DocketNumber： No. 63
Judges： Harrell
Filed Date： 4/24/2013
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/10/2024
Barbara and Stanley Samorajcyzk (referred to collectively as “the Samorajcyzks”) believed they had the right to use a ten-foot wide strip of land (hereinafter referred to as “the Strip”),
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Annapolis Roads subdivision was created by the filing of a Plat on 18 September 1928 among the land records for
The Strip, as conceived originally, is approximately ten feet wide and contains two parts. The first part, depicted on the 1928 Plat, runs approximately one hundred and fifteen feet from Carrollton Road in a southerly direction toward (but not
The Court of Special Appeals held, and it is undisputed before this Court, that the Strip “was a part of the lots binding it, and when lots were conveyed, the portion of the Strip binding the lots [to the mid-point of the Strip] was also conveyed.” Annapolis Roads, 205 Md.App. at 301-02, 45 A.3d at 768. The panel of the intermediate appellate court determined that, as a result of subsequent transactions, the Lindsay Trust possessed fee simple title to the Strip. Petitioners dispute only the finding that the owners of Lot 18, formerly the Samorajcyzks, have an easement over, and therefore the right to use, the Strip. Because the basis for the Samorajcyzks’ asserted right to use the Strip is claimed solely as an implied easement by reference to a plat, we explain (of necessity) the transfer history of the original four lots at issue as relevant.
Lot 18
The first transaction of Lot 18, following the filing of the 1928 Plat, occurred on 10 December 1928, when the Annapolis
[ARC] does grant and convey unto [Mohler], his heirs and assigns, in fee simple, all that piece or parcel of ground situate, lying and being in the Second Election District of Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland, being part of the same land which [ARC] obtained from The Armstrong Company by deed dated the 2nd day of December, 1927, ... to wit: Lot numbered Eighteen (18) of Section “D” in the development known as “Annapolis Roads”, as designated on the plat of said Annapolis Roads made by Olmsted Brothers, which said plat is recorded among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County ...;
Together with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made, or being; and all and every, the rights, alleys, ways, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same belong or in anywise appertaining.
On 10 April 1929, F.K. Mohler re-conveyed Lot 18 to ARC. Approximately two years later, on 20 February 1931, ARC conveyed Lot 18, again, to Mohler. The 1931 deed stated, in pertinent part:
[ARC] does grant and convey unto [Mohler], his heirs and assigns, in fee simple, all that piece or parcel of ground situate, lying and being in the development known as “Annapolis Roads” in the Second Election District of Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland, being part of the same land which the [ARC] obtained from The Armstrong Company by deed dated the 2nd day of December 1927 and recorded among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County ..., to wit:
Lot eighteen (18) in Section “D”
Together with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made, or being; and all and every the rights, alleys, ways, privileges, appurtenances and advantages to the same belonging or in anywise appertaining.
Lot 18, after a series of deed transfers not relevant to the question before us, became divided by deed as a result of
In 1961, the Powells conveyed what remained of Lot 18 (the original Lot 18 minus the triangular portion conveyed to the Solomons in 1957) to the Hortons. On 15 August 1962, the Hortons conveyed an additional portion of Lot 18 to then-owners of Lot 19, the Solomons. This portion consisted of the five-foot wide Strip extension that was retained by the Powells in the 1957 conveyance to the Solomons, as well as the portion of the Strip that abutted Lot 18. See Annapolis Roads, 205 Md.App. at 302 n. 17, 45 A.3d at 768 n. 17. The deed executed by the Hortons in favor of the Solomons conveying the five-foot wide Strip extension contained the following language:
Reserving, however, a right of ingress and egress to Carrollton Road over the above described property for the benefit of the grantors herein, their heirs and assigns forever.
Thus, although the five-foot wide Strip extension was joined thereby with Lot 19 under common ownership, the Hortons reserved expressly for themselves, their heirs, and assigns, an easement over the 1962 Extension, the portion of the Strip abutting Lot 18, and also, purportedly, over the remainder of the Strip, for the benefit of Lot 18.
In 1992, the Samorajcyzks purchased Lots 18 and 17. The Samorajcyzks owned also portions of Lots 15 and 16. In 2007, the Samorajcyzks executed a Lot Merger Agreement, recorded among the Land Records for Anne Arundel County, in compliance with § 18-4-203-04 of the Anne Arundel County Code,
Lot 19
Lot 19, now designated as 2515 Carrollton Road, was conveyed by ARC to The Homes Improvement Company by deed dated 8 October 1928.
Lots 20 and 21
ARC conveyed both Lot 20 and Lot 21, known now as 2509 Carrollton Road, to Helen Sagrario by deed dated 23 June 1932. On 25 May 1976, then-owners of Lots 20 and 21, John and Margaret Talbot, conveyed title to the one-half of the Strip binding Lots 20 and 21 to the then-owners of Lot 19, the Solomons. The deed stated, in pertinent part: “all of that 10 foot path lying between Lots 19 and 20 ... including that part of said 10 foot path or road lying contiguous to [lot] 21 ... to the end that said path or road may be closed, vesting title thereto in the [owners of Lot 19].”
Respondents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on 6 June 2007, seeking a declaratory judgment stating, in relevant part, that ARPOA owned title to the Strip, that the Strip may be used by ARPOA’s members, and that the Samorajcyzks, as the owners of Lot 18, have the rights to an easement over the Strip.
On 30 October 2008, Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a declaration that the Thomas C. Lindsay Revocable Trust is the fee simple owner of the Strip, or, in the alternative, that ARPOA is not the owner of the Strip. In a memorandum opinion issued on 10 August 2009, the Circuit Court determined that ARPOA held no right, title, or interest in the Strip because its predecessor in interest, ARC, failed to reserve expressly its rights, title, or interest in the Strip when it conveyed each of the four abutting lots.
On 9 September 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment that the owners of Lots 18,19, 20, and 21 owned the Strip as tenants in common. On 6 October 2009, after filing their Amended Counterclaim, Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on their Amended Counterclaim. Petitioners requested a declaratory judgment that the Lindsay Trust owns the entirety of the ten-foot wide Strip along its entire length in fee simple, and that the Strip is not encumbered by an easement running to the benefit of any party to the litigation. Specifically, with regard to the latter contention, Petitioners argued that an implied easement by reference to the Plat did not exist because the 1931 Deed, by which ARC reconveyed Lot 18 to Mohler, did not refer explicitly to the 1928 Plat, nor did the Plat itself contain or set forth a right of way or easement. Moreover, Petitioners contended that the Samorajcyzks could not possess an easement by necessity over the Strip, because (1) the Samorajcyzks acquired alternative access to Carrollton Road over Lots 15 and 16; and, (2) Lot 18 was merged, by operation of law and by execution of a Lot Merger Agreement by the Samorajcyzks, thus extinguishing any claimed easement by necessity by securing alternative access to Carrollton Road. Plaintiffs retorted that (1) an easement by necessity existed still in favor of Lot 18 because the Samorajcyzks have a continuing need for deliveries and service to the rear of their property, which is inaccessible by alternative routes, and (2) an easement by reference to a plat exists because the plat referenced in the relevant deeds depicts Lots 18 and 21 “as abutting a right of way, adjacent to and abutting Carrollton Road.”
The Circuit Court, in a memorandum opinion issued on 30 June 2010, determined that: (1) the Lindsay Trust holds fee simple title to the Strip; (2) the Talbots, as the owners of Lot 20 and 21, do not have an easement over the Strip because they conveyed in 1976 their interest in the Strip to the owners of Lot 19; and, (3) an implied easement by plat reference over the Strip exists appurtenant to Lot 18 for the purpose of ingress and egress to Carrollton Road. The court reasoned that, because the first conveyance of Lot 18 established an implied easement by plat reference over the Strip and the Hortons reserved expressly an easement in 1962, an express easement existed in favor of the Samorajcyzks over both the 1962 Extension and the Strip. Specifically, the Circuit Court found that, contrary to Petitioners’ assertion that the 1931 Deed was the relevant deed by which to determine the existence of an easement, the 1928 Deed, as the original conveyance, was the pertinent deed. Thus, because the 1928 deed referred expressly to the 1928 plat, which the court found depicted a right of way, it was sufficient to create an implied easement by reference to a plat. Moreover, because Lot 18, as the dominant tenement, had not been owned jointly with the servient tenement subsequent to the easement’s creation, nor had the easement been extinguished otherwise, the Samorajcyzks enjoyed the right to use the easement over the Strip and the 1962 Extension.
Respondents noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the Circuit Court’s judgment that the Lindsay Trust owned the Strip in fee simple. Petitioners filed a cross-appeal, seeking review of the Circuit Court’s finding that
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted on 21 September 2012, 428 Md. 543, 52 A.3d 978 (2012), to consider the following questions:
(1) Whether an implied easement by reference to a plat may be created without an express reference to the plat?
(2) Whether an implied easement by reference to a plat is created when the plat creates a strip of land but does not contain any words that demonstrate the existence of easement rights over the strip?
(3) Whether an easement appurtenant to an unimproved lot may be used by the owner of other improved lots that are forever merged into the lot with the easement appurtenant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a declaratory judgment entered pursuant to a motion for summary judgment to determine whether it was correct as a matter of law. Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 428 Md. 723, 741, 53 A.3d 1184, 1195 (2012); Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc. v. Magill, 414 Md. 457, 471-72, 995 A.2d 960, 968 (2010). Here, there is no dispute over any fact material to the resolution of the case. Because the parties dispute only issues of law, see White v. Pines Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 31, 939 A.2d 165, 175 (2008) (“The interpretation of mortgages, plats, deeds, easements and covenants has been held to be a question of law.”), we review the decision of the intermediate appellate court to determine whether it was correct legally. In construing the creation of an easement, the primary rule “is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties at the time the [easement] was made, if that be possible.” Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., 392 Md. 374, 392, 897 A.2d 206, 216-17 (2006) (quoting Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536, 545 (2003)).
Petitioners dispute the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that an easement by reference to a plat exists in favor of the owners of Lot 18 over the entirety of the ten-foot Strip. “[A]n easement is a ‘nonpossessory interest in the real property of another/ ” USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer, 429 Md. 199, 207, 55 A.3d 510, 515 (2012) (quoting Rogers v. P-M Hunter’s Ridge, LLC, 407 Md. 712, 729, 967 A.2d 807, 818 (2009)), and provides generally the owner of one property a right of way over the real property of another. Sharp v. Downey, 197 Md.App. 123, 160, 13 A.3d 1, 23 (2010), vacated on other grounds, 428 Md. 249, 51 A.3d 573 (2012). Thus, where a private easement, or one not enjoyed by the general public, exists, two distinct tenements arise. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Garrett Cnty. v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 175, 695 A.2d 171, 179 (1997) (quoting Consol. Gas Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 101 Md. 541, 545, 61 A. 532, 534 (1905)). The property benefitting from the easement is referred to generally as the dominant estate, while the property subject to or burdened by the easement is the servient estate. USA Cartage Leasing, 429 Md. at 208, 55 A.3d at 515; Rogers, 407 Md. at 715 n. 1, 967 A.2d at 810 n. 1.
“An easement may be created by express grant, by reservation in a conveyance of land, or by implication.” USA Cartage Leasing, 429 Md. at 208, 55 A.3d at 515 (citing Kobrine, LLC v. Metzger, 380 Md. 620, 635, 846 A.2d 403, 412 (2004)). Here, Petitioners do not contest the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that the 1962 Deed conveying a portion of Lot 18 from the Hortons to the Solomons created an easement by reservation over the 1962 Extension. In dispute, however, is whether that Deed also reserved expressly an easement over the Strip itself. As the lower courts both noted, the Hortons could reserve an easement over the Strip only if, in 1962, the Hortons enjoyed a right of way over the Strip. Because it is undisputed that no express easement existed over the Strip prior to 1962, we consider only whether an
Easements by implication may arise “by prescription, necessity, the filing of plats, estoppel, and implied grant or reservation where a quasi-easement has existed while the two tracts are one.” Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (internal citations omitted). Petitioners challenge the determination by the Court of Special Appeals that an implied easement by reference to a plat exists over the Strip for the benefit of Lot 18.
Petitioners argue that it is the second conveyance to Mohler in 1931, and not the original conveyance in 1928, that governs the resolution of the dispute before us. Specifically, Petition
In contrast to Petitioners’ assertion that the 1931 deed governs the dispute, the Court of Special Appeals relied, as did the Circuit Court, on the 1928 deed from ARC to Mohler to determine that an easement appurtenant to Lot 18 existed over the Strip. Petitioners acknowledge that the 1928 deed conveyed Lot 18 by express reference to the Plat, but insist that, by virtue of its subsequent conveyance back to Mohler, it is not the material reference deed to consult in resolving the present dispute. Thus, we must determine first which is the relevant conveyance creating the asserted easement.
I. Which Is the Relevant Conveyance Creating the Implied Easement?
Petitioners maintain that any easement by reference to the 1928 Plat conveyed by ARC in the first conveyance to Mohler was extinguished by the 1929 re-conveyance to ARC. Specifically, Petitioners argue that “[t]he conveyance of Lot 18 back to ARC also conveyed back to ARC any implied easement by reference to the Plat created in connection with the first conveyance because the dominant and servient estates were once again under common ownership.” Although unity of ownership of both the dominant and the servient estates extinguishes generally any easements as between those lots, see, e.g., Kelly v. Nagle, 150 Md. 125, 131, 132 A. 587, 590 (1926), the application of that principle here does not render the 1928 deed to Mohler irrelevant.
In reviewing the transfer history of Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21, we note that all four lots were held originally in common ownership by ARC. As the Court of Special Appeals held, title
Assuming, for the moment, that the 1928 deed, conveying originally Lot 18 from ARC to Mohler, was sufficient to create an easement by reference to a plat over the entirety of the Strip in favor of Lot 18, the easement was extinguished over the portions of the Strip abutting Lots 20 and 21 when Lot 18 was reconveyed to ARC. Lots 20 and 21 were also owned by ARC in 1929. Thus, the dominant and servient estates, with the exception of Lot 19, were under common ownership. We have held for a very long time that, “when the same person becomes the owner of the dominant and servient estates ... the unity of the two estates in the one individual necessarily extinguishes and merges the easement appurtenant to the dominant estate, because no person can have an easement in the land which he himself owns.” Kelly, 150 Md. at 131, 132 A. at 590 (quoting Duval v. Becker, 81 Md. 537, 545-46, 32 A. 308, 309 (1895)). Thus, any easement running to the benefit of Lot 18 over Lots 20 and 21 was extinguished in 1929, when ARC held title to the three lots.
We note, therefore, that with respect to an alleged easement running to the benefit of Lot 18 over the portion of the Strip conveyed by ARC to Homes Improvement Company in 1928 (Lot 19), the 1928 deed by ARC conveying Lot 18 to Mohler is the relevant transaction.
II. Sufficiency of the Deeds to Create an Implied Easement by Reference to a Plat
A. Reference to the Plat
As we noted in Boucher, “[a]n obvious but important factor in determining whether [an easement by plat reference exists] is whether [the] deed [purportedly creating the easement] contains a reference to a plat that contains a right of way.” 301 Md. at 688-89, 484 A.2d at 635. In Boucher, we implied an easement by plat reference where the deed in question, executed by the grantor who created the plat, referred expressly to the plat depicting allegedly a right of way “as a means of describing the boundaries of [the] property.” Id. at 691, 484 A.2d at 635. Indeed, where implied easements by plat reference have been found in Maryland appellate cases, it is noted frequently that an express reference to the plat depicting the alleged easement is contained in the relevant deed. See, e.g., Kobrine, 380 Md. at 638, 846 A.2d at 413 (noting that the deeds to the individual landowners included references to the relevant plats); Koch, 357 Md. at 196, 742 A.2d at 947 (noting that “[a]ll of the deeds refer to
In the present case, there is no question that the reference in the 1928 deed to the Plat is sufficient to satisfy this requirement under Boucher. The 1928 deed refers to the property depicted on the Plat in the following manner: “Lot numbered Eighteen (18) of Section “D” in the development known as “Annapolis Roads”, as designated on the plat of said Annapolis Roads made by Olmsted Brothers, which said plat is recorded among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County....” This express reference to the Plat is plainly sufficient to demonstrate the grantor’s intention that the Plat be incorporated by reference, and indeed, Petitioners appear to concede that the 1928 deed refers effectively to the Plat.
The 1931 deed does not refer to the Plat so explicitly, however. Rather, the only reference in the deed is to the “Annapolis Roads development,” as well as the following description of the property: “Lot eighteen (18) in Section ‘D’ Petitioners contend that this reference is insufficient to create an implied easement by plat reference because it does not refer expressly and sufficiently to the Plat. Moreover, Petitioners argue, ARC “knew perfectly well” how to convey lots by reference to the Plat, as demonstrated by, for example, the 1928 conveyance of Lot 18 to Mohler and the 1928 conveyance of Lot 19 to The Homes Improvement Company.
In considering this contention, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, “[d]espite lack of use of the term ‘plat’ or the liber and folio for the 1928 Plat,” the description was sufficient to imply an easement by reference because it referred to identifying characteristics of the lot that would not have existed absent the filing of the 1928 Plat. 205 Md.App. at 326, 45 A.3d at 782-83. Specifically, the court noted that the 1928
To re-establish an easement extinguished by merger, the grantor must recreate the easement as if for the first time. Thus, although the chain of title might be relevant in linking the relevant language, such as “Lot D,” to the 1928 Plat, it is not relevant independently in establishing the existence of the easement. Rather, we must determine whether the references to Lot D, Annapolis Roads, and Lot 18 are sufficiently specific to constitute an adequate reference to the Plat.
Although we acknowledge that the 1928 Plat created and defined the specific terms used in the 1931 deed, a comparison of the 1928 and 1931 deeds is instructive. In the 1928 deed, there is no question that the grantor intended to incorporate the Plat as part of the deed and, thus, any rights granted thereby. ARC included similar specific references to the Plat in multiple deeds, including a 1928 deed to The Homes Improvement Company, a 1932 deed to The Armstrong Company, and a 1932 deed to Helen Sagrario. Thus, as Petitioners note, ARC knew how to execute a deed referring expressly to the Plat, and had done so with respect to the initial convey
As this Court noted, purported implied grants of easements are construed strictly. See Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 538, 158 A.2d 319, 323 (1960); Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 321, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (1945) (“[G]rants of easements by implication are looked upon with jealousy and are construed with strictness by the courts.”). Thus, we have implied generally easements only when it was clear that the grantor incorporated a plat. See generally Koch, 357 Md. at 196, 742 A.2d at 947 (noting that “[a]ll of the deeds refer to ‘the unrecorded plat of Lerch’s Point’ ”). Because ARC conveyed repeatedly properties in the Annapolis Roads subdivision by Plat reference, we cannot ignore or even minimize the notable absence of such a specific reference with respect to the 1931 deed. The free-floating references to the terms defined in the Plat, without more, are not sufficient under our cases to imply an intention on the part of the grantor that the grantee have the right to use and enjoy the land of another. We hold that the references in the 1931 deed are not sufficient to establish that the grantor intended to incorporate the Plat into the deed. Thus, the Samorajcyzks do not have an easement by plat reference over the five-foot wide portion of the Strip abutting Lots 20 and 21.
B. Does the Plat Depict a Right of Way?
Petitioners argue that, regardless of whether the 1928 and the 1931 deeds referred sufficiently to the 1928 Plat, the lack of a legend on the 1928 Plat specifying that the Strip was intended to constitute a right of way renders both deeds insufficient to create an implied easement. Specifically, Peti
By contrast, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the absence of a legend on the Plat was insufficient to establish “that the parties did not intend to convey an easement.” Annapolis Roads, 205 Md.App. at 329, 45 A.3d at 785. Relying on Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954), in which we found an implied easement by reference to a plat over an unmarked roadway and a community beach, id. at 291, 107 A.2d at 85, the court determined that, because the plat depicts what appears to be a right of way, it demonstrates effectively “an intention to convey an easement.” Annapolis Roads, 205 Md.App. at 329-30, 45 A.3d at 784-85.
This court held for quite some time that, “when a property owner subdivides property and makes or adopts a plat designating lots as bordering streets, and then sells any of those lots with reference to the plat, an implied easement of way passes ... over the street contiguous to the property sold.” Kobrine, 380 Md. at 639, 846 A.2d at 414 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because the Strip is contiguous to Lot 18, if the Strip is a “street,” as that term has been considered by this Court in its cases, an easement was created by virtue of the Plat reference in the 1928 deed. The Court of Special Appeals, in considering whether the Strip constituted
Upon examination of the Plat, we agree with the intermediate appellate court that the Strip is a “street” within the meaning of the rule iterated by this Court in Kobrine. It cannot be disputed seriously that, on its face, the Plat suggests that the Strip was intended to be used jointly by the lots abutting it.
Here, an examination of the Strip depicted on the Plat, although not labeled there as a street or way, reveals, as in Klein, that it could not be regarded reasonably as anything else. It is evident from the face of the 1928 Plat that the common grantor intended that the owners of Lots 18, 19, 20, and 21 have access to use and enjoy the Strip. Indeed, Petitioners admit that the apparent purpose of the Strip was to provide access to Carrollton Road.
Petitioners assert that any implied easement created by reference to the Plat must be extinguished, because, due to the lot merger agreement executed by the Samorajcyzks in 2007, pursuant to Anne Arundel County Code §§ 18-4-203-04, effectively Lot 18 exists no longer. Upon review of the record, however, it does not appear that Petitioners mounted this argument before the Circuit Court. Although they alluded to the lot merger agreement and the merger provisions of the Anne Arundel County Code, Petitioners did not advance that the easement must be extinguished necessarily because Lot 18 has no continuing legal significance. Rather, Petitioners’ argument with respect to the lot merger agreement in the trial court was limited to their contention that the lot merger agreement extinguished any still-remaining easement by necessity for the benefit of Lot 18 by virtue of providing the Samorajcyzks with access to Carrollton Road via the now-merged portion of Lot 15. Petitioners did not argue that the lot merger agreement extinguished effectively an easement implied by reference to the Plat because Lot 18 no longer existed legally.
Because Petitioners failed to preserve this argument for appellate review, we do not consider Petitioners’ contentions on this point. See Md. Rule 8 — 131(a) (“Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide ... [an] issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court ... ”). We note, however, that the easement held by the owners of Lot 18 may be used only to benefit Lot 18. See, e.g., Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 538, 158 A.2d 319, 323 (1960) (noting that an “easement cannot be extended by the owner of the dominant estate to accommodate land which he did not own when the easement was acquired”). Thus, to the extent that improvements to the Samorajeyzk property exist only on portions of the original Lots 15, 16, and 17, the easement may not be used to benefit those improvements. The easement, as such, runs to the benefit of Lot 18 only.
. The Strip binds four lots, as depicted on a Plat filed in 1928 in the Land Records for Anne Arundel County, creating the Annapolis Roads subdivision. The Strip is described more fully infra.
. Counsel for Petitioners indicated before this Court at argument that Thomas C. Lindsay passed away during the pendency of the litigation. The Trust is now the Thomas C. Lindsay Irrevocable Trust.
. Plaintiffs were ARPOA, the Samorajcyzks, John and Margaret Talbot, and Elizabeth and William Ochs.
. Since commencement of this litigation, there has been a significant change in the composition of the original Plaintiffs. Elizabeth Ochs and John Talbot passed away. The Samorajcyzks sold their property. The record does not indicate who owns the Samorajcyzk property currently. Thus, because the Samorajcyzks were the property owners at the inception of this dispute, we refer to them occasionally as the owners of Lot 18 (a relevant reference point) for purposes of clarity.
Only ARPOA, the Samorajcyzks, and Margaret Talbot were appellants and cross-appellees before the Court of Special Appeals, and are thus before this Court, although they did not participate in this Court. We will refer to these parties collectively as "Respondents.”
. Respondents did not file a brief or participate in oral argument before this Court.
. A copy of the seminal 1928 Plat is appended to this opinion as Appendix "A.”
. The development existed previously under the name of "Belmont Farms,” but was conveyed by then-owner, The Armstrong Company, to the Annapolis Roads Company ("ARC”) in 1927. The 1928 Plat subdivided the properties and depicts the lot subdivisions central to understanding the dispute at issue here.
. All lot references are to the lots as depicted on the 1928 Plat.
. For purposes of simplicity and clarity, we recite here only the facts necessary to resolve the issues before this Court. A more complete factual and procedural history may be found in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. See Annapolis Roads, 205 Md.App. 270, 45 A.3d 749 (2012).
. Our review of the record reveals that some documents refer to the principal road of the subdivision as "Carrollton Road,” while others refer to it as "Carrolton Road.” For purposes of consistency with the other courts' opinions in the travail of this case, we shall refer to it as “Carrollton Road.”
. Lot 18 also is depicted as having access to Carrollton Road by virtue of a similar strip on the other side of Lot 19, abutting Lot 16. The use or ownership of that strip is not at issue here.
. § 18-4-203 of the Anne Arundel County Code states, in relevant part:
*283 (a) General prohibition against use of multiple lots to serve principal use. On and after September 25, 2003, multiple lots under the same ownership may not be used for the purpose of serving a principal use or be merged for the purpose of serving a principal use unless the requirements of this section are met.
(b) Merger by operation of law. Contiguous lots under the same ownership that are separated by a boundary line upon or across which a principal use is located on or after September 25, 2003, merge by operation of law on that date, and the Office of Planning and Zoning thereafter shall require the owner of the merged lots to execute and record a lot merger agreement as a condition precedent to receiving a permit for demolition, development, grading, or construction activity.
(c) Merger by agreement. Contiguous lots shall be merged by the owner of the lots for the purpose of serving a principal use, and the owner shall execute and record a lot merger agreement as a condition precedent to receiving a permit that requires use of the lots in service of a principal use.
(d) Unmerger. Some or all lots merged under subsections (b) or (c), or under a lot consolidation agreement executed and recorded before September 25, 2003, may be unmerged if:
(1) the lots no longer are used in service of a principal use;
(2) the lots comply with the minimum area and dimensional requirements of the zoning district in which the lots are located in effect at the time of the unmerger;
(3) all or party of any lots in the critical area were part of a subdivision approved on or after August 22, 1988; and
(4) the owner executes and records in the land records of the County at the owner's expense an instrument unmerging the lots in the form required by the Office of Planning and Zoning.
§ 18-4-204 states, in relevant part, that, ”[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, lots merged under this subtitle shall be treated as a single lot for purposes of this article.”
. The Lot Merger Agreement states, in relevant part:
Upon execution of this Agreement by all parties, the Lots shall be merged for the purpose of serving a single principle use as described by and under the conditions imposed by Section 201 through 205, of title 4, of Article 18 of the Anne Arundel County Code.
For the purposes of complying with the Anne Arundel County zoning and subdivision codes, lot lines separating the Lots, as shown on the referenced subdivision plat, shall no longer be considered as lot lines for any zoning or subdivision purpose, and the Lots shall, for building and development purposes be considered as a single lot.
[ ] The parties hereby agree that the Lots shall not be unmerged or resubdivided except in compliance with the laws of Anne Arundel County.
*284 Property Owner and the County agree and understand that this Agreement shall not affect the legal description or title to the Lots.
. The deed stated, in relevant part:
[ARC] does grant and convey unto [The Homes Improvement Company], its successors and assigns, in fee simple, all that piece or parcel of ground situate, lying, and being in Anne Arundel County, State of Maryland, ... to wit: Lot numbered nineteen (19) of Section "D” in the development known as "Annapolis Roads,” as designated on the plat of said Annapolis Roads made by Olmstead Brothers, which said plat is intended to be recorded among the Land Records of Anne Arundel County....
. The courts considering this litigation before us determined that, in conveying Lots 20 and 21 to the Solomons in this manner, the Talbots
. Respondents claimed initially also that the Lindsays misrepresented, intentionally and/or negligently, on a permit application that they owned title to the Strip. Consequently, Respondents sought initially compensatory damages, the revocation of the permit issued to the Lindsays, and the destruction of a building addition erected on the Lindsay property by virtue of the permit. Respondents dismissed later these claims voluntarily, without prejudice, conceding that they failed to exhaust available administrative remedies with regard to the permit-related claims.
. ARPOA filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but dismissed voluntarily the appeal on 15 October 2009, noting that a final judgment on all claims had not been issued by the Circuit Court.
. The trial court judge did not rule on Petitioners' claim that the Lindsay Trust was the owner of the Strip, apparently because Petitioners had not filed an affirmative pleading seeking such a judgment at that point in the litigation. Petitioners’ Amended Counterclaim remedied this defect.
. Whether the facts of this case present a case of an easement by necessity at the time the easement was created is not before us.
. Some jurisdictions hold that an easement over a common area in a subdivision cannot be extinguished unless all of the dominant and servient estates in the subdivision are in common ownership. See, e.g., Tract Development Serv., Inc. v. Kepler, 199 Cal.App.3d 1374, 246 Cal.Rptr. 469, 476 (1988) (noting that, because “each owner in the subdivision [had] the right to use every other owner's property to travel both within and through the subdivision” by virtue of the subdivision map, "the whole of the subdivision [was] in essence the servient tenement to each lot, and each lot [was] servient to every other lot[;]” thus, no merger could occur “unless there [was] common ownership of the entire subdivision”). Such cases deal generally with easements over all roads appearing on a subdivision plat that are considered appurtenant to each lot in the subdivision, rather than the limited
. Although Lot 19 was conveyed to The Homes Improvement Company prior to the conveyance of Lot 18 to Mohler in 1928, Lot 19 was conveyed by express reference to the 1928 Plat. Thus, if the 1928 deed to Mohler was sufficient to grant an implied easement by reference to the 1928 Plat over the Strip in favor of Lot 18, the 1928 deed to The Homes Improvement Company was also likely sufficient to reserve impliedly an easement by reference to the 1928 Plat for the benefit of the other property owners abutting the Strip. See, e.g., McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Balt., 174 Md. 118, 122, 197 A. 580, 582 (1938) ("When it appears, by a fair interpretation of the words of the grant, that it was the intent of the parties to create or reserve a right in the nature of a servitude or easement in the property granted, for the benefit of the other land owned by the grantor, and originally forming, with the land conveyed, one parcel, such right shall be deemed appurtenant to the land of the grantor....” (quoting Whitney v. Union Ry. Co., 77 Mass. 359, 11 Gray 359, 365 (1858))). Thus, that ARC did not hold title to Lot 19, or the five-foot wide half of the Strip abutting Lot 19, at the time of the 1928 and 1931 conveyances to Mohler is of no import in determin
. Because Lot 18 was conveyed twice from the original common grantor and Petitioners do not argue that the 1931 conveyance is irrelevant because it was not the original conveyance of the property after the filing of the plat, we assume, without deciding, that ARC's second conveyance of Lot 18 may create an easement by reference to a plat. See generally Olde Severna Park Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Barry, 188 Md.App. 582, 626, 982 A.2d 905, 931 (2009) (noting that, in implying an easement by reference to a plat, the court is concerned with the intent only of the original grantor).
. It appears that the Court of Special Appeals interpreted Petitioners' argument that the re-conveyance of Lot 18 from Mohler to ARC extinguished the easement as, instead, an argument that the reference in the 1931 deed terminated the easement because it was insufficiently specific. Annapolis Roads, 205 Md.App. at 325, 45 A.3d at 782 ("Appellees contend that the second conveyance of Lot 18 to Mohler did not refer to the 1928 Plat and, therefore, any easement to use the Strip was extinguished at that time."). We do not interpret Petitioners’ argument in that manner. Rather, it seems to us that Petitioners contend that the easement was extinguished by virtue of the reconveyance to ARC in 1929, and not by virtue ol the 1931 deed.
. The court considered both § 2-114 of the Real Property Article, as well as Maryland Code, Art. 21 § 5-114 (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) in reaching this conclusion. As noted in Boucher, Art. 21 § 5-114 “extend[ed] the common law presumption that title to the center of a binding street passes to the grantee.” 301 Md. at 687, 484 A.2d at 633. The statute was recodified in 1974 at § 2-114 of the Real Property Article.
. Moreover, Petitioners argued before the Court of Special Appeals that the Strip constituted a "street” or "shared driveway” for purposes of title. Thus, it seems consistent with Petitioners' argument in the intermediate appellate court to determine that the Strip was intended plainly to be used jointly. Indeed, as noted in Boucher, the purpose of former Article 21 § 5-114 (now codified as amended at Md.Code Ann., Real Property Art. § 2-114) is to "assure landowners that they will have access to streets bounding on their land by granting to them title to the center line of the street while recognizing an easement in the other half of the street.” 301 Md. at 693, 484 A.2d at 638 (emphasis added).
. We noted also that the plaintiffs in Klein relied presumptively on the plat depicting water rights in purchasing lots in the waterfront community. Id. We have implied easements by plat reference since without requiring plaintiffs to rely on the rights created allegedly by the plats. See, e.g., Kobrine, 380 Md. at 646, 846 A.2d at 419 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority opinion for recognizing "an implied easement where the moving litigant did not rely on — much less read — the documents creating the general scheme upon which the alleged implied easement ... is based”). The Annapolis Roads community in the present case is also a waterfront community, although we are not faced with the specific issue of water access rights.
. Petitioners imagine that our decision in Klein rested, at least in part, on the legend depicted on the plat, providing that the roads were reserved by the owner "for the exclusive and mutual use and benefit of the owners of the lots abutting on said Streets and Roads.” 205 Md. at 289, 107 A.2d at 84. Although the legend may have aided the Court in determining that the ten-foot road was intended for use by abutting landowners, the legend did not specify what community rights, if any, existed in the beach area.
. Petitioners contend, however, that the obvious purpose of the Strip supports an intention to create an easement by necessity (which, they claim, has since terminated), not an implied easement by plat reference.