In re Child of Amber L.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 91Docket: Pen-18-79
Submitted
On Briefs: June 27, 2018
Decided: July 5, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF AMBER L.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Amber L. appeals from the judgment of the District Court
(Bangor, Campbell, J.) that terminated her parental rights to her child pursuant
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), and (b)(i)-(ii) (2017).1 The mother
contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s findings of
parental unfitness. She further challenges the court’s determination that
termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child, arguing
that because the kinship placement for the child provides sufficient stability,
the court was required to order additional time for her to attempt to
rehabilitate herself and reunify with the child. We conclude that clear and
convincing evidence supports the court’s finding that the mother is unfit as a
1 The child’s father had his parental rights terminated after failing to appear at the termination
hearing. The father is not a party to this appeal.
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parent and that the court acted within its discretion in determining that
termination is in the child’s best interest. We therefore affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] After a two-day hearing in early February of 2018, the court found
that the mother is unwilling or unable (1) to protect the child from jeopardy
and (2) to take responsibility for him and that both of these circumstances are
unlikely to change in a time reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the child.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). After carefully considering the record,
the court ultimately determined that terminating the mother’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). To support
its findings of parental unfitness and its best interest determination, the court
made the following factual findings based upon clear and convincing evidence
in the record:
In this case, custody of [the child] was properly removed
from the parents and granted to DHHS on October 21, 2016.
. . . .
. . . Mother clearly loves [the child] very much, and she has a
bond with him. Mother has also made progress in some areas, for
which she deserves credit. For example, mother has consistently
engaged in supervised visits with [the child], and the visits have
generally gone very well. Mother also regularly attends [a clinic]
for replacement therapy, and she has not used opiates. . . .
Unfortunately, however, despite the progress mother has made in
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some aspects of this case, many of the very serious jeopardy
concerns remain.
. . . .
. . . Throughout the case, DHHS has attempted to assist
mother with her substance abuse and mental health issues.
Despite this, mother has continued to self-medicate with
marijuana, and she has been very inconsistent in her mental health
therapy. Mother has also continued to make very impulsive and
irresponsible decisions, and she continues to maintain contact with
unsafe people.
. . . Mother [has] long-standing problems with a cannabis use
disorder, personality disorder . . . , and complex post-traumatic
stress disorder. . . . Mother has [a] limited ability to self-correct and
learn from the consequences of her behavior and acting out.
According to [the court-ordered psychologist], without
appropriate treatment, mother’s ability to safely parent as well as
reunify with her children is guarded. [The psychologist] believes
that mother’s mental health diagnoses tend to be resistant to
change and historically require long-term and committed
involvement in treatment. Mother’s prognosis is further guarded
because of her tendency to self-medicate with marijuana.
. . . .
Although the [termination petition] had already been filed,
mother did not follow through with her therapy [provider]. Rather
than seeing her [therapist] twice a week, mother met with [her
therapist twice between August and November of 2017]. . . .
Although [her therapist] reports that mother has made progress
since November 3rd, mother still does not regularly attend her
appointments. . . . Mother has only attended her [dialectical
behavioral therapy] groups three times, twice in December and
once in January. Mother attended individual therapy twice, once
on December 11, 2017, and once on January 29, 2018.
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Mother’s level of commitment is unacceptable. [Her
therapist] testified that mother still has a lot of work to do.
According to [her therapist], mother’s [dialectical behavioral
therapy] will take a year from November 3, 2017. (This assumes
that mother will be fully committed to her therapy, which, at this
point, has not been the case.) [Her therapist] believes that mother’s
individual therapy will take longer. . . .
The court is very concerned about mother’s continuing
pattern of engaging in unsafe relationships with [the father of her
other children] and her former fiancé. . . . Mother has had numerous
and consistent police contacts resulting from family fights,
threatening behavior, protection order violations, mental health
crises, and other incidents involving [her former partners]. Rather
than demonstrating stability through her behavior, mother has
consistently been unstable in her relationships and behavior.
. . . .
. . . Mother clearly has a long-standing substance abuse
problem. She has continued to use marijuana throughout the time
that this case has been pending. This is not a situation where
mother smokes occasionally to relieve anxiety. According to [the
psychologist in this case], this is a situation where mother abuses
her methadone and marijuana to get intoxicated as a way of
self-medicating. . . .
. . . .
. . . [The child] has special needs, and he requires a high level
of care. He needs a safe and stable home. It is very important that
he receive permanency as soon as possible. Unfortunately, mother
is unable to provide permanency for [the child].
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II. DISCUSSION
[¶3] “We review the trial court’s factual findings that a parent is unfit and
that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest for clear error
and the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of
discretion.” In re Child of Kelcie L., 2018 ME 57, ¶ 3, --- A.3d ---.
A. Parental Unfitness
[¶4] We will reverse a finding on parental unfitness “only if there is no
competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly
misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to
the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.”
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶5] The mother does not dispute the finding that at the time of the
hearing, roughly fifteen months after the child was removed from her custody,
she could not provide the child with permanency. Instead, she asserts that the
circumstances causing her parenting deficits are likely to change in a
reasonable time. “Although the [mother] contends that [she] made progress
towards rehabilitation, the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of [her]
parental unfitness.” In re Child of Kelcie L., 2018 ME 57, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---.
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Competent evidence in the record, particularly the testimony of the mental
health professionals, fully supported the court’s findings that the mother’s
parenting deficits pose jeopardy to the child and are not likely to be resolved
absent intensive, long-term mental health treatment. See id.; In re Mathew H.,
2017 ME 151, ¶ 5, 167 A.3d 561. The court, as a result, did not clearly err by
finding that mother’s circumstances are unlikely to change within a time
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.
B. Best Interest of the Child
[¶6] Although the court granted the mother’s two motions to continue
the termination hearing over objections by the State, the mother argues that
the child protection statute’s prioritization of “family rehabilitation and
reunification,” 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3) (2017), and the absence of record evidence
suggesting that prolonging the kinship placement would harm the child,
required the court to provide her with additional time to attempt to rehabilitate
herself and reunify with the child, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2017). The mother
further argues that the Department of Health and Human Services “overstates
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the concept of permanency” in defending the court’s termination of her
parental rights.
[¶7] Among the general purposes for the child protection statute, the
Legislature has given priority to “family rehabilitation and reunification.”
22 M.R.S. § 4003(3). The Legislature, however, has qualified that general intent
with the competing goal to “prevent needless delay” in achieving permanency
for the child. Id. In the statutory provisions setting out the specific purposes of
terminating parental rights, the Legislature has further emphasized its intent
to “[e]liminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for
their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return to the family.”
See 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2) (2017). Although we have recognized that
“[p]ermanency is a dynamic concept that must be fashioned from the actual
circumstances and needs of the child,” In re Child of Kelcie L., 2018 ME 57, ¶ 7,
--- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted), “[i]nstability is antithetical to
permanence.” In re Marcus S., 2007 ME 24, ¶ 11, 916 A.2d 225.
[¶8] The court’s best interest analysis relied on competent evidence of
the “mother’s pattern of instability, her erratic behavior, and her continuing to
maintain relationships with unsafe people,” as well as competent evidence of
her “long-standing substance abuse problem” and “significant mental health
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issues that will take an extended period of time to treat.” Contrary to the
mother’s contention, the court was not required to base its best interest
determination on evidence of harm to the child resulting from additional time
for the mother to further attempt rehabilitation and reunification with the
child. Pursuant to the Legislature’s mandate, the court deemed in this case that
further delay of permanency is contrary to the child’s best interest, existing
attachments, and physical and emotional needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2);
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 13, 154 A.3d 1199; In re Dakota K., 2016 ME 30,
¶¶ 8-10, 133 A.3d 257. The court’s findings are supported by competent
evidence in the record; the court’s determination that termination of the
mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest was well within the
court’s discretion.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Erik T. Crocker, Esq., Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2016-80
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY