Judges: J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.
Filed Date: 4/29/1998
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Dear Judge Wilner:
On behalf of the Correctional Services Article Review Committee of the Commission to Revise the Annotated Code, you have requested our opinion concerning Article
You state that the Committee intends to revise and restate existing correctional services law without making any substantive changes. Accordingly, you ask about the meaning and scope of the phrase "other place of confinement in this State." Specifically, the question is whether this phrase is broad enough to include (i) hospitals where individuals are committed after a finding that they are not criminally responsible or (ii) facilities where juveniles are confined.
Our opinion is as follows: Despite its seeming breadth, the phrase "other place of confinement" does not expand the scope of the defined term "correctional facility" beyond places established for the purpose of confining prisoners charged with or convicted of a crime. Article
When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code. We may and often must consider other "external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.
The criminal offenses relating to contraband are set out in § 122A(b) and (c):
(b) Any person who commits any of the following offenses is guilty of a felony . . .
(1) Delivery of any contraband to effect an escape or a weapon to any prisoner or inmate detained or confined in a correctional facility;
(2) Possession with intent to deliver to any prisoner or inmate detained or confined in a correctional facility, of any contraband to effect an escape or a weapon;
(3) Depositing or concealing, in or about a correctional facility, or on any land appurtenant to the facility, any contraband to effect an escape; or
(4) Receipt of any contraband to effect an escape or a weapon.
(c) Any person who commits any of the following offenses is guilty of a misdemeanor . . .
(1) Delivery of any alcoholic beverage, any controlled dangerous substance, or other contraband not specifically designated in subsection (b) of this section to any prisoner or inmate detained or confined in a correctional facility; or
(2) Possession, with intent to deliver to any prisoner or inmate detained or confined in a correctional facility, of any alcoholic beverage, any controlled dangerous substance, or any other contraband not specifically designated in subsection (b).
The phrase "or other place of legal confinement in this State" in the definition of "correctional facility" initially appears broad enough to include a hospital or juvenile facility where an individual is legally confined. The historical context of the phrase, however, leads us to conclude that this definition is limited to penal institutions and jails only and does not include hospitals or juvenile facilities.
AN ACT to add new Section 122A to Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Edition), title "Crimes and Punishments", to follow immediately after Section 122 thereof and to be under the new sub-title "Contraband, — Drugs and Liquors in Prisons", making it a misdemeanor to illicitly convey to or from penal institutions any means of escape, intoxicating beverages, stimulating sedatives, narcotic or dangerous drugs, and providing penalties therefor.
(Emphasis added.) The new section established a misdemeanor offense for one who "delivers or procures to be delivered, or has in his possession with intent to deliver, [contraband] to a person legally detained and confined in any penal institution,reformatory or other place of confinement within the State. . . ." (Emphasis added.) None of these terms was defined.
The likely legislative understanding of the term "penal institution" is suggested, however, by nearly contemporaneous legislation. The year after the enactment of § 122A, the General Assembly extensively revised the law on what was then the Department of Correction. See Chapter 123 of the Laws of Maryland 1962. This law contained several references to "penal institutions," meaning those institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction. See Article 27, §§ 670, 672(e) (repealed), 673(b), 679, and 682(a). Then, as now, juvenile facilities and hospitals were not under the jurisdiction of the Division (formerly Department) of Correction. Rather, the training schools and forestry camps for delinquent children were under the jurisdiction of the former State Department of Public Welfare. See former Article 88, §§ 33 through 39A. See alsoMaryland Manual 1961-62 at 79-83.1 State mental hospitals, including the maximum security facility at the Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital, were under the jurisdiction of the former Department of Mental Hygiene. See former Article 59, §§ 19 and 19B(a). See also Maryland Manual 1961-62 at 74-77.
Unless a statute expressly includes a hospital or juvenile facility, these facilities are not ordinarily considered "penal institutions." See Doe v. Gaughan,
The term "reformatory," also used in the 1961 enactment of § 122A, surely referred to the two institutions so named at the time, the Maryland State Reformatory for Males in Hagerstown and the Maryland State Reformatory for Women in Jessup. Both of these, like other "penal institutions," were under the jurisdiction of the then Department of Correction.
Finally, the term "other place of confinement" in the 1961 enactment must be construed to refer to places of the same general type as penal institutions and reformatories — namely, local jails and detention facilities, holding those charged with or convicted of a crime. "[T]he established rule of ejusdem generis suggests that where general words in a statute follow the designation of a particular class, the general words are usually construed to apply only to those things of the same class as specifically mentioned. . . ." Culotta v. Raimondi,
The legislative history is devoid of any suggestion that the bill was intended to apply to facilities that were not previously within the scope of the prohibition. The focus of the General Assembly is suggested by the following passage from the Senate Committee Report: "The problems which are created by weapons, drugs, or alcohol within the institutions create danger for staff, visitors, inmates and the public." (Emphasis added.) Neither the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene nor the then Juvenile Services Administration testified or commented on the bill.
In short, we believe that the General Assembly intended to retain the original scope of § 122A and did not expand it to include either a hospital or a juvenile facility within the definition of "correctional facility" in § 122A(a)(4). Had the General Assembly so intended, models were readily at hand: Article 27, § 139(a) specifically includes hospitals and juvenile facilities, along with correctional facilities, as "places of confinement" for purposes of the offense of escape; and Article 27, § 413(e)(2) specifically includes "any institution for the confinement of juveniles charged with or adjudicated as being delinquent and any hospital . . ." where a person is confined by a criminal court within the definition of "correctional institution," for purposes of the capital murder statute.
Very truly yours,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General
Jack Schwartz Chief Counsel Opinions Advice
Craig A. Nielsen Assistant Attorney General
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