Kimble v. State

Jermaine Dancer Kimble v. State of Maryland, No. 2049, September Term, 2017. Opinion
by Nazarian, J.
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL – DISMISSAL OF CHARGES – RUNNING
OF TIME PERIOD
The time periods in Maryland Code, § 3-107(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article, after
which a court must dismiss criminal charges against a defendant found incompetent to
stand trial, begin to run from the date of the incompetency finding, not from the date the
charges were filed.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-K-12-007003
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 2049
September Term, 2017
______________________________________
JERMAINE DANCER KIMBLE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Nazarian,
Arthur,
Beachley,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Nazarian, J.
______________________________________
Filed: August 1, 2019
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2019-08-01 12:50-04:00
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
Jermaine Kimble was charged on November 9, 2012 with sexual abuse of a minor
and related offenses. His trial was postponed several times, and the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County eventually found him incompetent to stand trial.
On November 13, 2017, Mr. Kimble filed a motion to dismiss the charges. He
argued that Maryland Code, § 3-107(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) requires
dismissal when the defendant has been found incompetent to stand trial and more than five
years have passed from the date the charges were filed. The circuit court denied
Mr. Kimble’s motion on the ground that the five-year time period runs from the date of the
incompetency finding, not from the date the charges were filed, and that the time period
had not yet elapsed. Mr. Kimble appeals, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2014—approximately two years after Mr. Kimble had been charged, and
after his trial had been postponed twice while counsel had him evaluated—the circuit court
ordered the Department of Health to evaluate his competency to stand trial. Based on the
Department’s report, the court on September 2, 2014 found Mr. Kimble incompetent to
stand trial (“IST”), found him dangerous, and committed him to the custody of the
Department.1
At a review hearing on April 3, 2015, the court found that Mr. Kimble remained IST
1
“Incompetent to stand trial” is defined as “not being able: (1) to understand the nature or
object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in one’s defense.” CP § 3-101(f) (2001, 2008 Repl.
Vol., 2014 Supp.). The circuit court has the authority to “determine, on evidence presented
on the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” Id. § 3-104(a); see also
id. § 3-105, § 3-106.
but no longer was dangerous, and the court released him subject to continued treatment.
Several months later, the court held another status hearing, and found that Mr. Kimble was
still IST and “fully compliant” with his treatment plan.
At Mr. Kimble’s annual review hearing on April 1, 2016, the court considered the
Department’s most recent evaluation and found that Mr. Kimble remained incompetent to
stand trial. In the context of scheduling the next status hearing, the parties and the court
agreed that it should be set close to the “dismissal date,” which all appeared to assume was
five years from the date Mr. Kimble was charged:
THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Okay. [Mr. Kimble]’s
in for his annual review and I do have a report from the
Department. Has counsel received that?
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: I have, Your Honor.
STATE: As has the State, yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Any comments or anything?
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, in this report, the
Department opines that Mr. Kimble, at this point, is both,
remains incompetent to stand trial and also cannot be restored
to competency in the foreseeable future.
THE COURT: Right.
[DEFEDNANT’S COUNSEL]: I would ask that the Court set
the next date at the dismissal date, which at this point --
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFEDNANT’S COUNSEL]: -- is, by my calculation, he
was charged originally in November of 2012, so in the
December 2017 docket.
THE COURT: Okay. So, December 2017, if we have that
status [] conference at that time, that would be the dismissal
date.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
2
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: And, at this point, I, you
know, I don’t think setting another status conference --
THE COURT: Is going to change anything.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: -- is going to change anything
and just make the Department do another evaluation and, quite
frankly, I think they need the time, to spend the time on, for
having seen some of the other ones today --
THE COURT: Other things.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: -- doing a little more --
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: -- psychological testing with
the time that they do have.
THE COURT: Perhaps. Okay. Does the State have anything to
contribute or --
STATE: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- suggest? I mean, it makes perfect sense to me,
that we would not do another annual review. I mean, I do think
that the, that the statute does require an annual review, but this
isn’t, 2017 isn’t pushing, even though it’s December, it’s not
pushing it back that much further than we would normally see
him, so I think this is fine. It’s actually December the 1st.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: That would be perfect.
THE COURT: So, 12/1 of 2017 will be his annual review and
that will be his dismissal date.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay.
