State of Maine v. Jonathan Collins

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 52
Docket: Cum-14-363
Argued: April 10, 2015
Decided: May 7, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JONATHAN COLLINS
HJELM, J.
[¶1] Jonathan Collins appeals from an order of the trial court
(Moskowitz, J.) amending the conditions of his probation to prohibit him from
having contact with his minor son unless specifically permitted by the court.
Collins argues that the amendment constituted an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion and improperly interfered with his constitutional parental rights. We
affirm the order.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The relevant facts are not in dispute. See State v. Russo, 2008 ME 31,
¶ 2, 942 A.2d 694. Collins was indicted on January 11, 2013, for two counts of
unlawful sexual contact (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(F-1) (2014),
committed against his son and stepson. In June 2013, Collins pleaded guilty to two
counts of misdemeanor assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2014), and the
2
State dismissed the two original charges. The court imposed a suspended sentence
of 364 days to the Cumberland County Jail and one year of probation for each of
the two assault counts, to be served consecutively. The conditions of probation
prohibited Collins from having any contact with his stepson, and prohibited contact
with his son “unless supervised by a [third] party non-family member or by
agreement [with] family court [and] probation.” Collins was also ordered to
complete a “sex offender evaluation” and undergo “individualized treatment
(sex offender).”
[¶3] On March 31, 2014, Collins filed a motion to amend the conditions of
probation, alleging that his probation officer would not permit him to have contact
with his son and seeking expanded rights of contact. Then, in May 2014, while
Collins’s motion was still pending, the Department of Corrections, which
administers probation services, 34-A M.R.S. § 5401 (2014), issued a blanket
directive prohibiting probation officers from determining if probationers should
have contact with victims. As a result, the condition of Collins’s probation
predicating contact on permission from the family court and his probation officer
could not be implemented.
[¶4] At a conference of the parties held on June 6, 2014, the court ordered
that, pending a hearing on Collins’s motion, the probation condition governing
contact with the victims “is amended by agreement to read: no contact, direct or
3
indirect, with [Collins’s stepson]. No contact with [Collins’s son] direct, or
indirect, except as may be ordered by the court.” The court also scheduled a
hearing on Collins’s motion to modify.
[¶5] At the hearing, held on August 18, 2014, Collins requested that the
court modify the condition of probation to mirror a contact order that had been
issued in an action to determine Collins’s parental rights and responsibilities.
Collins told the court that the order allowed him to have “frequent and regular
contact” with his son if it were supervised by a third party who is not a member of
the family.1 Also, although he had already pleaded guilty to the two assault
charges, Collins maintained his innocence. The State argued that the court should
prohibit contact between Collins and his son.
[¶6] During the hearing, the court considered a letter that Collins’s
counselor had provided to him, indicating that during therapy sessions, Collins
stated that he does not believe that psychotherapy would be beneficial, denied
harming either victim, “close[d] down, [became] irritable,” and, on advice of
counsel, refused to take a polygraph examination. The child’s mother addressed
the court and stated that she had agreed to supervised visitation in the parenting
action only because she expected that the probation officer would oversee Collins’s
1
The record does not include copies of the order issued by the District Court in the parenting action.
Rather, it contains only the parties’ description to the court of some of its terms.
4
treatment and that Collins would be allowed to have contact with the child if he
was doing well on probation and in counseling. She also told the court that since
the child stopped having contact with Collins, troubling aspects of the child’s
behavior had improved.
[¶7] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Collins’s motion and
ordered that the June 6 order would continue to govern his rights of contact with
his son—that is, Collins was prohibited from having any contact with his son
except as specifically permitted by the court. The court found that Collins’s
counseling was “really slow at best and very, very difficult. It really doesn’t seem
that treatment has been that productive at all.” Determining from this and other
circumstances that contact with Collins would expose the child to psychological
harm, the court found that even supervised contact was not appropriate. The court,
however, expressly reserved to Collins the opportunity to seek modification of the
order if he was able to demonstrate that counseling has become productive and that
he has developed insight into
this offense and how it affects the children and how it affects himself,
and if he has some understanding of how he should comport himself
when he has contact with his children, specifically [his son]. And
perhaps, if [his son’s] counselors concur that supervised contact
makes sense, then perhaps the condition of probation can be amended
to allow for that. But given what I know now, we’re nowhere near
there especially when – in light of the letter that [Collins’s counselor]
sent to Mr. Collins.
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[¶8] Collins appeals the court’s order.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶9] As his central challenge to the court’s order foreclosing contact with
his son absent specific judicial approval, Collins argues that the court abused its
discretion because, he contends, the evidence did not warrant that restriction, and
because the District Court, in a collateral parenting action, had already allowed
him to have supervised contact with his son.2
[¶10] The Legislature has given the courts a broad range of dispositional
authority when adjudicating motions to modify conditions of probation:
During the period of probation specified in the sentence . . . , and upon
application of a person on probation or the person’s probation officer,
or upon its own motion, the court may, after a hearing . . . , modify the
requirements imposed by the court . . . , add further requirements
authorized by section 1204 or relieve the person on probation of any
requirement imposed by the court . . . that, in its opinion, imposes on
the person an unreasonable burden.
17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2) (2014). In other words, “[a] court addressing a motion to
modify conditions of probation has three options. It may modify a condition, add a
condition, or relieve the defendant from a condition entirely.” State v. Spencer,
2
In his brief on appeal, Collins also argues that the court was not authorized to modify the conditions
of probation to make them more restrictive than the terms of the plea agreement that led to the
convictions. At oral argument, however, Collins clarified that he is arguing only that the court’s
disposition of his motion to modify constituted an abuse of discretion. Even if Collins pressed an
argument that the court acted beyond its power, it would be unavailing because, for the reasons set out in
this opinion, the court’s modification of the terms of probation was within its statutory authority and
therefore lawful. See State v. Telford, 2010 ME 33, ¶¶ 9-12, 993 A.2d 8 (conditions of probation may be
modified even when they were the product of a plea agreement, if the modification is authorized by
17-A M.R.S. § 1202 (2014)).
6
2003 ME 112, ¶ 8, 831 A.2d 419. When modifying probation conditions, a court is
only required to consider and promote any of the objectives of probation found in
17-A M.R.S. § 1204 (2014). State v. Telford, 2010 ME 33, ¶ 7, 993 A.2d 8. On an
appeal from a decision to modify probation, we review the record for clear error.
Id.
[¶11] Section 1204 expressly authorizes the court to impose conditions of
probation that prohibit the offender from “consorting with specified persons” and
that satisfy any condition “reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the convicted
person or the public safety or security.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1204(2-A)(F), (M). We
have held that these statutory provisions allow a court to prohibit a person
convicted of sexual assaults against a child from having contact with most
children, because such a restriction “furthers the rehabilitation process by reducing
the risk of [the offender] committing further crimes against minors, and protects
the public safety.” State v. Coreau, 651 A.2d 319, 321 (Me. 1994).3
[¶12] At the motion hearing, the court considered the information presented
by the parties, and then, specifically citing section 1204 and Coreau, carefully
applied that information to the statutory and decisional framework that governs
3
In State v. Coreau, we held that the condition of probation prohibiting all contact between Coreau
and his own children, who were not the victims of his crimes, was overbroad because there was no
evidence that supervised contact would place his children at risk and because some contact would help
stabilize Coreau’s family. 651 A.2d 319, 321-22 (Me. 1994). This aspect of the holding in Coreau is
inapposite here because Collins assaulted his own child, which gave the court a reasonable basis to be
concerned that the victim would be harmed further if Collins had contact with him.
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conditions of probation. In framing the issues that were important to its
adjudication of the motion, the court described the new Department of Corrections
policy not to assess whether a probationer should have contact with a victim as the
loss of a “safeguard,” which assumed heightened importance because Collins’s
assaults against his son and stepson were sexual, even though the convictions
themselves were for assaults of an unspecified nature. The court also found that
Collins had not benefited from counseling, continued to deny any culpability, and
had not yet recognized the harm he had caused to the two victims.
[¶13] Although a change of circumstances is not a necessary predicate to a
change in probation conditions, Telford, 2010 ME 33, ¶ 7, 993 A.2d 8, the court
here was faced with a situation where Collins, a convicted offender who refused to
acknowledge that he had victimized his son, was supervised by a probation officer
who was no longer available to make judgments about whether contact with the
victim was appropriate. The court’s decision to prohibit contact under any
circumstances absent specific judicial approval was supported by the evidence and
was clearly responsive to the statutory purposes of probation. The court’s ruling
on Collins’s motion to modify therefore was not erroneous, much less clearly
erroneous.
[¶14] Collins contends that the court erred by declining to defer to the
parenting order issued in the family proceeding that allowed him to have “regular
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and frequent” supervised contact with his son. He argues that the justification for
the criminal justice system’s interference with his constitutional right to parent is
diminished because in the parenting action a court had already addressed the issue
of the victim’s safety, eliminating the need for further governmental intrusion
through the criminal case.
[¶15] Collins’s argument fails for two reasons. First, as a doctrinal matter,
the State is not bound by a judicial determination made in a proceeding to which
neither it nor a privy is a party. See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 37
(Me. 1991); State v. Spearin, 463 A.2d 727, 729-30 (Me. 1983), overruled in part
on other grounds by State v. Walker, 510 A.2d 1064 (Me. 1986) (applying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to criminal proceedings). This consideration is
particularly important because the State’s interests and objectives may not be fully
aligned with those of either parent in a civil family action. Therefore, the contact
order issued in the parenting action did not bind the State and left it free to argue in
support of greater contact restrictions than were contained in the parental rights
order, and similarly the court in the criminal action was also not bound by the prior
parenting order.
[¶16] Second, Collins’s argument does not account for the essential
differences between a parental rights action and a criminal case where the
perpetrator and victim are members of the same family. It cannot be disputed that
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Collins’s right to parent his child is of constitutional magnitude. See Rideout v.
Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291. We have repeatedly acknowledged
that “parents have a fundamental liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and
control of their children.” Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 11, 90 A.3d 1169
(quotation marks omitted); see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
However, this right consists of heightened protection, not absolute protection, from
governmental inference with matters affecting “family integrity.” Rideout,
2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291. Protecting a child from harm is a compelling
governmental interest that justifies narrowly tailored restrictions on a parent’s
rights. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23.
[¶17] The touchstone of a court’s decision on parenting issues in a family
action is the best interest of the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2014);
Daggett v. Sternick, 2015 ME 8, ¶ 11, --- A.3d ---. In a criminal proceeding, when
a minor child is the victim of a crime committed by a family member, the child’s
physical safety and psychological well-being must be compelling considerations
for the sentencing court to address. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1151(8)(A),
1204(2-A)(F), (M) (2014); cf. Coreau, 651 A.2d at 321. Therefore, in situations
involving child abuse, the issue of the child’s best interest is common to the two
types of court proceedings.
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[¶18] In the criminal setting, however, the Legislature has identified
additional factors for the court to consider in fashioning a sentence, including, for
example, punishment, specific deterrence, and public safety. 17-A M.R.S. § 1151
(2014). When a sentence includes a period of probation, the court must impose
conditions designed to rehabilitate an offender who has the capacity to benefit
from “the supervision, guidance, assistance or direction that probation can
provide.” State v. Black, 2007 ME 19, ¶ 14, 914 A.2d 723 (quotation marks
omitted). Probation carries aspects that are both rehabilitative and punitive, id.,
which go beyond the parental rights analysis that centers on a child’s best interest.
The considerations that influence the terms of a sentence imposed against a parent
in a criminal case, including the probation component of a sentence, are therefore
not coextensive with those that influence a court’s judgment on parental rights.
[¶19] Consequently, the exercise of judicial authority over Collins’s
parental rights in the family law proceeding does not eliminate the justification for
an additional layer of governmental involvement through the criminal action.
When framed properly, conditions of probation affecting an offender’s rights of
contact with his child who is the victim of the offender’s violent conduct are
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” and do not
unconstitutionally infringe on the offender’s parental rights. Rideout,
2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291; see also Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 12,
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90 A.3d 1169; United States v. Smith, 436 F.3d 307, 308-11 (1st Cir. 2006)
(concluding that, in a case where the defendant’s conditions of supervised release
prohibited contact with his child, “a sentencing court can infringe upon a convicted
felon’s liberty . . . by imposing conditions of supervised release” and that such
conditions “limit[ing] a convicted felon’s liberty do[] not render them invalid.”);
Commonwealth v. LaPointe, 759 N.E.2d 294, 298 (Mass. 2001) (holding that
“[p]arental rights are not absolute and they may be restricted by probation
conditions” (citations omitted)).4 Therefore, a court’s determination of parental
rights in a family law proceeding is not dispositive of sentencing issues, including
probation, in a related criminal prosecution of a parent.
[¶20] Here, as the court in the parental rights action presumably did, the
court that acted on Collins’s probation motion properly placed substantial weight
on the victim’s best interest, concluding that even supervised contact with Collins
would create the risk of psychological harm. The criminal court also, however,
went beyond this factor and noted that Collins had made no meaningful
rehabilitative strides through counseling and that Collins did not believe
counseling would benefit him. Although this evidence could be pertinent to a
4
The court’s decision to prohibit contact between Collins and his son is not permanent. As the court
made clear in its order, Collins maintains the right to seek a modification of that prohibition if he can
demonstrate that he is progressing in counseling. In this way, the court ensured that the restrictions on
Collins’s parenting rights were a “narrowly tailored” response to the present circumstances and are
subject to change when Collins is less of a threat to his son’s safety.
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determination of parental rights and responsibilities, it bears more closely on the
central probationary objectives of rehabilitation, deterrence, and public safety, and
thus is entitled to greater weight in a criminal case. While it was proper for the
criminal court to consider the order issued in the parental rights action, it was not
limited by that decision and properly considered the entire record, of which that
court order was a part. Accordingly, the court did not unconstitutionally infringe
on Collins’s parental rights when it increased the restrictions on his rights of
contact with his son that had been set by a court in a separate judicial proceeding.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Jonathan
Collins
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and Jennifer F.
Ackerman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. Two,
Portland, for appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq., for appellant Jonathan Collins
Jennifer F. Ackerman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of
Maine
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2013-298
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY