State of Maine v. David L. Violette

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 65Docket: Pen-15-310
Submitted
On Briefs: April 21, 2016
Decided: May 3, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
DAVID L. VIOLETTE
GORMAN, J.
[¶1] On October 19, 2014, an officer of the Bangor Police Department
stopped a vehicle driven by David L. Violette. As a result of that stop, Violette
was charged with operating under the influence with two prior convictions for
operating under the influence (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(B)(2) (2015).
The motion judge (Penobscot County, A. Murray, J.) denied Violette’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, and Violette then entered a
conditional guilty plea to the charge pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
[¶2] Because Violette had two previous convictions for operating under the
influence within the ten-year period preceding this conviction, the court sentenced
him to four years in prison with all but eighteen months suspended; two years of
probation; a fine of $1,385; and a six-year license suspension. See 29-A M.R.S.
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§ 2411(5)(C) (2015). Violette appeals, challenging the court’s denial of his motion
to suppress.
[¶3] Violette contends that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by the
required reasonable articulable suspicion, and that the trial court therefore erred by
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. See State v.
Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 8, 960 A.2d 321 (holding that an investigatory stop of a
vehicle is justified when the police officer has an “objectively reasonable,
articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to
public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur” based on the totality
of the circumstances (quotation marks omitted)). The court found, based on
competent evidence in the suppression record, that the officer’s attention was
drawn to Violette’s vehicle because Violette was accelerating the vehicle in such a
manner as to cause smoking tires and a squealing noise that lasted for three to four
seconds. Based on these facts, the court concluded, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that Violette had
violated 29-A M.R.S. § 2079 (2015), which prohibits braking or accelerating that
is “unnecessarily made so as to cause a harsh and objectionable noise.”
[¶4] We discern no error in the court’s findings of fact or conclusions of
law. See Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 7, 960 A.2d 321 (stating that we review the
suppression court’s findings of fact for clear error and its ultimate legal conclusion
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de novo); State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me. 1984) (providing that the
suppression court “alone . . . passes upon the credibility and weight of [the]
testimony and decides what inferences and deductions can reasonably be drawn
therefrom”); see also State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (holding that an
officer’s objectively reasonable belief that the defendant was committing a traffic
violation was a sufficient ground to support the stop, even when the officer later
realized that no such traffic violation had occurred).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant
David L. Violette
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Susan J. Pope,
Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee
State of Maine
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2014-3769
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY