Town of Glenburn v. Sidney Pinkham

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 145 Docket: Pen-18-89
Submitted
On Briefs: September 26, 2018
Decided: October 30, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
TOWN OF GLENBURN
v.
SIDNEY PINKHAM
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Sidney Pinkham appeals from a judgment entered by the District
Court (Bangor, Jordan, J.) in favor of the Town of Glenburn on its land use
violation complaint filed pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452 (2017) and
M.R. Civ. P. 80K. Pinkham asserts that the court violated his right to procedural
due process and abused its discretion during the hearing on the complaint by
(1) allowing one of the Town’s witnesses to testify by telephone, see
M.R. Civ. P. 43; and (2) failing to exclude two hearsay statements on its own
initiative. He further argues that the court erred in not making explicit findings
addressing the statutory factors to be considered in setting the amount of the
civil penalty that it imposed. See 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(E). Because the record
is devoid of any evidence of one of the factors that 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(E)
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requires the court to consider, we vacate the imposition of the civil penalty. In
all other respects, including the award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to
30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(D), we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] At the hearing on this matter, the court heard testimony from two
witnesses: the owner of property that abuts Pinkham’s, who testified
telephonically, and the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer. In its resulting
judgment, the court found the following facts, “which are viewed in the light
most favorable to support the trial court’s judgment.” MacMahon v. Tinkham,
2015 ME 9, ¶ 4, 109 A.3d 1141. Pinkham was the owner of property in the
Town from December 22, 2016, through August 18, 2017. During that time, the
mobile home located on the property had plumbing fixtures installed but was
not connected to a sewage disposal system. Additionally, the plumbing fixtures
were not supplied with potable running water, and a portable toilet was used
as a substitute for a permanent toilet.
[¶3] On September 8, 2017, the Town filed a land use citation and
complaint in the District Court pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452 and
M.R. Civ. P. 80K, alleging that Pinkham’s property was in violation of a
wastewater disposal rule promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
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Services, 16 C.M.R. 10 144 241-22 § 4(I) (2015), and sections 305 and 601 of
the Uniform Plumbing Code, as adopted by 8 C.M.R. 02 395 4-1 § 1 (2016). The
Town sought a civil monetary penalty and attorney fees as well as an order from
the court requiring Pinkham to remove the violations and enjoining him from
occupying the property until he complied.
[¶4] The court ordered Pinkham to maintain the property in compliance
with regulatory requirements by supplying the dwelling structure with
pressurized water and with a subsurface wastewater disposal system,1 and
further ordered him to pay a $23,900 civil monetary penalty and reasonable
attorney fees. Pinkham timely filed a notice of appeal. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901
(2017); M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] Pinkham first contends that the court violated his right to
procedural due process and abused its discretion during the hearing on the
Town’s complaint by allowing one of the Town’s witnesses to testify by
telephone and by failing to exclude two hearsay statements on its own
initiative. We conclude that the court acted within its discretion and committed
1 The parties agreed, and the evidence establishes, that the violations alleged in the complaint had
been fully abated by late August 2017, shortly before the Town filed its land use complaint.
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no due process violation when it allowed a witness to testify by telephone. The
circumstances necessitating the call constituted good cause, and the court
safeguarded Pinkham’s right to cross-examine the witness, see M.R.
Civ. P. 43(a), (i).
[¶6] Similarly, the court committed no error in not excluding, sua sponte,
testimony from the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer concerning two
out-of-court statements made by the witness who testified telephonically. The
Town did not offer the witness’s prior statements for their truth, see
M.R. Evid. 801(c)(2), rather, it offered them (1) to authenticate the witness’s
affidavit as part of that witness’s telephonic testimony, see M.R. Evid. 901(b)(1),
and (2) to demonstrate that the witness’s prior statements concerning
violations had the effect of prompting the Code Enforcement Officer to inspect
Pinkham’s home, see In re Hope H., 2017 ME 198, ¶ 13, 170 A.3d 813; State v.
Harrigan, 662 A.2d 196, 197-98 (Me. 1995). Furthermore, the statements were
merely cumulative of the live telephonic testimony, rendering admissibility
harmless even if the statements were considered hearsay. See State v. Witham,
1997 ME 77, ¶ 16, 692 A.2d 930 (concluding that admission of the witness’s
hearsay statements was harmless error where other admissible testimony
made it highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict).
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[¶7] Pinkham next argues that the court erred in not making explicit
findings addressing the statutory factors to be considered in setting the amount
of a civil penalty. “On review after a hearing in which the court has stated its
findings, and there has been no motion for further findings, we will infer that
the court found all the facts necessary to support its judgment if those inferred
findings are supportable by evidence in the record.” State v. Connor,
2009 ME 91, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 1003.
[¶8] In this case, although the evidence supports the court’s ultimate
finding that Pinkham allowed the alleged plumbing and subsurface wastewater
disposal violations to occur on the property, the record is devoid of any mention
of a “municipal order to stop,” 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(E)(3), or any other notice
to the landowner that he was in violation of the ordinance. Thus, on the
evidence before it, the court could not have considered the extent to which the
violations may have continued after notification to Pinkham—a factor that
must be considered by the court before assessing a civil penalty.2 In the
2 Pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(E) (2017), in setting a civil penalty, “the court shall consider,
but is not limited to, the following: (1) Prior violations by the same party; (2) The degree of
environmental damage that cannot be abated or corrected; (3) The extent to which the violation
continued following a municipal order to stop; and (4) The extent to which the municipality
contributed to the violation by providing the violator with the incorrect information or by failing to
take timely action.”
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absence of such evidence,3 the imposition of the $23,900 civil penalty must be
vacated. However, because the court’s finding that the violations occurred was
indeed fully supported by competent evidence in the record, the award of
attorney fees is affirmed.
The entry is:
The imposition of a civil penalty pursuant to
30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3) is vacated; in all other
respects, including the award of attorney fees
and costs pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(D),
the judgment is affirmed.
Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Sidney Pinkham
Kate J. Grossman, Esq., Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, for appellant Town
of Glenburn
Bangor District Court docket number CV-2017-231
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
3 Although service of a Rule 80K land use citation and complaint could be construed as a municipal
order to stop, the service here occurred after the violation had been abated. Furthermore, although
the complaint states that the Code Enforcement Officer notified Pinkham of the violation by letter on
December 22, 2016, there is no evidence in the record consistent with that allegation. The contents
of a complaint do not constitute evidence. See Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc.,
2012 ME 135, ¶ 18, 58 A.3d 1083.