State of Maine v. Roxanne Jeskey

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 134Docket: Pen-15-315
Argued: May 4, 2016
Decided: August 16, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ROXANNE JESKEY
HUMPHREY, J.
[¶1] Roxanne Jeskey appeals from a judgment of conviction for the
intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder of her
husband, Richard Jeskey, entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County,
Hunter, J.) after a bench trial. Roxanne argues that (A) there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she
was guilty of knowing or intentional murder or depraved indifference murder;
(B) the court erred by not finding her not guilty by reason of insanity; (C) the
court erred by not considering the lesser included offense of manslaughter;
2
and (D) the court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial.1
We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
trial record supports the following facts, which were found by the Superior
Court in a comprehensive decision following a seven-day bench trial. See
State v. Weaver, 2016 ME 12, ¶ 2, 130 A.3d 972.
[¶3] Roxanne and Richard “Rick” Jeskey were married and living
together in an apartment in Bangor in June 2011. Rick was employed full time
as a freight delivery truck driver, and Roxanne regularly provided care for her
young grandchildren at their apartment. In 2003, Roxanne underwent a
resection of the anterior right temporal lobe of her brain to mitigate
intractable seizures. The surgery left Roxanne with some cognitive
limitations, such as disorganized thinking and impaired processing, as well as
personality, emotional, and behavioral changes, such as being quick to anger
and experiencing stronger and more frequent impulsive reactions. Roxanne
1 Roxanne also asserts that the court abused its discretion by limiting the use of information that
she related to a doctor during her forensic evaluation. We do not find this argument persuasive and
do not discuss it further.
3
also suffers from heart disease and may suffer from post-traumatic stress
disorder associated with childhood abuse.
[¶4] A husband and wife lived in the apartment next door to, and were
friends with, the Jeskeys. They reported that the Jeskeys frequently argued
and that Roxanne often described and displayed bruising on her arms, legs,
and torso, but Roxanne provided no explanation for them other than that she
was on blood thinners for her heart condition and had a history of bruising
easily.
[¶5] Both the Jeskeys and the couple next door were home in the late
afternoon and evening on Sunday, June 12, 2011. Roxanne called the wife
around 6:00 p.m., when the couple was having dinner, and the wife spoke with
her briefly. The wife fell asleep watching television and was awoken about an
hour later by loud banging or slamming sounds coming from the Jeskeys’
apartment. The wife called Roxanne to see if everything was all right.
Roxanne told her that everything was fine and that they did not need any help.
At ten or twenty minute intervals throughout the course of the evening until
midnight, the couple heard loud banging, slamming sounds, bumps, and thuds
coming from the Jeskeys’ apartment.
4
[¶6] The wife and Roxanne exchanged several more phone calls that
evening, and, at some point, Roxanne told the wife that she and Rick were
fighting because she had discovered that he had been speaking with a former
girlfriend on the phone, and she was mad.2 The wife testified that she never
heard any voices that night despite Roxanne’s assertion that she and Rick
were fighting. Roxanne also told the wife that Rick slapped her across the face
and asked what she “planned to do about it” when Roxanne confronted him
about the former girlfriend. Roxanne explained that, in response, she used a
pickaxe to damage Rick’s motorcycle3 that was parked near the apartment and
had then gone back inside to hit him in the face with a plastic bat.
[¶7] When the wife asked if Rick was okay, Roxanne told her that she
had given him a bloody nose and had loosened a tooth but that he was fine,
and if he really needed an ambulance, Roxanne said, she would let the wife
know. During one call, in response to the wife’s repeated offers of assistance,
Roxanne specifically asked her not to call an ambulance. Roxanne stated that
she was “pissed off” and that she could “be your best friend or your worst
fucking enemy, and that’s what [Rick] picked.” Roxanne told the wife that Rick
2 Roxanne also made several calls to the former girlfriend from Rick’s cell phone, and Rick had
called the woman once in the early evening and once again at around 9:30 p.m.
3 Roxanne had cut the brake lines and spark plug wire, pulled out wires, and loosened the air
filter and wire harness box.
5
was getting cleaned up and taking a bath. She ended the phone call by telling
the wife that Rick was calling her from the bathroom, though the wife testified
that she did not hear him.
[¶8] Shortly after 11:30 p.m., the husband heard a very loud thud
coming from the Jeskeys’ apartment, and he was so concerned that he went
next door, in the pouring rain, to find out for himself if everything was all
right. Roxanne came to the door but only opened it a crack to speak with him.
She did not invite him in. He stayed at the door less than a minute, but he did
not see anything out of the ordinary regarding Roxanne’s appearance, and she
assured him that all was well. Roxanne called the couple once more and
thanked the husband for coming over; that was the last contact they had with
her until the following day. Both husband and wife stated that on each
occasion they spoke with Roxanne, she appeared to be appropriately
responsive, outwardly calm, and coherent.
[¶9] Later that night, at approximately 2:30 a.m. on June 13, 2011,
Roxanne called Rick’s place of employment and spoke with the night
supervisor. She told him that Rick was very ill and that the two of them were
driving home from the hospital where they had just spent the entire evening,
and therefore Rick would not be going to work that morning. Roxanne also
6
asked for the supervisor’s name so that she could write it down, which the
supervisor considered odd because he and Rick had worked together for
years, and Roxanne claimed that Rick was sitting next to her in the car.
[¶10] That morning, around 8:30 a.m., Roxanne called 9-1-1 and
reported that Rick was unconscious and not breathing. Emergency services
and law enforcement arrived within minutes, found Rick lying in the bathtub,
and quickly determined that he was dead. An officer with the Bangor police
department arrived on the scene, and, as he began to interact with Roxanne,
he noted that she appeared weak and was breathing rapidly. She volunteered
that she had gotten in a huge fight with her husband the night before and that
she had hit him with her grandchild’s plastic bat—part of which the officer
subsequently found in the garbage can. She admitted to the officer that she
lied to Rick’s supervisor about having been at the hospital. She also told him
that she found Rick in the tub when she went to take a shower that morning.
[¶11] As she was speaking with the officer, she made repeated requests
for medical personnel to “get a pulse” from Rick, and, when informed that he
was deceased, she began to strike the officer’s chest repeatedly. He took hold
of her arms and held them away from him. Following her outburst, Roxanne’s
breathing became more labored, and she began to clutch her chest. As EMTs
7
walked her to the door, she stated that Rick had pushed her down, and she
displayed what to the officer’s observation seemed like aged bruises on her
arms and legs. Roxanne was taken to the hospital for evaluation. She spent
approximately four hours in the emergency department and, during that time,
interacted with one particular nurse for about twenty minutes.
[¶12] That nurse described Roxanne’s demeanor at the hospital as calm
and matter-of-fact, and testified that Roxanne was consistently oriented to
person, place, time, and situation. The nurse noted that Roxanne had no
difficulties communicating and that Roxanne volunteered to the nurse that
she had “hit [Rick] again and again and again,” that she had cut him, and that
“he had made quite a mess and that she had to clean it up.” At no time did
Roxanne complain to the nurse of any specific injuries nor did she claim that
Rick had hit her. The nurse observed bruises on Roxanne’s body and the back
of her hands, consistent with the use of blood thinners.
[¶13] When the wife went to the hospital to visit, Roxanne gave her a
rambling explanation of what happened, reporting that Rick had been quite
drunk, and that he had repeatedly fallen down and kept banging his face to the
point that his eye came out. Roxanne also told the wife that Rick took the
8
towel rack off the wall and attempted to strike her with it. She repeatedly told
the wife that “she didn’t do it,” and she only wanted to “hurt [him] a little bit.”
[¶14] Upon investigation of the Jeskeys’ apartment, law enforcement
found Rick’s unclothed body in the bathtub with a cellphone, broken in two,
on his chest, a ripped shower curtain, a broken wooden towel rack and a
brown leather belt lying on the bathroom floor; a pair of needle-nose pliers
and a razor without the blade on the bathroom counter; and a broken piece of
a metal broom handle, a cigarette lighter, and a bent metal towel rod also lying
on the floor. In addition, there were impact, cast-off, and transfer blood
patterns4 in the shower; on the bathroom door, floor, walls and counter; on
the hallway carpet; and on the toolbox in the bedroom closet. The washing
machine and a laundry basket were full of wet laundry with red-brown stains
on several of the articles. The bathroom appeared as though it had been
cleaned up.
[¶15] The medical examiner testified that Rick sustained multiple
injuries to the front, both sides, and back of his head; a deep laceration across
the bridge of his nose and a broken nose; a subarachnoid hemorrhage near
4 An officer with the Bangor Police Department’s Criminal Investigation Division testified that
“cast-off is basically blood that is flung from or released from a moving object.” “Impact” is “the
striking of blood with an object. Liquid blood, wet blood.” “Transfer” is a “bloodied surface coming
in contact with another surface.”
9
the surface of his brain; multiple cuts and tear wounds to his forehead and
scalp; injuries all around his eyes and a cutting injury to his left eyelid, the
globe of his left eye sliced open in a manner that allowed the vitreous fluid to
escape; puncture wounds to his arms5; significant bruising around his entire
neck; a fractured hyoid bone; pinpoint hemorrhages inside his lips suggesting
that he was strangled or choked; multiple torso injuries on his front and left
side, including three rib fractures; a burn to his left nipple; punctures, bruises,
and cuts to the exterior of his penis; injuries to his scrotum that were caused
when something6 was thrust through the scrotal sac far enough to reach the
pelvic floor and grab onto and damage the mesentery and tear a hole in the
small bowel; cuts and lineal abrasions to the anus; and bruising, cuts, tears,
and abrasions to the forearms, hands, thighs, and calves. Rick also had alcohol
and sleeping pills in his system, which may have impaired or incapacitated
him, but the court specifically found that he was “conscious throughout his
ordeal.”
[¶16] On June 22, 2011, Roxanne was charged with intentional or
knowing murder or, in the alternative, depraved indifference murder in
5 The court found that these wounds were caused by blows from the wooden towel rack, which
had protruding screws.
6 The court found that Roxanne caused the injuries to Rick’s genitals using needle-nose pliers
and the injuries to his anus using the metal broom handle.
10
violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)-(B) (2015). On June 24, 2011, the State
filed a motion for a forensic evaluation, stating, “The circumstances of the case
strongly suggest that the defendant may have mental illness issues, including
neuropsychological issues.” On July 27, 2011, the grand jury returned an
indictment charging Roxanne with one consolidated count of intentional or
knowing and/or depraved indifference murder.
[¶17] Roxanne pleaded not guilty at her arraignment in
September 2011 and, after holding a hearing on October 31, 2011, the court
(A. Murray, J.) granted the State’s motion for a forensic evaluation, ordering a
mental examination to determine Roxanne’s competency, whether she
suffered from insanity or an abnormal condition of the mind, and whether
there existed other mental conditions relevant to issues that might arise at
trial, such as battered woman syndrome. In May 2012, at the State’s request,
the court also ordered a neuropsychological examination to be conducted by
the State Forensic Service. Shortly thereafter, Roxanne was ordered admitted
to Riverview Psychiatric Center for sixty days.
[¶18] On April 10, 11, 12, and 16, 2013, the court held the first of two
competency hearings. Four expert witnesses testified. Dr. Riley, a clinical
neuropsychologist, opined that Roxanne had all the skills necessary to
11
demonstrate competency if she chose to exercise those skills. Drs. Doiron, a
board-certified clinical neuropsychologist, and Lorenz, a clinical psychologist,
opined that she did not. And Dr. O’Grady, a clinical and forensic psychologist,
opined that Roxanne’s “skills related to competency fell somewhere between
her functioning prior to arrest”—which included being entrusted with the
care of young children, volunteering at school, driving, functioning in the
community—“and not being competent.” In its May 2013 order, the court
noted that Roxanne’s presentation to the four experts was “markedly different
than her presentation to others.” The court stated that, although it was
convinced that Roxanne “has some impairments, and is further convinced that
stress may exacerbate those impairments,” it concluded, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that she was competent to stand trial because she was able to
cooperate with counsel to conduct a defense in a reasonable manner.
[¶19] On May 24, 2013, Roxanne entered a plea of not criminally
responsible by reason of insanity, 17-A M.R.S. § 39 (2015), and waived her
right to a jury trial.7 On November 8 and 12, 2013, Roxanne and the State
each moved for a second competency evaluation alleging a change in
7 Also on that day, Roxanne moved for the recusal of Justice Murray on the ground that the court
found that Roxanne was “malingering,” i.e. intentionally presenting symptoms to avoid
consequences, which Roxanne claimed raised a question as to whether the court was prejudicing
Roxanne’s credibility. The motion to recuse was granted, without comment.
12
circumstances based on a new report by Dr. Lorenz, and the court (Hunter, J.)
granted the motion.
[¶20] On December 10 and 11, 2013, the court held a second
competency hearing and took testimony from the same panel of four doctors.
This time, Drs. O’Grady’s and Riley’s testimony supported the conclusion that
Roxanne did have the ability to cooperate and assist in her defense, but Drs.
Doiron and Lorenz testified that she did not have the ability to assist. In an
order dated December 13, 2013, the court noted that the experts shared a
view that Roxanne suffered from low cognition, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and “other significant mental health issues that adversely affect[ed]
her level of functioning.” The court appropriately took into account its
observations of Roxanne during the course of the proceedings and other
evidence presented of her behavior in jail for five months and concluded,
again, that she was competent to stand trial.
