Citation Numbers: 11 Me. 361
Judges: Mullen
Filed Date: 6/15/1834
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
On the 9th of June, 1827, Samuel Holbroolc, the plaintiff, gave a bond to Saul Holbroolc, conditioned to give him a good and sufficient deed of a certain parcel of land, on or before the -1st of March, 1828, on payment by him to the plaintiff of the sum of $135. On the 29th of April, 1828, a deed of said land was made, bearing the above date, by the plaintiffj conveying the same to said Preston, one of the defendants, but it was never delivered till June 9th, 1823: at which time also the contract declared on was executed, though that also bears the date of April 29th, 1828. By this contract the defendants agreed to indemnify and secure the plaintiff harmless from all claim., right and title which said Saul then had in the premises. What is the true construction of this contract ? By the terms of it, both defendants must be considered as knowing of the existence of the abovementioned bond, and that the condition of it had been violated. They must have considered Saul as having some claim, right or title in the land, whatever might have been the fact, on strictly legal principles ; and it would seem that the indemnity intended, was against the consequences of his assertion of his claim and right. It is true, that on the 9th of June, 1828, Saul had no legal title to the land, but he had to damages for the breach of the condition, equal to the value of the land. For what purpose could the defendants’ contract have been made, but
The subject of the barn, and the instruction of the Judge as to the plaintiff’s right to recover its value, next claim our consideration. The bill of sale bears date June 21, 1826. In virtue of this, Saul Holbrook immediately became owner of the barn, and the bam immediately became personal property, in the same manner as though he had built it at his own expense upon the land, by the consent of the plaintiff; and therefore, according to our decision in the case of Russell v. Richards & al. 1 Fairf. 429, it did not pass by the plaintiff’s deed to Preston. He should have defended the action which Saul brought against him, and prevented his recovering back the price which be paid for it: but instead of doing this, he consented to the claim and was defaulted. His surrender to that claim, furnishes no foundation 'for a claim against the defendants. Besides, the agreement of the defendants, declared on, has no reference to the sale of the barn, which was made two years before; but exclusively relates to the claim, title and interest of Saul in the real estate or premises in question. The case before us, furnishes no proof of any promise of indemnity or reimbursement on account of the barn or its value. We are therefore of opinion, that the instruction as to this portion of