C.L. v. L.L. in Re A.L.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 131
Docket: Wal-14-500
Argued: May 14, 2015
Decided: October 13, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
C.L.
v.
L.L.1
******
IN RE A.L.
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] C.L. sought de facto parent status regarding his ex-wife’s then
eight-year-old daughter, A.L. He appeals from a judgment entered by the District
Court (Belfast, Worth, J.) ruling on two motions that were consolidated for
consideration: (A) a motion in a child protection matter concerning A.L. and (B) a
post-judgment motion in C.L.’s divorce from A.L.’s mother, L.L.2 C.L. argues that
the court made insufficient factual findings and erred in determining that C.L. was
not a de facto father to A.L. We dismiss the appeal from the order entered in the
1
Because the court consolidated motions filed in a child protection and a divorce matter for
consideration, we avoid the use of full names here in compliance with the statutory directive that, with
respect to child protection matters, “[a]ll proceedings . . . be closed to the public” unless otherwise
ordered by the court. 22 M.R.S. § 4007(1) (2014).
2
C.L. filed a single document raising the two motions and listed the docket numbers for both
proceedings in the document heading.
2
child protection matter and affirm the court’s judgment entered in the divorce
action.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] C.L. and L.L. were married and had a daughter in 2001. Several years
later, L.L. became pregnant with another man’s child, and the child—A.L.—was
born in August 2005. C.L. knew that he was not A.L.’s biological father.
[¶3] C.L. filed a complaint for divorce in April 2012 when A.L. was six
years old. In that complaint, he alleged that he was A.L.’s parent. During the
proceedings, the issue of A.L.’s paternity was raised, and C.L. asserted that he was
A.L.’s de facto parent. The court entered a divorce judgment in October 2012 that
provided, by the parties’ agreement, for shared parental rights and responsibilities
but did not adjudicate C.L.’s claim of de facto parenthood. Pursuant to the
judgment, L.L. provided primary residence for both A.L. and the parties’
biological daughter, and C.L. had rights of contact with them. Based on the
parties’ agreement, the court’s judgment made C.L. responsible for paying child
support for both children. The court indicated that the judgment could be
reconsidered after the receipt of genetic testing results.
[¶4] In March 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services became
involved with L.L. and her children, and a safety plan was put in place that called
for A.L. and her older sister to stay with C.L. Two months later, the Department
3
filed a petition for a child protection order with respect to A.L. The court entered
an order of preliminary protection granting the Department custody of A.L. A.L.
was placed in C.L.’s home.
[¶5] The results of a paternity test confirmed that another man is A.L.’s
biological father, and within a week after the preliminary protection order was
issued, the court entered an order establishing that man’s parenthood in the child
protection proceeding. L.L. waived the opportunity for a summary preliminary
hearing, and the court ordered that A.L. remain in the Department’s custody and in
C.L.’s home. After conducting a separate summary preliminary hearing with
respect to the newly established father, the court found that A.L. would be in
immediate risk of serious harm if placed in her father’s care. Based on that
finding, the court maintained custody with the Department, and A.L. remained in
C.L.’s home.
[¶6] The court entered a jeopardy order on October 21, 2013, in which it
found that A.L. was in circumstances of jeopardy with L.L. The court entered a
separate jeopardy order with respect to the biological father in which it found
jeopardy on the basis that he had not been able to protect A.L. from serious harm,
was only beginning to form a relationship with her, and had a criminal history that
raised concerns. Also on October 21, 2013, the court entered an order in the
4
divorce matter determining that C.L. is not A.L.’s father. The court order ended
his obligation to continue paying child support for her.
[¶7] A gradual, therapeutically guided transition of A.L. to her paternal
grandmother’s house was then planned. C.L.—who was receiving no services
from the Department other than as a foster placement where home and community
treatment services were provided for A.L.—became increasingly distressed about
the transition. He raised allegations about the biological father’s conduct with A.L.
[¶8] In April 2014, the Department immediately relocated A.L. to her
paternal grandmother’s house after an incident with C.L. at a family team meeting.
After a judicial review hearing held on April 14, 2014, the court ordered the child’s
continued placement with the grandmother.
[¶9] C.L. filed a motion for determination of de facto parent status in both
the child protection and the family matter cases. A.L.’s biological father moved to
intervene in the family matter case, and that motion was granted. In the child
protection case, the Department objected to C.L.’s motion for de facto parent
status.
[¶10] After appropriately consolidating the motions for hearing, the court
held a two-day trial on C.L.’s motions in July 2014. Based on the evidence
presented, the court determined, in an order entered in September 2014, that C.L.
was not a de facto parent for purposes of the child protection proceeding because
5
he had not previously been determined to be a de facto parent in a family matter.
The court further found that C.L. was not a de facto parent for purposes of the
family matter, concluding that C.L. failed to meet his burden to establish that
(1) he had “undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible
parental role in the child’s life,” and (2) “there are exceptional circumstances
sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent’s rights.”
Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 27, 90 A.3d 1169 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶11] In support of its judgment, the court made extensive findings by clear
and convincing evidence, see id., all of which are supported by competent evidence
in the record. The court’s findings, taken together, demonstrate that, although C.L.
loves A.L., C.L. is unable to fulfill a responsible parental role for A.L. When she
lived with C.L., A.L. lacked a routine and structure, suffered from chronic lice,
appeared at school dirty and tired, came to supervised visits hungry because there
was no food at C.L.’s home, and wore the same clothes for days. C.L.’s housing
was crowded with stored items and in a state of disrepair, he smoked indoors, and
his twelve-year-old daughter would be out of the home for days “house surfing” at
friends’ homes without C.L. knowing where she was. Caseworkers and other
professionals often found it difficult to reach C.L., and he declined to address any
of the identified problems or improve his ability to take care of A.L.
6
[¶12] C.L.’s inability to function as a responsible parent, his unwillingness
to learn the necessary parenting skills, and the ensuing chaos in the home all
harmed A.L. The court found that A.L.’s behavior at school was so serious while
she was staying at C.L.’s home that she repeatedly had to go to a “time-out room”
to de-escalate. Even at a young age, she needed one-on-one support at school, and
C.L. did not assist in upholding the rules and structure that the school sought to
provide, once yelling at the school principal in front of A.L. C.L. refused to meet
with A.L.’s biological father as recommended by service providers and would not
encourage A.L. to attend visits with her father or show support for the reunification
efforts that were part of A.L.’s case plan. After A.L. moved to her grandmother’s
home, C.L. inappropriately raised adult concerns with her at his visits, asking A.L.
how often she visited with her biological father and telling her that she should not
be seeing her father more often than she was seeing him.
[¶13] The court found that, although A.L. expressed a desire to live with
“Daddy [C.L.],” she also said that she wanted to live with her grandmother, her
father, and her mother. C.L. told the Department’s caseworker, “that little girl
would never turn against me,” and said that he had been very nice but things could
take a different route if things did not go right in court, and that he was “willing to
go to jail” for A.L.
7
[¶14] In A.L.’s placement with her grandmother, there are no safety
concerns. The grandmother has followed the advice of professionals, including
school staff, and the child has flourished with the reasonable routine and structure
of the home. A.L. is clean; is better able to control her behavior, including at
school; has made significant academic gains; and is more rested, happy, and
self-assured.
[¶15] Based on its findings, the court determined that C.L. had failed to
establish de facto parenthood for purposes of the family matter. Specifically, the
court determined that C.L. had not shown that he had undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in her life and that
exceptional circumstances justified an intrusion on the parental rights of L.L. and
the biological father. See id. The court maintained A.L.’s placement with her
grandmother.
[¶16] C.L. moved for the court to make additional findings of fact, primarily
regarding his role in A.L.’s upbringing before the child protection proceeding
began, and to amend the order to determine that he is a de facto parent. The court
denied his motion and entered an amended order only to correct clerical errors.
C.L. appealed to us.
