Citation Numbers： 96 A.2d 585, 148 Me. 500
Judges： Merrill, Thaxter, Nulty, Williamson, Tirrell
Filed Date： 4/17/1953
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
On appeal. This is a petition under the “contested election” statute to determine whether the petitioner Arthur Lesieur was elected mayor of Biddeford for the current term commencing January 1, 1958 and is entitled to the office. R. S., Chap. 5, Secs. 85-89 inclusive.
The petitioner and the respondent were the only candidates for mayor at the election of December 15, 1952. On the basis of the official returns showing 3985 votes for the respondent and 3945 votes for the petitioner, the respondent was declared elected. On December 19th the petitioner commenced the present proceeding alleging in substance that if absentee ballots illegally cast, and ballots defective, invalid and void on their face should be set aside, the petitioner would be found to have a majority of the votes legally cast and thus entitled to the office of mayor. The respondent took the oath of office on January first and has since then been in possession of and has conducted the office of mayor.
The Justice of the Superior Court before whom the matter was returnable found that the petitioner received 3986 votes and the respondent 3846 votes. In a judgment rendered on February second the justice said, in part:
“Upon these findings of law and fact, as a whole it is my judgment that the petitioner has received a majority of the legal votes cast for the office of Mayor in the Biddeford municipal election of December 15, 1952, for the term beginning January 1, 1953, and, for that reason, I hereby declare him to have been duly and legally elected to said office, and to be entitled thereto for the term stated.
“The fact that the petitioner is Judge of the Municipal Court does not, in my opinion, disqualify him as a candidate for Mayor. If and when he*502 assumes the latter office, he will vacate the former under the holding in Howard vs. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769.”
The respondent duly entered an appeal “which appeal shall briefly set forth the reasons therefor” (Sec. 87) — in this instance thirty-five in number. It may be noted that the appeal is not to the Law Court but to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court who “shall immediately consider the cause and decide thereon and transmit their decision to the clerk of courts in the county where the suit is pending .. .” (Sec. 87) On appeal the case is considered de novo.
The statutory proceeding is designed to combine the ouster from office of quo warranto with the introduction into office of mandamus. Informative cases on the history and scope of the statute and the proper procedure to be followed are Prince v. Skillin, 71 Me. 361; Bartlett v. McIntire, 108 Me. 161, 79 A. 525; Tremblay v. Murphy, 111 Me. 38, 88 A. 55; Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769, L. R. A. 1917 A. 211.
In our view we need consider only the fifth reason of appeal, reading as follows:
“5. Because the Petitioner, Arthur J. Lesieur, is not entitled by law to the office of Mayor of the City of Biddeford, as claimed by him for that since the first day of January, 1953, and prior thereto, he has been the legally appointed and qualified Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Biddeford which office is incompatible with that of Mayor of the City of Biddeford, and since the fifteenth day of December, A. D. 1952, the date of election, and the first day of January, A. D. 1953, the date the Mayor assumes office in the City of Biddeford, and since February 2, 1953, the date of judgment of the Justice of the Superior Court, he has performed and continued to perform the duties of said office whereby he has waived, surrendered,*503 abandoned, terminated and vacated his rights, if any, to the said office of Mayor, the term of which began January 1, 1953, and has thereby disqualified himself.”
The petitioner in challenging the conclusions of the fifth reason does not question the facts. Indeed we take judicial notice that the petitioner has held and exercised the office of judge of the Biddeford Municipal Court as there stated.
The decisive question is: Did the petitioner vacate or surrender his claim to the office of mayor by continuing in and exercising the office of judge of the Municipal Court after the time fixed by law for the assumption of the duties of the office of mayor by one elected to said office? The controlling date in this respect is January 1, 1953. Sections 16 and 17 of the city Charter of Biddeford; P. & S. L., 1941, Chap. 84, Sections 9 and 10. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the petitioner has no standing under the statute cited above to contest the election of the respondent. The petitioner may have judgment in his favor only if he “is entitled by law to the office claimed by him . . .” (Sec. 86) If the claimant is disqualified, clearly he has no right to proceed under the statute.
There are certain basic principles with respect to incompatible offices which we need no more than mention.
First: The offices of mayor and judge of the municipal court are incompatible. They cannot be held by one person. Howard v. Harrington, supra.
Second: The acceptance of a second office vacates the first office, whether or not the person becomes the lawful incumbent of the second office. This is the rule when the offices are under one government. We are not concerned with distinctions arising, for example, when the first is a federal office and the second a state office. Stubbs v. Lee, 64
In Howard v. Harrington, supra, with Chief Justice Savage speaking for the court, the principle that acceptance of the second office vacates the first office is carried a step further. There, as here, the petitioner was a candidate for the office of mayor to which the respondent was declared elected. While the case, brought under the “contested election” statute, was pending and during the term of office to which Howard claimed to have been elected, he accepted the office of judge of the police court.
After a careful review of the authorities the court concluded that the office of mayor and of judge of the police court were incompatible, and the court said on page 449:
“Thence it is that two such offices must be held to be incompatible. And we are all of opinion that when one who has the office of mayor of Rockland, or one who has the right of office,' accepts the incompatible office of Judge of the police court, he thereby abandons, surrenders and vacates ipso facto, such election, or right of election, as he had to the office of mayor.
*505 “Since the petitioner has vacated and surrendered his right to the office of mayor, we think that he cannot maintain this petition. The ultimate purpose of the petition is to oust the respondent, by showing that the petitioner is entitled to the office. And it is only when a petitioner ‘is entitled by law to the office claimed by him,’ R. S., ch. 6, sect. 71, that the Justice hearing the case may issue an order to the party unlawfully claiming or holding said office, commanding him to yield up said office to the officer who has been adjudged to be lawfully entitled thereto. Sect. 73. The petitioner has now no interest in the proceeding.”
In the Howard case the petitioner, while claiming the present right to be mayor, accepted the incompatible office of judge. Here the petitioner, while claiming the present right to be mayor, has continued to exercise the incompatible office of judge. The court in the Howard case treated the claim of right to the office as the equivalent of the office itself. Had Howard been the mayor, then of course acceptance of the office of judge would have vacated or forfeited the office of mayor. From this starting point the court concluded that by taking the office of judge he vacated or surrendered his claim of present right to the office of mayor. The underlying principle to be derived from the court’s reasoning is that eligibility with reference to compatibility of office is determined as of the time of the commencement of the term of office. The phrase “commencement of the term of office” where used in this opinion refers to the time fixed by law for assumption of the duties of the office. In the instant case the time is established at the first day on which the mayor-elect is entitled to hold the office. It is not necessary, however, that the time be so firmly fixed. For example, public officers appointed by the governor and council must qualify within thirty days after being commissioned. R. S., Chap. 11, Sec. 8. “A Member-elect (of the National House of Representatives) may defer until the meeting of the Con
The principle is applicable with full force in the instant case. We hold that retention of the first office beyond the commencement of the term of the second office is a declination or forfeiture of the second office. Let us suppose that there had been no contest and that the petitioner had been declared elected but failed to qualify for the office. Would it not necessarily follow that his continuance in an incompatible office pointed directly and conclusively to the forfeiture or declination of any claim of title to the mayoralty?
The petitioner is a contestant under the statute seeking to gain the office from a declared winner. Obviously there was no obligation on his part pending the determination of the contest to take the oath of office or to attempt to take possession of the office of mayor on January first. He had commenced a contest and only if successful, and if he then so chose, would he qualify.
The position of the declared winner and the contestant, however, are precisely alike in this respect, namely, that each claims that he was the lawfully elected mayor for the stated term. The respondent has the benefit of possession of the office on the basis of the election returns, but the validity of the election was not thereby determined.
We have seen that when the second office of incompatible offices is accepted, the first office is thereby vacated. It does not follow, however, that the second office cannot be declined or that claim of title thereto may not be forfeited or abandoned. The acceptance of the second office, when the time comes to assume its duties, is a fact — a widely known fact. The judge has become the mayor and ceased to be the judge. Under like reasoning the continuance of the judge
This reasoning is forcefully stated in a Report of the Committee of Elections to the House of Representatives in the case of General Blair, reading in part:
“But this record raises another question which, so far as the committee can learn, has not before arisen, and which it becomes necessary to examine. Mr. Blair was appointed a brigadier general August 7, 1862, and a major general, November 29, 1862, the duties of which latter office he discharged till January 1, 1864, when he tendered his resignation, which was accepted January 12, 1864. On this latter day he was qualified, and took his seat in the House of Representatives. The first regular session of the 38th Congress, fixed by law, commenced on the first Monday of December, 1863. It therefore appears that Mr. Blair held and discharged the duties of the office of major general for more than a month after the commencement of the session fixed by law of the Congress in which, after resigning that office, he subsequently took his seat. Now, if the reasoning already submitted, and the conclusions which the committee have drawn therefrom, be correct, viz., that the acceptance of an office incompatible with one already held must be deemed and treated as the resignation of the former, then does it not follow that the continuance in the discharge of the duties of the former office, after the time at which the law requires the entering upon and discharge of the incompatible duties of the latter, must be deemed and treated as a declination of this latter office? If two offices are tendered at the same time to the same person, and he is at liberty to choose between the two, but either the nature of the offices, or the requirements of the law or Constitution, forbid the acceptance of both, no one will doubt but that, after an election between them is made and the*508 duties of one have been entered upon, it is too late then to take the other. As both cannot be taken, the one is declined in the acceptance of the other. Does the fact that these two offices are tendered at the same time, make any difference in the principle ? A man in the discharge of the duties of one office is tendered another, whose duties he is required to enter upon at a certain time, but the functions of both he cannot perform. When the time arrives at which the duties of the latter office commence, he is at liberty to choose. If he takes the latter, the functions of the former, ipso facto, cease as the result of his choice. If he determines to continue to hold the former, does he not of necessity decline the latter, as a like result of that choice? When he accepts one office, the law interprets the act as a surrender of any incompatible office. Shall it not put a like interpretation upon a continuance to discharge the duties of the other? If he may be permitted to keep vacant the one office one month by continuing in the incompatible one during that time, he may two or twelve months, or during its whole term. If these acts are not to be taken as an election on his part; then that election is yet to be made; and what interposes to require it to be made till the day before the term expires, or then ? And thus may the people of any district, or any number of districts, be deprived altogether of representation. The committee can not arrive at any conclusion fraught with such results, but are of opinion that, when the time arrives at which the duties of two incompatible offices are by law to be discharged, a man at liberty to choose between the two, as effectually declines one not entered upon, by continuing in the one already held, as he would vacate the former if he did enter upon the latter.
“It therefore follows that Mr. Blair, by voluntarily continuing to hold and discharge the duties of the office of major general till January, 1864, declined and disqualified himself for the office of representative, the duties of which, by law, com*509 menced on the first Monday of the December preceding.”
Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, First Session, 38th Congress, 1863-64, volume 1, Report number 110; McCrary on Elections (Fourth Edition) Pages 258-260.
An interesting reference to the Blair case which we have found in a judicial opinion is in United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 676, 682, where Judge Van DeVanter, later a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, without expressing an opinion on the question, said:
“It may be that to have continued in the office of governor beyond the next meeting of the Senate would have operated as a declination of the office of senator (the case of Gen. Blair of Missouri, Reports of Committees 1st Sess., 38th Cong., No. 100 (110) and that of Gov. Hill of New York, Cong. Rec., vol. 23, pt. 1, 52d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 74, 180, seem to be opposing precedents on this question) ; but to have continued in the office of governor after election as a senator, but not beyond the next meeting of the Senate, would have been permissible under the law, and would not have affected defendant’s right to accept the senatorship if the Senate should give its favorable judgment upon his election, credentials, and qualifications.”
The reasoning of the Blair case is appealing and is in accord with the underlying fundamental principals on which Howard v. Harrington, supra, was decided.
Applying the principle of the Howard case, supra, namely, that the claim of title to office by a contestant is equivalent to the office for purposes of testing incompatibility and the right to proceed under the “contested election” statute, we find that the petitioner has declined and disqualified himself as clearly and completely as did General Blair.
Under the “contested election” statute the proceeding may be commenced before or at any time during the term of the office at stake. There is no compulsion on the petitioner to start the contest within a given period. On the petitioner’s theory the candidate defeated on the returns and occupying an incompatible office can continue to exercise such office and at the same time hold the threat of a contest over the incumbent long after the start of the term. The removal of this candidate from the role of contestant will not determine the validity of the incumbent’s election, but it will make the latter’s title to that extent more certain.
Indeed the compelling reason why action in the first office must operate as a surrender of claim of title to the second office is the need of the public to know with certainty who possesses the power and authority'to act in public office. Chief Justice Appleton stated the principle in words often quoted:
“Where one has two incompatible offices, both cannot be retained. The public has a right to know which is held and which is surrendered. It should not be left to chance, or to the uncertain and fluctuating whim of the office-holder to determine.” Stubbs v. Lee, supra.
The petitioner having forfeited any claim to the office of mayor no longer has an interest in this proceeding. Accordingly we need neither consider nor determine whether in fact he was legally elected. When it appears that a petitioner could not serve if elected, the case ends.
Appeal sustained.
Petition dismissed with costs.