State of Maine v. Nathan J. Lacourse

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 75 Docket: Yor-16-160
Argued: December 15, 2016
Decided: April 27, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
NATHAN J. LACOURSE
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] Based on events occurring during his ten-year-long marriage to
the victim, Nathan J. Lacourse was convicted after a jury trial of domestic
violence assault, domestic violence stalking, and endangering the welfare of a
child.
[¶2] Lacourse now appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by
the trial court (York County, O’Neil, J.) as to the charge of domestic violence
assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2016). We conclude that the trial
record contains insufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the conduct forming the basis for that crime occurred within the
applicable limitations period. We therefore must vacate the judgment of
conviction and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the domestic
2
violence assault charge. We also remand for the court to determine whether
resentencing is necessary as to the stalking and endangering the welfare of a
child charges.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] Although, as noted above, Lacourse was also convicted of domestic
violence stalking and endangering the welfare of a child, he challenges only
the domestic violence assault conviction on appeal. We therefore do not
discuss facts relevant only to his other convictions.
[¶4] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
jury rationally could have found the following relevant facts beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Fay, 2015 ME 160, ¶ 2, 130 A.3d 364. At some
point during Lacourse’s ten-year-long marriage with the victim, Lacourse hit
the victim with a ruler on her lower back, causing her pain and leaving a welt.
[¶5] On June 6, 2013, a York County grand jury returned an eight-count
indictment charging Lacourse, in Count VII, with domestic violence assault
(Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A).1 The portion of the indictment setting
forth that charge stated:
1 The indictment contained the following additional charges: kidnapping (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 301(1)(A)(4) (2016) (Count I); assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(B) (2016) (Count II);
domestic violence terrorizing (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-B(1)(A) (2016) (Count III); domestic
violence stalking (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-C(1)(A) (2016) (Count IV); domestic violence criminal
3
On or about August 30, 2012, in Hollis, YORK County, Maine,
NATHAN J LACOURSE, did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact to [the victim].
This conduct was committed against a family or household
member as defined by 19-A M.R.S.A. §4002(4).
As part of discovery, the State provided to Lacourse seventeen journals, or
diaries, that the victim kept during the course of her relationship with
Lacourse. One of the journals contained an entry dated “8/23/12”2 stating
that Lacourse struck the victim with a ruler “the other day.” The same journal
also contained an entry “written 8/29/12” describing an incident in which
Lacourse squeezed the victim’s hand to the point of causing pain and would
not let go.
[¶6] Lacourse moved for a bill of particulars pursuant to M.R.
Crim. P. 16(c)(1) (Tower 2012-2013),3 arguing that the indictment was too
vague for him to prepare his defense and asking the court to order the State to
“confirm” that the domestic violence assault charge “correspond[ed] to” the
threatening (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) (2016) (Count V); a second charge of domestic
violence assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2016) (Count VI); and endangering the
welfare of a child (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2011) (Count VIII). Title 17-A M.R.S.
§ 554(1)(C) was amended in 2015, but the amendment is not relevant to this appeal. See P.L. 2015,
ch. 358, § 3 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2016)).
2 Lacourse’s assertion on appeal that this entry is dated “8/03/2012” is not supported by the
record.
3 The Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure did not take effect in York County until July 1,
2015, after the judgment of conviction was entered in this case. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 1(e)(3). All
references to court rules in this opinion are to the rules in effect when these proceedings took place.
4
incident described in the journal in which Lacourse squeezed the victim’s
hand. The court (O’Neil, J.) denied Lacourse’s motion.
[¶7] A jury trial was held on December 10 through December 13, 2013.
During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor referred to an
“instance[] of physical abuse . . . where [Lacourse] hit [the victim] with a ruler
on her back, hard enough to leave a mark.” In a chambers conference after
opening statements, Lacourse argued that he had been unaware that the State
would seek to introduce evidence of the “ruler” incident because the State had
given him the impression, in an off-the-record conversation during the
hearing on the motion for a bill of particulars, that the “hand squeeze” incident
formed the factual basis for the domestic violence assault charge. After some
discussion, the court required the State to “pick an event,” and the prosecutor
eventually indicated that the factual basis for the charge was “the slap with
the ruler to her back.”
[¶8] During trial, on direct examination, the victim testified that her
marriage to Lacourse began in August 2003 and that she left the couple’s
home in March 2013. She described the “ruler incident” in response to the
prosecutor’s question, “During the course of your relationship was [Lacourse]
ever physically abusive with you?” The victim testified that “he did hit me
5
with a ruler once on my lower back,” but the State did not ask when the
incident occurred, and the victim did not testify as to a specific date or time
period. None of the victim’s journals or journal entries was admitted in
evidence at trial.4
[¶9] After the State rested, Lacourse moved for a judgment of acquittal,
see M.R. Crim. P. 29, arguing, as to the domestic violence assault charge, that
the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty. The
court denied the motion. The jury found Lacourse guilty of domestic violence
assault.
[¶10] Three days later, Lacourse filed a written motion for a judgment
of acquittal, see M.R. Crim. P. 29(b), arguing principally that he was unfairly
surprised at trial by the evidence about the “ruler” incident. He also stated
that the jury “could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct took place within the statute of limitations” because “the jury was
never presented with any testimony or evidence regarding the date of the
4 The court and the parties did discuss the admissibility of the journals. The court suggested
that even if the State could demonstrate that a hearsay exception applied to portions of the
journals, admission of a voluminous set of journal entries might pose an “unnecessary burden” on
the jury and the trial process. Notwithstanding this discussion, the State sought to admit, as one
exhibit, a box of all seventeen journals. The court rejected that approach but suggested that the
State offer a “specifically delineate[d]” “subset” for the court’s review. The State then proffered four
of the journals, which “cover[ed] the periods from 2009 . . . to 2013” and comprised hundreds of
pages of diary entries. After reviewing the entries during a lunch break, the court ruled that they
were inadmissible because much of the content was irrelevant and much of it did not meet the
requirements of any exception to the rule against hearsay.
6
ruler slapping incident.” The court denied the motion. The court then entered
a judgment of conviction and sentenced Lacourse on the domestic violence
assault conviction to 364 days in jail, with all but six months suspended, and
two years of probation with conditions that included completion of a certified
batterer’s intervention program.5 Lacourse appealed.6
II. DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
[¶11] The criminal code provides that “[i]t is a defense that prosecution
was commenced after the expiration of the applicable period of limitations.”
17-A M.R.S. § 8(1) (2016). “The State is not required to negate any facts
expressly designated as a ‘defense[]’ . . . unless the existence of the defense . . .
is in issue as a result of evidence admitted at the trial that is sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt on the issue . . . .” 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2012).7 Evidence
that “make[s] the existence of all the facts constituting [a] defense a
5 The court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence it imposed for the
stalking conviction, which was 364 days in jail, unsuspended. On the conviction of endangering the
welfare of a child, the court sentenced Lacourse to six months in jail, to be served concurrently with
the sentence imposed on the stalking conviction.
6 After we dismissed Lacourse’s initial appeal as untimely, the trial court granted his petition for
post-conviction review and granted him the right to file a new appeal.
7 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) has been amended since the time of trial in this case, but the
amendment is not relevant to our analysis. See P.L. 2015, ch. 431, § 35 (effective July 29, 2016)
(codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2016)).
7
reasonable hypothesis for the fact-finder to entertain” is sufficient to place the
defense “in issue” within the meaning of section 101(1). State v. Graham,
2004 ME 34, ¶ 12, 845 A.2d 558 (quotation marks omitted). If the evidence
generates the defense, “the State must disprove its existence beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1).8 Thus, relevant to this case, if a
statutory defense was “in issue” within the meaning of section 101(1), the
State was required to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
[¶12] We review the record in the light most favorable to the defendant
to determine whether the evidence generates a particular defense. State v.
Gagnier, 2015 ME 115, ¶ 13, 123 A.3d 207. “[T]he State’s burden to disprove a
statutory defense generated by the evidence is the functional equivalent of the
State’s burden to prove all of the elements of the offense.” State v. Hernandez,
1998 ME 73, ¶ 7, 708 A.2d 1022 (quotation marks omitted). To determine
whether the State presented sufficient evidence to disprove a statutory
8 Since 1997, the criminal code has also provided that the court is not required to instruct the
jury “on an issue that has been waived by the defendant.” 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2012); see P.L.
1997, ch. 185, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 1997). This portion of section 101(1) is irrelevant to our
analysis for two reasons. First, the issue in this case is not whether the court should have
instructed the jury on the statute of limitations. Even if it had, Lacourse would still have been
entitled to a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, as we discuss infra. Second, there is no evidence in
this record suggesting that Lacourse expressly waived the statute of limitations defense. See State
v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170, 172 & n.2 (Me. 1995) (concluding that it was obvious error for the court to
fail to instruct the jury on a partial statutory defense where the defendant did not assert—but also
did not waive—the defense); cf. State v. Ford, 2013 ME 96, ¶¶ 11-17, 17 n.5, 82 A.3d 75 (declining
to reach the question of whether self-defense and voluntary intoxication defenses were generated
by the evidence because, in any event, the defendant expressly waived the defenses).
8
defense that has been generated by the evidence, therefore, we view the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a jury
could rationally have found [the nonexistence of the defense] proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d 583 (quotation
marks omitted); see United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2009)
(reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the trial court
should have granted the defendant’s statute-of-limitations-based motion for a
judgment of acquittal).
[¶13] “A prosecution for a Class D or Class E crime must be commenced
within 3 years after it is committed.” 17-A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B) (2012).9
A prosecution is commenced when the relevant charging document is filed,
17-A M.R.S. § 8(6)(B) (2016), and “[a] crime is committed when every element
thereof has occurred, or if the crime consists of a continuing course of
conduct, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity
therein is terminated,” 17-A M.R.S. § 8(6)(A) (2016). Here, because Lacourse
was charged with domestic violence assault as a Class D crime, see 17-A M.R.S.
§ 207-A(1)(A), the applicable limitations period was three years, see
17-A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B). The prosecution was commenced when the State filed
9 An amendment to 17-A M.R.S. § 8(2) that is not relevant to our analysis took effect two months
before trial in this case. See P.L. 2013, ch. 392, § 1 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.
§ 8(2) (2016)).
9
the indictment on June 6, 2013. Criminal conduct occurring before June 6,
2010, was therefore outside the limitations period.
[¶14] Viewed in the light most favorable to Lacourse, see Gagnier,
2015 ME 115, ¶ 13, 123 A.3d 207, the victim’s direct testimony was “sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue” of whether the alleged criminal
conduct occurred within the limitations period, 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1). The
victim testified that she and Lacourse had been married since August 2003,
but no evidence was admitted describing when the conduct forming the
factual basis for the domestic violence assault charge occurred. To the
contrary, the victim described the “ruler” incident in response to a question
about whether Lacourse was physically abusive “[d]uring the course of [the]
relationship.”10
[¶15] The State was therefore required to present evidence sufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the incident occurred during the
limitations period, i.e., sometime on or after June 6, 2010. As the State all but
conceded at oral argument, it did not do so, even viewing the record in the
light most favorable to the State. See Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d
10 The State’s assertions at oral argument that in her testimony the victim described the “ruler”
incident as occurring “later in the relationship” or “toward the end of the relationship” are not
supported by the trial record.
10
583.11 As Lacourse argued in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal,
because the State introduced no evidence upon which a jury could rationally
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct at issue occurred on or after
June 6, 2010, as opposed to at some earlier time, Lacourse was entitled to a
judgment of acquittal.12 See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 90-91 (Me. 1986)
(holding that testimony that an offense occurred “in April” was sufficient to
generate a statute of limitations defense where the dates of April 1 and 2 were
outside the limitations period, and remanding for entry of a judgment of
acquittal because the State presented no evidence tending to disprove the
defense); see also State v. Thompson, 1997 ME 109, ¶¶ 1, 7-8, 10, 695 A.2d
1174 (directing the entry of a judgment of acquittal where the evidence
generated a statute of limitations defense but was insufficient for the jury to
find that the crime was committed within the applicable limitations period).
We must therefore vacate the judgment as to the domestic violence assault
charge and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
11 Despite multiple invitations from the court for the State to sufficiently narrow the range of
journal entries it sought to introduce, the State never offered a redacted version of the journal entry
dated “8/23/12” in which the victim described the “ruler” incident. Neither did the State ask the
victim, during her testimony, when the event took place, which prevented it from refreshing her
recollection using the relevant journal entry if she did not remember. See M.R. Evid. 612.
12 Because we agree with Lacourse that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, we do not
address his principal arguments that the court (1) should have granted his motion for a bill of
particulars on the domestic violence assault charge and (2) acted too late in ultimately requiring
the State to specify the factual basis for that charge.
11
B. Sentencing
[¶16] Although only Lacourse’s conviction for domestic violence assault
has been vacated, resentencing as to stalking and endangering the welfare of a
child may be necessary to the extent that the sentences the court imposed
were interrelated. See State v. Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶¶ 15-16, 704 A.2d 353;
State v. Bunker, 436 A.2d 413, 419 (Me. 1981). The court did not expressly
indicate, during the sentencing hearing, whether the sentences imposed on
the domestic violence stalking and endangering the welfare of a child charges
were affected by the sentence imposed on the domestic violence assault
charge. The record does, however, suggest that the court viewed each crime
in the context of the others. See Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶¶ 15-16, 704 A.2d 353.
For example, in discussing the sentence for the stalking charge, the court
referred to “a series of episodes” taking place over time, potentially referring
to the “ruler” incident as one of those “episodes.” The court also determined
that the domestic violence assault sentence would be consecutive not because
it stemmed from separate conduct, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2)(A) (2016), but
because the assault was particularly serious due to its role as “part of a
pattern of a[n] exercise of extreme power and control over [the victim],”
see 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2)(D) (2016).
12
[¶17] We therefore remand this case with instructions for the court to
first determine whether the sentences imposed for stalking and endangering
the welfare of a child were affected by the sentence imposed for assault.
See Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶¶ 15-16, 704 A.2d 353; Bunker, 436 A.2d at 419. If
the court determines that the sentences were interrelated, it shall resentence
Lacourse on the stalking and endangering charges after “a new sentencing
proceeding at which both [Lacourse] and the State may be heard.” Bunker,
436 A.2d at 419.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated as to Count VII. Remanded
for entry of a judgment of acquittal on Count VII
and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant Nathan J.
Lacourse
Kathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Thomas R. Miscio, Esq. (orally),
Prosecutorial District #1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
York County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-613
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY