporting the fairness of a court psychiatrist’
and motions and pleadings regarding the records to be produced to Dr. Siebert in the
Divorce Case,” because, in fact, no such documents had been filed. Further, “Respondent
intentionally misrepresented to Judge Russell that ‘there was a hearing scheduled October
19, 2012, which was cancelled the day before the hearing, so we had to prepare for that
and get everyone geared up for that[.]’” In fact the hearing on October 19, 2012, was
cancelled no later than October 8, 2012. Respondent admitted to the hearing judge that her
statement to Judge Russell was false.
The hearing judge found, in addition, that Respondent intentionally misrepresented
16
Dr. Siebert’s opinion. Respondent had testified in the fee case that “Dr. Siebert thankfully
agreed with us, and he said, ‘this is way too complicated of an issue for this gentleman to
be able to work through without assistance.’” The hearing judge found that, because
Respondent knew the details of Dr. Siebert’s report, she should have relayed his findings
accurately. The hearing judge found as well that Respondent made misrepresentations by
omitting relevant medical information, including Dr. Lasson’s and Dr. Siebert’s reports
and Dr. Lasson’s deposition testimony. Respondent had also failed to inform Judge Russell
that she had filed an opposition to Mr. Wilson’s answer to the second petition for
guardianship.
Based upon those findings, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated
MLRPC 1.4; 1.7; 1.15; 3.3; and 8.4(a), (c), and (d); and Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a), but
did not violate MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, or 1.5.
II.
“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete
jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Good, 445 Md. 490, 512 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accept
the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Id. “That
deference is appropriate because the hearing judge is in a position to assess the demeanor-
based credibility of the witnesses.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 427 Md. 15, 27
(2012). “The hearing judge is permitted to ‘pick and choose which evidence to rely upon’
from a conflicting array when determining findings of fact.” Id. (alteration omitted)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 (2006)). We review the
17
hearing judge’s legal conclusions de novo and thus render the ultimate decision as to an
attorney’s alleged misconduct. Good, 445 Md. at 512. We must therefore determine
independently whether sufficient evidence in the record exists to support the hearing
judge’s conclusions of law under a “‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof.” Tanko, 427
Md. at 27.
Both Petitioner and Respondent have filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Given the number of exceptions presented, we
address each exception as it relates to our de novo review of the hearing judge’s conclusions
of law.
MLRPC 1.1
MLRPC 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” The hearing judge concluded
that Petitioner failed to prove a violation of MLRPC 1.1 by clear and convincing evidence.
The hearing judge recognized that “there had to be a point in time . . . where Respondent
should have advised Wilson, and documented such advice, that the costs of all of the
respective litigation had reached a point where it was not feasible to continue.” The hearing
judge nevertheless rejected Petitioner’s contention that Respondent was required to
perform a cost-benefit analysis, and he concluded that Respondent did not violate MLRPC
1.1 by failing to do so. The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent’s conduct in the
divorce case, while aggressive, was sufficiently competent because she ultimately was
successful in getting the divorce judgment vacated for Mr. Wilson. Likewise, the hearing
18
judge rejected Petitioner’s contention that Respondent’s deficient filings in the
guardianship case rose to the level of a violation of MLRPC 1.1.
Petitioner takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent did not
violate MLRPC 1.1. Petitioner points out that Respondent, among other failures, never
conducted a cost-benefit analysis for Mr. Wilson and that Respondent’s guardianship
petitions were twice rejected by the court. Petitioner also asserts that Respondent’s failure
to identify a conflict of interest in the guardianship case and to advise Messrs. Wilson and
Griggs to that effect “does not meet the bare minimum required of competent
representation.”
We sustain Petitioner’s exception. The essence of competent representation under
MLRPC 1.1 is adequate preparation and thoroughness in pursuing the matter. Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Blair, 440 Md. 387, 401 (2014). Consequently, “[a]ttorneys remain
potentially susceptible to violating MLRPC 1.1 notwithstanding they possess the requisite
skill or knowledge to represent a client.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 441 Md.
590, 610 (2015). We agree with Petitioner that Respondent’s mistakes and errors in
judgment demonstrate a lack of competence, in violation of MLRPC 1.1. Respondent’s
failure to advise Mr. Wilson at any time during the representation that the cost of continuing
to pursue litigation might vitiate any benefit he may receive ultimately does not reflect
thorough and competent representation. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sutton, 394
Md. 311, 323 (2006) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 “by undertaking
representation of [his client’s] claim although respondent recognized from the beginning
that the likelihood of success with [his client’s] claim was limited” (internal quotation
19
marks omitted)). Respondent’s abuses of discovery, which delayed the divorce
proceedings and caused Dr. Lasson’s testimony to be excluded entirely from the case, also
demonstrate Respondent’s failure to provide Mr. Wilson competent representation.
Similarly lacking in competence was Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson
and Mr. Griggs in the guardianship case. Respondent filed a petition for guardianship that
wholly failed to comply with the Maryland Rules and only in her third attempt were the
physicians’ certificates accepted by the court. Respondent’s evident failure to conduct
even minimal research, which would have revealed the defects in her submissions and
avoided multiple filings, violates MLRPC 1.1. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davy,
435 Md. 674, 698 (2013) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 when “the
bankruptcy court sent Davy three deficiency notices regarding the bankruptcy filing”
because the respondent did not adequately research her case).
Further, Respondent’s failure to recognize the inherent conflict of interest in
representing Mr. Griggs in the guardianship case while remaining counsel to Mr. Wilson
in the divorce case falls below the minimum standard of competence. See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 266 (2015) (“We agree with the hearing
judge that, on the facts of this case, ‘a minimal threshold of competent representation was
breached when [Respondent] agreed to represent one client against another[.]’” (alteration
in original)).
In sum, we conclude that the facts found by the hearing judge present clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1.
MLRPC 1.2
20
MLRPC 1.2(a) provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning
the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued.” The hearing judge noted that “what
happened in the Guardianship Case could potentially have been avoided through better and
more detailed communication between Respondent and Wilson.” Evidently for this reason,
the hearing judge concluded that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated
MLRPC 1.2(a) because Respondent, in filing the guardianship petition on behalf of Mr.
Griggs, was “still ultimately attempting to advance Wilson’s position in the Divorce Case.”
Petitioner excepts to this conclusion. We agree with Petitioner that, by opposing
Mr. Wilson’s answer in the guardianship case, Respondent took a position that was directly
contrary to that of her client. By definition, Respondent did not “abide by [her] client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation.” See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Haley, 443 Md. 657, 669 (2015) (concluding that the respondent violated
MLRPC 1.2(a) by seeking primary physical custody of his client’s children despite the
client’s instruction for shared physical custody). We disagree with the hearing judge that
Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.2(a) simply because the issues in the guardianship
case might have been resolved through better communication. That Respondent’s
misconduct with respect to MLRPC 1.2(a) might overlap with another one of our rules of
professional conduct does not remove that misconduct from its scope. We conclude that
Petitioner proved a violation of MLRPC 1.2(a) by clear and convincing evidence.
MLRPC 1.3
MLRPC 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
21
promptness in representing a client.” The hearing judge concluded that Respondent did
not violate MLRPC 1.3. The hearing judge determined that the seven-month delay between
the filing of the first and second petitions for guardianship did not establish a lack of
diligence because proceedings in the divorce case were ongoing. Similarly, the hearing
judge declined to conclude that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 in failing to file timely
physicians’ certificates because the Maryland Rules impose a “narrow timeframe” of
twenty-one days from the time of the evaluation to the filing of the certificate.
Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion. Petitioner argues that
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 by failing both to advance the divorce case for almost
one year after filing the motion to vacate and to file diligently petitions for guardianship
that complied with the Maryland Rules. Petitioner also argues that Respondent’s failure to
communicate adequately, conduct a cost-benefit analysis, perform any research on Mr.
Wilson’s claims for Mrs. Wilson’s marital property, and abide by the Maryland Rules and
court orders with respect to Dr. Lasson’s deposition violates MLRPC 1.3. Petitioner states,
in sum, that “two years after [Respondent] was retained to represent Mr. Wilson, no
guardian had been appointed and the only evidence in support of Mr. Wilson’s motion to
vacate the divorce judgment, namely Dr. Lasson’s testimony, had been excluded due to the
Respondent’s misconduct.”
We overrule Petitioner’s exception. We are not persuaded that the time elapsed
between the filing of the motion to vacate and Respondent’s next advancement of Mr.
Wilson’s claims in the guardianship case, in itself, violates MLRPC 1.3. The remainder of
Petitioner’s arguments in support of its charge speak more to Respondent’s violations of
22
other rules of professional conduct than a lack of diligence in violation of MLRPC 1.3.
MLRPC 1.4
MLRPC 1.4 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule
1.0(f), is required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
The hearing judge rendered conclusions of law on MLRPC 1.4 with respect to
Respondent’s overall representation of Mr. Wilson as well as her representation of Mr.
Griggs in the guardianship case.
With respect to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson, the hearing judge
concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(b) but not MLRPC 1.4(a). The hearing
judge determined that Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.4(a) because she orally
communicated with Mr. Wilson regarding the divorce and guardianship cases. In
concluding that Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson violated MLRPC 1.4(b), the
hearing judge took judicial notice of Judge Bailey’s determination that Mr. Wilson was
“incompetent to enter into a legal agreement” and found that Mr. Wilson was a vulnerable
adult. The hearing judge concluded consequently that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(b)
by failing to communicate major events to Mr. Wilson in writing, which was necessary for
23
him to be able to understand and later recall that information.
With respect to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Griggs, the hearing judge
concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b). The hearing judge noted that
Respondent did not explain her role as Mr. Griggs’s attorney or the existence or appearance
of a conflict of interest between Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson in the guardianship case. The
hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s failure to explain adequately the guardianship
case deprived Mr. Griggs of the ability to make informed decisions.
Respondent takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated
MLRPC 1.4 in any respect in representing both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Griggs. Respondent
asserts that she adequately communicated all facets of the guardianship case to Mr. Griggs
and Mr. Wilson. As to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Wilson, Respondent argues that
the hearing judge erred in concluding that Mr. Wilson was a vulnerable adult because there
was no competency hearing or expert testimony opining that Mr. Wilson was incompetent.
She also contends that she was under no legal obligation to memorialize her advice in
writing and therefore did not violate MLRPC 1.4(b).
We disagree with Respondent and overrule her exceptions. The hearing judge,
having credited Mr. Griggs’s testimony, found that Respondent never explained to Mr.
Griggs that she was representing him and that a conflict of interest existed. Respondent
has offered no basis for concluding that these findings are clearly erroneous. We reject,
moreover, Respondent’s contention that the hearing judge erred in concluding that Mr.
Wilson was a vulnerable adult. Respondent improperly equates vulnerability with a
judicial determination of incompetence. The hearing judge’s finding of vulnerability was
24
related to the level of communication required to satisfy MLRPC 1.4, and that finding was
not clearly erroneous.
We also agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by
failing to put her advice to Mr. Wilson in writing. MLRPC 1.4(b) requires an attorney to
communicate with a client “to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions.” Consequently, to comply with MLRPC 1.4, an attorney may be
required to alter the way he or she communicates with a client to ensure that the client is
adequately informed. Respondent was aware of Mr. Wilson’s difficulty understanding and
retaining information and his reliance upon Ms. Stewart and Mr. Griggs to assist him.
Given those circumstances, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to take reasonably
necessary steps to ensure that Mr. Wilson would be able to understand her advice by
memorializing it in writing.
Petitioner does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent’s
representation of Mr. Wilson did not violate MLRPC 1.4(a). Based on our independent
review of the judge’s findings, we disagree with the hearing judge’s conclusion. See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294, 330-31 (2016) (reversing the hearing
judge’s conclusion that the respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a) in two client matters
notwithstanding that Bar Counsel only took exception to that conclusion with respect to a
third matter). The hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) by
failing to inform Mr. Griggs of a potential conflict of interest equally violates MLRPC
1.4(a) with respect to Mr. Wilson. See Olszewski, 441 Md. at 267 (“We agree with the
hearing judge that Respondent clearly violated Rule 1.4(a)(1) by failing to explain the
25
potential conflict of interest when he undertook joint representation of Mr. and Mrs.
Ware.”).
Respondent likewise violated MLRPC 1.4(a) in her representation of Mr. Wilson
by intentionally misrepresenting to him that Ms. Denrich failed to object timely to Dr.
Lasson’s initial deposition.6 See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shapiro, 441 Md. 367,
385 (2015) (“The misrepresentation of the status of a case to a client constitutes a violation
of MLRPC 1.4(a).”). That Respondent “at least orally communicated with Wilson” does
not remedy her failure to communicate fully and honestly.
In sum, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and (b) in connection with her
representation of Mr. Wilson as well as her representation of Mr. Griggs.
MLRPC 1.5
MLRPC 1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from charging or collecting “an unreasonable fee
or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”7 The hearing judge found that Petitioner failed
to submit any evidence, particularly any expert testimony, proving that Respondent’s fees
were unreasonable. The hearing judge concluded that, although the Respondent’s bills to
Mr. Wilson were high, her bills were not unreasonable given the amount of time and effort
6
The hearing judge found in connection with his conclusions of law regarding MLRPC
8.4(c) that Respondent had intentionally misrepresented that fact to Mr. Wilson, but the
hearing judge did not refer to that finding in the judge’s discussion of MLRPC 1.4. The
hearing judge’s finding that Respondent made that intentional misrepresentation to her
client equally establishes a failure of communication in violation of MLRPC 1.4(a).
7
MLRPC 1.5(a) details several factors to be considered when evaluating the
reasonableness of an attorney’s fee such as the time and labor required, the difficulty of the
issues, and the skill necessary to resolve the client’s problem.
26
Respondent expended to litigate the divorce and guardianship actions. The hearing judge
further concluded that, even though Mr. Wilson should not have been charged for
Respondent’s errors, her conduct did not rise to the level of a violation of MLRPC 1.5(a).
Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s factual finding and to the conclusion that
Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a). Petitioner argues that Respondent’s testimony
sufficiently shows that her fees were unreasonable because Respondent admitted that she
billed Mr. Wilson for her representation of Mr. Griggs, defective filings, and time spent on
obtaining Dr. Lasson’s deposition. Petitioner argues that, although Mr. Wilson ultimately
obtained the result he wanted, that outcome “was not because of the Respondent’s efforts,
but rather despite the Respondent’s misconduct.” Petitioner argues that, aside from timely
filing the motion to vacate, “Respondent failed to take any meaningful action to advance
Mr. Wilson’s claims.”
Respondent counters that, based upon our decision in Attorney Grievance
Commission v. MacDougall, 384 Md. 271 (2004), the reasonableness of her fees is
established as a matter of law because the District Court entered judgment in her favor.
We disagree. In MacDougall, we held that the respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.5(a)
because a court had approved his attorney’s fees and “[t]he parties agree[d] that the
Respondent comported himself properly insofar as his taking of a fee for his services.” Id.
at 276, 280 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not have that situation here, given
the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent eventually misled the District Court in her
pursuit of those fees.
We sustain Petitioner’s exception. Respondent charged Mr. Wilson $58,748.77 and
27
collected over $54,000 to vacate a $55,000 divorce judgment.8 The hearing judge found
that Respondent’s fees were reasonable in light of “the immense scope of the time and
effort that were ultimately incurred as a result of Respondent’s representation.” The record
does not reasonably support that finding. Despite the sizeable fee and length of
representation, the time and effort Respondent expended was due largely to her own
misconduct in connection with both the divorce case and the guardianship action. See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brady, 422 Md. 441, 459 (2011) (concluding that fees that
are “wholly disproportionate, and unreasonable, in relation to the services” violate MLRPC
1.5(a)).
In the divorce case, Respondent charged Mr. Wilson for her work in procuring Dr.
Lasson’s testimony despite the fact that her discovery misconduct caused his testimony to
be excluded. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 277 (2004)
(concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.5(a) for charging a client “to respond
to discovery motions” and court sanctions that resulted from the respondent’s own
misconduct). Other than timely filing the motion to vacate, Respondent’s efforts in the
divorce case focused largely on her motion to withdraw and her discovery misconduct.
Indeed, it was not Respondent’s actions that led to the outcome her client sought. Rather,
the record demonstrates that Judge Bailey, on her own initiative, ordered a court
psychiatrist to evaluate Mr. Wilson, and her analysis of that psychiatric report, in the
absence of any argument by Respondent on the merits, led Judge Bailey to find that Mr.
8
We arrive at that figure by taking together the $19,125 Mr. Wilson had paid Respondent
by November 2011 and the judgment entered in favor of Respondent in the fee case.
28
Wilson lacked capacity to enter into the settlement agreement. In short, Respondent failed
to take action commensurate with the fees she charged and accordingly violated MLRPC
1.5(a). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 187 (2015) (explaining
that when an attorney fails “to perform to any meaningful degree the legal services for
which the fee was set initially, the fee becomes unreasonable with the benefit of
hindsight”).
Respondent further violated MLRPC 1.5(a) in connection with the fees she sought
and obtained from Mr. Wilson in the guardianship action. She billed him for her
representation of his legal adversary, Mr. Griggs. We cannot accept Respondent’s position
that her bills were fair and reasonable when she billed Mr. Wilson for filing a pleading that
was in direct opposition of his position. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manger, 396
Md. 134, 143 (2006) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.5(a) because he
billed the client for conduct that did not advance the client’s interests and for his failure to
act competently). Respondent also violated MLRPC 1.5(a) by charging Mr. Wilson for
her numerous defective filings in the guardianship action. See Davy, 435 Md. at 702
(concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 1.5 by charging and collecting $10,000
to prepare a defective complaint). We agree with Petitioner that it was not necessary for
an expert to testify that it was unreasonable for Respondent to charge and collect fees for
filing defective pleadings, representing an adverse party, or violating the Rules and court
orders. We accordingly conclude that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.5(a).
MLRPC 1.7
MLRPC 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client “if the representation
29
involves a conflict of interest.” MLRPC 1.7(a)(1) states that a conflict of interest exists
when “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client[.]” The
hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.7 because she represented
Mr. Griggs in the second petition in the guardianship case in opposition to her current
client, Mr. Wilson, whom she was representing in the divorce case. The hearing judge
further noted that, even though it was arguably true that Mr. Griggs’s and Mr. Wilson’s
interests were aligned at the outset, a clear conflict existed when Respondent filed an
opposition against Mr. Wilson. The hearing judge determined that this conflict could not
be waived.
Respondent takes exception to this conclusion. Respondent argues that no conflict
of interest existed because, “[w]hile Respondent technically represented Mr. Griggs” in the
second petition, “Mr. Griggs was an incidental beneficiary of Respondent’s services, and
Mr. Griggs’ and Mr. Wilson’s interests in that matter were at all times aligned.”
Respondent argues further that her client at all times was Mr. Wilson, not Mr. Griggs.
We overrule Respondent’s exception. We agree with the hearing judge that
Respondent’s representation of Mr. Griggs in the guardianship case created a conflict of
interest that could not be waived because Mr. Griggs and Mr. Wilson were in a directly
adverse relationship. We do not subscribe to the contention that Mr. Griggs was a mere
“incidental beneficiary” because his and Mr. Wilson’s interests were in fact aligned. We
have explained that the formation of an attorney-client relationship “does not require an
explicit agreement,” but rather may arise from the conduct of the parties. See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 175 (2003). The record reflects that
30
Respondent represented Mr. Griggs, and Respondent concedes that she “technically”
represented him in the second petition for guardianship. Respondent should have become
aware that a conflict existed when the court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Wilson and,
certainly so, at the latest, when she filed an opposition to Mr. Wilson’s answer to the
petition. See Olszewski, 441 Md. at 267 (concluding “that Respondent’s joint
representation of Mr. and Mrs. Ware became a conflict of interest, at the very latest, when
Respondent filed suit on behalf of Mr. Ware against Mrs. Ware”).
Before the hearing judge and at oral argument before this Court, Respondent argued
that there was no conflict because she was acting pursuant to MLRPC 1.14 (client with a
diminished capacity) when she filed the second petition for guardianship to help secure a
guardian to protect Mr. Wilson’s interests. We recognize the difficult position an attorney
may be in when representing a client with diminished capacity. For this reason, MLRPC
1.14 permits a lawyer to protect a client by “seeking the appointment of a guardian.” But,
in doing so, the lawyer may not represent the petitioner while continuing to represent the
alleged disabled person because “the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client.” MLRPC 1.7(a)(1); see Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Parisi, 965 N.E.2d 268
(Ohio 2012) (“[Rule 1.14] does not authorize a lawyer to represent a third party in seeking
to have a court appoint a guardian for his client. Such a representation would necessarily
have to be regarded as ‘adverse’ to the client and prohibited by Rule 1.7(a), even if the
lawyer sincerely and reasonably believes that such representation would be in the client’s
best interests[.]” (quoting ABA Comm. Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Client Under a
Disability, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996))). Respondent’s representation of both Mr. Griggs
31
and Mr. Wilson created a conflict of interest in violation of MLRPC 1.7(a).
MLRPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 16.606.1
MLRPC 1.15(a) requires that all “[f]unds shall be kept in a separate account
maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be
created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter.” Maryland Rule 16-
606.1(a) requires an attorney to create and maintain records of certain information
regarding the receipt and disbursement of client funds. The hearing judge concluded, and
Respondent conceded, that she violated MLRPC 1.15(a) by failing to create and maintain
records of her fees collected and disbursed in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a).
We agree. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kobin, 432 Md. 565, 582 (2013)
(concluding that an attorney violated MLRPC 1.15(a) when he admitted his failure to
comply with Maryland Rule 16-606.1).
MLRPC 3.3
MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not intentionally “make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” This Rule “is based on the idea that
every court has the right to rely upon an attorney to assist it in ascertaining the truth of the
case before it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 442 Md. 14, 34 (2015) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted). Comment three to MLRPC 3.3 states that a
lawyer’s statement to the court “may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the
assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There
are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
32
misrepresentation.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pak, 400 Md. 567, 602 (2007)
(concluding that an attorney’s intentional failure to disclose material information violated
MLRPC 3.3).
The hearing judge made a number of factual findings in connection with this
charged violation and concluded that Respondent in several ways violated MLRPC 3.3 in
her testimony in the fee case. Respondent excepts to every one of the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with that charge. She contends that
her testimony before Judge Russell was truthful and, to the extent that any of her statements
were false, Petitioner failed to prove that those misstatements were intentional or material.
The hearing judge found that Respondent made material misrepresentations and
omissions to Judge Russell in the fee case. The most significant of those relate to her
characterization of Mr. Wilson’s mental capacity. Respondent misrepresented to Judge
Russell that Mr. Wilson could “certainly deal with his day-to-day events and simple
contracts,” and implied that Mr. Wilson’s only limitation concerned complex matters. The
hearing judge found that Respondent intentionally omitted Dr. Lasson’s findings that Mr.
Wilson was unable to recall and understand basic information. The hearing judge found
that Respondent’s misrepresentation was made knowingly because she had personal
knowledge of the extent of Mr. Wilson’s diminished capacity and her position in the fee
case was directly contrary to the position she advanced before the court in the divorce and
guardianship cases. As a result, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s conduct
violated MLRPC 3.3.
Respondent excepts to this conclusion, maintaining that her testimony before Judge
33
Russell regarding Mr. Wilson’s capacity was accurate. We disagree. Respondent’s
testimony that Mr. Wilson “can certainly deal with his day-to-day events and simple
contracts” and “is very able to understand anything that one would tell him, and make an
appropriate response” is entirely inconsistent with Dr. Lasson’s opinion, of which
Respondent had full knowledge, that Mr. Wilson was unable to recite the alphabet, count
backwards from twenty, name the U.S. President, or recall “basic information” that “even
a child would know.” Respondent’s testimony is also inconsistent with her argument
before Judge Bailey in the divorce case in support of her motion to withdraw, namely that
Respondent was unable to maintain a consistent strategy or discern what Mr. Wilson
wanted because he could not remember her advice from one moment to the next.
Moreover, Respondent failed to submit as evidence in the fee case Dr. Siebert’s
report and Dr. Lasson’s reports and testimony, and she omitted any reference to Judge
Bailey’s finding that Mr. Wilson was incompetent to enter into any legal agreement.
Respondent instead submitted a report of Mr. Wilson’s prior physician who opined that
Mr. Wilson suffered from no mental disability. Those omissions, in tandem with her
testimony of the substance of Dr. Lasson’s and Dr. Siebert’s reports, constituted a
misrepresentation of Mr. Wilson’s incapacity to Judge Russell.
We accept the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent’s misrepresentations were
made intentionally, given that Respondent had personal knowledge of the extent of Mr.
Wilson’s diminished capacity and took a position in the fee case that was directly contrary
to the position she advanced before the court in the divorce and guardianship cases.
Respondent cherry-picked the information that benefited her and bolstered her position that
34
she was entitled to her fees, to the exclusion of all previous arguments she had made to the
contrary. She did so knowing that her adversary was a former client with diminished
capacity who was representing himself in that litigation. Such misconduct is a lack of
candor that violates MLRPC 3.3.
Respondent contends that she did not violate MLRPC 3.3 because any
misrepresentation was not of a material fact. Respondent points to Judge Russell’s finding
that Mr. Wilson was competent to enter into, and later ratify, the retainer agreement. We
disagree. It defies reason to assume that Judge Russell concluded that Mr. Wilson was
competent to enter into the retainer agreement based upon her own observations of him,
without also taking into account Respondent’s misleading testimony suggesting that he was
generally capable of retaining and understanding information presented to him.
Respondent’s intentional misrepresentations, then, were material. Petitioner proved, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3 in connection with
her representation of Mr. Wilson’s capacity in the fee case.
We further reject Respondent’s argument that she “had no duty to take over Mr.
Wilson’s advocacy against herself” by “assert[ing] Mr. Wilson’s defenses for him” or
submitting evidence to support his defense. She relies for this proposition on Winkler
Construction Co. v. Jerome, 355 Md. 231 (1999), in which we stated:
We agree with the general statement that a party may not couch a pleading
in a manner that is likely to mislead the court, and there is no doubt that
attorneys have clear duties and constraints under Rule 3.3. Neither precept,
however, requires a party or an attorney to assert an adverse party’s defense,
much less to produce evidence in support of it, when the party disputes that
defense.
35
Id. at 245-46. Respondent’s reliance on Jerome is misplaced. Respondent violated
MLRPC 3.3 not because she failed to present evidence in the fee case in support of Mr.
Wilson’s defense, but because she made intentional misrepresentations to the court
designed specifically to lead to a judgment in her favor. We agree with Petitioner that,
“[o]nce the Respondent presented the issue of Mr. Wilson’s mental competency to the
District Court, her obligation under the MLRPC was to refrain from misleading the court
about the issue or misrepresenting the evidence.” Respondent altogether ignored this
obligation and, in doing so, she violated MLRPC 3.3.
The hearing judge also found that Respondent made intentional misrepresentations
to Judge Russell regarding the scheduling of Dr. Lasson’s deposition in the divorce case.
The hearing judge found that Respondent misrepresented the timing of Ms. Denrich’s
motion for protective order by testifying that Respondent had offered to reschedule the
deposition after it had already taken place “since [Ms. Denrich] didn’t show up,” and only
then did Ms. Denrich file the motion for protective order. The hearing judge found that
Respondent’s testimony was intentionally false because she had personal knowledge of
when she received the motion for protective order, as evidenced by her response to it before
the deposition on February 7, 2012. Based upon those misrepresentations, the hearing
judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3.
Although Respondent concedes that she “undoubtedly misspoke” in her testimony
on this point, she excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion nevertheless because, in her
view, Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she “knowingly
misled the District Court.” We overrule this exception. We do not accept that
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Respondent’s misrepresentations were mere “unintentional misspeaks” when she made
statements to Judge Russell having personal knowledge of facts establishing that the
opposite of those statements were true. The hearing judge’s finding that Respondent’s
misrepresentations were intentional is supported by sufficient evidence and therefore is not
erroneous, much less clearly so.
The hearing judge further found that Respondent testified falsely before Judge
Russell that Ms. Stewart was present when Mr. Wilson signed the retainer agreement. The
hearing judge found that testimony to be false, having credited Ms. Stewart’s testimony to
the contrary, and accordingly concluded that such testimony violated MLRPC 3.3.
Respondent contends that she made no intentional misrepresentation because it is her
recollection that Ms. Stewart was present at that meeting. We overrule Respondent’s
exception because the hearing judge expressly discredited her testimony in favor of Ms.
Stewart’s. “As we have stated, a hearing judge is free to disregard the testimony of
respondent if the judge believed the evidence was not credible.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 182 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We defer
to the hearing judge’s credibility determination.
The hearing judge found, too, that Respondent failed to inform Judge Russell that
she had opposed Mr. Wilson in the guardianship action and that Judge Bailey found Mr.
Wilson incompetent. The hearing judge also found that Respondent failed to summarize
sufficiently the “voluminous amount of material” before Judge Russell, who relied on
Respondent as an officer of the court. In doing so, the hearing judge concluded that
Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3.
37
Respondent admits that she did not explain to Judge Russell that she had filed an
opposition in the guardianship or that Judge Bailey had found Mr. Wilson incompetent.
She argues, however, that she did not violate MLRPC 3.3 in that respect because she was
under no obligation to submit to Judge Russell every pleading she filed over the course of
the representation or to summarize all of those pleadings. We overrule this exception
because the information Respondent chose to omit was designed to persuade Judge Russell
that Respondent’s fees were reasonable. Respondent similarly contends that she did not
have to summarize every filing because she presumed that Judge Russell reviewed all of
Respondent’s exhibits. We disagree. Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3 not because she
did not summarize every exhibit submitted to Judge Russell, but rather because her
summaries were inaccurate and were designed to mislead the District Court.
In sum, having accepted the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we conclude that
Respondent violated MLRPC 3.3 in several respects.9
MLRPC 8.4(c)
MLRPC 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . .
engage in conduct involving fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Similar to MLRPC
3.3(a)(1), this Rule prohibits a lawyer from making false statements. Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 707 (2013). “We have found a Rule 8.4(c) violation when
9
Respondent claims error in certain of other factual findings made by the hearing judge in
connection with the MLRPC 3.3 violation. It is unnecessary to address those claims
because, even if we were to do so and determine that any one or more of the judge’s
additional findings were clearly erroneous, that determination would have no bearing on
our conclusion that Respondent otherwise committed multiple violations of MLRPC 3.3.
38
a misrepresentation is overt or based upon a concealment of material facts.” Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Barton, 442 Md. 91, 142 (2015).
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s intentional misrepresentations that
violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) likewise violated MLRPC 8.4(c). In addition, the hearing judge
found in connection with the divorce case that Respondent intentionally misrepresented to
Mr. Wilson that Mrs. Wilson’s attorney, Ms. Denrich, never objected to Dr. Lasson’s
deposition because Respondent admitted that Ms. Denrich in fact did object. Respondent
also intentionally misrepresented to Judge Bailey in her opposition to Ms. Denrich’s
motion to strike that “Ms. Denrich again would not supply dates on which she would
commit to being available for [Dr. Lasson’s] deposition” because Respondent and Ms.
Denrich had agreed upon a date for retaking the deposition. Finally, the hearing judge
found that Respondent intentionally misrepresented to Judge Russell in the fee case that
she filed motions regarding Dr. Siebert, the cancellation date of a hearing, and the
substance of Dr. Siebert’s opinion. Respondent takes exception to each of these factual
findings, as well as the hearing judge’s legal conclusion that she violated MLRPC 8.4(c).
She asserts that her statements, even if false, were not proven by Petitioner to have been
intentional.
Respondent has not persuaded us that any of these findings of fact or conclusions of
law are erroneous, and we therefore overrule her exceptions. As with Respondent’s
violation of MLRPC 3.3, whether Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) turns on whether
her conceded misrepresentations were made intentionally. See Smith, 442 Md. at 33.
Resolution of that question is largely a matter of credibility. We defer to the hearing
39
judge’s determination in that respect, particularly “when it comes to assessing an attorney’s
state of mind as to an intent to deceive.” Id. at 35. The hearing judge found that
Respondent’s misrepresentations were made intentionally. The hearing judge’s findings
in this regard are supported by the evidence that Respondent had personal knowledge of
information that contradicted entirely her misrepresentations. Respondent’s intentional
misrepresentations to Mr. Wilson and Judge Bailey violated MLRPC 8.4(c).
MLRPC 8.4(d)
MLRPC 8.4(d) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . .
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” The hearing judge
concluded that Respondent’s conduct that underlay her many violations of the MLRPC,
including, most notably, her intentional misrepresentations to Judge Russell during the fee
case, were prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Respondent excepts to that conclusion. She argues that the hearing judge “did not
explain how Respondent prejudiced the administration of justice by attempting to collect a
reasonable fee that she indisputably earned in accord with MLRPC 1.5.”
We overrule Respondent’s exception. A lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(d) “when his
or her conduct impacts negatively the public’s perception or efficacy of the courts or legal
profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reno, 436 Md. 504, 509 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Before Judge Russell, Respondent mischaracterized the mental
capacity of her client, who represented himself in the fee case, in order to collect
unreasonable fees. That some accurate information was buried in the exhibits before Judge
Russell cannot remedy Respondent’s oral misrepresentations before the court. Respondent
40
took a position before Judge Russell that directly contradicted her position regarding her
client’s diminished capacity before different tribunals in this State. Respondent, among
other professional misconduct, engaged in representation that created a conflict of interest,
charged and collected unreasonable fees, and made numerous intentional
misrepresentations to her client and the courts. Respondent’s conduct erodes the public’s
confidence in the legal profession and is prejudicial to the administration of justice in
violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Williams, 446 Md. 355,
375 (2016) (concluding that the respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by “failing to comply
with numerous court orders and then making misrepresentations to excuse his misconduct”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
MLRPC 8.4(a)
MLRPC 8.4(a) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . .
violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another[.]” The
hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) because of her above-
described violations of the Rules. “We have held that, when an attorney violates a rule of
professional conduct, the attorney also violates MLRPC 8.4(a).” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Young, 445 Md. 93, 106 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Respondent’s violations of MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.7, 3.3, and 8.4(c) and (d)
result in a violation of MLRPC 8.4(a).
III.
It remains for us to decide the proper sanction for Respondent’s misconduct.
41
Mindful that “the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, not punish the
attorney,” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mixter, 441 Md. 416, 527 (2015), we aim to
impose a sanction “commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the
intent with which they were committed,” Good, 445 Md. at 513 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We protect the public through sanctions against offending attorneys in two
ways: through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated, and by
removing those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of those authorized
to practice in this State.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 372
(2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the appropriate
sanction, we likewise weigh the attorney’s misconduct against any existing mitigating and
aggravating factors. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 405 (2011).
The hearing judge found one aggravating factor: Mr. Wilson “is a vulnerable
person, suffering from significant, ongoing cognitive and memory problems, resulting in
diminished capacity.”10 The hearing judge also found in mitigation that Respondent has
no prior disciplinary record; did not display a selfish motive; provided full and free
disclosure during the disciplinary proceedings; cooperated during the disciplinary
proceedings; provided character and reputation evidence; and expressed remorse for her
conduct towards Ms. Denrich and for “relying too heavily on her memory during the Fee
Case.”
Petitioner excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent did not display a
10
The hearing judge referred to the aggravating and mitigating factors as set forth in
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sperling, 434 Md. 658, 676-77 (2013).
42
selfish motive and to the hearing judge’s failure to address five other aggravating factors:
that Respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, has
refused to recognize wrongful nature of her conduct, has substantial experience in the
practice of law, and has displayed indifference to making restitution.
We sustain each of Petitioner’s exceptions. See Landeo, 446 Md. at 350 (finding
the presence of additional aggravating factors, not found by the hearing judge, based on
the Court’s own review of the record); Coppola, 419 Md. at 406 (sustaining Bar Counsel’s
exceptions regarding two aggravating factors). Respondent displayed a selfish motive by
attempting to persuade Mr. Wilson to attest to his “sound mind” in writing. She further
displayed a selfish motive by misleading the District Court in order to collect her fees. We
agree with Petitioner that there “is no plausible motivation for making the
misrepresentations and misleading statements to the court other than the Respondent’s
motivation to further her financial gain.” Respondent displayed a pattern of misconduct
from June 2010 to October 2013 by failing to act competently, acting contrary to her
client’s direction, charging unreasonable fees, and making intentional misrepresentations
to her client and the tribunal. Respondent’s pattern of misconduct resulted in multiple
violations of the Rules. Respondent continues to refuse to recognize the wrongful nature
of her actions and has shown indifference to refunding Mr. Wilson any money. Respondent
has substantial experience in the practice of the law, having been admitted to the Bar in
1981.
We also disagree with the hearing judge that Respondent’s “remorse” is a mitigating
factor. Respondent’s remorse for her conduct towards Ms. Denrich is irrelevant because
43
Respondent has not demonstrated remorse for her actions in representing Mr. Wilson, the
party whom she harmed through her misconduct. Moreover, that Respondent regrets
relying on her memory does not demonstrate remorse because, again, it reflects her failure
to acknowledge that she engaged in any intentional misconduct. Although Respondent
cooperated with Bar Counsel during these proceedings and submitted evidence of her good
character, the aggravating factors in this case outweigh any facts in mitigation.
Upon our assessment of Respondent’s misconduct and in light of substantial
aggravating factors, we hold that disbarment is the appropriate sanction to be imposed in
this case. Our cases have long established that, when an attorney’s misconduct is
characterized by “repeated material misrepresentations that constitute a pattern of deceitful
conduct, as opposed to an isolated instance,” disbarment follows as a matter of course. See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 647 (2002). This rule is not limited to
cases involving misappropriation or criminal conduct. When a pattern of intentional
misrepresentations is involved, particularly those misrepresentations that attempt to
conceal other misconduct by the attorney, disbarment will ordinarily be the appropriate
sanction. In Lane, we disbarred an attorney who “failed to diligently act on his clients’
behalf” and “compounded this failure by engaging in a pattern of deceitful and lying
conduct designed to conceal his lack of diligence.” Id. Similarly, in Steinberg, the
respondent engaged in discovery tactics that resulted in sanctions being imposed on his
client; made numerous misrepresentations to his clients, opposing counsel, and the court;
and failed to put a contingency fee arrangement in writing, file a petition on behalf of a
client, and communicate with his client and opposing counsel. 395 Md. at 374. We held
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that “[s]uch a pattern of neglectful and deceitful conduct, coupled with the deceitful
attempts to conceal Respondent’s lack of diligence, merits disbarment.” Id.; see also
Williams, 446 Md. at 376 (“Respondent’s actions to conceal his incompetence and lack of
diligence from his client in an attempt to lead her and the courts to believe that he was
acting in the best interests of the client cannot be tolerated.”).
Respondent’s actions in this case are marred by similar misconduct. Respondent
failed to act competently and communicate adequately with her client. She engaged in
unreasonably aggressive discovery tactics that resulted in sanctions imposed on Mr.
Wilson, which were lifted only after a judge later determined that her client was
incompetent. Respondent made a misrepresentation to Mr. Wilson to conceal the fact that
her misconduct excluded the only available medical evidence that would have been
required to support his claims. Finally, and most egregiously, Respondent lied to and
deceived the court to the detriment of her former client for her own monetary gain.
We impose a sanction less severe than disbarment in cases of intentional
misrepresentations only upon a showing of “compelling extenuating circumstances.”
Steinberg, 395 Md. at 375. Respondent has not offered, nor do we find, the presence of
any extenuating circumstances, much less the compelling circumstances we require.
Accordingly, we hold that Respondent’s misconduct is deserving of the ultimate sanction.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 19-709, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
45
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION AGAINST RHONDA I.
FRAMM.
46