8
II. DISCUSSION
A. Child Protection Matter
[¶17] Pursuant to the chapter of Title 22 that governs child protection
proceedings, “[o]rders entered under this chapter under sections other than section
4035, 4054 or 4071 are interlocutory and are not appealable.” 22 M.R.S. § 4006
(2014). Because of this statutory provision crafted by the Legislature, we do not
apply “the traditional judge-made exceptions to the final judgment rule” in child
protection cases “absent any constitutional infirmity in the statute.” In re L.R.,
2014 ME 95, ¶ 9, 97 A.3d 602.
[¶18] C.L. does not raise any constitutional infirmity in the child protection
statute. He contends only that the court misapplied the common law de facto
parent doctrine. Accordingly, the appeal from the judgment in the child protection
matter is interlocutory, and we dismiss it.3 See 22 M.R.S. § 4006; In re L.R., 2014
ME 95, ¶ 9, 97 A.3d 602.
B. Family Matter
[¶19] With respect to the judgment entered in the divorce case, from which
C.L. properly appealed, see 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2014), C.L. contends that the court
misapplied the standard for determining de facto parenthood by failing to take into
3
Given the interlocutory nature of this appeal, we do not opine on whether a de facto parenthood
could be established through a child protection case.
9
account the evidence of his involvement as a parent during the years of A.L.’s life
that preceded the child protection proceeding. He further argues that “exceptional
circumstances” warrant a determination of de facto parenthood.
[¶20] We review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
conclusions of law de novo. Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 9, 90 A.3d 1169. To obtain
parental rights as a de facto parent, an individual must show that (1) “he or she has
undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in
the child’s life,” and (2) “there are exceptional circumstances sufficient to allow
the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent’s rights.” Id. ¶ 27 (quotation
marks omitted).4
[¶21] Here, the court found that C.L. failed to meet both parts of this test.
With respect to the first prong, the court found that C.L. did not occupy a
responsible parental role with respect to A.L. Specifically, the court found that he
had failed and refused to set necessary limits to assist A.L. at school, had not
provided adequate housing or food, had not enabled A.L. to maintain basic
hygiene, and had declined to stop smoking in the home where A.L. resided with
him. Although most of these findings concern C.L.’s most recent conduct, they
4
This common-law test will soon be superseded because the Legislature adopted the Act to Update
Maine’s Family Law. See P.L. 2015, ch. 296, § A-1 (adopting the Maine Parentage Act, which includes a
subchapter regarding de facto parentage) (effective July 1, 2016) (to be codified, in relevant part, at
19-A M.R.S. § 1891).
10
support the court’s determination that C.L. had failed, as of the time of hearing, to
undertake a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in
the child’s life.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). We therefore
affirm the court’s determination that he failed to meet the first required element for
establishing de facto parenthood.
[¶22] The creation by a court of an additional, legally recognized parental
relationship with a child permanently alters the relationships among the child and
the other parents. Introducing another adult into the group of adults who will care
for and make decisions about the child should not occur in instances where that
adult is unable to act as a responsible parent. C.L.’s relationship with A.L. does
not “entitle” him to de facto parenthood if he cannot, or will not, undertake a
permanent responsible parental role in her life.
[¶23] Because we affirm the court’s finding that C.L. failed to establish the
first element of de facto parenthood, we do not reach or review the court’s finding
that C.L. failed to satisfy the second necessary element by establishing
“exceptional circumstances” sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal
parents’ rights. Id. Nor is it necessary for us to reach the biological father’s
equitable arguments against a determination that C.L. is a de facto parent.
11
The entry is:
Appeal from child protection order dismissed.
Judgment in family matter affirmed.
On the briefs:
Sean Ociepka, Esq., Belfast, for appellant C.L.
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
Logan E. Perkins, Esq., Silverstein-Law, P.A., Bangor, for
appellee biological father of A.L.
At oral argument:
Sean Ociepka, Esq., for appellant C.L.
Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine
Logan E. Perkins, Esq., for appellee biological father of A.L.
Belfast District Court docket numbers FM-2012-100 and PC-2013-13
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY