Adoption of Priscilla D.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 81Docket: Ken-15-510
Argued: May 3, 2016
Decided: May 31, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and
HUMPHREY, JJ.
ADOPTION OF PRISCILLA D.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The parents1 of Priscilla D. appeal from a judgment of the Kennebec
County Probate Court (J. Mitchell, J.) granting the child’s maternal grandmother’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the parents’ petition to annul the child’s
adoption by the grandmother. Because the Probate Court’s termination of parental
rights, affirmed in In re Priscilla D., 2010 ME 103, 5 A.3d 677, governs the
parents’ rights regarding the child, and because the court’s error in excluding
certain testimony offered by the parents was harmless, we conclude that the
Probate Court did not err in declining to annul the 2009 adoption.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶2] The child is thirteen years old. Since her birth, her mother and her
maternal grandmother have had a strained relationship. At this point, there has
1
The “parents” are the child’s birth parents. Their parental rights were terminated in 2009 and the
child’s maternal grandmother adopted the child. For ease of reference, the birth parents are referred to in
this opinion as the child’s parents.
2
been nearly a decade of litigation between these parties over responsibility for the
child. That history is detailed in our 2010 opinion. See In re Priscilla D.,
2010 ME 103, ¶¶ 3-7, 5 A.3d 677.
[¶3] After approximately three years of disputes and litigation between the
parents and the grandmother, the court, in 2009, terminated the parents’ parental
rights. The parents appeared at the 2009 hearing and consented to termination.
Because of the parents’ hesitation about consenting to termination expressed in a
statement read by the parents’ attorney and in a colloquy between the court and the
mother, the court indicated that it would decide the termination question based on
evidence, rather than act solely on the parents’ consent.
[¶4] Referencing the record from prior proceedings, which the parties
agreed the court could consider, the court found that the parents were unfit and that
termination of the parents’ parental rights was necessary and in the best interest of
the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2015). In making the findings that
supported its conclusions, the court addressed comments made at the hearing
indicating that the grandmother had suggested during settlement discussions that
the parents might have limited access to the child and information about the child
following an adoption. The court noted that any continued contact with the child
was unlikely unless the relationship between the parents and the grandmother
improved considerably.
3
[¶5] The parents appealed the termination of their parental rights, and, in the
2010 opinion noted above, we affirmed. The grandmother then adopted the child.
[¶6] In August 2014, the parents petitioned to annul the adoption,2 arguing
that it was obtained by means of fraud or duress. See 18-A M.R.S. § 9-315(a)(1)
(2015). The court held a one-day hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the court
excluded certain evidence offered by the parents, including statements allegedly
made during settlement discussions that occurred immediately before the
termination of parental rights hearing. The excluded statements included those that
were referenced in the 2009 hearing regarding the possibility of the parents’
continued limited contacts with the child. The court found that such statements
were inadmissible pursuant to M.R. Evid. 408(a)(2) (barring admission of evidence
of “[c]onduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations or in mediation
about the claim” where it is offered “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of
a disputed claim”).
[¶7] At the conclusion of the parents’ case, the grandmother moved for
judgment as a matter of law. The court orally granted the grandmother’s motion,
finding that “the evidence does not indicate and does not prove that without
2
Whether parents whose parental rights regarding a child have been terminated have standing to seek
to annul a post-termination adoption of the child is a question that we need not address because the
Probate Court, after apparently inferring that the parents had standing, reached the merits of their petition
to annul and denied the petition.
4
consent, there would not have been a termination.” The court entered a written
judgment the same day.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶8] On appeal, the parents challenge the court’s evidentiary rulings,
including the exclusion of statements made during settlement negotiations and
offered in support of their claims of fraud and duress. Assuming that the claim of
fraud or duress was a viable claim, M.R. Evid. 408(a)(2) creates no bar to the
admission of the excluded statements in this case because the statements were not
offered to prove the validity or amount of the claim about which the parties were
negotiating. Instead, the evidence was offered in a subsequent proceeding in an
attempt to demonstrate fraud or duress in the 2009 proceeding. Without such
evidence, fraud or duress in settlement negotiations would be difficult to prove.
Rule 408(a)(2) does not require exclusion of such evidence. See Union River
Assocs. v. Budman, 2004 ME 48, ¶ 18, 850 A.2d 334 (holding that Rule 408(a)
excludes evidence offered to prove liability, validity, or amount of a claim, but
does not exclude evidence of settlement discussions offered for other purposes.).
[¶9] The court’s error in excluding the evidence is insufficient to vacate the
court’s judgment because the error was harmless.3 See M.R. Civ. P. 61; Starrett v.
3
The parents also argue that the court erred by excluding evidence of the mother and grandmother’s
past relationship. It is unclear whether this evidence would have been relevant, but any error in the
court’s exclusion of this evidence was likewise harmless.
5
Starrett, 2014 ME 112, ¶ 16, 101 A.3d 435. In 2009, the court informed the
parents that any expectations created during settlement discussions regarding
future contact with the child might not be fulfilled. Further, even if the parents had
been permitted to present the excluded evidence and the court had found that such
evidence demonstrated that the parents’ consent to termination was obtained based
on fraud or duress, the parents would not have been entitled to an annulment of the
adoption. The termination of parental rights was based on a finding that the
statutory requirements for termination had been met. We affirmed that finding on
appeal, addressing issues the parents later presented in support of their petition to
annul the adoption. See In re Priscilla D., 2010 ME 103, ¶¶ 19-20, 5 A.3d 677.
[¶10] The parents have not raised any issue sufficient to warrant prolonging
this litigation. It is contrary to the child’s interests to continue a legal battle over a
termination of parental rights and an adoption that was finalized approximately six
years ago.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs and at oral argument:
Erika S. Bristol, Esq., Auburn, for appellant parents
Pamela J. Ames, Esq., Waterville, for appellee maternal
grandmother