eCases

. This Court will also consider
“the structure of the [order], how it relates to other [orders], its general purpose, and the
relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.”

Id.,

 (citations omitted). Language contained in an administrative order’s preamble and title
“may be considered in conjunction with the body of the [order] to determine its intent,
purpose and effect[.]” Clarke v. Cnty. Comm’rs for Carroll Cnty.,

270 Md. 343

, 349,

311 A.2d 417

, 421 (1973) (citations omitted). “To the extent that the preamble collides with
the plain and unambiguous language of the [administrative order], the latter must prevail.”

Id.,

.
3
In the case at bar, Kern Hosein (“Petitioner”) argues that the fifteen-day extension
applied broadly to all claims with filing deadlines that would have expired during the
COVID-19 emergency period between March 16, 2020 and April 3, 2022. The Fire and
Police Employees’ Retirement System for the City of Baltimore (“Respondent”) contends
that the extension applied narrowly to claims that were tolled during the closure of the
clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. Both parties assert that the
plain language of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order is dispositive in this case. I
disagree. The plain language of the fifteen-day extension is ambiguous. Section (f) states:
“With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20,
2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been extended by previous Order, by
an additional 15 days[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4 (footnote omitted). Section (f)
does not discuss the relationship between the clerks’ offices reopening and the application
of the extension. Section (f) also does not define the scope of the extension. It merely
states that a “previous [o]rder[]” extended “the filing deadlines to initiate matters[.]”

Section (f)’s reference to a “previous [o]rder[]” suggests that the Tenth Revised
Administrative Order itself does not implement the fifteen-day extension; rather, it was a
“previous [o]rder[]” that did so.

 Section (f) does not indicate whether the “previous
[o]rder[’s]” extension remained in effect.

 Although Section (f) invites this Court to
consider the scope of the “previous [o]rder,” that invitation undermines the fact that the
Tenth Revised Administrative Order, as with all successive administrative tolling orders,
had expressly rescinded its predecessor.

 at 4–5; see Lockshin,

412 Md. at 275

 (“[This Court] . . . do[es] not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do[es] [it]
4
confine strictly [its] interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section
alone.” (citations omitted)). By voiding their predecessors, the administrative tolling
orders exclusively operated under the terms of the specific order that was in effect at any
given time, which, in this case, was the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. Therefore,
the scope of Section (f) must be apparent from the plain text of the Tenth Revised
Administrative Order, or it is necessarily ambiguous. See

id. at 276

 (noting
that language that appears “clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation[]” may
“become ambiguous when read as part of a larger [] scheme[.]” (citations omitted)).
The footnote in Section (f) provides no clarity. Although the footnote describes a
case that was affected by the closure, the omission of claims with deadlines following the
closure does not foreclose a broader extension. See Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4 n.1.
On one hand, the footnote may illustrate the only types of claims that Chief Judge Barbera
had envisioned would receive an extension. On the other hand, the footnote may simply
illustrate the most complex and salient application of the fifteen-day extension for litigants
who anticipated the clerks’ offices reopening.
The operative language in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order also fails to
conclusively establish the meaning of Section (f). Section (a) explains that a prior order
had tolled all filing deadlines during the closure.

 at 2–3. Section (b) maintained that
tolling period. Id. at 3. Section (c) excuses parties from establishing their “practical
inability to comply” with a tolled deadline. Id. Section (d) defines the tolling period as
the court closure between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. Id. Sections (a) through (d)
5
do not discuss the fifteen-day extension or provide guidance regarding its scope. Id. at 2–
3. Section (e) warrants further discussion because Petitioner relies on its language.
From the outset, Section (e) states that it exists “[f]or the purposes of tolling of
statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Id. at 3.
The gerund “tolling” combined with the preposition “of” indicate that the action of
“tolling” pertains to the terms that follow. Id. Generally, the term “and” “is a conjunction
meaning ‘[t]ogether with or along with; in addition to; as well as[; u]sed to connect words,
phrases, or clauses that have the same grammatical function in construction.” SVF Riva
Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy,

459 Md. 632

, 642,

187 A.3d 686

, 692 (2018) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the use of “and” in the prefatory clause connects “statutes of limitations” with
“other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3.
Taken together, the plain language of the prefatory clause clarifies that the operative
language addresses the dual “purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations[,]” as well as the
“tolling of . . . other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]”

Section (e) then defines “matters” retroactively as claims with filing deadlines that
would have elapsed “between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19
emergency operations in the Judiciary[.]”

 COVID-19 emergency operations in the
Judiciary extended beyond the emergency tolling period, but that alone does not clarify the
scope of the fifteen-day extension. See Final Admin. Ord. at 3 (Mar., 28, 2022), archived
at: https://perma.cc/CTL2-JCAV (defining the “COVID-19 emergency” period as March
16, 2020 through April 3, 2022). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, Section (e) does not
suggest that the definition of “matters” is related to the application of the fifteen-day
6
extension. Like the other operative provisions, Section (e) does not discuss the fifteen-day
extension at all. Instead, Section (e) serves a clarifying function regarding the scope of the
“matters” subject to the “tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the
initiation of matters[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 2–3. The only type of tolling
discussed in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order involved the closure of the clerks’
offices.
Section (g) is similarly unhelpful. It provides that “[a]ny such filings made within
the period described in [Sections] (d) and (e) shall relate back to the day before the deadline
would have expired had it not been tolled or suspended[.]” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The
phrase “[a]ny such filings” refers to the initiation of matters, as described in the Order. Id.
The “period described in [Sections] (d) and (e)” concern two different timeframes: (1) the
four-month closure of the clerks’ offices under Section (d); and (2) the entire COVID-19
emergency period under Section (e). Id. at 3–4. Although these two periods initially
suggest an ambiguity in Section (g), the provision proceeds to connect its operation to cases
that were “tolled or suspended[.]” Id. at 4. Section (g) does not mention deadlines that
were “extended[,]” which limits any relation-back to cases that were “tolled or
suspended[]” during the four-month closure of the clerks’ offices. Id. at 4. Regardless of
the scope of Section (g), nothing in its language clarifies the operation of Section (f).
Sections (a) through (e), as well as (g), all concern the emergency tolling period,
which Section (d) defines as the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020
through July 20, 2020. Id. at 3. This suggests that the operation of Section (f) is limited
to that period. Since the four-month closure had long passed when the Tenth Revised
7
Administrative Order was issued, that would mean Section (f) was inoperative and served
in an advisory capacity during all relevant times in this matter. That interpretation,
however, belies the fact that Section (f) was included in the Tenth Revised Administrative
Order in the first place. The inclusion of Section (f) implies that the Chief Judge had
intended for that provision to have some effect. Petitioner highlights the tension between
an inoperative fifteen-day extension and its inclusion in the Order:
[N]o further tolling orders would be necessary after the [c]lerks of [c]ourts’
offices reopened on July 20, 2020, because all conceivable limitations
periods that were tolled by the original orders would have completed running
despite the extended time. Yet the [Chief Judge] ha[d] issued at least nine
additional orders on emergency tolling of statutes of limitations prior to the
Tenth [Revised Administrative] Order and continued to issue modified
orders until March 2022.
In essence, the plain language of the Order does not, by itself, explain the scope of
Section (f) or indicate whether the extension that the “previous [o]rder[]” had purportedly
established remained in effect. Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4. Absent clarification,
Section (f) could be interpreted to be broad or narrow. Thus, Section (f) is susceptible to
two reasonable interpretations: (1) once the clerks’ offices reopened, all filing deadlines
through April 3, 2022 received a fifteen-day extension; or (2) only the filing deadlines that
were suspended during the court closure received a fifteen-day extension. The first
interpretation would broaden the scope of the extension beyond the emergency tolling
period, whereas the second interpretation would render Section (f) vestigial, despite its
inclusion in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 179, 286
A.3d at 12 (noting that courts avoid constructions that either “add []or delete language” or
render language “surplusage, superfluous, meaningless[,] or nugatory.” (cleaned up)).
8
To resolve this ambiguity, this Court must consider other indicia of the Chief
Judge’s intent, including the preamble, title, other administrative tolling orders, relevant
case law, and the Maryland Rules governing the administrative tolling orders.              See
Lockshin,

(“[A] court must resolve the ambiguity by
searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or
other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.” (citations
omitted)).3 It is clear upon reviewing those extrinsic sources that the fifteen-day extension
applied only to claims that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices between
March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.
II. Other Indicia Reveal that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order’s Fifteen-
day Extension Narrowly Applied to Deadlines that were Tolled During the
Closure of the Clerks’ Offices.
A. The history of the fifteen-day extension.
The Tenth Revised Administrative Order is a byproduct of several amendments,
which “largely consisted of updated cross-references to other administrative orders
3
This Court’s modern trend when evaluating unambiguous language is to use
legislative history to “check” any conclusions drawn from the plain language. See
Elsberry, 482 Md. at 190, 286 A.3d at 19. Here, Section (f)’s reference to a “previous
[o]rder[]” invites this Court to consider the history of the administrative tolling orders.
Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4. Those prior orders cannot be considered a part of a
“scheme” of administrative tolling orders that would be subject to this Court’s plain
language analysis because each administrative tolling order expressly rescinded its
predecessor. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 180, 286 A.3d at 13 (“[T]he plain language must be
viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[.]” (citation
omitted)). Thus, evaluating prior orders to interpret a provision in the only operative order,
i.e., the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, is akin to considering legislative history and
superseded statutes to resolve statutory ambiguity. Id. at 179, 286 A.3d at 12 (“This Court
need not resort to other rules of statutory construction when the plain language of the statute
unambiguously communicates the intent of the General Assembly.” (citation omitted)).
9
concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.” Murphy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

478 Md. 333

, 362,

274 A.3d 412

, 429 (2022) (footnote omitted). The context and history of an administrative
order, including its relationship with earlier and subsequent orders, may “eliminate another
version of [the Chief Judge’s] intent alleged to be latent in the language.” See Blackstone
v. Sharma,

461 Md. 87

, 113,

191 A.3d 1188

, 1203 (2018) (citations omitted). Chief Judge
Barbera alluded to the fifteen-day extension in the First Administrative Order, dated April
3, 2020. See First Admin. Ord. at 2 (Apr. 3, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/568M-
28TV. That order tolled the filing deadlines for matters “by the number of days that the
courts [were] closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency[.]”

 Then, the order
provided that “[s]uch deadlines further shall be extended by a period to be described in an
order by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals terminating the COVID-19 emergency
period[.]”