THE COURT: I’ll note that on my calendar. All right, we’ll
see you then.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: Keep up the good work, sir.
Approximately a year and a half went by, and on November 13, 2017, Mr. Kimble
filed a motion to dismiss. He argued that the five-year time limit set forth in CP § 3-107(a)
required the court to dismiss his charges. The court held a hearing on the motion on
December 1, 2017, at which the State argued that dismissal was not required. Although
3
five years had passed since the charges were filed, the State argued that the time period
begins on the date he was found IST, not the date he was charged, and that the motion
should be denied because that time had not yet expired. The court agreed, and denied
Mr. Kimble’s motion:
THE COURT: Well, I think under the circumstances where the
maximum penalty is exceeded by the length of time that the
person has been held, that you would, you certainly have a
strong argument there. The question is, whether the words
when charged mean [] are intended to distinguish between a
felony or a lesser offense or a capital offense, or if the words
when charged are intended to sort of [] start the clock on the
dismissal of the charges. And I have to say [] that it does appear
to me that the language is intended to distinguish between a
capital offense, a felony and a lesser offense, rather than the
date at the time at which [] the clock starts to run in terms of
the State’s ability to maintain the charges against the
Defendant. So, I’m going to deny your Motion at this time.
We supply additional facts as necessary below.
II. DISCUSSION
The only question before us is whether the circuit court erred in denying
Mr. Kimble’s motion to dismiss the charges.2 The answer hinges on the resolution of the
purely legal question of whether the circuit court correctly interpreted CP § 3-107(a) to
2
Mr. Kimble states the Question Presented as follows:
Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Kimble’s motion to
dismiss when Mr. Kimble was found incompetent to stand trial
and more than five years had passed from the date Mr. Kimble
was charged?
The State states the Question Presented as follows:
Did the circuit court properly deny the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Kimble less than five years after he was first deemed
incompetent to stand trial?
4
mean that the five-year time limit began to run from when Mr. Kimble was found
incompetent rather than, as he now argues, the date on which charges were filed. Because
the plain language of CP § 3-107(a) is subject to “two or more reasonable alternative
interpretations,” Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 (2004), we find it ambiguous, and
resolve that ambiguity by finding that the time limits began running when he was found
IST.
Normally, we review a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment
for abuse of discretion. State v. Lee, 178 Md. App. 478, 484 (2008). But where, as here,
the trial court’s decision “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland
constitutional, statutory or case law, [we] must determine whether the trial court’s
conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Schisler v. State, 394
Md. 519, 535 (2006).
The Court of Appeals has “observed many times” that “‘the paramount goal of
statutory interpretation is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the
statute(s) at issue.’” State v. Ray, 429 Md. 566, 576 (2012) (“Ray II”) (quoting Derry v.
State, 358 Md. 325, 335 (2000)). When interpreting a statute, we consider the text first. If
we find the language ambiguous, we look to other indicia as well:
In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute’s
language, which the court applies where the statute’s language
is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s
apparent purpose. Where the statute’s language is ambiguous
or not clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose,
the court searches for the General Assembly’s intent in other
indicia, including the history of the statute or other relevant
sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process, in light
of: (1) the structure of the statute; (2) how the statute relates to
5
other laws; (3) the statute’s general purpose; and (4) the
relative rationality and legal effect of various competing
constructions.
Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 495–96 (2015) (cleaned up).
The version of the statute in effect in 2017, at the time Mr. Kimble filed his motion,3
stated that unless the court finds extraordinary cause to extend the time period, the court
shall dismiss felony charges such as these after the expiration of five years or the maximum
sentence:
(a) Whether or not the defendant is confined and unless the
State petitions the court for extraordinary cause to extend the
time, the court shall dismiss the charge against a defendant
found incompetent to stand trial under this subtitle:
(1) when charged with a felony or a crime of violence as
defined under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, after
the lesser of the expiration of 5 years or the maximum
sentence for the most serious offense charged; or
(2) when charged with an offense not covered under item (1)
of this subsection, after the lesser of the expiration of 3
years or the maximum sentence for the most serious
offense charged.
(b) Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court
considers that resuming the criminal proceeding would be
unjust because so much time has passed since the defendant
was found incompetent to stand trial, the court shall dismiss
the charge without prejudice. However, the court may not
3
As we discuss further below, the statute in its current form is almost identical to the
language in effect in 2017, and our construction of the statute applies equally to the statute
in its current form. In addition, the version of CP § 3-107 in effect in 2012, when the
charges were filed, was almost identical to the 2017 version. The absence of material
differences makes it unnecessary for us to decide which version of the statute—i.e., 2012
or 2017—applies to Mr. Kimble’s motion. For our purposes, we assume that the 2017
version applied, which matters only insofar as the court appeared, based on references to
capital punishment at the December 1, 2017 hearing, to be relying on a pre-2013 version
(2013 was the year the death penalty in Maryland was repealed).
6
dismiss a charge without providing the State’s Attorney and a
victim or victim’s representative who has requested
notification under § 3-123(c) of this title advance notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
(c) If charges are dismissed under this section, the court shall
notify:
(1) the victim of the crime charged or the victim’s
representative who has requested notification under § 3-
123(c) of this article; and
(2) the Criminal Justice Information System Central
Repository.
CP § 3-107(a) (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2017 Supp.) (emphasis added).
The issue in this case is when this time period begins to run. Mr. Kimble argues that
the clock starts when the defendant is charged, i.e., that the term “when charged” refers to
the time the clock should start. The State argues that the period begins when the defendant
is found incompetent to stand trial, i.e., that the term “when charged” refers to the type of
crime charged, and is meant to differentiate when the different time periods (five or three
years) apply.4 We agree that the statute is ambiguous, although as a grammatical matter,
the term “when charged” can only refer to the type of crime. The ambiguity arises from the
statute’s silence about when the clock starts, not from the ambiguity of the term “when
charged.”
To resolve the ambiguity, we examine the statute’s language (including previous
versions), review relevant case law, and review the legislative history. See Hailes, 442 Md.
at 495–96; see also Town of Oxford v. Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 585–86 (2012), aff’d 431
4
The five years from the IST finding expires on September 4, 2019.
7
Md. 14 (2014).
A. Earlier Versions Of The Statute Define The Starting Point As The
Date The Defendant Was Found IST.
Both Mr. Kimble and the State acknowledge that pre-2006 versions of CP § 3-107
unambiguously started the time period on the date the court found the defendant
incompetent to stand trial. In its earliest form, before 1967, the statute contained no time
period at all—the relevant section of then-Article 59 provided that a defendant found to be
incompetent to stand trial would be committed to an institution, and the pending criminal
charges would be stayed “until he or she shall have recovered.” Md. Code (1951), Article
59, § 8; see also Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 407 (2009) (“Ray I”); Ray II, 429 Md. at 580.
In 1967, the General Assembly amended the statute to limit the period of
commitment. The trial court could—in its discretion—dismiss pending criminal charges if
it determined that “so much time has elapsed since the finding of [the defendant’s]
incompetency that it would be unjust to resume the criminal proceeding.” Md. Code (1957,
1968 Repl. Vol.), Article 59, § 8(b); see also Ray I, 410 Md. at 407–08; Ray II, 429 Md. at
580. But the court could exercise its discretion to dismiss charges only after the expiration
of certain time periods measured “from the date of the finding of incompetency”—ten years
in a capital case and five years in “all other cases punishable by imprisonment”:
Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court is of the
view that so much time has elapsed since the finding of
incompetency that it would be unjust to resume the criminal
proceeding, the court may dismiss the charge; provided, that in
capital cases the court may not dismiss the charge until ten
(10) years have elapsed from the date of the finding of
incompetency and in all other cases punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary the court may not dismiss the
8
charge until five (5) years have elapsed from the date of the
finding of incompetency. . . .
Article 59, § 8(b) (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1967 Supp.) (emphasis added). This section
continued to allow the State to hold a defendant IST indefinitely, an issue addressed by a
later version of the statute that we discuss below. See Ray II, 429 Md. at 581.
In 1982, the statute was amended again and re-codified as Section 12-105 of the
Health-General Article (“HG”). See Ray I, 410 Md. at 408–09; Ray II, 429 Md. at 580–81.
The update re-worded the statute and gave it the essential structure it has today. Like the
earlier version, the 1982 version gave the court discretion to dismiss the charges if it found
that pursuing them would be unjust because of the passage of time, but only after ten years
in capital cases and five years in others:
Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court considers
that resuming the criminal proceeding would be unjust because
so much time has passed since the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial, the court may dismiss the charge.
However, the court may not dismiss a charge:
(1) Until 10 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any capital case; or
(2) Until 5 years after the defendant was found incompetent
to stand trial in any other case where the penalty may be
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.
HG § 12-105 (1982) (emphasis added).
In 1984 and 1997, the General Assembly made several additions to HG § 12-105
not relevant to this appeal, and also re-numbered it as HG § 12-106.5 See Ray I, 410 Md.
5
The 1984 version read:
(a) Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court
considers that resuming the criminal proceeding would be
9
unjust because so much time has passed since the defendant
was found incompetent to stand trial, the court may dismiss the
charge. However, the court may not dismiss a charge:
(1) Until 10 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any capital case; or
(2) Until 5 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any other case where the
penalty may be imprisonment in the State penitentiary.
(b) The court shall notify the central repository of the criminal
justice information system any time charges are dismissed
under this section.
HG § 12-106 (1982, 1984 Supp.) (emphasis added).
The 1997 version read:
(a) Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court
considers that resuming the criminal proceeding would be
unjust because so much time has passed since the defendant
was found incompetent to stand trial, the court may dismiss the
charge. However, the court may not dismiss a charge:
(1) Without providing the State’s Attorney and a victim who
has filed a notification request form under Article 27, § 770
of the Code advance notice and an opportunity to be heard;
and
(2) (i) Until 10 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any capital case; or
(ii) Until 5 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any other case where the
penalty may be imprisonment in the State penitentiary.
(b) If charges are dismissed under this section, the court shall
notify:
(1) The victim of the crime charged who has filed a
notification request form under Article 27, § 770 of the
Code; and
(2) The Central Repository of the Criminal Justice
Information System.
HG § 12-106 (1982, 1994 Repl. Vol., 1997 Supp.) (emphasis added).
10
at 409 n.9. And in 2001, the General Assembly again revisited the incompetency statutes,
repealing HG § 12-106 and re-enacting it as CP § 3-107.6 But the 1982 language setting
the time periods and running them from the date of the IST finding remained, without
revision, in all of these versions. See footnotes 4–6.
In 2006, the General Assembly again revised CP § 3-107, and those amendments
give rise to the dispute here. During this round of revisions, the language “after the
defendant was found incompetent to stand trial” was removed. The time periods remained,
6
The 2001 version read:
(a) Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court
considers that resuming the criminal proceeding would be
unjust because so much time has passed since the defendant
was found incompetent to stand trial, the court may dismiss the
charge. However, the court may not dismiss a charge:
(1) without providing the State’s Attorney and a victim or
victim’s representative who has filed a notification request
form under § 11-104 of this article advance notice and an
opportunity to be heard; and
(2) (i) until 10 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any capital case; or
(ii) until 5 years after the defendant was found
incompetent to stand trial in any other case where the
penalty may be imprisonment in a State correctional facility.
(b) If charges are dismissed under this section, the court shall
notify:
(1) the victim of the crime charged or the victim’s
representative who has filed a notification request form
under § 11-104 of this article; and
(2) the Criminal Justice Information System Central
Repository.
CP § 3-107 (2001) (emphasis added).
11
but the statute contained at least three relevant (and substantive) changes. First, the statute
no longer defined the event beginning the time periods. Second, the revisions made
dismissal after expiration of those time periods mandatory, rather than discretionary. And
third, the revisions added a new subsection (b) that allows the court to dismiss the charges,
without prejudice, when the court finds it would be unjust to continue because “so much
time has passed” since the defendant was found IST:
(a) Whether or not the defendant is confined and unless the
State petitions the court for extraordinary cause to extend the
time, the court shall dismiss the charge against a defendant
found incompetent to stand trial under this subtitle:
(1) when charged with a capital offense, after the
expiration of 10 years;
(2) when charged with a felony or a crime of violence as
defined under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, after
the lesser of the expiration of 5 years or the maximum
sentence for the most serious offense charged; or
(3) when charged with an offense not covered under
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, after the lesser of
the expiration of 3 years or the maximum sentence for
the most serious offense charged.
(b) Whether or not the defendant is confined, if the court
considers that resuming the criminal proceeding would be
unjust because so much time has passed since the defendant
was found incompetent to stand trial, the court shall
dismiss the charge without prejudice. However, the court
may not dismiss a charge without providing the State’s
Attorney and a victim or victim’s representative who has
requested notification under § 3-123(c) of this title advance
notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(c) If charges are dismissed under this section, the court shall
notify:
(1) the victim of the crime charged or the victim’s
representative who has requested notification under § 3-
123(c) of this article; and
12
(2) the Criminal Justice Information System Central
Repository.
CP § 3-107(a) (2001, 2006 Supp.) (emphasis added).
The statute was revised again in 2013 in connection with the repeal of the death
penalty, see Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 472 (2017), and that is the version in effect
today (save for two word substitutions in 2015 and 2018 not relevant to this appeal). The
only change to the text in 2013 from the 2006 version was the removal of subsection (a)(1),
which applied to capital offenses. But for present purposes, although we assume that the
version in effect in 2017—reproduced in full above—is the applicable version, see
footnote 3 above, the relevant language has not changed since 2006.
We presume that “a change in the phraseology of a statute as part of a recodification
will ordinarily not be deemed to modify the law unless the change is such that the intention
of the Legislature to modify the law is unmistakable.” Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 538 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). And in this
instance, the 2006 revisions reveal no intention by the legislature to change when the time
periods begin to run. Indeed, the structure of the statute as a whole indicates that the
General Assembly meant to keep that time the same: subsection (b) still contemplates a
discretionary dismissal of charges in a situation where “the court considers that resuming
the criminal proceeding would be unjust because so much time has passed since the
defendant was found incompetent to stand trial . . . .” CP § 3-107(b) (emphasis added).
Reading the deletion of similar language from subsection (a) to require the time to run from
the date of indictment would create a new inconsistency with the express terms of another
13
subsection of the same statute. See Ray II, 429 Md. at 595–96. Although we don’t know
why the timing language came out of subsection (a), we see no basis to interpose a new
starting point that deviates from the statute’s history and structure.
B. Case Law Is Consistent.
Neither the State nor Mr. Kimble cited, nor could we find, any cases interpreting the
language of CP § 3-107(a) at issue here. The Court of Appeals has examined CP § 3-107
and its legislative history, though, in answering other questions about the statute in Ray I,
410 Md. at 407–18, and Ray II, 429 Md. at 579–85. As the Court explained in the Ray
cases, the 2006 revisions were driven in large part by the concern that Maryland’s
incompetency statutes, including CP § 3-106 and CP § 3-107, allowed for indefinite
commitments of incompetent defendants, including for periods longer than they would
have been incarcerated had they been convicted of and sentenced for the charged crime(s).
See Ray I, 410 Md. at 415–16; Ray II, 429 Md. at 585–86. Among other things, that concern
was prompted by Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 729 (1972), in which the Supreme
Court held that indefinite confinement violates an IST defendant’s equal protection and
due process rights. See Ray I, 410 Md. at 413–16; Ray II, 429 Md. at 581, 585–89. So in
contrast to earlier versions of the statute, in which the court had discretion to decide
whether to dismiss charges, the revised version of the statute mandated dismissal after
certain time periods expired. See Ray II, 429 Md. at 584.
In Ray II, the particular question was whether dismissals under subsection (a) were
dismissals without prejudice, even though subsection (a) did not contain the phrase
“without prejudice” (as subsection (b) did). 429 Md. at 577–78. After analyzing the
14
legislative history and case law, the Court held that subsection (a) dismissals were
dismissals without prejudice, just as under CP § 107(b). Id. at 595. In the course of its
analysis, the Court observed that the time limits were “the General Assembly’s way of
saying” that if a defendant does not become competent within a certain period of time, it is
highly unlikely that they will become competent in the foreseeable future:
By mandating dismissals upon the expiration of ten, five and
three years—regardless of whether the psychiatrists still
deemed the defendant restorable—the General Assembly
created the upper limit on how long the State may attempt to
work toward the goal of making an incompetent defendant
become competent, at least with respect to that indictment.
***
But . . . [t]hat the dismissal deadlines are statutory cutoffs for
restorability determinations does not mean that the State may
not re-indict such an individual unless he has been restored to
competency. What these dismissal deadlines are is the
General Assembly’s way of saying that—if a defendant,
charged with a particular crime and placed in IST
commitment, does not become competent within ten, five,
or three years depending on the severity of the crime—
there is no substantial probability that the defendant will
become competent in the foreseeable future. In other
words, the passage of time in IST treatment—without the
defendant’s gaining competency—and the resulting
dismissal under CP § 3-107 create the presumption that the
defendant is not restorable.
This reading of CP § 3-107 reconciles, on the one hand, the
requirement of CP § 3-107(a) that charges be dismissed upon
expiration of time; with, on the other hand, the provision of CP
§ 3-107(b) that any dismissal be “without prejudice.” Even
more importantly, such a reading of CP § 3-107 carries out
the General Assembly’s intent of making sure that
unrestorable defendants are not “locked up and forgotten.”
Id. at 594–95 (emphasis added) (quoting Del. Kathleen M. Dumais, Written Testimony in
Support of HB 795 (Feb. 22, 2006)). The Court went on to observe that the State may or
15
may not re-indict the defendant, depending on the circumstances. Id. at 595–96.
In light of the Court of Appeals’s analysis, it makes more sense to read the time to
run from the date of the IST finding. The dual aims of the time limits are to (1) prevent a
defendant’s prolonged or indefinite IST confinement and (2) provide the State sufficient
opportunity to restore a defendant to competency. It makes sense, then, to begin the time
period once competency becomes an issue in the case, not before. Indeed, the State’s
opportunity to restore competency to a defendant who is apprehended after charges are
filed would be truncated by Mr. Kimble’s reading.
C. The Legislative History Points To The Same Answer.
Finally, the parties did not cite, and we did not find, any part of the legislative
history of House Bill 795 (enacted as Chapter 353 of the Laws of Maryland in 2006) that
addresses why the “after the defendant was found incompetent” language was removed
from subsection (a). Although the history refers occasionally to the existence of the time
limits, the time when the clock should start running does not appear. For example, the
“Short Summary” section of the Floor Report to House Bill 795 states, without elaboration,
that “the bill provides time requirements for dismissal of criminal charges if the defendant
remains incompetent to stand trial.” Both the Floor Report and each of three versions of
the Fiscal and Policy Note contain sections titled “Dismissal of Charges,” but those
sections simply mirror the ambiguous language of the statute:
Whether or not the defendant is confined and unless the State
petitions the court for extraordinary cause to extend the time,
the court shall dismiss the charge against a defendant: (1) after
10 years, if charged with a capital offense; (2) after the lesser
of 5 years or the maximum sentence for the most serious
16
offense charged, if charged with a felony or crime of violence;
or (3) after the lesser of the expiration of 3 years or the
maximum sentence for the most serious offense charged, if
charged with an offense not covered by the two previous
categories.
The court is required to dismiss a charge without prejudice if
the court considers that resuming the criminal proceeding
would be unjust because so much time has passed since the
defendant was found incompetent to stand trial. Before
dismissing a charge, the court must provide the State’s
Attorney and a victim or victim’s representative who has
requested notification advance notice and an opportunity to be
heard. If charges are dismissed, the court must notify the victim
or representative mentioned above and the Criminal Justice
Information System (CJIS).
Similarly, the preamble of the law as enacted notes that the bill “require[s] a court to
dismiss, under certain circumstances, a certain charge after passage of certain time
periods,” but does not mention the starting point for those time periods. 2006 Md. Laws,
Chap. 353. And none of the written testimony in support of or against House Bill 795
suggests that the date the period begins to run ought to be changed from the date of the IST
finding to the date of indictment.7
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE
COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT
TO PAY COSTS.
7
Mr. Kimble argues that the “rule of lenity and principles of fundamental fairness militate
in favor of” his reading of the statute. The State does not respond to this argument.
Nevertheless, the rule of lenity does not apply in this case. The rule allows a court to
interpret an ambiguous criminal statute in a way that “treats the defendant more leniently.”
Bellard, 452 Md. at 502 (quoting Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 676 (2015)). But it applies
only “where there is no evidence of legislative intent with respect to an ambiguous
statute—i.e., the ambiguity cannot be resolved under the traditional principles of statutory
construction.” Bellard, 452 Md. at 503. In this case, the rules of statutory construction
allow us to interpret the statute, so we need not resort to this alternative.
17