State of Maine v. Eric M. Martin

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 91Docket: Aro-14-452
Argued: June 18, 2015
Decided: July 23, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ERIC M. MARTIN
MEAD, J.
[¶1] The State of Maine appeals from an order entered by the trial court
(Hunter, J.) granting Eric M. Martin’s motion to suppress as evidence illegal drugs
seized from him by law enforcement officers after they stopped a vehicle in which
he was a passenger. The court found that the warrantless search of clothes that
Martin was wearing violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution. The State asserts
that the search was (1) justified by probable cause and the existence of exigent
circumstances, (2) incident to a lawful arrest, and (3) subject to the application of
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Because we agree that
the search was justified by probable cause and that it was conducted under exigent
circumstances, we vacate the suppression order.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The State does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings, which
are supported by the record. See State v. Babb, 2014 ME 129, ¶ 9, 104 A.3d 878(stating that a suppression court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error). In
July 2013, Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) Special Agent Peter
Johnson began investigating the importation of heroin and prescription pills into
Maine from Detroit, Michigan. A confidential informant (CI) who had previously
provided information to MDEA set up a delivery of several hundred oxycodone
pills with the CI’s source, a man calling himself “Al.” The CI reported that Al had
been coming to Maine monthly, sometimes armed; had stayed with the CI on
occasion; and had sold the CI heroin and pills. Al provided the CI with the cell
phone number of “one of his boys” who he would be using as the deliveryman for
the transaction; the number belonged to Ricci Wafford, who had at least two
convictions for drug possession and who had been charged with carrying a
concealed weapon. Johnson obtained a warrant allowing him to track the location
of Wafford’s cell phone.
[¶3] On August 2, the CI received a call telling him that the drugs were on
their way; once Wafford was in Maine, officers were able to follow the cell phone
north on Interstate 95. At one point the CI received another call and was told that
“they” had stopped at a convenience store to buy cigars and that “they were on
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their way up,” giving agents their first indication that Wafford might not be alone.
When Special Agent Craig Holder began following Wafford’s car in Aroostook
County, about twelve minutes before Wafford was stopped, he saw two people in
the vehicle. Just before the stop, the CI received a final phone call from Al, who
said that “he had just received a phone call from his connection stating cops.”
[¶4] Between five and ten police vehicles stopped Wafford’s vehicle on
I-95. Both men in Wafford’s car were ordered out and handcuffed.
Detective Ross McQuade of the Aroostook County Sheriff’s Office patted the men
down, first Wafford and then Martin. At the time that he conducted the pat-down
search, McQuade did not know which of the two men was Wafford. McQuade had
received information that the men might be armed and were likely transporting
drugs, but he did not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant. He testified that in
searching Martin for weapons and contraband he did not feel anything that could
be a weapon, but “[i]n [Martin’s] lower body region, towards the right side of his
lower groin area, I felt something that appeared to be unnatural and thought that it
was likely a plastic bag.” He felt objects in the bag moving around but he did not
know what they were.
[¶5] When McQuade was unable to locate the bag in Martin’s pockets, he
alerted MDEA Supervising Special Agent Shawn Gillen. Gillen, too, had received
information from Agent Johnson that the men in the car were transporting drugs
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and might be armed. When McQuade told Gillen that he thought Martin had
“a baggy, or a bag, with something in it,” Gillen pulled out the waistband of
Martin’s “extremely loose” shorts and underwear with his finger, then “reached in
and grabbed the bag,” which contained ninety-eight 30mg oxycodone pills. After
Wafford and Martin were arrested, Gillen was notified by a deputy that another
bag of fifty pills was found on the ground in the same area where McQuade had
searched both men; the pills were the same kind taken from Martin.
[¶6] Martin was indicted on one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled
drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A) (2014), and one count of illegal
importation of scheduled drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1118(1), (2)(A) (2014).
He moved to suppress the bag of pills seized by Gillen, asserting that Gillen had
conducted an unreasonable warrantless search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution. Martin did not
challenge the legality of either the stop or the initial pat-down. The court held an
evidentiary hearing at which Johnson, McQuade, and Gillen testified. It granted
the motion by written order, finding that “Agent Gillen’s search of [Martin’s]
person exceeded the bounds of a valid protective search or justifiable search for
contraband.”
[¶7] The State moved for reconsideration and for additional findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court denied the motion for additional factual
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findings, but set out extensive additional legal reasoning in affirming its earlier
suppression order. The State then filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by the
written approval of the Attorney General pursuant to 15 M.R.S. 2115-A(5) (2014)
and M.R. App. P. 21.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶8] Because the trial court’s factual findings are unchallenged, we review
de novo only the court’s “ultimate determination regarding suppression,” and we
will uphold that determination “if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the
trial court’s decision.” State v. Kierstead, 2015 ME 45, ¶ 14, 114 A.3d 984(quotation marks omitted). Although a search conducted without a warrant is
presumed to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see United States v.
Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2014), a warrantless search is not
unreasonable, and thus not unconstitutional, if “it is supported by probable cause
and exigent circumstances exist requiring a prompt search without the delay
occasioned by the need for a warrant.” State v. Michael M., 2001 ME 92, ¶ 6,
772 A.2d 1179 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶9] Regarding the first requirement, “[p]robable cause to search exists
when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In Maryland v.
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Pringle, the United States Supreme Court discussed the probable cause standard
extensively:
The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects citizens from
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded
charges of crime, while giving fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community’s protection. On many occasions, we have reiterated that
the probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception
that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
Probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. The probable-cause
standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into
percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the
totality of the circumstances.
540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
[¶10] We recently discussed the probable cause standard as well, noting that
it “is flexible and based on common sense. Although requiring more than mere
suspicion, probable cause can be satisfied on less than the quantum of proof
necessary to establish a fact by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” State v.
Flint, 2011 ME 20, ¶ 12, 12 A.3d 54 (citations omitted). “The information
determining the existence of probable cause includes all the information known to
the police,” and “[t]he determination is based on an objective standard, not on
whether the particular officer believed he had probable cause.” State v. Foy,
662 A.2d 238, 240 (Me. 1995) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see State
v. Libby, 453 A.2d 481, 485 (Me. 1982). No single fact is viewed in isolation;
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rather, each piece of information is “a factor in the totality of the circumstances.”
Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372 n.2.
[¶11] Here, the Superior Court found that “the police investigation in this
case provided a clear basis for probable cause to believe that there would be
contraband in the vehicle or on the person of Mr. Wafford,” and that, “[b]ased on
these facts, the officers had a fair probability to suspect that drugs would be found
with Mr. Wafford or in his car.” That finding is well supported by the record.
Nevertheless, the court, citing, inter alia, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581(1948), and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), found that the search of Martin
was not supported by probable cause because there was no particularized evidence
of his involvement in drug trafficking beyond his presence in Wafford’s car.
[¶12] The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Pringle. In that case, a
police officer stopped a car occupied by three men and found a large amount of
rolled-up cash in the glove compartment and five bags of cocaine, which he
discovered when he pulled down the back-seat armrest. 540 U.S. at 367-68. When
none of the vehicle’s occupants offered any information about the drugs or the
money, all three were arrested. Id. at 368-69. The Court found that the officer had
probable cause to arrest Pringle, the front-seat passenger:
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any
or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised
dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer
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could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.
....
[A] car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra—
will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and
have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing. Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a
common enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs and
cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise
to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with
the potential to furnish evidence against him.
Id. at 372-73 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶13] The Pringle Court, saying that “Pringle’s attempt to characterize this
case as a guilt-by-association case is unavailing,” distinguished the two cases
relied on by the Superior Court, Ybarra and Di Re, reasoning that in Ybarra the
challenged search was of a customer who happened to be present in a public
tavern, not a small automobile; and in Di Re the challenged search was of the
front-seat passenger after the government informer in the rear seat singled out the
driver as the sole guilty party. Id. at 372-374.
[¶14] Pringle controls the result here. Given the facts that it found, the trial
court’s probable cause finding concerning Wafford’s car extends to Martin, who
travelled in the car being driven to Maine for the reported purpose of delivering
illegal drugs. Gillen therefore had probable cause to conduct the challenged search
of the clothing Martin was wearing, particularly after McQuade first detected a bag
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with objects moving inside—objects that were entirely consistent with the pills that
officers had reason to suspect were being illegally trafficked and were therefore
evidence of a crime.1
[¶15] Because we conclude that the trial court correctly found probable
cause to believe that evidence of drug trafficking would be found on Wafford’s
person or in his vehicle, and therefore officers had probable cause to search Martin,
we turn to the second question of whether the warrantless search was also justified
by the existence of exigent circumstances. See Michael M., 2001 ME 92, ¶ 6,
772 A.2d 1179; State v. Bilynsky, 2007 ME 107, ¶ 26, 932 A.2d 1169. “Exigent
circumstances exist when there is a compelling need to conduct a search and
insufficient time in which to secure a warrant.” Bilynsky, 2007 ME 107, ¶ 26,
932 A.2d 1169 (quotation marks omitted). The determination “is inherently
fact-specific.” Id. ¶ 30.
[¶16] In State v. Smith, we approved a warrantless search of the defendant’s
jacket pocket once the officer had probable cause to believe that he would find
1
See also United States v. Brown, No. 05-70-P-S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1628, at *4, *20
(D. Me. Jan. 17, 2006) (Cohen, M.) (“Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, [police] were not required
to determine whether the blue bag [in a pickup truck] actually belonged to the defendant . . . or whether
the defendant owned the cocaine in the glove compartment before they could arrest the defendant.” (citing
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003))), aff’d by United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Almeida, No. 04-56-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15543, at *19
(D. Me. Aug. 6, 2004) (Cohen, M.) (“Under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to
believe that Almeida constructively possessed the crack pipe found underneath the seat behind which he
was sitting.” (citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371-74)), aff’d by United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25(1st Cir. 2006).
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evidence of marijuana and “exigent circumstances rendered the obtaining of a
warrant impracticable,” reasoning that “[t]he exigent circumstances presented to
[the officer] were related to the nature of marijuana as evidence that easily can be
destroyed.” 593 A.2d 210, 212-13 (Me. 1991); see United States v. Samboy,
433 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Sangineto-Miranda,
859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that exigent circumstances
exist “when there is an urgent need to prevent evidence from being lost or
destroyed, particularly in drug cases where narcotics can be easily and quickly
destroyed while a search is progressing” (quotation marks omitted)). The same is
true here, as demonstrated by the fact that either Wafford or Martin, although
handcuffed, was apparently able to dispose of a bag of pills that was later found on
the ground.
[¶17] Because Gillen had probable cause to search Martin for illegal drugs
under exigent circumstances, neither the Fourth Amendment nor article I, section 5
of our state constitution barred the search, and the court erred in suppressing its
fruits.2
2
Article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution provides protections that are coextensive with the
Fourth Amendment. Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr., 2014 ME 60, ¶ 67 n.21, 91 A.3d 567.
We further note that even if there were a constitutional defect in Gillen’s search at the time that it
occurred, the bag of pills in Martin’s clothing would have inevitably been discovered through
independent, lawful means once a similar bag of pills was discovered on the ground in the area where he
had been patted down, and so suppression was unwarranted. See State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶¶ 37-38,
1 A.3d 445 (stating that the inevitable discovery doctrine is an “exception to the application of the
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The entry is:
Order vacated. Remanded for entry of an order
denying the motion to suppress.
On the briefs:
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, 8th Prosecutorial District,
Caribou, for appellant State of Maine
James M. Dunleavy, Esq., and Jon P. Plourde, Esq., Currier and
Trask, P.A., Presque Isle, for appellee Eric M. Martin
At oral argument:
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, for appellant State of Maine
James M. Dunleavy, Esq., for appellee Eric M. Martin
Aroostook Superior Court (Houlton) docket number CR-2013-103
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
exclusionary remedy,” and setting out the three-part test for application of the doctrine). In its order on
the State’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court found that “the officers upon finding the drugs on
the ground . . . could arrest both [Wafford and Martin],” which would have inevitably led to a valid search
of Martin’s person incident to the arrest that would have been justified by the discovery of the pills on the
ground. See State v. Foy, 662 A.2d 238, 241 (Me. 1995).
In light of our conclusion that the warrantless search was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances, we need not consider the State’s alternative argument that the search was proper as
incident to a lawful arrest.