 The phrase “[s]uch deadlines” is critical because it connects the operation
of the extension directly to the deadlines that were tolled during the closure. Id. at 1. If
the Chief Judge initially raised the extension in connection with the closure, then the
implementation of that extension must be imbued with that same context, absent contrary
language.
The Revised Administrative Order, dated May 22, 2020, introduced the following
provision: “With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on July 20,
2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an additional 15
days[.]” Revised Admin. Ord. at 3 (May 22, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/58SR-
UWEH. This provision fulfilled the Chief Judge’s promise to extend filing deadlines that
were tolled during the closure. The extension appeared in anticipation of the clerks’ offices
10
reopening, which clarifies why the footnote example pertained to a case that was affected
by the tolling period. This history also clarifies the ambiguous language of Section (f)
under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. The Order states that “the filing deadlines
to initiate matters ha[d] been extended by previous Order[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Order
at 4 (emphasis added). The Revised Administrative Order, as the progenitor of the fifteen-
day extension, was the very order that Section (f) had referenced.
None of the orders subsequent to the Revised Administrative Order purported to
modify the fifteen-day extension. Although the Fifth Revised Administrative Order
introduced two substantive changes, they have no bearing on the scope of the fifteen-day
extension. The Fifth Revised Administrative Order: (1) added Section (e), which defined
“matters[,]” “[f]or the purposes of tolling[,]” as claims with deadlines that would have
elapsed from March 16, 2020 through the end of COVID-19 emergency operations; and
(2) altered the relation-back provision to refer to Section (e) instead of the fifteen-day
extension.    Fifth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3–4 (Nov. 24, 2020), archived at:
https://perma.cc/NQY3-LQMQ. These changes are unremarkable.
Prior to the Fifth Revised Administrative Order, it was unclear whether the tolling
period applied solely to filing deadlines that would have elapsed during the four-month
closure or included filing deadlines that had accrued before the closure but would not
expire until a later date. With the addition of Section (e), Chief Judge Barbera clarified
that the tolling period applied to the latter. Section (g) accounts for matters with longer
filing deadlines that happened to overlap with the four-month closure. That is why Section
(g) references “deadline[s] [that] would have expired had [they] not been tolled or
11
suspended[.] Id. at 4 (emphasis added). That language remained unchanged under the
Tenth Revised Administrative Order. Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3–4. Critically, the
Final Administrative Order clarified that the administrative tolling orders had applied to
“matters for which the statute of limitations and other deadlines related to initiation would
have expired between March 16, 2020, through . . . April 3, 2022, but for the tolling or
suspension described in this Order[.]” Final Admin. Ord. at 3 (emphasis added). In light
of the Final Administrative Order, the application of Section (e), and by extension Section
(g), cannot extend beyond claims that were affected by the tolling period.
Since none of the administrative tolling orders modified or extended the operation
of the Revised Administrative Order, it follows that the fifteen-day extension had only
applied to the deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices. The above
history confirms that Section (f) was inoperative under the Tenth Revised Administrative
Order and had merely advised the public that a prior order had extended filing deadlines.
Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4. This history further establishes that the fifteen-day
extension from the Revised Administrative Order remained in effect under each successive
order, notwithstanding the rescission of prior orders, including the “previous [o]rder[]” that
initially implemented the extension.       Id.    Though this Court generally disfavors
interpretations that render operative language “surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or
nugatory[,]” the advisory capacity of Section (f) “reconcile[s] and harmonize[s]” the
tension between Section (f)’s reference to a “previous [o]rder[]” with the rescission of that
order. Id.; Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP,

473 Md. 356

, 384,

250 A.3d 197

, 213 (2021)
(citation omitted); Lockshin,

(citation omitted).
12
Accordingly, the history of the fifteen-day extension reflects that the Chief Judge had
contemplated a narrower extension.
B. The Maryland Judiciary’s understanding of the fifteen-day extension and
communications to the public.
The Maryland Judiciary, of which Chief Judge Barbera was the administrative head
during the relevant time period, communicated to the public that the fifteen-day extension
only applied to claims affected by the closure. On the same day that Chief Judge Barbera
issued the Revised Administrative Order, the Maryland Judiciary published a press release
stating, in relevant part: “Filing deadlines to initiate matters will be extended by an
additional 15 days, depending on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens.” Press
Release, Md. Jud. Gov’t Rels. & Pub. Affs., Maryland courts announce plan to gradually
reopen through phased approach (May, 22, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/LT68-
AV5H. The Maryland Judiciary’s website published all of the Chief Judge’s administrative
tolling orders pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-1003(d). Md. Jud., (COVID-19)
Administrative Orders, archived at: https://perma.cc/6XCF-AGMG; see Md. Rule 16-
1003(d) (requiring “a copy of all directives and orders issued under [Maryland Rule 16-
1003(a)] . . . [to be] posted on the Judiciary website.”). The Maryland Judiciary website
also maintained a “COVID-19 Timeline of Events[,]” which summarized the Chief Judge’s
administrative tolling orders as they were issued. Md. Jud., COVID-19 Timeline of Events,
archived at https://perma.cc/VU32-3M4G. The timeline document summarized the
Revised Administrative Order’s new provisions as follows:
[T]he number of days that the courts were closed to the public does not count
against the time remaining for the initiation of a court matter. Filing
13
deadlines to initiate matters will be extended by an additional 15 days,
depending on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added). An extension that was intended to apply to all filings, regardless
of whether they were impacted by the closure, would not “depend[] on the date in which a
specific clerk’s office opens.” Id. (emphasis added).
The People’s Law Library of Maryland (“PLL”)4 reflected the same interpretation
of the extension. The PLL’s website states that “[t]he deadlines [to initiate new matters
were] tolled or suspended by the number of days the courts [were] closed plus an additional
15 days.” Filing Deadlines and Statutes of Limitation, COVID-19 Updates, archived at:
https://perma.cc/Z6UL-5CFR. Together, these public resources establish that the
Maryland Judiciary conveyed to the public that the fifteen-day extension would only apply
to deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks’ offices. These public
communications are especially notable because Chief Judge Barbera expressly advised
Maryland attorneys to rely upon the Maryland Judiciary’s website for updates regarding
the Judicial Branch’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A Message from the Chief
Judge to Attorneys on COVID-19 | Maryland Judiciary | March 23, 2020, archived at:
https://perma.cc/W7MC-J7T9.
4
PLL “is a legal information and self-help website maintained by the Thurgood
Marshall State Law Library, a court-related agency of the Maryland Judiciary[.]” The
People’s Law Library of Maryland, Introduction to the People’s Law Library, archived at:
https://perma.cc/XP5G-ZDZT. The website is designed “to provide self-represented
litigants in Maryland state courts information about the law, including summaries of the
law[.]” Id.
14
Chief Judge Barbera was not only aware of the interpretation of her administrative
tolling orders that the Maryland Judiciary was communicating to the public, but she also
participated in disseminating it. On January 8, 2021, the Chief Judge “provided a further
briefing to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on ‘the Courts and Criminal Justice
System During the COVID-19 Pandemic.’” Murphy, 478 Md. at 363, 274 A.3d at 429.
The meeting agenda included a copy of the COVID-19 Timeline of Events, which
contained the above summary of the Revised Administrative Order. Id. at 363 n.34, 274
A.3d at 429 n.34 (citing Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Briefing on the
Courts and Criminal Justice System During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Agenda (Jan. 8,
2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/DZP4-5X4H).
In alignment with these statements to the public, the Chief Judge continued to
promulgate updated administrative tolling orders that maintained the same language. See
Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia,

432 Md. 679

, 693,

69 A.3d 1149

, 1157 (2013)
(explaining that inaction is persuasive evidence of intent in some circumstances). This
Court should hesitate to retract an interpretation of the fifteen-day extension that the
Maryland Judiciary had communicated to the public. Assuming, arguendo, there was no
evidence the Chief Judge was aware of the Maryland Judiciary’s communications to the
public, this Court must presume that she exercised her emergency powers with “full
knowledge and information” regarding her “prior and existing” administrative tolling
orders, as well as the Maryland Judiciary’s publications. Collins v. State,

383 Md. 684

,
693,

861 A.2d 727

, 732 (2004) (citation omitted).
15
C.     The Order’s title mentions “[e]mergency [t]olling[.]”
The Tenth Revised Administrative Order’s title reflects that any relief under the
Order pertained to “[e]mergency [t]olling[,]” which was limited to the four-month closure.
Just as “a bill’s title and function paragraphs are indicative of legislative intent[,]” an
administrative order’s title is indicative of its drafter’s intent. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at
187, 286 A.3d at 17 (cleaned up). The Order is entitled “Tenth Revised Administrative
Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory
and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules
Deadlines in Pending Matters[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 1. The title provides two
purposes: (1) the emergency tolling of deadlines related to the initiation of matters; and (2)
emergency suspension of deadlines in pending matters. The first purpose is relevant to this
Court’s analysis.
The operative language in the Order pertains to emergency tolling. Sections (a)
through (f) discuss the emergency tolling period, which Section (d) defines as the four-
month closure of the clerks’ offices. Id. at 2–4. Sections (a), (b), and (d) mention the
tolling period in the context of “the number of days that the courts were closed to the
public[,]” which Section (d) defined as the days when the clerks’ offices were closed to the
public. Id. at 2–3. Section (c) excuses parties from demonstrating their inability to comply
with those tolled deadlines. Id. at 3. Both Sections (d) and (e) exist to define terms relevant
to the scope of the tolling period, with Section (d) defining the four-month closure and
Section (e) defining the scope of “matters” subject to the provisions of the order. Id.
16
In that context, Section (f) references the fifteen-day extension after mentioning the
reopening of the respective offices of the clerks of court on July 20, 2020. Id. at 4; see
D.C. v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570

, 577,

128 S. Ct. 2783

, 2789 (2008) (“Logic demands that there
be a link between the stated purpose and the command. . . . That requirement of logical
connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause.”).
Petitioner’s interpretation would render Section (f) an anomaly among the other clauses,
interjecting an entirely different extension unconnected to the tolling period, and render the
Order’s title misleading. Indeed, this Court must interpret the Order in a manner that is
reasonable and not “absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Lockshin,

 (citations omitted). The Order’s references to the four-month
closure comport with the title’s reference to emergency tolling, suggesting that the fifteen-
day extension is limited to claims affected by that tolling.
D.     The preamble.
Petitioner argues that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order’s preamble
recognizes the detrimental impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the ability of litigants
to prepare pleadings and meet deadlines. Although the preamble is not an operative section
of the Order, it is evidence of the Chief Judge’s “purpose or goal.” See Georgia-Pac. Corp.
v. Benjamin,

394 Md. 59

, 81,

904 A.2d 511

, 524 (2006) (citations omitted).
The preamble discusses the Order’s purpose in paragraphs three through six.
Paragraph three states that “the Chief Judge . . . may be required to determine the extent to
which court operations or judicial functions shall continue[,]” where “instances of
emergency conditions, whether natural or otherwise, [] significantly disrupt access to or
17
the operations of one or more courts or other judicial facilities of the State or the ability of
the Judiciary to operate effectively[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 1. Paragraph four
provides that the COVID-19 pandemic created an emergency “for which measures
continue to be required to mitigate potential for exposure for individuals visiting a court or
judicial facility and for judicial personnel[.]”

 Paragraph five recognizes that pandemic-
related restrictions “had a widespread detrimental impact upon the administration of
justice, impeding the ability of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct
research, gather evidence, and prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses, with the
impact falling hardest upon those who are impoverished[.]”

at 1–2. Similarly,
paragraph six states that the widespread impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic “created a
general and pervasive practical inability for certain deadlines to be met[.]” Id. at 2.
The preamble bears an uncanny resemblance to the language contained in Title 16,
Chapter 1000 of the Maryland Rules. Paragraph three parallels Maryland Rule 16-1003(a),
which authorizes the Chief Judge to issue administrative orders when she determines “that
an emergency declared by the Governor or [a natural or other] event within the scope of
[Maryland] Rule 16-1001(b) significantly affects access to or the operations of one or more
courts or other judicial facilities of the State or the ability of the Maryland Judiciary to
operate effectively[.]” Paragraph four tracks with Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(12), which
empowers the Chief Judge to “authorize administrative judges or security personnel to
preclude or control entry into courthouses or other judicial facilities by persons who pose
a credible threat to the health or safety of members of the public or judicial personnel[.]”
Paragraph six reflects the language in Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), which authorizes the
18
Chief Judge to “suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines . . .
where there is no practical ability of a party subject to such deadline . . . to comply with
the deadline[.]”5 The preamble’s resemblance to the Maryland Rules suggests that the
Chief Judge intended to advise the public of her obligations as the administrative head of
the Judiciary, the scope of her authority under the Maryland Rules, and how she would
exercise her authority during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Petitioner attributes a more expansive meaning to the preamble, which is similar to
the arguments that this Court rejected in Clarke. In that case, the petitioners filed an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the respondent to prevent him from developing
his residential property. Clarke,

270 Md. at

344–45,

311 A.2d at 418

. Both parties owned
property that was classified as “A” Agricultural District under Article 6 of the Carroll
County Zoning Ordinance.

Id. at 345

311 A.2d at 418

. The petitioners argued that the
preamble to Article 6 limited the law’s purpose to “continued farming activity,” which
prohibited respondent from developing his residential property, despite the ordinance
expressly permitting single-family and two-family “[d]wellings[.]”

 at 345–46,

311 A.2d at

418–19. This Court rejected that argument because “[t]he intention and meaning
of the [General Assembly] are to be collected from the law itself and are not to be restrained
by anything in the preamble.”

Id. at 349

. This Court reasoned that a
5
Paragraph six was added in the first clarifying Amended Administrative Order
alongside what is now Section (c), which excused parties from establishing their “practical
inability to comply with [a tolled] deadline[.]” Am. Admin. Ord. Clarifying at 2 (Apr. 24,
2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/87KX-Y957. This concurrent implementation
suggests that Chief Judge intended for paragraph six of the preamble to justify Section (c),
rather than the fifteen-day extension under Section (f).
19
preamble may be persuasive when resolving an ambiguous law, but it cannot override the
law’s conflicting operative language.

 at 349–50,

.
Like the petitioners in Clarke, Petitioner argues that the preamble supersedes the
operative language. Petitioner relies on paragraphs five and six for the proposition that
“the intent of the Orders [was] clearly to maximize the flexibility of the [c]ourts and statutes
of limitations during the COVID-19 emergency, and not merely those portions of the
emergency when the [c]ourts were closed.” I disagree. For Petitioner to prevail, this Court
would need to broaden the scope of the fifteen-day extension beyond the emergency tolling
period, thereby rendering it an anomaly among its sister provisions that are expressly
limited to the closure. A broader application of the fifteen-day extension would conflict
with: (1) the Order’s title that discusses emergency tolling; (2) the history of the fifteen-
day extension that indicated a narrower application; and (3) the Maryland Judiciary’s
communications to the public that the extension would only apply to claims that were tolled
during the closure. The generalized language in the preamble cannot outweigh those more
explicit indicia of the Chief Judge’s intent. See Clarke,

270 Md. at 349

(noting that preambles are persuasive but not dispositive).          This Court’s goal is to
harmonize provisions in the Order, not to distort them. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 180, 286
A.3d at 13 (explaining that this Court’s objective is to harmonize law and to avoid
unreasonable or absurd constructions). Accordingly, I would decline Petitioner’s invitation
to broaden the scope of the fifteen-day extension.
20
E.      Applying Murphy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

478 Md. 333

274 A.3d 412

(2022).
Respondent contends that this Court’s language in Murphy “undercuts [Petitioner’s]
argument[,]” because this Court had “instruct[ed] that the 15-day grace period only
applie[d] to the cases where statutes of limitations were tolled.” Although I agree with this
Court’s description of the fifteen-day extension from Murphy, that language was dicta and
not dispositive of the analysis in the case at bar.
In Murphy, this Court resolved a certified question from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland regarding whether the Chief Judge had authority to issue
the administrative tolling orders. 478 Md. at 340, 274 A.3d at 416. This Court commented
on the nature of the fifteen-day extension twice. Id. at 362, 369 n.43, 274 A.3d at 429, 433
n.43. This Court stated that “[t]he May 22 order further extended the filing deadlines for
the initiation of matters by an additional 15 days past the date on which clerks’ office[s]
reopened and provided an example as to how a new filing deadline would be computed.”
Id. at 362, 274 A.3d at 429. Then, this Court stated in a footnote that “[l]ater revisions of
the order also added a 15-day grace period to the tolling period.” Id. at 369 n.43, 274 A.3d
at 433 n.43. This Court observed that the grace period “was apparently based on
[Maryland] Rule 16-1003(b), which” included a Rules Committee Note that
“contemplate[d] that some extensions of deadlines might remain in place for a reasonable
time after termination of an emergency.” Id., 274 A.3d at 431 n.43.
Petitioner correctly asserts that this Court’s description of the fifteen-day extension
in Murphy was dicta. The issue of the fifteen-day extension was not germane to the
21
disposition of the certified question in Murphy. See Plank v. Cherneski,

469 Md. 548

, 594,

231 A.3d 436

, 463 (2020) (noting that dicta is a comment that lacks “precedential” value
because it is unnecessary for the disposition of a case, but “it may be considered
persuasive” (citation omitted)).      The plain language of the fifteen-day extension is
ambiguous, which undermines this Court’s peripheral observations in Murphy.
Additionally, the fifteen-day extension cannot be an exercise of Maryland Rule 16-1003(b)
because the grace period was implemented before the Chief Judge terminated COVID-19
emergency operations in the Judiciary. The basis for the grace period was Maryland Rule
16-1003(a)(7), which was the only Rule expressly invoked in the Tenth Revised
Administrative Order. As discussed below, Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7) suggests that the
Chief Judge’s authority to extend deadlines was related to the public’s practical inability
to submit their pleadings whenever an emergency curtailed “access to” courts. See Md.
Rule 16-1003(a)(7). For those reasons, Murphy does not bring this Court closer to a
definitive interpretation of the fifteen-day extension.
F.      Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7).
The language and history of Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7) further supports a
narrower interpretation of the fifteen-day extension. The basis for the extension was
Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), which authorizes the Chief Judge to “extend . . . time
deadlines . . . where there is no practical ability of a party subject to such a deadline . . . to
comply with the deadline[.]” Before the Chief Judge may exercise her emergency powers,
there must be “an emergency declared by the Governor . . . [that] significantly affects
access to or the operations of one or more courts or other judicial facilities of the State or
22
the ability of the Maryland Judiciary to operate effectively[.]” Md. Rule 16-1003(a). The
phrase “access to . . . one or more courts or other judicial facilities” provides a backdrop
for when the Chief Judge may invoke her emergency authority to extend deadlines and
when parties lack the “practical ability” to meet those deadlines. See Md. Rule 16-
1003(a)(7). The Rule suggests that litigants do not have a “practical ability” to meet their
deadlines when an emergency “significantly affects access to or the operations” of the
Judiciary.

Id.

The Rules Committee’s discussion of Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7) indicates that
“practical ability” refers to a litigant’s inability to file pleadings due to court closures. The
Committee Chair, the Honorable Alan M. Wilner, stated that “there needs to be a way to
categorically extend deadlines . . . [i]f the filer is unable to timely file due to an emergency
and court closure[.]” Rules Committee Minutes, at 25 (Mar. 13, 2020), archived at:
https://perma.cc/ZC3N-6VNU (emphasis added).              Another committee member, the
Honorable Paula A. Price, noted that “[i]f an individual is unable to physically file, the
statutes of limitations would be tolled.”

Id.

 (emphasis added). The Honorable Yvette M.
Bryant “agreed[.]”

Id.

 These statements clarify that Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7) was
drafted with court closures specifically in mind.
The language of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order indicates that the Chief
Judge implemented the fifteen-day extension to remedy litigants’ inability to “access”
courts during the closure of the clerks’ offices. The Order’s title mentions “[e]mergency
[t]olling[,]” which Section (d) defines as the four-month closure. Tenth Revised Admin.
Ord. at 1, 3. Section (c) absolves parties from establishing their “practical inability to
23
comply with such a deadline[,]” which refers to deadlines that were suspended during the
closure under Sections (a) and (b).

Id.

 at 2–3. To the extent the preamble offers any
guidance, it only mentions “practical inability” within the context of “restrictions required
to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic[.]”

Id.

 at 1–2. The only “restriction” discussed in
the Order was the closure of the clerks’ offices. See

id.

at 1–4. Therefore, the language in
Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), the Rules Committee’s discussions, and the language of the
Order imply that the Chief Judge extended filing deadlines to assist litigants who lacked
“access to” the clerks’ offices during the four-month closure.
III. The Appropriate Interpretation of the Fifteen-day Extension.
In light of the history of the fifteen-day extension clause, the Maryland Judiciary’s
communications to the public, the Tenth Revised Administrative Order’s title, the
preamble, this Court’s decision in Murphy, and the language and history of Maryland Rule
16-1003(a)(7), it is clear that the fifteen-day extension in Section (f) applied to deadlines
for the initiation of matters that were suspended between March 16, 2020 and July 20,
2020. Although the above indicia do not individually establish the Chief Judge’s intent,
they cumulatively support a narrower extension.
Petitioner asserts that this Court should interpret the definition of “matters” under
Section (e) and the fifteen-day extension under Section (f) to extend the grace period to all
matters with deadlines that would have expired between March 16, 2020 and April 3, 2022.
Petitioner’s isolated interpretation is similar to the “surgically extracted” construction of
24
Md. Code Ann., Real Property (“Real Prop.”) § 14-117(a)(3)6 that this Court rejected in
Elsberry, 482 Md. at 183, 286 A.3d at 15. In Elsberry, the purchaser sued the seller for
allegedly violating Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) because it had imposed an amortized water
and sewer charge that exceeded twenty years for real property located in Charles County.
Id. at 164–65, 286 A.3d at 4. The purchaser argued that Real Prop § 14-117(a)(3)(ii)
applied to properties throughout Maryland because it did not expressly mention Prince
George’s County. Id. at 171, 286 A.3d at 8. This Court rejected the purchaser’s isolated
reading of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) because it disregarded “the context of the entire
statute and its legislative purpose.” Id. at 183, 286 A.3d at 15 (citations omitted). This
Court held that Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(ii) was limited to residential real property located
in Prince George’s County because: (1) the bill’s title and purpose paragraph pertained to
Prince George’s County; and (2) the introductory language of Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(i)
was “limited to Prince George’s County[,]” and had therefore “modif[ied] the remainder
of the subsection[.]” Id. at 183–84, 197, 286 A.3d at 15, 23.
Like the purchaser in Elsberry, Petitioner “examine[s] the trees so closely that [he]
do[es] not see the forest[.]” Id. at 183, 286 A.3d at 15 (cleaned up). Although the COVID-
19 emergency period extended beyond the closure of the clerks’ offices, that alone does
6
Real Prop. § 14-117(a)(3)(i) “requires a seller of residential real property in Prince
George’s County to provide the purchaser with certain disclosures in the initial contract of
sale, including the estimated cost of any deferred water and sewer charges for which the
purchaser may become liable.” Elsberry, 482 Md. at 164, 286 A.3d at 4. Real Prop. § 14-
117(a)(3)(ii) prohibits a seller from “impos[ing] upon the purchaser a repayment period [of
water and sewer costs] for a duration longer than twenty years from the date of initial sale.”
Id. at 165, 286 A.3d at 4.
25
not negate the significant indicia that the administrative orders pertained to emergency
tolling, which Section (d) defines as the four-month closure. The Order’s operative
language discusses: (1) tolling filing deadlines “by the number of days that the courts were
closed” in Sections (a) and (b); (2) clarifying parties’ obligations following the tolling
period in Section (c); (3) defining the tolling period and “matters” encompassed therein in
Sections (d) and (e), respectively; and (4) the clerks’ offices reopening on July 20, 2020 in
Section (f). Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 2–4. Petitioner’s construction disregards the
stated purpose of Sections (d) and (e), which is “tolling statutes of limitations and other
deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Id. at 3; Elsberry, 482 Md. at 179, 286
A.3d at 12 (“This Court construes the statute as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence
or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless[,] or nugatory.” (cleaned up)).
The ambiguity of Section (f) dissipates upon reviewing its context and history. The
Chief Judge indicated in the First Administrative Order that the extension would only apply
to “statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters” that were tolled during
the court closure. First Admin. Ord. at 1–2. Following the implementation of the fifteen-
day extension, the Maryland Judiciary advised the public that the extension would apply
to claims affected by the closure of the clerks’ offices. The Chief Judge never corrected
that interpretation. The title suggests that remedies under the Order pertained to emergency
tolling, which occurred during the four-month closure. Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7),
which governs the extension in this case, was drafted, in relevant part, to remedy situations
26
where litigants could not physically file their pleadings due to court closures.7 Given these
indicia of the Chief Judge’s intent, I agree with the Per Curiam opinion’s conclusion to
answer the certified question in the negative and holding that the fifteen-day extension
applied to claims that were suspended during the four-month closure, despite the ambiguity
of Section (f) under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order.
CONCLUSION
I agree with the Per Curiam opinion’s conclusion that the fifteen-day extension
under Section (f) did not apply filing to deadlines that would have expired during the
COVID-19 emergency period between March 16, 2020, and April 3, 2022. Rather, the
extension applied narrowly to claims that were suspended during the emergency tolling
period between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. In my view, this Court can only reach
that conclusion by recognizing the ambiguity of Section (f) and evaluating extrinsic indicia
of Chief Judge Barbera’s intent. In this case, the Petition for Judicial Review was filed
subsequent to the thirty-day deadline under Maryland Rule 7-203(a)(2) and Baltimore City
Code, Article 22, § 33(l)(14). The limitations period fell outside the ambit of the Tenth
Revised Administrative Order because it had not begun to accrue until December 22, 2021.
Absent the fifteen-day extension, Petitioner’s filing was untimely, and the circuit court
correctly dismissed this case. For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the Per Curiam
opinion.
7
I do not opine on whether the Chief Judge had authority under Maryland Rule 16-
1003(a)(7) to extend time deadlines through the entire COVID-19 emergency period, as
Petitioner contends. I only conclude that the Chief Judge had not done so in this instance.
27
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-22-000458
Argued: May 4, 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF MARYLAND*
Misc. No. 24
September Term, 2022
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
OF KERN HOSEIN
______________________________________
Fader, C.J.
Watts
Hotten
Booth
Biran
Gould
Eaves,
JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Biran, J.,
which Watts and Eaves, JJ., join.
______________________________________
Filed: August 14, 2023
* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the
voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
amendment changing the name of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of
Maryland. The name change took effect on
December 14, 2022.
Respectfully, I dissent.
In a series of administrative orders, the former Chief Judge of this Court,1 the
Honorable Mary Ellen Barbera, tolled, suspended, and extended the statutes of limitations
and other deadlines for the initiation of matters in Maryland courts during the COVID-19
emergency. These were remedial orders – i.e., the Chief Judge issued them to remedy the
adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the ability of parties to initiate matters
within the deadlines that normally would apply.
One of the measures that eventually became part of this series of orders was a 15-day
extension that the Chief Judge applied to deadlines to initiate certain “matters.” The
question we must decide in this case is, which “matters” did the Chief Judge intend would
receive the 15-day extension? We must determine whether the provision in the relevant
order that referred to ﬁling deadlines to initiate “matters” having been extended by an
additional 15 days was linked to tolling during the closure of courts, which ended on July
20, 2020, or was meant to apply to all matters with deadlines that otherwise would have
expired during the emergency operations period, which ended on April 3, 2022.
Interpretation of the relevant order is necessary to determine the timeliness of filing by
1
The constitutional amendment that changed the name of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland also changed the titles of those who serve on
the Court. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland became the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Maryland, and the other Judges of the Court of Appeals became
Justices of the Supreme Court. These changes, in addition to the change of the name of the
Court, took effect on December 14, 2022, subsequent to the retirement of both Chief Judge
Mary Ellen Barbera and her successor as Chief Judge, the Honorable Joseph M. Getty. I
will refer to both of these former leaders of this Court by the title they held while serving
in that capacity, i.e., Chief Judge.
Appellant Kern Hosein, who sought judicial review of the denial of retirement benefits
from Appellee Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System of Baltimore City (“the
City”).
I agree with Justice Hotten that the order in effect at the time Mr. Hosein filed his
petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is ambiguous on this
point. However, I disagree as to how to resolve the ambiguity. The context surrounding the
adoption of the relevant provisions in the order reveals that, as of November 24, 2020, with
COVID-19 cases surging, Chief Judge Barbera decided that the 15-day extension should
apply to all matters with deadlines that otherwise would expire between the date when the
clerk’s offices closed at the beginning of the pandemic (March 16, 2020) and the end of
emergency operations in the Maryland Judiciary (which turned out to be April 3, 2022). A
contrary conclusion leads to illogical and unjust results that I cannot believe Chief Judge
Barbera intended.
Under the correct interpretation of Chief Judge Barbera’s order, Mr. Hosein’s
petition for judicial review is timely. The circuit court erred in dismissing this case.
I
The Order Under Review
Beginning in March 2020, Chief Judge Barbera issued dozens of administrative
orders in response to the COVID-19 emergency. At issue here is a series of orders in which,
among other things, Chief Judge Barbera tolled, suspended, and extended the deadlines for
the initiation of matters in Maryland courts. In particular, we must interpret Chief Judge
Barbera’s final order on this subject, which she issued on August 6, 2021. See TENTH
-2-
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON THE EMERGENCY TOLLING OR SUSPENSION OF
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND STATUTORY AND RULES DEADLINES RELATED TO THE
INITIATION OF MATTERS AND CERTAIN STATUTORY AND RULES DEADLINES IN PENDING
MATTERS (Aug. 6, 2021), available at https://perma.cc/5RFY-XAFV (“Tenth Revised
Order”2). The Tenth Revised Order included the following language germane to this
appeal:3
(a) By previous Order, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), all
statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters required
to be filed in a Maryland state trial or appellate court, including statutes
of limitations, were tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March
16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts were closed to the public
due to the COVID-19 emergency; and
(b) By this Order, those same deadlines remained tolled or suspended, as
applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the
courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency; and
(c) Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines
during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently
and equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be
compelled to prove ... their practical inability to comply with such a
2
For purposes of brevity, I will cite to other orders in this series using similar short
titles.
3
Chief Judge Getty issued the last three orders in this series, including the Final
Administrative Order, dated April 3, 2022, but it is Chief Judge Barbera’s Tenth Revised
Order that was in effect at the time that Mr. Hosein filed his petition for judicial review. At
oral argument, attorneys for both parties repeatedly referred to the Tenth Revised Order as
having been issued by “this Court.” That was incorrect. The Tenth Revised Order was not
issued by this Court, but rather by Chief Judge Barbera in her capacity as the administrative
head of the Maryland Judiciary. Although Chief Judge Barbera was my colleague on this
Court at the time she issued this Order, she did not consult me about its language, nor
would I have expected her to do so. Nor, as far as I know, did she consult any of the other
Judges who were then serving on this Court, including Judge Getty, her eventual successor
as Chief Judge.
-3-
deadline if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the
relief that this Order provides; and
(d) For the purposes of tolling statutes of limitations and other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “tolled or suspended by
the number of days that the courts were closed” means that the days that
the offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March
16, 2020 through July 20, 2020) do not count against the time remaining
for the initiation of that matter; and
(e) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “matters” are, nunc pro
tunc to March 16, 2020, those matters for which the statute of limitations
and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired between
March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19 emergency
operations in the Judiciary as determined by the Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals; and
(f) With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public
on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been
extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days; and
(g) Any such filings made within the period described in (d) and (e) shall
relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not
been tolled or suspended[.]
Tenth Revised Order at 3-4 (footnote omitted). A footnote to section (f) provided an
example of how the 15-day extension worked:
For example, if two days remained for the filing of a new matter on March
15, 2020, then two days would have remained upon the reopening of the
offices of the clerks of court to the public on July 20, 2020. With the
additional fifteen days, seventeen days would be left for a timely filing,
beginning July 20, 2020.
Id. at 4 n.1.
On March 28, 2022, Chief Judge Getty issued an administrative order lifting the
COVID-19 emergency, effective April 3, 2022. See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER LIFTING THE
COVID-19 HEALTH EMERGENCY AS TO THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY at 2 (Mar. 28, 2002),
-4-
available at https://perma.cc/6ULX-6W6C. Thus, April 3, 2022 became “the termination
date of the COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary” in section (e) of the Tenth
Revised Order.
The Tenth Revised Order was in effect in January 2022, when Mr. Hosein filed his
petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The circuit court
dismissed Mr. Hosein’s petition as untimely. The correctness of the circuit court’s ruling
depends on whether the 15-day extension referred to in section (f) of the Tenth Revised
Order applies to the matter that Mr. Hosein initiated with his January 2022 filing.
II
Analysis
As Justice Hotten explains, when construing an administrative order, we apply the
same interpretive principles that we use when analyzing a statute. I will not repeat the
principles that Justice Hotten has cataloged in her concurring opinion. However, there is
an additional canon of statutory construction that applies here: Because Chief Judge
Barbera’s administrative orders providing relief from the application of deadlines for the
initiation of matters were remedial in nature, we must construe the Tenth Revised Order
“as liberally in favor” of Mr. Hosein “as [the Tenth Revised Order’s] provisions will permit
in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.” Matter of Collins,

468 Md. 672

, 689 (2020).
A. The Tenth Revised Order Is Ambiguous.
I agree with Justice Hotten that the Tenth Revised Order is ambiguous. Below, I
make a few additional points about section (f) and conclude that section (e) also is
ambiguous.
-5-
1. Section (f)
Section (f) of the Tenth Revised Order states: “With the offices of the clerks of
courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate
matters having been extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days[.]” In my view,
the ambiguity in section (f) emanates from the verb form that Chief Judge Barbera used in
referring to the extension: “having been extended.” On the one hand, this phrase could lead
to a reading of section (f) as only providing information about what a prior, rescinded order
had done in the past. On this reading of section (f), there is no indication from the reference
to the 15-day extension that Chief Judge Barbera intended anything in the Tenth Revised
Order to have any bearing on extensions of deadlines to initiate matters.
On the other hand, the recognition that Chief Judge Barbera used a perfect participle
phrase4 – “having been extended” – can lead to a different interpretation. If Chief Judge
Barbera had intended merely to advise the public as a point of information that some
deadlines to file matters had been extended by a previous order, she could have used the
simple past tense: “were extended.” Instead, she chose to use “having been extended,”
which can be read as signifying that something elsewhere in the operative language of the
Tenth Revised Order flows from, or bears on, the “filing deadlines to initiate matters having
been extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days[.]” On this reading, section (f)
is more than a superfluous, vestigial remain of a prior order. Rather, it is part of a multi-
4
What are participle clauses?, TEST-ENGLISH, available at https://perma.cc/36FC-
3ZLP (“By using the perfect –ing participle clause you can emphasi[z]e that an action was
previous to another. These clauses are commonly used to express the cause of a second
action.”).
-6-
faceted scheme designed to provide relief from deadlines to initiate matters to those
affected by the COVID-19 emergency.
In addition, section (f) makes no reference to the tolling or suspending of deadlines.
It merely refers to the reopening of the courts and “the filing deadlines to initiate matters
having been extended ... by an additional 15 days[.]” So, the correct interpretation could
be the attenuated one, as the City and my colleagues in the Plurality contend, that the
reference to the reopening of the courts links the “extended” deadlines to the tolling,
thereby applying the extension only to matters with deadlines that had been tolled. But
section (f) could also be interpreted based on its plain language, as Mr. Hosein contends,
to establish “extended” deadlines separate and apart from the tolling of the matters affected
by the closure. The basis for the tolling (the closure) no longer being in existence, the
“extended” deadlines could have been meant to address the ongoing emergency and its
difficulties, disconnected from the closure. The words “extended” and “additional” could
support either reading, because they could mean “extended” and “additional” to the tolling
period or “extended” and “additional” in relation to the original deadlines.5
What is clear about section (f) is the meaning of its first clause: “With the offices of
the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020[.]” In conjunction
with the rest of section (f), this opening clause denotes that the 15-day extension became
effective after the courts reopened (and litigants once again could file pleadings that
5
The footnote example accompanying section (f) is not helpful. Because it is an
example, the footnote could only conceivably describe one factual scenario, which does
not mean that it excludes other factual scenarios, such as Mr. Hosein’s.
-7-
initiated matters). It does not mean that the 15-day extension was necessary because the
clerk’s offices had been closed to the public. This understanding of section (f)’s first clause
is confirmed by reviewing section (f)’s predecessors in Chief Judge Barbera’s earlier
orders.
The first specific reference to an extension of deadlines to initiate matters came in
the order that Chief Judge Barbera issued on May 4, 2020. See May 4 Amended Order
(May 4, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/9T6H-VPFY.6 Having provided in section (a)
of that Order that “all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters …
shall be tolled or suspended … effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the
courts are closed to the public,” Chief Judge Barbera stated in section (c) that “[s]uch filing
deadlines further shall be extended by a period to be described in an order by the Chief
Judge … terminating the COVID-19 emergency period[.]” May 4 Amended Order at 2.
On May 22, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera announced several phases under which
Maryland courts would gradually resume operations. See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON THE
PROGRESSIVE RESUMPTION OF FULL FUNCTION OF JUDICIARY OPERATIONS PREVIOUSLY
RESTRICTED DUE TO THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY at 3 (May 22, 2020), available at
6
Chief Judge Barbera issued the first of her orders granting relief from various
deadlines on April 3, 2020. See First Order (April 3, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/568M-28TV. In the First Order, as well as in an amended order issued on
April 24, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera stated that an order extending deadlines would be
forthcoming at a later date. However, as I read those first two orders, it is not clear whether
the extension will apply to deadlines to initiate matters, or to deadlines to hear pending
matters, or to both. In the May 4 Amended Order, Chief Judge Barbera made clear that
both types of deadlines would be extended by a period to be described in an order by the
Chief Judge terminating the COVID-19 emergency period. See May 4 Amended Order,
sections (c) and (f).
-8-
https://perma.cc/T34Y-SBN7. After explaining that “Phase I is the current state of
emergency operations,” Chief Judge Barbera stated that, on June 5, 2020, the courts would
enter Phase II and expand the scope of matters that could be heard remotely and onsite. Id.
at 2-3.
Most important for our purposes, on July 20, 2020, the courts would enter Phase III,
at which time the clerk’s offices would reopen and courts would conduct a broader range
of matters. Id. at 3.
On August 31, 2020, the courts would enter Phase IV, at which time courts would
resume non-jury trials and contested hearings in criminal, civil, family, and juvenile
matters. Id. Finally, on October 5, 2020, the courts would enter Phase V, the return to full
operations. Id.
On the same day that Chief Judge Barbera announced these phases for resuming
Judiciary operations, Chief Judge Barbera also issued a revised order relating to deadlines.
See Revised Order (May 22, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/58SR-UWEH. The
Revised Order clarified in section (d) that all the days the clerk’s offices would be closed
to the public (the period between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020) would not count
against the time remaining for the initiation of matters. Revised Order at 2. Following this
new clarification, the Revised Order included new language in section (e) setting the length
of the extension of filing deadlines that the Chief Judge had presaged on May 4:
(e) With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on
July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended
by an additional 15 days;
-9-
Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).7 The impetus for, and import of, this provision are clear.
Because Chief Judge Barbera now knew the date that the clerk’s offices would reopen and,
therefore, be able once again to accept filings initiating matters, it was time for the Chief
Judge to let the public know what the length of the promised extension of deadlines for
initiating matters would be: 15 days. The prefatory clause of section (e) of the Revised
Order only explains why the length of the extension is being specified at that time. It does
not indicate any limitation on the “matters” to which the extension shall apply, nor does it
in any way link the substantive need for an extension of deadlines to the circumstance that
the clerk’s offices have been closed to the public. Indeed, as a matter of logic, Chief Judge
Barbera must have implemented the 15-day extension for reasons other than the closure of
the clerk’s offices, because the extension was only going to become effective after the
clerk’s offices reopened to the public. Put another way, if the only obstacle that litigants
faced in attempting to initiate matters at the outset of the pandemic was the inability of the
clerk’s offices to accept initiating filings, there would have been no need for an extension
of deadlines after the clerk’s offices reopened.8
7
Notably, while the Chief Judge initially contemplated that the length of the
extension would be announced at the same time that the Chief Judge terminated the
COVID-19 emergency, see May 4 Amended Order at 2, that did not turn out to be the case.
By May 22, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera had decided that the clerk’s offices would reopen
before the end of the COVID-19 emergency. The emergency period continued for more
than 20 months after the clerk’s offices reopened to the public.
8
As I discuss below, it is clear that the reason for the 15-day extension was the
recognition that, due to illness and other disruption caused by COVID-19, an unknown
percentage of litigants (and/or their attorneys) would not be able to meet the initiating
deadlines that otherwise would apply to their claims.
- 10 -
In subsequent orders issued after the clerk’s offices reopened, including the Tenth
Revised Order, Chief Judge Barbera simply changed the tense of the participle in this first
clause: “to be reopened” became “having been reopened.” There is no reason to believe
that Chief Judge Barbera intended the first clause of section (f) to do any more work than
it had done before the clerk’s offices reopened. In sum, read in context, the first clause of
section (f) of the Tenth Revised Order simply explains the timing of the “previous Order”
that implemented the 15-day extension.
2. Section (e)
Section (e) of the Tenth Revised Order provides:
(e) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other
deadlines related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “matters”
are, nunc pro tunc to March 16, 2020, those matters for which the statute
of limitations and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired
between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of the COVID-19
emergency operations in the Judiciary as determined by the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals[.]
Tenth Revised Order at 3-4 (emphasis added).
If section (e) existed without the language in bold above, the reach of the 15-day
extension referred to in section (f) would be clear: “matters” in the Tenth Revised Order
(including the “matters” referred to in section (f)) would include all matters with deadlines
that otherwise would have expired at some point during the COVID-19 emergency period
- 11 -
(March 16, 2020 through April 3, 2022).9 However, section (e)’s prefatory clause
complicates matters. In my view, this clause is ambiguous.
On one hand, the prefatory language in section (e) (and the same prefatory language
in section (d)) can be read as the Plurality reads it, i.e., as “defining ‘matters’ for a specific
purpose: ‘tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of
matters.’” Plur. Op. at 9. On this reading, the verb “tolling” has a compound object; i.e., it
refers to tolling of “statutes of limitations” and to tolling of “other deadlines related to the
initiation of matters.” See also Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at 6 (“[T]he use of ‘and’ in the
prefatory clause connects ‘statutes of limitations’ with ‘other deadlines related to the
initiation of matters[.]”’). If this is the correct reading of section (e)’s prefatory clause, only
a matter that accrued on or before July 20, 2020 – and therefore had its statute of limitations
or other deadline for initiation “tolled” as a result of the clerk’s offices being closed to the
public – is a “matter” under the Tenth Revised Order.
On the other hand, the prefatory clause of section (e) can be read as stating that the
definition of “matters” that follows is being provided for two “purposes”: (1) for the
purpose of tolling of statutes of limitations; and (2) for the purpose of “other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters.” This reading is consistent with the prefatory clause’s
reference to multiple “purposes,” as opposed to the Plurality’s reading of the clause, which
leads the Plurality (and Justice Hotten in one instance) to refer to a singular “purpose” of
9
In addition, if the lack of reference to tolling and suspending deadlines in section
(f) means it is not related to the tolling provision, then the prefatory language in section (e)
would have no relevance to section (f). This would support a reading that section (f)’s
extended deadlines have no nexus with tolling.
- 12 -
section (e). See Plur. Op. at 9; Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at 26. On this alternate reading,
“tolling” has one object – “statutes of limitations” – and the phrase “other deadlines related
to the initiation of matters” relates to the deadlines that were not “tolled.”
On its face, both of these readings of the prefatory clause of section (e) are
reasonable, which makes section (e) ambiguous.10
----------
Because the Tenth Revised Order is remedial in nature, our inquiry should end
simply by resolving the ambiguity in favor of Mr. Hosein, who is among the class of
persons to whom Chief Judge Barbera sought to provide relief in her series of
administrative orders. See, e.g., Design Kitchen and Baths v. Lagos,

388 Md. 718

, 729 n.7
(2005) (observing that silence in a statute “may itself be an ambiguity and, where
appropriate, does, and should, trigger the liberal interpretation rule applicable to remedial
statutes”); Elste v. ISG Sparrows Point, LLC,

188 Md. App. 634

, 653-54 (2009) (because
the statute under review was remedial, “[a]ny uncertainty in the law should be resolved in
favor of the claimant, and thus interpretation of its provisions may depend upon whether
its terms are clear or ambiguous”). However, even if we “search[] for [Chief Judge
Barbera’s] intent in other indicia, including the history of the [Tenth Revised Order] or
10
Section (g) also is arguably ambiguous. Although it comes immediately after (f),
section (g) refers only to “[a]ny such filings made within the period described in (d) and
(e)” before stating that they “shall relate back to the day before the deadline would have
expired” without the tolling. Because, under the City’s position, the same would seem to
necessarily be true of the 15-day extension, which is not mentioned, the omission in section
(g) of a reference to section (f) would support an application of section (f) separate from
the tolling and courts’ closure. See also pages 22-24 & 28 n.24 below.
- 13 -
other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic” to the issuance of the Order, Lockshin v.
Semsker,

412 Md. 257

, 276 (2010), the outcome is the same, as I explain below.
B. Other Indicia of Chief Judge Barbera’s Intent
The overriding contextual factor that sheds light on Chief Judge Barbera’s intent is
the unprecedented disruption and devastation caused by COVID-19. It is important to place
Chief Judge Barbera’s orders concerning the initiation of matters properly in that context.
When that context is considered, it becomes clear that, when she issued the Fifth Revised
Order on November 24, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera decided that the 15-day extension
should apply to all matters that otherwise would have expired between March 16, 2020 and
the end of emergency operations in the Maryland Judiciary. The relevant operative
language remained the same thereafter, including in the Tenth Revised Order.
1. March 2020 – October 2020
The weeks following Governor Larry Hogan’s declaration of a state of emergency
on March 5, 2020,11 were unlike any period we had ever lived through. On March 11, 2020,
the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic.12 On March 12,
2020, the Governor took several “extraordinary steps,” including closing public schools,
11
UPDATE: Governor Hogan Declares State of Emergency, Expands Statewide
Response to Novel Coronavirus, THE BAY NET (Mar. 6, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/NY5Z-N8GZ.
12
Bill Chappell, Coronavirus: COVID-19 is Now Officially a Pandemic, WHO
Says, NPR (Mar. 11, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/4UEK-MWM9.
- 14 -
calling up the Maryland National Guard, and prohibiting mass gatherings of 250 people or
more, including for religious purposes.13
On March 12, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera issued administrative orders suspending
all non-essential judicial activities and jury trials statewide until at least April 3, 2020. See
MD. JUDICIARY: COVID-19 TIMELINE OF EVENTS, available at https://perma.cc/VU32-
3M4G. On March 13, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera issued an administrative order closing
the courts, effective March 16, 2020, through April 3, 2020.

On March 16, 2020, the Governor announced by executive order the closing of all
bars, restaurants, gyms, and movie theatres; gatherings of 50 or more individuals were
prohibited, while 1,000 Maryland National Guard members were activated to support the
fight against COVID-19.14 By March 19, 2020, Governor Hogan had limited gatherings to
10 people, ordered the closure of shopping malls, and restricted access to
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport.15
13
Jenny Fulginiti et al., 2020 Timeline: Coronavirus in Maryland, WBAL-TV 11
(updated Jan. 4, 2022), available at https://perma.cc/Z4F9-466F.
14
Ryan Dickstein, Gov. Hogan Orders Bars, Restaurants, Gyms, Movie Theaters to
Close, WMAR-2 BALT. (updated Mar. 17, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/7C9J-9CU3
(quoting Governor Hogan as saying: “Decision makers at the federal, state, and local level
are going to have to take drastic actions right now that may seem scary and may sound
extreme. They will be terribly disruptive, but they are also absolutely necessary to save the
lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.”).
15
Kate Amara et al., Hogan Signs Emergency COVID-19 Legislation as 5-Year-Old
Tests Positive, WBAL-TV 11 (updated Mar. 20, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/5GPV-XLD9.
- 15 -
On March 23, 2020, the Governor ordered the closure of all non-essential businesses
in the State.16 And, on March 30, 2020, the Governor issued a stay-at-home order, making
the willful violation of the order a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment.17
News articles from this period cast a bleak outlook on the future, with the subheading of
one article reading: “The United States is About to Endure a Collective Trauma Unlike
Anything in Recent Memory.”18
This was the context in which Chief Judge Barbera issued the First Order on April
3, 2020, tolling “all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters”
between March 16, 2020 and the unspecified date when the clerk’s offices would
eventually reopen. First Order at 1-2.
On April 15, 2020, the global case count surpassed two million, just two weeks after
passing one million.19 As discussed above, on May 4, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera issued an
amended order in which, for the first time, she explicitly stated that an extension of
16
Luke Broadwater et al., Maryland Gov. Hogan Announces Closure of
Nonessential Businesses Due to Coronavirus Pandemic, BALT. SUN, (Mar. 23, 2020),
available at https://perma.cc/6C2Y-Y9ZJ.
17
As COVID-19 Crisis Escalates in Capital Region, Governor Hogan Issues Stay
at Home Order Effective Tonight, S. MD. NEWS NET (Mar. 30, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/6MB7-CD6Y.
18
David Scharfenberg, A Quarter Million Americans Could Die from the
Coronavirus. Maybe More. How do we Absorb that Much Death?, BOS. GLOBE (updated
Apr. 3, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/T8G9-A2NS.
19
Coronavirus: The First Three Months as it Happened, NATURE (Apr. 22, 2020),
available at https://perma.cc/5DQL-SSY4.
- 16 -
deadlines for the initiation of matters would be forthcoming. The May 4 Amended Order
began with a preamble that, among other things, stated:
WHEREAS, The impact of the restrictions required to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic has had a widespread detrimental impact upon the
administration of justice, impeding the ability of parties and potential
litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence, and prepare
complaints, pleadings, and responses, with the impact falling hardest upon
those who are impoverished; and
WHEREAS, the detrimental impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is so
widespread as to have created a general and pervasive practical inability for
certain deadlines to be met[.][20]
Sections (a) through (d) of the May 4 Amended Order read, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), all statutory and rules
deadlines related to the initiation of matters required to be filed in a
Maryland state trial or appellate court, including statutes of limitations,
shall be tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by
the number of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the
COVID-19 emergency by order of the Chief Judge…; and
(b) Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines
during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently
and equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be
compelled to prove his, her, its, or their practical inability to comply with
such a deadline if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain
the relief that this Administrative Order provides; and
(c) Such filing deadlines further shall be extended by a period to be described
in an order by the Chief Judge … terminating the COVID-19 emergency
period; and
20
This portion of the preamble first appeared in an administrative order that Chief
Judge Barbera issued on April 24, 2020, clarifying the emergency tolling procedures.
Amended Order at 1-2 (Apr. 24, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/87KX-Y957.
- 17 -
(d) Any such filings made within the to-be-described period in (c) shall relate
back to the day before the deadline expired[.]
May 4 Amended Order at 2 (emphasis added).
We can glean at least three important points from the context surrounding the early
administrative orders and the language Chief Judge Barbera used in them. First, Chief
Judge Barbera recognized that COVID-19 not only interfered with the ability of claimants
to initiate matters by eliminating the ability of clerk’s offices to receive pleadings initiating
those matters, but also by impeding the ability of potential litigants and their attorneys to
take the necessary steps to meet initiating deadlines.
Second, Chief Judge Barbera recognized that, even after the clerk’s offices
eventually reopened, the disruption COVID-19 would have caused with respect to the
preparation of complaints and other pleadings would not be cured only by tolling the filing
deadlines by the number of days the courts were closed. Rather, an additional extension of
deadlines to initiate matters would be necessary.
Third, we can fairly conclude that, on May 4, 2020, when Chief Judge Barbera
referred to the further extension of filing deadlines, she only had in mind deadlines for
matters that would also be subject to tolling under section (a) of the May 4 Amended Order;
i.e., deadlines to initiate matters that would have accrued by the time the courts reopened
to the public. We can reach this conclusion because in section (c) of the May 4 Amended
Order, Chief Judge Barbera referred to “[s]uch filing deadlines” being subject to further
extension. “Such filing deadlines” referenced the deadlines discussed in section (a), which
were deadlines subject to tolling due to the closing of the clerk’s offices to the public.
- 18 -
Additionally, in section (d), Chief Judge Barbera provided that “[a]ny such filings” made
within the extension period would “relate back to the day before the deadline expired,”
further confirming that the filing deadlines that were tolled due to the court closures were
the deadlines that would receive an additional extension.
For a while after the May 4 Amended Order was issued, it appeared that we would
be able to put the pandemic behind us in 2020. On May 15, 2020, following the lead of
other states that had begun reopening in late April, Governor Hogan lifted Maryland’s
“stay-at-home” order.21 As discussed above, on May 22, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera
announced that clerk’s offices would reopen on July 20, 2020, and set the phases for the
resumption of Judiciary operations. This was also when Chief Judge Barbera issued the
Revised Order in which she added new sections (d) and (e):
(d) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “tolled or suspended by
the number of days that the courts were closed” means that the days that
the offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March
16, 2020 through July 20, 2020) do not count against the time remaining
for the initiation of that matter; and
(e) With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on
July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended
by an additional 15 days;
Immediately after those new sections came section (f), in which Chief Judge Barbera
provided:
21
Luke Broadwater et al., Maryland Gov. Hogan Lifts Stay-at-Home Order, Allows
Limited Retail to Resume, BALT. SUN (May 13, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/54GD-
RKW7.
- 19 -
(f) Any such filings made within the period described in (d) and (e) shall
relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not
been tolled or suspended[.]
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, in the Revised Order, consistent with the May 4 Amended
Order, Chief Judge Barbera explicitly linked the deadlines that were to be extended by 15
days to the deadlines that also would have been tolled or suspended due to the court
closures.
If there had been no material substantive changes to Chief Judge Barbera’s orders
between the Revised Order and the Tenth Revised Order,22 I would agree with the
Plurality’s and Justice Hotten’s interpretation of the Tenth Revised Order. But there were
substantive changes in those orders caused by the worsening of the pandemic.
2. November 2020
The Judiciary entered Phase V operations as planned on October 5, 2020. However,
in November 2020, a “rapid increase of COVID-19 infection rates throughout Maryland”
required “a realignment of the phase of operations consistent with the worsening health
conditions and concomitant risk to individuals visiting a court or judicial facility and to
judicial personnel[.]” See SIXTH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER RESTRICTING STATEWIDE
JUDICIARY OPERATIONS DUE TO THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY at 2 (Nov. 24, 2020),
available at https://perma.cc/3QLD-EGE6. On November 12, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera
22
Between May and October 2020, Chief Judge Barbera issued two more revised
orders that made non-substantive changes to the provisions relating to the initiation of
matters. See Second Revised Order (June 3, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/NZ9J-
TAKV (issued shortly before the Judiciary entered Phase II operations); Third Revised
Order (Oct. 2, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/L3VT-S758 (issued shortly before the
Judiciary entered Phase V operations).
- 20 -
announced that, due to the surge in COVID-19 cases, the Judiciary would regress from
Phase V operations to Phase III operations, effective November 16, 2020, through
December 31, 2020.       See FIFTH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER RESTRICTING STATEWIDE
JUDICIARY OPERATIONS DUE TO THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY (Nov. 12, 2020) available at
https://perma.cc/K9KE-6AF8.
Also on November 12, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera issued the Fourth Revised Order
(Nov. 12, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/JH9Y-SPE8. The Fourth Revised Order
made only non-substantive changes to cross-references. See Fourth Revised Order at 2
(“WHEREAS, The Fifth Administrative Order Restricting Statewide Judiciary Operations
Due to the COV[I]D-19 Emergency, having been filed on November 12, 2020, requiring
the courts to return to Phase III operations in light of surging COVID-19 infection rates
throughout Maryland, technical amendments to the cross-references are necessary in
related administrative orders…”).
The COVID-19 surge continued to worsen. On November 24, 2020, the Chief Judge
further restricted access to the courts by returning to Phase II operations, effective
November 30, 2020, through January 15, 2021. See SIXTH ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
RESTRICTING STATEWIDE JUDICIARY OPERATIONS DUE TO THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY
(Nov. 24, 2020), available at https://perma.cc/3QLD-EGE6. This severely restricted the
number and types of cases that could be processed in the courts, primarily limiting such
matters to those that needed to be expediently addressed.
It is notable, then, that Chief Judge Barbera issued her Fifth Revised Order relating
to initiation of matters on the same day that she announced the Judiciary’s intent to return
- 21 -
to Phase II operations. See Fifth Revised Order (Nov. 24, 2020), available at
https://perma.cc/NQY3-LQMQ. Unlike the preamble to the Fourth Revised Order, which
noted only that “technical amendments to the cross-references are necessary,” Fourth
Revised Order at 2, the preamble to the Fifth Revised Order stated: “WHEREAS, the Sixth
Administrative Order Restricting Statewide Judiciary Operations Due to the COVID-19
Emergency, having been filed on November 24, 2020, requiring the courts to return to
Phase II operations in light of surging COVID-19 infection rates throughout Maryland,
substantive and technical amendments to the cross-references are necessary in related
administrative orders[.]” Fifth Revised Order at 2 (emphasis added).
The substantive amendments that Chief Judge Barbera made in the Fifth Revised
Order were to add the definition of “matters” in new section (e) and to amend section (g)
so that the “relation-back” provision referenced new section (e) and no longer referenced
the 15-day extension period (which now was addressed in section (f)).
Below are sections (d) through (g) from the Fifth Revised Order (which are identical
to sections (d) through (g) in the Tenth Revised Order):
(d) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “tolled or suspended by
the number of days that the courts were closed” means that the days that
the offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March
16, 2020 through July 20, 2020) do not count against the time remaining
for the initiation of that matter; and
(e) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “matters” are, nunc pro
tunc to March 16, 2020, those matters for which the statute of limitations
and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired between
March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19 emergency
- 22 -
operations in the Judiciary as determined by the Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals; and
(f) With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public
on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been
extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days; and
(g) Any such filings made within the period described in (d) and (e) shall
relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not
been tolled or suspended[.]
Fifth Revised Order at 3-4 (footnote omitted). Thus, in contrast to the Fourth Revised Order
and its three predecessors, the Fifth Revised Order (and all successive orders, including the
Tenth Revised Order) did not state that a filing made during the 15-day extension period
“shall relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been tolled
or suspended.”
To recap: from May 2020 through the first part of the fall of 2020, Chief Judge
Barbera did not make any substantive amendments to her orders indicating that the 15-day
extension would apply to deadlines for “matters” that accrued after the courts reopened to
the public.23 However, on November 24, 2020, Chief Judge Barbera added a definition of
23
Chief Judge Barbera first added section (d) in the Revised Order, at the same time
that she added section (e), which identified the length of the extension of filing deadlines
that would take effect after the clerk’s offices reopened. Although, at that time, Chief Judge
Barbera contemplated that the matters that would receive the 15-day extension were the
same ones that would have been tolled or suspended during the time the clerk’s offices
were closed, it does not follow that Chief Judge Barbera meant for “tolling,” as used in the
prefatory clause of section (d), to have a compound object (“statutes of limitations and
other deadlines related to the initiation of matters”). Indeed, as discussed above, Chief
Judge Barbera referred to multiple “purposes” in that prefatory clause. At that time, it was
already clear that the affected deadlines would be extended, not just tolled or suspended.
Thus, it is reasonable to read the prefatory clause of section (d) in the Revised Order as
referring separately to “tolling of statutes of limitations” and to “other deadlines for the
- 23 -
“matters” in new section (e) that referenced the entire period of the COVID-19 emergency
and delinked the 15-day extension period from the section that provided for relation-back
of deadlines that “would have expired had [they] not been tolled or suspended.”
Chief Judge Barbera made these substantive changes at the same time that she
moved the Judiciary back to Phase II operations due to “surging COVID-19 infection rates
throughout Maryland.” Prior to this surge, it appeared that the pandemic might be winding
down. However, as of November 24, 2020, Maryland was averaging 2,253 new cases and
24 deaths daily. See Coronavirus Resource Center: Maryland, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.,
available at https://perma.cc/V36S-35CY.
In my view, this context makes the meaning of section (e) clear. The realization that
COVID-19 was not going away any time soon – in fact, that it had worsened to the point
that a regression to Phase II operations was necessary – led Chief Judge Barbera to broaden
the application of the previously ordered 15-day extension such that the deadlines of all
matters that otherwise would expire at some point during the COVID-19 emergency would
be extended by the 15 days. The concerns that led Chief Judge Barbera to decide early in
the pandemic that a 15-day extension of deadlines was necessary on top of tolling – i.e.,
the adverse effects of COVID-19 on the ability of claimants and counsel to prepare
initiating filings, whether or not the clerk’s offices were open to accept them – were at least
as serious, if not more serious, in November 2020.
initiation of matters.” Under this reading, there is no inconsistency between the prefatory
clauses of section (d) and section (e) in the Tenth Revised Order.
- 24 -
To be sure, one purpose for the addition of section (e) was to provide an end date
for the application of the 15-day extension period; i.e., by specifying that the order would
only apply to matters that otherwise would have expired at some point during the COVID-
19 emergency period, Chief Judge Barbera prevented a litigant with a claim that had
accrued before or during the court closure period, but which would not expire until after
the emergency period ended, from benefitting from the 15-day extension. But that could
not have been the only reason why Chief Judge Barbera added the new definition of
“matters” in section (e), given that she included the phrase “nunc pro tunc” in the
definition.
“Nunc pro tunc” means “now for then,” or an action “[h]aving retroactive legal
effect.” Nunc Pro Tunc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). As I read section (e),
it must be intended to cover, at least in part, some claims: (1) that, under the prior versions
of the order, would not have been entitled to the 15-day extension; and (2) that Chief Judge
Barbera had decided should retroactively benefit from that extension. As an example of
such a claim, suppose two people got into an argument on August 3, 2020 (which was after
the clerk’s offices reopened), and one of them punched the other. The punching victim’s
civil claim for assault accrued on August 3, 2020. There is a one-year statute of limitations
for a civil action for assault in Maryland. See Maryland Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105
(2020 Repl. Vol.). Under the order that was in effect on August 3, 2020 (the Second
Revised Order), the 15-day extension would not apply to the deadline for this assault claim
because the cause of action had not accrued before the reopening of the clerk’s offices.
- 25 -
Therefore, unless extended, the deadline to file a complaint alleging a claim for assault
would expire on August 3, 2021.
The “nunc pro tunc” language in section (e)’s new definition of “matters” would
make the above hypothetical assault claim a “matter” under the Fifth Revised Order,
meaning that it would retroactively receive the 15-day extension referred to in section (f).
In light of surging COVID-19 infections in Maryland in November 2020, it makes perfect
sense that the Chief Judge would decide that litigants with claims that had accrued since
the reopening of the courts should receive the benefit of the 15-day grace period to account
for the likelihood that, going forward, some percentage of them would be adversely
affected by COVID-19 during the time that the emergency was in effect. If the Chief Judge
had not intended to expand the scope of the 15-day extension so that it applied to matters
that accrued after the reopening of the courts, there would have been no need to make
substantive changes to the relevant language as it existed after she issued the Revised Order
on May 22, 2020, let alone refer to any claims as “matters” on a “nunc pro tunc” basis.
Contrast my assault hypothetical with the Plurality’s hypothetical: a claim with a
three-year statute of limitations that would have expired in April 2021, meaning that it
accrued in April 2018, and therefore its statute of limitations was tolled for the entire period
of time the courts were closed. See Plur. Op. at 11 n.7. The problem with the Plurality’s
hypothetical is that it already received the benefit of the 15-day extension under the plain
language of the pre-November 2020 orders. The pertinent language of the Revised Order
(issued on May 22, 2020) provided:
- 26 -
(a) By previous Order, … all statutory and rules deadlines related to the
initiation of matters required to be filed in a Maryland state trial or
appellate court, including statutes of limitations, were tolled or
suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of
days that the courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19
emergency; and
(b) By this Order, those same deadlines remain tolled or suspended, as
applicable, effective March 16, 2020, for the number of days that the
courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency; and
(c) ….
(d) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines
related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “tolled or suspended by
the number of days that the courts were closed” means that the days the
offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March 16,
2020 through July 20, 2020) do not count against the time remaining for
the initiation of the matter; and
(e) With the offices of the clerks of court to be reopened on July 20, 2020,
the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an
additional 15 days; and
(f) Any such filings made within the period specified in (d) and (e) shall relate
back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been
tolled or suspended[.]
Revised Order at 2-3 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
“All” deadlines, as referenced in section (a) of the Revised Order, and “those same
deadlines,” as discussed in section (b), encompass a claim (such as the Plurality’s
hypothetical claim) that accrued before the courts reopened to the public on July 20, 2020.
And, under section (g) of the Revised Order, a filing initiating such a claim within the
applicable tolling period plus 15 days would relate back to the day before the deadline
would have expired had it not been tolled or suspended during the closure of the courts.
Thus, it is clear that Chief Judge Barbera did not need to apply anything “nunc pro tunc”
- 27 -
in order for the Plurality’s hypothetical claim to be subject to both the tolling period and
the 15-day extension. However, if in November 2020, Chief Judge Barbera decided that
she wanted the 15-day extension to apply to a claim like the one in my hypothetical that
accrued between the date the clerk’s offices reopened and the time she made her
determination to expand the reach of the 15-day extension, including “nunc pro tunc” in
the definition of “matters” made sense.24
24
I recognize that, if Chief Judge Barbera intended the 15-day extension to apply
more broadly than it initially had, one would expect that, in section (g) she would have said
that “[a]ny such filings made within the period described in (d) and (e) shall relate back to
the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been tolled, suspended, or
extended.” She did not add a reference to “extended” deadlines at the end of section (g).
However, it is notable that Chief Judge Barbera also did not refer to the “extending” of
deadlines in the Revised Order’s title, despite the fact that she implemented the 15-day
extension in that Order. See Revised Order at 1, 3 (title of the Order does not refer to
“extending” deadlines, at the same time that section (e) extends deadlines to initiate matters
by 15 days). Nor did the Chief Judge refer to the “extending” of deadlines in the titles of
the Second and Third Revised Orders, despite their operative language extending the
deadlines for filing matters by 15 days. Thus, the fact that Chief Judge Barbera omitted a
reference to “extended” deadlines in section (g) of the Fifth Revised Order does not
convince me that my colleagues’ interpretation is correct. See Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at
7. This also highlights the weakness of the position that the absence of a reference to
“extending” deadlines in the title of the Tenth Revised Order supports the conclusion that
Chief Judge Barbera did not intend to expand the application of the 15-day extension in
the Tenth Revised Order. See, e.g., Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at 16-17.
In my view, the key point about section (g), as set forth in the Fifth Revised Order
and its successors, is that Chief Judge Barbera provided for relation-back of filings “made
within the period described in … [section] (e),” not section (f). The “period described in”
section (e) is the entire COVID-19 emergency period. This begs the question why Chief
Judge Barbera would refer to the entire COVID-19 emergency period if she wanted the 15-
day extension to continue to apply only to the first few months of that period? If that had
been Chief Judge Barbera’s intention, it would have been far easier and clearer to maintain
the linkage between the 15-day period and section (d) in the relation-back provision. And,
again, there would have been no need to include any reference to “nunc pro tunc” in section
(e).
- 28 -
It is difficult to reconcile Justice Hotten’s characterization of section (f) as an
“anomaly,” see Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at 17, 20, with the Fifth Revised Order’s new
definition of “matters” in section (e), followed immediately by section (f), which also
includes the word “matters.”25 The Plurality’s and Justice Hotten’s interpretations
essentially render section (f) a superfluous provision amidst the operative language of the
Tenth (and Fifth) Revised Order(s), which conflicts with one of this Court’s most
fundamental canons of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Johnson v. State,

467 Md. 362

,
372 (2020) (“We read the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or
phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). In contrast to my colleagues’ interpretations, my
interpretation gives effect to all provisions in the Fifth and Tenth Revised Orders.26
25
I also disagree with the Plurality’s view that the retention of the example in
section (f)’s footnote supports the position that Chief Judge Barbera did not intend to
broaden the scope of section (f) when she added section (e)’s definition of “matters” in the
Fifth Revised Order. See Plur. Op. at 9 (“Had Chief Judge Barbera intended to extend all
deadlines, the example would have been unnecessary.”). It remained helpful in November
2020 and beyond to provide the footnoted example for those claimants whose causes of
action accrued prior to the clerk’s offices reopening and who might otherwise find it
confusing to determine when their claims would expire. For those whose claims accrued
after July 20, 2020, but would expire on or before the end date of the COVID-19 emergency
period, the application of the 15-day extension was more straightforward.
26
The Fifth Revised Order was rescinded by the Sixth Revised Order, which Chief
Judge Barbera issued on December 22, 2020. However, as noted above, the language of
sections (a) through (g) remained the same in the subsequent orders, up to and including
the Tenth Revised Order. Thus, the circumstances surrounding Chief Judge Barbera’s
issuance of the Fifth Revised Order – the Order in which she added section (e) and made
the substantive change to the relation-back provision in section (g) – are critical to
understanding Chief Judge Barbera’s intent.
- 29 -
None of the other indicia to which Justice Hotten points persuade me that Chief
Judge Barbera, as of November 24, 2020, still intended for the 15-day extension to apply
only to matters that had accrued by the time the courts reopened to the public in July 2020.
Most of what Justice Hotten relies on comes from the first few months of the pandemic.
See, e.g., Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at 13 (press release, dated May 22, 2020). As discussed
above, I do not dispute that, at first, Chief Judge Barbera contemplated that the 15-day
extension would apply only to claims that were tolled as a result of the closure of the clerk’s
offices. Thus, the fact that the Judiciary issued a press release in May 2020 that reflected
the current understanding of the scope of the 15-day extension does not answer the question
whether Chief Judge Barbera’s intent with respect to the application of the 15-day
extension changed in November 2020.
The only post-November 2020 item from the Chief Judge Barbera era27 to which
Justice Hotten refers is the inclusion of a Judiciary-created COVID-19 Timeline of Events
in a January 8, 2021 meeting agenda for a briefing that Chief Judge Barbera gave to the
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. In an entry dated May 22, 2020, the Timeline
noted that, under the Revised Order, “[f]iling deadlines to initiate matters will be extended
by an additional 15 days, depending on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens.”
27
In my view, the language of the Final Administrative Order sheds no light on
Chief Judge Barbera’s intent in making the substantive amendments to the Fifth Revised
Order, see Concur. Op. of J. Hotten at 12, given that Chief Judge Barbera did not issue the
Final Administrative Order.
- 30 -
Again, it is not remarkable that a description of the Revised Order would be consistent with
Chief Judge Barbera’s initial understanding of the scope of the 15-day extension.28
I also disagree with Justice Hotten’s contention that the language of Maryland Rule
16-1003 supports a narrow interpretation of the Tenth Revised Order. That Rule provides,
in relevant part:
(a) Generally. Upon a determination by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court that an emergency declared by the Governor … significantly
affects access to or the operations of one or more courts …, the Chief
Justice, by Administrative Order, may, to the extent necessary:
…
(7) suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines,
requirements, or expirations otherwise imposed by applicable statutes,
Rules, or court orders, including deadlines for appeals or other filings,
deadlines for filing or conducting judicial proceedings, and the expiration
of injunctive, restraining, protective, or other orders that otherwise would
expire, where there is no practical ability of a party subject to such
deadline, requirement, or expiration to comply with the deadline or
requirement or seek other relief[.]
(Emphasis added).
The language of Rule 16-1003(a)(7) does not compel the conclusion that a decision
by the Chief Justice to “extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines” must be due
to the inability of a litigant to file an initiating pleading due to the closure of a court or
clerk’s office. Rather, the emergency declared by the Governor must significantly affect
28
The Timeline’s entry for November 24, 2020, noted that Chief Judge Barbera
issued the Fifth Revised Order on that date, but did not provide any further information
about it. It is not clear why, despite the Fifth Revised Order having made (by its own
description) substantive changes, the Timeline did not provide any information concerning
those changes.
- 31 -
“access to” or “the operations” of one or more courts. Where thousands of people were
falling sick daily with COVID-19 in November 2020, Chief Judge Barbera reasonably
could conclude that, going forward, the pandemic would significantly affect individual
access to the courts in the same way that justified the initial application of the 15-day grace
period to claims that accrued during the period that the clerk’s offices were closed. Thus,
under Rule 16-1003(a)(7), Chief Judge Barbera had the authority to broaden the application
of the 15-day extension to all matters with deadlines that would otherwise expire during
the COVID-19 emergency period.
C. A Contrary Interpretation Leads to Illogical and Unjust Results.
Ultimately, the Tenth Revised Order “must be given a reasonable interpretation, not
one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Lockshin,