[¶21] A seven-day bench trial commenced on December 16, 2013. On
December 20th, following the State’s case-in-chief, the court granted an
extended recess to give Roxanne time to decide whether she wanted to testify.
On January 2, 2014, during the break, the court held a video conference with
Roxanne, her counsel, and the State’s attorneys. Roxanne’s counsel alleged
13
that she was suffering from an active psychotic disorder that was “seriously
interfering with her ability to assist counsel in anything close to a normal
relationship” and requested that she be evaluated by a psychiatrist to address
her significant medication and treatment issues that affected, counsel claimed,
her ability to make the decision whether or not to testify.
[¶22] The State contended that Roxanne had been given several
opportunities to review trial materials and availed herself of many of those
opportunities, and the prison staff reported that she adamantly denied
suicidal or homicidal ideations, plan, or intent, and that she did not endorse
perceptual disturbances. The court stated that there was “nothing to suggest
that Ms. Jeskey does not enjoy the competence – the level of competence that
the Court had found in its most recent order, and, therefore, [it was] not
inclined to order any further evaluations or any testing such [as] has been
suggested by the defense here.”
[¶23] When trial re-commenced on January 6, Roxanne presented one
witness in her defense, Dr. Doiron, who testified that Roxanne suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder and schizoaffective disorder, which, when
coupled with her cognitive and mood changes following her brain resection,
resulted in her inability to properly perceive the situation the night of the
14
murder. He testified that Roxanne had been experiencing a dissociative state
that prevented her from being able to form the requisite culpable state of
mind for knowing and intentional murder. In contrast, the State’s rebuttal
witness, Dr. O’Grady, testified that she did not observe anything during the
course of her interaction with Roxanne that would support Dr. Doiron’s
conclusion that Roxanne was experiencing a dissociative state.
[¶24] In an order dated May 30, 2014, as to the charge of knowing or
intentional murder the court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
(1) Roxanne inflicted injuries upon Rick Jeskey that ultimately lead to his
death; (2) what Roxanne did to Rick was for the purpose of hurting him, and
therefore her conduct was the product of her own free choice; and (3) she
intentionally caused Rick’s death. As to the charge of murder based on
depraved indifference, the court found that “[a]ny one of [the injuries Rick
sustained] standing alone manifests a depraved indifference to the value of
human life. Taken together they reflect a monstrous savagery and cruelty that
defies comprehension.” The court also found that this was “not a case of
criminally negligent manslaughter,” despite that being a lesser included
charge.
15
[¶25] As to evidence bearing on Roxanne’s defenses of self-defense and
justified use of deadly force based on her allegations of mutual aggression
between her and her husband, the court stated that, even under Roxanne’s
view of the evidence, the State had proved the absence of self-defense beyond
a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the court stated, “The evidence is clear to this
court that [Roxanne’s] use of force greatly exceeded the bounds of objective
reasonableness and simply cannot be viewed as a ‘reasonable degree’ of
force.” The court also found “that [Roxanne] did not actually believe that what
she did to Mr. Jeskey was necessary because it is clear to this court that [she]
continued to use force against [him] long after he had become unresponsive
and therefore long after any threat of imminent use of force against her had
ended.” Further, the court found that there was “no credible evidence that
would have, at any time, justified [Roxanne’s] use of deadly force against”
Rick.
[¶26] As to Roxanne’s contention that she should be held not criminally
responsible for her conduct by reason of insanity, the court found that she
failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that at the time of her
actions, she lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her
conduct because of a severe abnormal condition of the mind that grossly and
16
demonstrably impaired her perception or understanding of reality,” despite
the fact that she suffered from “a variety of mental health issues.” The court
found that, because Roxanne was coherent in her communications with the
neighbors, Rick’s supervisor, a police officer, and the nurse, and because she
made several phone calls throughout the course of the evening, she was
coherent and “capable of reality[-]based, goal[-]directed behavior.”
[¶27] The court also concluded that Roxanne had demonstrated
appreciation for the wrongfulness of her conduct by her request that the wife
not call an ambulance; by her “opening the door a crack” and subsequent
failure to invite the husband in when he came over to check on her; by her
deceptive call to Rick’s supervisor; and by her efforts to clean the bathroom
and launder the clothing. The court concluded that, “at the time she was
causing fatal injuries to Mr. Jeskey, [Roxanne] did not suffer from the kind of
severe abnormal condition of the mind that would be sufficient to shield her
from criminal responsibility under Maine law.” The court entered a finding of
guilty on May 30, 2014.
[¶28] On June 9, 2014, Roxanne filed a motion for a new trial on the
ground that “it was manifestly unjust for [her] to be tried while she was
actively psychotic” because it was impossible for her to be adequately
17
counseled and make a “truly voluntary and informed decision about . . .
whether to testify in her own defense.” She implied that she was entitled to a
new trial because her new anti-psychotic medication had markedly improved
her overall mental health by the time she made the motion. On June 12, 2014,
the court denied the motion, noting that, other than Roxanne’s counsel, no
one, including the court, had observed any evidence of active psychosis prior
to or during the trial. The court stated that it was “aware of no recognized
right for a criminal defendant to be at some specified state of optimum
physical or mental health before being required to stand trial. That they
might be made better able to participate in trial proceedings through medical
intervention does not appear to be a recognized basis for granting a new trial.”
[¶29] On June 27, 2014, the court held a sentencing hearing and
sentenced Roxanne to fifty years in prison. Roxanne timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Murder Convictions
1. Knowing or Intentional Murder Conviction
[¶30] Roxanne first argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed
intentional or knowing murder. We review the evidence, and all reasonable
18
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to
the court’s judgment to determine whether the trial court rationally could
have found each element of the charged offense proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. See State v. Jones, 2012 ME 88, ¶ 7, 46 A.3d 1125.
[¶31] A person is guilty of murder if the person intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another human being or engages in conduct
that manifests a depraved indifference to the value of human life that in fact
causes the death of another human being. 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A)-(B). “In
order to prove the defendant guilty of murder, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt” that (1) the victim is dead; (2) the defendant caused his
death; (3) the defendant’s conduct was voluntary;8 and (4) the defendant
acted knowingly or intentionally.9 Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual,
§ 6-62 at 6-123 (2016 ed.).
8 Voluntary conduct means “that the defendant’s actions that caused the death were the result of
the defendant’s conscious choice and not the result of reflex, convulsion or some other
nonvoluntary act. . . .” Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 6-62 at 6-123 (2016 ed.).
9 “A person causes death intentionally if it is that person’s conscious object to cause death. A
person causes death knowingly if that person is aware that it is practically certain that his/her
conduct will cause death.” Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 6-62 at 6-123.
19
[¶32] Relying on the law of abnormal condition of the mind10 and
self-defense based on mutual physical combat, Roxanne asserts that the court
erred because it failed to consider fully those distinguishing factors that raised
a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the required culpable state of mind.
See 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2015). The flaw in her reasoning is that “merely because
there is evidence sufficient to generate an issue does not mean that the [court]
is compelled to believe that evidence.” State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 542
(Me. 1980).
[¶33] Our standard of review requires us to view evidence in the light
most favorable to the court’s judgment. See Jones, 2012 ME 88, ¶ 7, 46 A.3d
1125. Here, the court could rationally have found every element of knowing
or intentional murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt despite evidence
presented that could negate Roxanne’s mental state. First, evidence
established that Rick was dead and that Roxanne was responsible for his
death.
[¶34] Second, regarding Roxanne’s state of mind, the court found, and
the record supports, that because Rick sustained so many injuries over what
10 “Evidence of an abnormal condition of the mind may raise a reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the required culpable state of mind.” 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2015); See State v. Graham,
2015 ME 35, ¶ 17, 113 A.3d 1102.
20
must have been an extended period of time, “[t]he very nature of those
injuries reflect a willfulness and a sense of purpose to inflict serious harm.”
The court also found that because Roxanne was emotionally hurt due to Rick’s
perceived infidelity, she “became enraged and formed an intention to hurt”
him—an intention that she communicated to a neighbor. Finally, the record
supports the court’s finding that Roxanne’s actions were taken knowingly.
Rick was alive but incapacitated most of the time that the injuries were
inflicted as demonstrated by the fact that the neighbors heard no voices or
screams; that Rick was still bleeding and hemorrhaging from his injuries and
was laying prone; and that Roxanne, an LPN, had sufficient medical knowledge
to attend to his medical needs, and even a layperson would be aware that, if
unattended, Rick would bleed to death from the injuries that she had inflicted.
[¶35] Roxanne’s contentions that, because she did not have a plan to
kill Rick, because there was evidence of a mutual physical altercation,11 and
because she had several mental health diagnoses, she could not, and did not,
have the requisite culpable state of mind to commit knowing or intentional
murder are unavailing. We conclude that sufficient evidence existed to permit
11 The court considered but ultimately rejected Roxanne’s affirmative defense of self-defense,
stating that there was no properly submitted evidence that generated the issue, and that her use of
force, even if she was not the original aggressor, “exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.”
21
a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Roxanne
was guilty of knowing or intentional murder.
2. Depraved Indifference Murder Conviction
[¶36] Roxanne also contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that she committed depraved indifference murder. We
apply the same standard of review and examine the facts in the light most
favorable to the court’s judgment to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State proved all of the
elements of the charged offense. See id. ¶ 7.
[¶37] A defendant may be convicted of depraved indifference murder if
the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the conduct was
voluntary, representing the defendant’s conscious decision; (2) the conduct
caused the victim’s death; and (3) when looking objectively, the fact-finder is
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was, as the court here
stated, so bad, brutal, savage, revolting or shocking, that, although the
defendant may not have acted with the actual subjective intent to kill the
victim, the fact-finder can nonetheless impute the highest degree of
blameworthiness. See State v. Thongsavanh, 2007 ME 20, ¶ 39, 915 A.2d 421;
see also State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 63 (Me. 1981) (“[D]eath-producing
22
conduct will justify a verdict of guilty of depraved indifference murder if a jury
could find that [the] conduct was so heinous in the eyes of the law as to
constitute murder.” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶38] Citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), Roxanne
contends that, as a predicate to all criminal liability, the person must have fair
notice that her conduct is forbidden, and, because she suffered from multiple
mental health and medical diagnoses, she could not know that her behavior
was proscribed. She argues that it is inherent in this predicate that a person’s
individual capacities are always a factor when they so significantly and
severely deviate from the norm. Contrary to Roxanne’s contention, Harriss
establishes an objective standard and requires only that a statute give “a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute.” Id.; see also State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 174
(Me. 1981). No special dispensation for individuals diagnosed with mental
health conditions exists in our case law to alter the objective standard we
have enunciated, and Roxanne cites none in her brief. Roxanne also argues
that the existence of several mental health diagnoses raises more than a
reasonable doubt as to her ability to form the requisite intent; however “[t]he
23
offense does not require evidence of a defendant’s subjective state of mind.”
Thongsavanh, 2007 ME 20, ¶ 38, 915 A.2d 421.
[¶39] Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the record supports the
court’s finding that Roxanne acted with depraved indifference to human life.
Her violence against her husband lasted for several hours, and the litany of
the injuries he sustained as recited by the medical examiner, including a
fractured hyoid bone, a sliced-open eyeball, and punctured scrotal sac, would
lead a rational fact-finder to conclude that Roxanne’s conduct was so
outrageous and revolting as to constitute depraved indifference murder. See
id. ¶ 39 (stating that “[c]onduct manifests a depraved indifference to the value
of human life when it is highly charged with death-inducing potential and
demonstrates a total lack of concern that a person may die or suffer as a result
of the conduct”).
B. Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
[¶40] Roxanne contends next that the court erred by concluding that
she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she is not guilty
by reason of insanity. See 17-A M.R.S. § 39. “We review the evidence, and any
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, most favorably to the result
reached by the trial court.” State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 44, 36 A.3d 893.
24
[¶41] “A defendant is not criminally responsible by reason of insanity if,
at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the
defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the
criminal conduct. Mental disease or defect means only those severely
abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person’s
perception or understanding of reality.” Id. ¶ 45 (alterations omitted)
(quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see 17-A M.R.S. § 39. The
defendant must prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, and we will overturn a trial court’s finding adverse to the defendant
“only if the record compels a contrary conclusion.” Gurney, 2012 ME 14,
¶¶ 45-46, 36 A.3d 893 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶42] Roxanne contends that she has a severely abnormal mental
condition due to her several documented diagnoses. The defense expert, Dr.
Doiron, testified that he diagnosed Roxanne with “cognitive disorder, not
otherwise specified” resulting from her brain surgery, schizoaffective
disorder, and severe post-traumatic stress disorder. He stated that Roxanne
would have been “overwhelmed” and “unable to properly understand what is
taking place” in an altercation with her husband. She also may have
developed a “fractionated sense of self” from abuse she suffered early in her
25
life and may have been in and out of a dissociative state. Dr. Doiron stated
that he did not believe that Roxanne was able to appreciate the wrongfulness
of her actions.
[¶43] The State’s rebuttal witness, Dr. O’Grady, testified that she had
diagnosed Roxanne with post-traumatic stress disorder, “cognitive disorder,
not otherwise specified,” and personality change due to general medical
condition, but she disagreed with Dr. Doiron’s diagnosis of a psychotic
disorder. Dr. O’Grady did not believe that Roxanne was in the severe
dissociative state required to negate criminal responsibility because Roxanne
could not have made phone calls, engaged in coherent conversation, or quickly
adjusted her behavior from one moment to the next if she had been in that
state. Dr. O’Grady agreed that Roxanne had a “thought dysfunction” and a lack
of impulse control but noted evidence of malingering in another doctor’s
reports.
[¶44] Although the court heard differing diagnoses and opinions
concerning Roxanne’s ability to perceive the situation the night of Rick’s
death,12 on appellate review “[a]ny conflicts in evidence are resolved in favor
of the State.” State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 26, 892 A.2d 447. The evidence in
12 Roxanne at all times denied having hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia to Dr. Doiron.
26
the record supports the court’s finding that “[a]lthough it is clear that
[Roxanne] suffers from a variety of mental health issues, she has failed to
prove that at the time of her actions, she lacked substantial capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.” For example, the court noted
that during the night of June 12, 2011, Roxanne was coherent in her several
conversations with the neighbors, and neither neighbor suggested that she
seemed out of touch. She was also able to fabricate a story when she called
Rick’s supervisor to tell him that Rick would not be coming in to work. She
could communicate coherently with a dispatcher, the Bangor police officer,
the nurse, and her neighbor on the morning of June 13, 2011. Roxanne was
also able to damage Rick’s motorcycle and make several phone calls,
indicating that she was capable of reality-based, goal-directed behavior.
Evidence that she appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct included her
refusal to allow her neighbor to call an ambulance, opening the door “a crack”
when her other neighbor came over in response to a particularly loud noise,
her lies to Rick’s supervisor, and her efforts to clean the bathroom and do the
laundry. The court found that these actions were intended to hide and
deceive, which reflected an appreciation of wrongful behavior and a
consciousness of guilt.
27
[¶45] Roxanne’s actions and statements amply support the court’s
findings and conclusion that she failed to prove that she was not guilty by
reason of insanity. See Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 43 & n.7, 36 A.3d 893. On this
record, we discern no error in the court’s determination that Roxanne did not
meet her burden of proof on her affirmative defenses.
C. Manslaughter
[¶46] Roxanne argues that the court erred by not considering the
“lesser included” charge of manslaughter because her mental health diagnoses
raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the culpable state of mind
required for a murder conviction. We review the court’s application of a
statute de novo. See Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 57, 956 A.2d
110. Title 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1-A) (2015) provides that “when the crime of
depraved indifference murder is charged, the crime of criminally negligent
manslaughter is deemed to be charged.” “A person is guilty of manslaughter if
that person . . . with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human
being[.]” State v. Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 15, 736 A.2d 1047 (alterations in
original) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶47] The court here acknowledged that a depraved indifference
charge included the lesser charge of manslaughter and explicitly rejected it,
28
stating “[t]his is not a case of criminally negligent manslaughter. The evidence
in this case is so compelling that it permits no other conclusion and proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Roxanne] is guilty of depraved indifference
murder.” See 17-A M.R.S. § 13-A(1) (2015) (providing that the court, as fact-
finder, need not consider a lesser included offense “unless on the basis of the
evidence there is a rational basis for finding the defendant guilty of that lesser
included offense”). Roxanne has no constitutional entitlement to
consideration of the lesser included offense once the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that her conduct was sufficiently dangerous as to reflect a
depraved indifference to the value of human life. See Boyce v. Comm’r Me.
Dep’t. of Corr., 217 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D. Me. 2002); see also Thongsavanh,
2007 ME 20, ¶¶ 32-33, 915 A.2d 421.
[¶48] Because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support
the court’s conclusion that the State had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Roxanne committed depraved indifference murder, the court did not err
in finding there was no rational basis for finding Roxanne guilty of the lesser
offense of manslaughter.
29
D. Motion for New Trial
[¶49] Roxanne contends that the court abused its discretion by denying
her motion for a new trial. “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial
for clear error or an abuse of discretion.”13 State v. Robinson, 2016 ME 24,
¶ 24, 134 A.3d 828. Former Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,14 in effect
at the time, permitted a court to grant a new trial if required in the interest of
justice. Roxanne moved for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the court erred
in denying her request for a third competency hearing because she was
demonstrating an active psychotic disorder, which constituted a bona fide
doubt regarding her competency and, (2) because her mental health status
has improved following the administration of antipsychotic medication,
allowing her to proceed untreated during trial was substantially unfair and
deprived her of due process of law.
[¶50] “Competence to stand trial sufficient to meet the requirements of
due process means that the accused is capable of understanding the nature
and object of the charges and proceedings against him . . . and of conducting in
13 “Review for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three questions: (1) are factual
findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) did the court
understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying
the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds
of reasonableness.” Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074.
14 Maine R. Crim. P. 33 (amended 2015, current version at M.R.U. Crim. P. 33).
30
cooperation with his counsel his defense in a rational and reasonable
manner.” Thursby v. State, 223 A.2d 61, 66 (Me. 1966). A defendant may be
mentally competent to stand trial even though he or she may require
psychiatric treatment. Id. at 68; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
180 (1966) (stating that “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial
are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required . . . .”).
[¶51] Dr. O’Grady with the State Forensic Service first evaluated
Roxanne in November 2011 over the course of two sessions, totaling five and
a half hours. Dr. O’Grady wrote an addendum to her report in June 2012
following receipt of Dr. Riley’s evaluation, and she conducted follow-up
evaluations in May 2012 and April and December 2013. Dr. Lorenz
interviewed Roxanne in October and November 2011, in March 2012, and in
December 2013. Dr. Doiron evaluated Roxanne in five separate sessions in
February and March 2012 and November 2013. Finally, Dr. Riley conducted
evaluations of Roxanne in June 2012 and March and December 2013.
Additionally, prison staff and counselors regularly made inquiries and
notations as to Roxanne’s affect and state of mind during her confinement.
The court held two separate, multiple-day, testimonial competency hearings
31
in March and December 2013, the second hearing being held just days before
her trial was scheduled to begin. The record demonstrates that Roxanne’s
mental health was well monitored and regularly assessed over the course of
the several years her case was pending and during the trial itself.
[¶52] In denying Roxanne’s motion for a new trial, filed in June 2014,
the court noted that three of the four experts examining her never observed
any evidence of active psychosis and that “none of the transport officers,
general jail staff members making progress notations15 and in particular jail
mental health workers ever observed any evidence of psychosis.” Roxanne
also indicated concern during the trial regarding the media’s video recording
of the proceeding, demonstrating her awareness of courtroom activity and
ability to advocate for her needs. Additionally, following the extended recess
during trial to give Roxanne time to decide whether she wanted to testify, the
court engaged in a careful colloquy with her regarding her wishes, and at no
time did she demonstrate psychosis; rather, she answered the court’s
questions in an appropriate and rational manner.
15 A corrections officer stated in an interview in June 2014 that Roxanne’s behavior was “much
different when her defense attorneys came to visit her. . . . She would become more withdrawn,
child-like and frail in demeanor . . . [but] after the attorneys left . . . she’d be back to the old Roxanne,
with an age-appropriate voice and demeanor.”
32
[¶53] As to the improvement in her mental health status resulting from
being prescribed anti-psychotic medication, in its order denying her motion
for a new trial, the court observed that it was “aware of no recognized right
for a criminal defendant to be at some specified state of optimum physical or
mental health before being required to stand trial.” “Requiring that a criminal
defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While
psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify various kinds and
degrees of competence . . . the Due Process Clause does not impose [that]
additional requirement[].” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
[¶54] Given the discrepancies in Roxanne’s presentation of symptoms
among experts and jail staff, the consistent monitoring of her mental health
status, and two judicial determinations of competency for trial, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Roxanne’s motion for a new trial. She
was not deprived of her due process right because there was sufficient
evidence to support the court’s findings that she was, and continued to be,
competent to stand trial; and the court’s weighing of the facts and choices was
within the bounds of reasonableness. See Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11,
930 A.2d 1074.
33
III. CONCLUSION
[¶55] In summary, we conclude that the court did not err in
determining that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element
of both knowing or intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.
We also conclude that the court did not err in determining that her defense of
not guilty by reason of insanity was not supported by the evidence. We also
conclude that the court properly declined to consider whether Roxanne was
guilty, instead, of the lesser offense of manslaughter because there was no
rational basis for finding she was guilty of that offense. Finally, the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Roxanne’s motion for a new trial despite
her allegedly improved psychological state.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., Law Office of Joseph M. Baldacci,
Bangor, and David Bate, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Roxanne
Jeskey
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General and Donald W. Macomber,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
34
At oral argument:
Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq., for appellant Roxanne Jeskey
Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant State of
Maine
Penobscot Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2011-2195
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY