In re Child of Heather W.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 31Docket: Yor-17-451
Submitted
On Briefs: February 26, 2018
Decided: March 6, 2018
Panel: ALEXANDER, J., and, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF HEATHER W.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Heather W. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Springvale, Foster, J.) terminating her parental rights to her daughter pursuant
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) (2017).1 She
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s finding of
parental unfitness and the court’s discretionary determination that
termination is in the best interest of the child. See id. § 4055(1)(B)(2).
Additionally, the mother argues that the Department failed to meet its
obligation to provide reunification services pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041
(2017). We affirm the judgment.
1 The court entered a judgment terminating the father’s parental rights to the child after the father
consented to termination. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(1) (2017). The father does not
appeal from that judgment.
2
[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by clear
and convincing evidence that the mother (1) is unable to protect the child from
jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time that is
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (2) is unable to take
responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet
the child’s needs, and (3) has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate
and reunify with the child pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv). The court also determined that termination of
the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See id.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). We review the trial court’s factual findings supporting the
unfitness determination and the best interest determination for clear error, and
we review the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of
discretion. In re Anastasia M., 2017 ME 213, ¶ 2, 172 A.3d 922.
[¶3] The court based its determinations on the following findings of fact.
The mother was first prescribed opiates in 2010 following a gallbladder issue.
She continued using opiates to deal with back pain. In 2012, the mother was in
a car accident and was again prescribed opiates, which she used until after a
resulting surgery in January 2013. When her prescription expired a few
months later, she began obtaining unprescribed opiates through other means.
3
[¶4] The mother sought treatment for her addiction. From May 2013 to
August 2014, she successfully completed a methadone treatment program. In
the fall of 2014, she experienced another injury, which required surgery. She
was prescribed oxycodone and subsequently relapsed. The mother continued
to use unprescribed opiates for the next five months and soon began injecting
heroin.
[¶5] During this time, the mother and the child were living at the
mother’s uncle’s home. In April 2015, the mother stole valuable coins from her
uncle in order to purchase drugs. She was charged with theft, and she and the
child were evicted from the home.
[¶6] In May 2015, the Department filed a petition for a child protection
order, which the court granted. The mother waived her right to a summary
preliminary hearing and agreed to the entry of a jeopardy order in which the
court found that jeopardy as to the mother “consists of her inability to provide
adequate care for the child and neglect of the child’s basic daily needs due to
the mother’s long-standing opiate addiction.”
[¶7] Visitation between the mother and the child was fully supervised.
There were concerns during some visits that the mother appeared to be falling
asleep or “nodding off” at times and that she took extended bathroom breaks.
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These concerns contributed to the Department’s reluctance to ease the
requirement of full supervision. There was no visitation between July 9, 2016,
and August 28, 2016, when the mother was incarcerated for the theft of coins
from her uncle. Upon her release, she “procrastinated” in resuming treatment
and visitation with the child because she had relapsed using heroin combined
with fentanyl. The mother visited with the child a couple of times in
December 2016, but before additional visits were arranged, she was arrested
in February 2017 and incarcerated for six months for violating her probation.
As of the date of trial, visitation between the mother and the child had not been
reestablished.
[¶8] The child is diagnosed with Reactive Attachment Disorder. She has
been in three different foster placements as well as a trial placement with the
father. She has also been hospitalized in psychiatric crisis centers on two
different occasions.
[¶9] At the time of trial, the mother was participating in another
substance abuse program, but she was two weeks into a program that can run
for up to fifty-two weeks. She stated that she would require thirty to sixty days
to secure a residence that could accommodate the child and would be in a
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position to parent the child full-time after another three to six months of
reunification services. The court ultimately determined the following:
[The mother] is at the very beginning of a long-term process
to achieve and maintain sobriety. She has a “long-standing opiate
addiction.” At times, she has experienced some success in
treatment, notably from May of 2013 to August of 2014. . . .
However, she has relapsed repeatedly. She has done so even when
fully aware that the return to use of illegal drugs would subject her
to incarceration and adversely affect her reunification efforts. [The
mother’s] projected timeframe for resuming full-time care of [the
child] is totally unrealistic given the chronicity of her addiction, the
status of her substance abuse treatment, and the period of time that
her daughter has been out of her care. It is unfair, and totally
contradictory to the terms of the Act, to require [the child] to
endure the continued uncertainty of foster care while [the mother]
resumes treatment. Time is of the essence in providing [the child]
with a permanent home and the stability necessary to allow her the
opportunity to work on her own issues in a timely fashion.
[¶10] Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact,
all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did
not err in its finding of parental unfitness, nor did it err or abuse its discretion
in determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with a
permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest. See In re Logan M.,
2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17,
889 A.2d 297.
[¶11] The mother also contends that the Department did not meet its
burden to provide reunification services pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041 and that
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the court erred by failing to consider the negative effect that the Department’s
efforts had on her ability to reunify. However, the “Department’s compliance
with its rehabilitation and reunification duties as outlined in section 4041 does
not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in termination proceedings,
nor does the failure of the Department to comply with section 4041 preclude
findings of parental unfitness.” In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d 572;
see also 22 M.R.S. § 4041. Additionally, contrary to the mother’s contention,
there is ample evidence in the record that the Department made reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family.2 Despite these efforts, the mother
was unsuccessful in reunifying with the child.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
2 These efforts included supporting the child in a foster placement, supporting the child in a trial
placement with her father, conducting well-being checks of the child, providing individual counseling
for the child, providing individual counseling for the mother, facilitating family team meetings,
facilitating contact between the child and parents, providing access to an intensive outpatient
program for the mother, providing methadone treatment for the mother, making a referral for case
management for the mother, providing transportation assistance for the mother, scheduling drug
screens for the mother, and providing other services.
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Amanda E. Ramirez, Esq., Law Office of Amanda E. Ramirez, Newfield, for
appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Springvale District Court docket number PC-2015-25
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY