DocketNumber: Civil No. PJM 10-3510
Citation Numbers: 914 F. Supp. 2d 688
Judges: Messitte
Filed Date: 11/27/2012
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/26/2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Vidya Sagar has sued his former employer Defendant Oracle Corporation (Oracle), alleging that his termination from employment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq (ADEA). Oracle has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which Sagar opposes, and has filed his own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Oracle’s Motion and DENIES Sagar’s Cross-Motion.
I.
In early 2005 Oracle acquired a corporation known as Peoplesoft. Sagar was an employee of Peoplesoft at the time of the acquisition. Following the acquisition, Oracle offered Sagar employment as a billable Consultant. At the time Sagar was 58 years old.
Sagar worked under several different managers at Oracle until December 2006, when he was assigned to a newly formed group at Oracle known as North American Strategic Accounts (NASA). ’ Sagar continued on as a billable Consultant
During Sagar’s employment with Oracle, as the national economy declined, Oracle found its business drastically reduced. Between June 2008 and November 2009, the company conducted six rounds of layoffs, affecting over 730 employees. When forced to choose people to terminate in the ATS group, Bradley Sachar decided to use each employee’s “utilization rate”
In support of his assertion that he was a non-billable Portfolio Manager as of the time of his termination, Sagar offers anecdotal evidence which demonstrates that he performed certain tasks which would normally be done by a Portfolio Manager. While Oracle does not dispute this, it claims that Sagar was assigned this work in order to give him gainful activity during a period when he was unable to find billable work to meet his utilization rate expectations. Oracle asserts that Sagar at all times remained a billable employee; was continuously told to seek out billable work; and was continuously aware that the position of Portfolio Manager remained open and that the company was actively seeking someone other than Sagar to fill the position permanently. In other words, Oracle says Sagar knew that he was not a Portfolio Manager and knew that he was still expected to maintain minimum utilization rates. Oracle offers substantial evidence in support of this assertion including personnel records, performance evaluations and emails. Many of these bear Sagar’s acknowledgment that he remained a billable employee, discussing his utilization rate expectations.
Apart from this, Sagar claims that he was chosen for termination because of his age, and that Sachar sought to have a “young” team. He points out that Michelle Probst, age 59, was terminated around the same time as he was. He also claims that he “heard rumors” around the office that Oracle always fires people about 60 years of age. In particular, he cites an incident where Sachar “looked him up and down,” allegedly to assess his overall health. Sagar claims that all of these events amount to proof that he was the victim of age discrimination.
Oracle denies that age had anything at all to do with Sagar’s termination. It points out that Susan Curry, who is two years older than Sagar, was in fact retained by the ATS group and continues to work at Oracle to this day. Oracle also states that there were several legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Sagar. In general the company was suffering a severe decline in business and was forced to implement a reduction in force. As a result, there was not a large pipeline of work for employees like Sagar, who had the lowest utilization rates in the entire ATS group. Furthermore, during both of his last two assignments, Sagar received complaints from both customers and colleagues to the effect that he was difficult to work with. Oracle submits that these were the factors that led to the decision to terminate Sagar, not his age.
II.
A.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
A plaintiff proceeding pro se is held to a “ ‘less stringent’ ” standard than is a lawyer, and the court must construe his claims liberally, no matter how “ ‘inartfully pleaded.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Nonetheless, even a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from the requirement that his complaint contain more than mere “ ‘labels and conclusions’ ” or “ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of [a] cause of action.’ ” Walden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 Fed.Appx. 223, 224 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
B.
Sagar alleges age discrimination in violation of the ADEA.
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee based on the employee’s age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1985). The circumstances must suggest that, but for the employer’s motive to discriminate on this basis, the employee would not have suffered the adverse action. Fink v. Western Elec. Co., 708 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.1983). As plaintiff, Sagar has the burden of establishing the defendant’s discriminatory intent for all of the claims, a burden which can be met
Under McDonnell Douglas, to justify an inference of discrimination, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The central focus of the inquiry is whether the employer has treated some people less favorably than others because of a protected status, such as age or race. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). More specifically, in order to establish a prima facie case in the context of reductions in force, the plaintiff must prove that: “(1) he was protected by the ADEA; (2) he was selected for discharge from a larger group of candidates; (3) he was performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those of the group retained; and (4) the process of selection produced a residual workforce including some persons in the group who were substantially younger than him and who were performing at a level lower than that at which he was performing.” Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 430 (4th Cir.2000).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, which the employer may rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The employer’s burden is merely one of production, not persuasion. Id. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption raised by the plaintiffs prima facie case is rebutted and the factual inquiry proceeds to a “new level of specificity.” Id. at 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
At that juncture, the plaintiff must prove that “the legitimate reasons offered by the agency were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 456 (4th Cir.1989). To support a finding of pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s articulated reasons have no basis in fact or that its reasons were not the “real” reason for the adverse employment action. See Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir.1996). “The plaintiff must establish that he was the better qualified candidate for the position” to meet his burden of proving that the company’s explanation is pretextual and that he was the victim of intentional discrimination. Evans v. Techs. App. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir.1996).
The ultimate burden of showing that the employer intentionally discriminated against him remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Even if the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case and sufficient pretext, however, the defendant will still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if “no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct.
III.
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that Sagar was not chosen for termination during a company-wide reduction in force because of his age.
A.
Indeed, Sagar fails to make out even a prima facie case for age discrimination. To repeat, in order to proceed with his claim, Sagar must show that: (1) he was protected by the ADEA; (2) he was discharged; (3) at the time he was discharged he was performing up to his employer’s expectations; and (4) lower performing, substantially younger employees were retained. Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 430 (4th Cir.2000). Sagar fails to satisfy the third and fourth prongs.
In choosing which employees to terminate during the reduction in force, Oracle evaluated the utilization rates of every employee for the previous two fiscal quarters (fourth quarter FY2008 and first quarter FY2009). Not only were Sagar’s utilization rates well below the company-wide expectation of seventy-five percent; his utilization rates were the lowest of all the billable employees in his group. While Sagar does not contest these figures, he asserts that this manner of evaluation was unfair considering his “superb” performance prior to the evaluation periods in question. The Court is not persuaded. It is well established that “in employment discrimination cases involving a reduction in force, it is not the court’s duty to second guess the business judgment of defendant’s employees and managers” or the manner in which the reduction in force is carried out. Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 739 F.Supp. 1006, 1017-18 (D.Md.1990), aff'd, 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
Sagar also argues that he was a non-billable Portfolio Manager instead of a billable Project Manager, and as such, his utilization rates are irrelevant because non-billable Portfolio Managers are not expected to maintain minimum utilization rates. In effect, he argues that he was performing up to employer expectations and was in fact replaced by a substantially younger Portfolio Manager, which, he submits, establishes a prima facie case. However, Sagar offers nothing more than his own assertions and narratives to support the proposition that he was a non-billable Portfolio Manager without utilization expectations. Oracle, on the other hand, has submitted a plethora of direct and circumstantial evidence, including Sagar’s own concessions, to show that Sagar was never promoted to Portfolio Manager, but at all times remained a Project Manager with utilization expectations. In order to survive summary judgment Sagar must provide more than “naked opinions” and “conclusory assertions.” Goldberg v. B. Green and Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.1988). On this record, no trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Sagar was a Portfolio Manager.
B.
Although enough has been said to deny Sagar’s age discrimination claim without more, assuming arguendo that Sagar has established a prima facie case, Oracle cites several legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for his discharge, which Sagar has not adequately demonstrated to be pretextual or untrue. Oracle has shown that Sagar was not highly utilized, since the pipeline of work for Project Man
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Oracle Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Paper No. 79], and DENIES Vidya Sagar’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Paper No. 146], Final Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
A separate Order will ISSUE.
. A "billable employee” is one who is expected to attribute a certain percentage of his or her working time to activities which can be directly billed to a client.
. The percentage of time an employee spends on "billable” activities is referred to as the "utilization rate.”
. Oracle had and has a companywide expectation that all “billable” employees will maintain 75 percent utilization rates.