DocketNumber: No. 1920
Citation Numbers: 210 Md. App. 535, 63 A.3d 666
Judges: Zarnoch
Filed Date: 3/22/2013
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants, Covered Bridge Farms II, LLC, Covered Bridge Farms III, LLC, Covered Bridge Farms IV, LLC (collectively “CBF entities”), and Robert Wayne and Melissa Newsome (collectively the “Newsomes”) appeal a judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County granting summary
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Charles G. and Elizabeth S. Grey owned farmland in Howard County. In 1980, the Greys took steps to become part of Maryland’s agricultural land preservation program. To be part of the program, the farmland has to meet certain soil and location criteria and be at least 50 acres. Before 2007, the farmland had to be placed first in an Agricultural District.
An agricultural district was created through a district agreement.
In 1995, the Greys conveyed the entire land to Kenneth Lee and Maureen Fogarty Williams.
In 2007, Covered Bridge Farms was liquidated and, without requesting MALPF’s approval, it conveyed the three reconfigured parcels to three separate entities, namely Covered Bridge Farms II, III, and IV. MALPF filed a complaint against the CBF entities and the Newsomes in 2011. MALPF alleged that the three separate conveyances constituted subdivisions of the land in violation of the deed of easement, the
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Appellants present two questions for review,
Did the circuit court err in concluding that the transfer of the three reconfigured parcels from Covered Bridge Farms, LLC to the Covered Bridge entities were subdivisions in violation of the District Agreement, the Easement, and applicable State regulations?
For the following reasons, we answer this question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a declaratory judgment that was entered as the result of the grant of a motion for summary judgment to determine whether that declaration was correct as a matter of law. Claggett, 412 Md. at 61, 985 A.2d 565.
DISCUSSION
We focus on a case that is on all fours with this one. In Stitzel v. Maryland, 195 Md.App. 443, 448-52, 6 A.3d 935
In concluding that this was a subdivision in violation of the district agreement and the easement, we explained first that the district agreement stated that “[t]he landowner agrees not to subdivide the land for any purpose unless the Foundation first has approved the proposed subdivision,” and the easement reiterated that “[t]he land subject to this Deed of Easement may not be subdivided for any purpose including subdivision, off conveyance and the movement of boundary lines unless written approval first has been obtained from the [Foundation].” Id. at 448, 6 A.3d 935.
In defining subdivision, we agreed with the circuit court that the then-current COMAR regulation provided the best guidance. Id. at 449-50, 6 A.3d 935. It defined subdivision as: “the division of land into two or more parts or parcels.” COMAR 15.15.01.01-2B(7) (2001), 28 Md. Reg. 1063 (June 1, 2001) (proposed), 28 Md. Reg. 1399-1400 (July 27, 2001) (adopted). The circuit court disagreed with StitzeFs argument that because the parcel was separate before the district agreement and easement it was already subdivided. Stitzel, 195 Md.App. at 449-51, 6 A.3d 935. Instead, the circuit court
The holding in Stitzel controls the outcome of this case. The restriction on the subdivision of the land is found in both the Stitzel easement and the easement in this case. Here, the restriction reads: “[sjubject to the reservations hereinafter contained, the Grantors covenant, grant, and relinquish the following rights: ... [t]he right to subdivide the above described land for any purpose except upon written approval of the Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation[.]” In Stitzel, the restriction read: “[t]he land subject to this Deed of Easement may not be subdivided for any purpose including subdivision, off conveyance and the movement of boundary lines unless written approval first has been obtained from the [Foundation].” Although the appellants correctly point out that this restriction does not contain the words “off conveyance” or “movement of boundary lines,” the focus in Stitzel was on the word subdivision, as it is in this case.
The same COMAR regulation that applied in Stitzel applies in this case because it was the regulation in place when both
As a routine matter, the Foundation accepted individual farms into the state agricultural land preservation program that are composed of separately described parcels of land. The Foundation does not require landowners to survey and combine the multiple parcels into one parcel because the great cost of doing so would discourage program participation. However, the Foundation considers the entirety of the multiple parcels covered in the District Agreement or easement as one “land” and one “parcel” subject to the subdivision prohibition that prevents any landowner from chopping up the farm and conveying its pieces or parcels to other owners, thereby destroying the farm’s potential as a profitable agricultural unit.
The appellants vigorously contend that the land in this case should not be treated as one parcel because it was described differently than the land in the Stitzel case. They argue that the easement in Stitzel described the land as a single “agricultural preservation parcel,” while the easement in this case described three separate parcels. Looking at the two documents, we can see that this supposed difference is actually not a difference at all. Although one section of the easement in this case describes the three parcels as “all those three contiguous parcels of land,” everywhere else in the easement these parcels are described as the “land.” Also, in the district agreement related to this case, the three parcels are referred to as the “subject property” and it is noted that the agreement is for the “establishment of an agricultural preservation district.” Looking to the Stitzel easement, it similarly uses the
Stitzel conveyed one of the parcels that was separately described in the district agreement to a buyer. Here, the appellants actually reconfigured the three parcels that were part of the agricultural district and sold each parcel to a different entity. Thus, unlike in Stitzel, where the property lines were the same as they were before becoming part of an agricultural district, the three parcels in this case were not the same three parcels separately described in the easement. The Court in Stitzel determined that the conveyance of a parcel that was separately described in an agricultural district agreement was a subdivision. Thus, conveying three parcels that were not actually the same parcels separately described in the district agreement is clearly a subdivision.
To no avail, appellants continue to argue that this case is distinguishable. They vehemently believe the conveyances in this case are different from the one in Stitzel because the parcel in Stitzel was improved with a dwelling, the buyers expected to receive the title free of encumbrances, and the parcel, according to appellants, was subtracted from the “operation and effect” of the easement. We disagree. The dwelling and the buyer’s feelings were both irrelevant to the Court’s analysis in Stitzel. Additionally, the land was still subject to the easement. Specifically, the Court explained that the owner removed a portion of land that was still within an agricultural district and subject to the easement. Controlled by our holding in Stitzel, we conclude that the conveyances in this case were subdivisions of the agricultural district subject to the easement. Because the conveyances were subdivisions, the sellers needed the Foundation’s approval before conveying the parcels to separate buyers.
except as approved by the Foundation as provided by this chapter and in COMAR 15.15.01.17C and 15.15.06.01-.06, a landowner may not subdivide land encumbered by an easement, including the movement of interior boundary lines, or transfer or cause to be transferred, any part or parts separately from the total acreage of the land, voluntarily, involuntarily, by testamentary disposition, or by reason of foreclosure or bankruptcy.
The new language of these regulations is not necessary for the conveyances in this case to be deemed subdivisions. Even without the new language, the conveyances were violations of the former regulations and the deed of easement. In 2007, when the land was conveyed, a subdivision was defined as a “the division of land into two or more parts or parcels.” Stitzel held, in 2010 before the new regulation language, that land in one agricultural district was considered one parcel even if it originally had been more than one. Thus, the conveyances in this case were subdivisions regardless of the 2011 regulation language because the three parcels became one agricultural district in 1980 and the deed of easement in this case prohibited subdivision of the district without prior approval.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
. The General Assembly has since eliminated this requirement as a condition for the easement sale application process. See Act of May 17, 2007, ch. 650, 2007 Md. Laws 4073. The law terminated "agricultural districts” as of June 30, 2012, except for those districts on which an easement had been conveyed to the Foundation or for districts established by a county for tax credit purposes. Id. at 4077. An easement has been conveyed to the Foundation on the district in this case and, therefore, is still in effect.
. This was a contract between the Foundation and the landowner. The agricultural district became effective upon that recording of the agreement in the local land records and continued in effect unless terminated. COMAR 15.15.01.03G.(1979).
. The District Agreement provides that it is binding on subsequent heirs, successors and assigns, and the easement states that it runs with the land. See Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 64, 985 A.2d 565 (2009).
. The size of one of the parcels changed from 5.757 acres to 6 acres and another segment was altered from 80.25 acres to 80.07 acres.
. The CBF entities and the Newsomes ask:
1. Did the Appellants cause a subdivision of the Easement Land by-conveying the pre-existing parcels of record that comprise the Easement Land to separate owners?
2. Are the Foundation’s recently adopted agricultural subdivision regulations controlling as to the conveyances of title to separate entities?
. The Stitzel Court did mention off conveyance, but it did so as a type of subdivision. Stitzel, 195 Md.App. at 451-52, 6 A.3d 935.
. The CBF entities and the Newsomes do not challenge the court’s remedy for the failure to seek Foundation approval. Therefore, we will not address the issue.