In re Child of Nicholas M.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 30 Docket: Pen-17-441
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2018
Decided: March 6, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF NICHOLAS M.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Nicholas M. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Newport,
Budd, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child1 pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) (2017). He argues that there
is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings of unfitness, that the
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to continue the hearing
on the petition to terminate his parental rights, and that the court abused its
discretion when it denied his attorney’s motion to withdraw. We affirm the
judgment.
1 The mother consented to the termination of her parental rights, and she is not a party to this
appeal.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The court made the following findings of fact, and even though they
are expressed in terms of witness testimony, all are supported by competent
evidence in the record:
The final hearing in this matter occurred September 8, 2017
and was relatively brief. . . .
[The father] himself did not appear for the final hearing. In
spite of this, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
he was aware of the hearing . . . . There was not so much as a phone
call to the court on the day of the hearing. . . .
[The permanency caseworker] testified that she has worked
for two years in her current capacity, and has been involved with
this case for most of its history. She testified that [the father]
maintained somewhat regular e-mail contact with the Department
early in the case. According to [her], among the notable
expressions made by [the father] during this time was his
acknowledgement in December 2016 that he believed he was [the
child’s] father. During this time, [the father] expressed interest in
participating in the reunification and rehabilitative services the
Department could offer. However, beginning in May 2017, [the
father] discontinued his communication with the Department.
[The permanency caseworker] testified that, to the best of
her knowledge, [the father] had contact on only one occasion with
[the child]. That supervised visit took place on February 23, 2017,
and was largely facilitated by the Department, which scheduled the
visit, arranged the supervision and provided [the father] with bus
transportation . . . . [The permanency caseworker] testified further
that [the father] made no further expression of interest in
participating in the various rehabilitative or other reunification
services the Department could provide him, other than to indicate
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that his probation restrictions limited his ability to leave the state
of Rhode Island with any regularity.
[The permanency caseworker] confirmed that [the child]
entered Department custody on September 12, 2016 . . . . [The
child] is doing well and has established a loving bond with his
foster parents and foster siblings.
. . . .
[The guardian ad litem’s] final report . . . indicates that he had
an opportunity to speak with [the father] the week prior to the final
hearing. The report states that [the father] last saw [the child] in
February and [the father] is currently on probation for a domestic
violence incident that occurred just after that visit. [The guardian
ad litem] reports that [the father] was also arrested in September
2016 following his involvement in a domestic incident with his
then-girlfriend. [The guardian ad litem’s] report notes that [the
father] was substantiated in 2010 by [the Department] in Maine for
physical abuse towards [the child’s] older brother.
(Footnotes omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶3] The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the
father is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy, and that this
circumstance is unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated
to meet the child’s needs; (2) the father is unwilling or unable to take
responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet
the child’s needs; and (3) the father has failed to make a good faith effort to
rehabilitate and reunify with the child. Contrary to the father’s contention, each
4
of the court’s unfitness findings is supported by competent evidence in the
record. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv); see also In re River B.,
2017 ME 77, ¶ 6, 159 A.3d 1222.
[¶4] We are not persuaded by the father’s additional arguments that the
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue and his attorney’s
motion to withdraw. On the record before us, neither the court’s denial of the
motion to continue nor its denial of the motion to withdraw constitutes an
abuse of discretion. See In re Trever I., 2009 ME 59, ¶ 28, 973 A.2d 752; see also
In re J.R., 2013 ME 58, ¶ 19, 69 A.3d 406.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Randy G. Day, Esq., Garland, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Newport District Court docket number PC-2015-10
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY