Judges: J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.
Filed Date: 1/12/1998
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Dear Treasurer Dixon:
You have requested our opinion on the relationship between §
Our opinion is as follows: SFP, § 6-222(a)(6) and (7) are separate and distinct authorizations. Therefore, an investment official may invest in a mutual fund pursuant to SFP, § 6-222(a)(7), even if the mutual fund holds substantial amounts of commercial paper. If, as your letter suggests, you believe that this investment alternative poses unacceptable risks, the General Assembly may wish to consider an amendment to the statute.2
One of the eight permissible investment categories is "commercial paper that has received the highest letter and numerical rating by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization as designated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. . . ." SFP, § 6-222(a)(6). This investment alternative is restricted, however: Investments in commercial paper "may not exceed 5% of the total investments made by the Treasurer under this subsection."
Another investment alternative is "money market mutual funds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940 . . . and operated in accordance with Rule 2A-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. . . ." SFP, § 6-222(a)(7). Some money market mutual funds within this description hold substantial amounts of commercial paper; your letter states that some hold as much as 60% of their investments in commercial paper. Yet, despite the 5% cap in SFP, § 6-222(a)(6), this alternative places no restriction on investment in these funds.
In construing a statute, "[o]ur search for legislative intent begins, and usually ends, with the words of the statute at issue."Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. MVA,
To be sure, this general rule has its exceptions. Even unambiguous text is not to be given effect if the language is patently a drafting mistake. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore,
Apparently at the suggestion of the staff of the Treasurer's Office, however, the bill was altered even before introduction, so that the investment alternative for money market mutual funds was no longer limited to those holding federal government obligations. As introduced, the bill provided for investment in "money market mutual funds registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940 . . . and operated in accordance with
The same legislation authorized direct investment in commercial paper. As introduced, House Bill 913 authorized investment in "commercial paper that has received the highest letter and numerical rating by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization as designated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission." By amendment, the General Assembly added the 5% cap: "provided that such commercial paper may not exceed 5% of the total investments made by the Treasurer under this subsection."4 The General Assembly made no comparable change to the provision on money market mutual funds, despite its broadening of that provision to allow investment in mutual funds that themselves held commercial paper.
Although the legislative history suggests a desire to "modernize" investment alternatives, it does not specifically discuss the reasons for differential treatment of investments in commercial paper, depending on whether the investment is direct or not. Presumably, the General Assembly concluded that direct investment in commercial paper was more risky than indirect investment in commercial paper through the medium of a money market mutual fund. The General Assembly might have supposed that a mutual fund's decision to hold commercial paper comes only after extensive analysis of risk by professionals at the mutual fund. Accordingly, the General Assembly imposed a 5% limitation on direct investments and no limitation at all on investments via money market mutual funds.
We are not commenting on the correctness of this policy judgment or on related issues, like the degree of risk that governments ought to tolerate in order to obtain the higher rate of return afforded by commercial paper.5 These are matters on which we defer to your expertise and ultimately the judgment of the General Assembly. We recite these considerations merely to underscore our conclusion that there is no evidence of the kind of drafting error that would allow us to depart from the import of the statutory text.
Very truly yours,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General
Jack Schwartz Chief Counsel Opinions Advice
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