In re I.R.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 93
Docket: Cum-14-476
Submitted
On Briefs: July 1, 2015
Decided: July 28, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
IN RE I.R.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The mother of I.R. appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Portland, Powers, J.) terminating her parental rights to the child pursuant to
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2014). The mother argues that there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing
evidence, of at least one ground of parental unfitness. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The record supports the following findings of the court by clear and
convincing evidence. See In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶ 13, 90 A.3d 443.
[¶3] The mother suffers from a significant mental illness. Due to concerns
about the effect of that illness on her mental capacity, the court assigned the
mother her own guardian ad litem in these proceedings. The mother spent time in
psychiatric facilities in 2013 and 2014, and has a history of suicidal thoughts. The
mother lived in multiple states while this case was pending.
2
[¶4] The Department of Health and Human Services initiated child
protection proceedings concerning I.R. in 2012, while he was still in the hospital
after having been born two months premature. The Department alleged that the
mother has schizo-affective disorder, for which she does not consistently take her
medication; in the forty days the child spent in the hospital after his birth, the
mother spent very little time with him and did not understand the nature of the
child’s needs or the seriousness of his medical condition; and the mother had
agreed that she was uncomfortable caring for the child alone.1 The mother later
agreed to a finding of jeopardy concerning the child based on her untreated mental
health issues, her inability to care for the child’s daily needs, her inability to care
for the child’s particular medical and developmental needs, and her lack of overall
stability. See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(6), 4035 (2014).
[¶5] Since child protection proceedings began, the mother has not engaged
in any reunification services, including mental health counseling or parenting
education. The mother also has not visited the child with any consistency; in the
summer of 2014, for example, she saw him six times. During those visits, the
mother did not interact with the child, and the court found that she has no “real
relationship” with him.
1
The father does not appeal from the termination of his parental rights.
3
[¶6] In 2014, the Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s
parental rights, alleging that the mother has a history of command auditory
hallucinations and suicidal ideation; has a history of substance abuse; while
pregnant again, was admitted to a hospital in Massachusetts due to her reports of
auditory hallucinations and suicidal statements; moved to Maryland without
notifying the Department of her move; had no contact with her child for five
months after she left Maine; has not engaged in any mental health treatment or
reunification services; has no stable housing; does not engage with the child during
the visits she does have with the child, and instead watches him and makes no
attempt to interact with him; and has no ability to care for the child. The court
conducted a testimonial hearing on the termination petition. The mother did not
testify at the hearing, but did stipulate to her mental health issues and her failure to
participate in various Department services.
[¶7] During the hearing, the court discussed its recent receipt of two letters
from the child’s maternal grandmother, who was neither a party nor an intervener
in the proceeding. In one of those letters, the grandmother purported to inform the
court that the mother and the child were members of the Seminole tribe, and
attempted to obtain custody over the child pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 1901-1963 (LEXIS through P.L. 114-25, approved
6/15/15). The Department responded that, in January of 2013, when it had first
4
learned of this claim, it had contacted both the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. Both responded to the Department’s inquiry by
reporting that there was no record of enrollment of the parents or the child in the
Seminole tribe or nation. The Department had also contacted the Penobscot
Nation, but had received no response. Based on this information, the court
correctly declined to apply the ICWA to this matter.
[¶8] The court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the child on
grounds that she is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy, is
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a reasonable time,
and failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and
that termination is in the best interest of the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2).
The mother appeals. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2014).
[¶9] The child is now three years old and has been with his foster family
since he left the hospital shortly after his birth. He suffers from a chronic lung
disease, a hip condition, and motor skills problems, all of which require frequent
treatment and/or therapy. Although all of his conditions have been improving, the
child requires a healthy parent who can meet his daily physical and emotional
needs, as well as his greater medical needs, and who can provide safe and stable
housing. The foster parents who are currently caring for the child and providing
for all of his needs wish to adopt him.
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II. DISCUSSION
[¶10] The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
court’s findings of parental unfitness. She argues that although there was sufficient
evidence of her deficits, the court erred in failing to consider whether or how those
deficits affect her ability to parent the child. In particular, the mother argues that
there was no evidence that, with family or community support, she could not
appropriately parent the child.2
[¶11] Contrary to the mother’s suggestion, there was sufficient evidence to
support the court’s judgment by clear and convincing evidence, including its
findings that the mother’s deficits—and particularly her mental illness—affected
her ability to parent. Specifically, there was evidence that she has never cared for
the child since his birth, lacks any understanding of the child’s needs, is
subjectively uncomfortable around him, fails to interact with him during visits, and
failed to make any efforts to rehabilitate and reunify with him. There was also
sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that termination is in the best
interest of the child, i.e., that the child has particular medical and emotional needs
that the mother is unable to understand or satisfy, and that the foster parents—who
2
The mother also challenges the court’s alleged failure to consider a kinship placement for the child.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3-A) (2014). The placement she suggested—her own mother—was carefully
considered by the Department, the guardian ad litem, and the court early in these proceedings, and was
found to be completely inappropriate. This argument is not persuasive and we do not discuss it further.
6
wish to adopt the child—have cared for those needs well since shortly after the
child’s birth. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2); In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶¶ 13, 15,
90 A.3d 443.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Erika S. Bristol, Esq., Auburn, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Portland District Court docket number PC-2012-72
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY