State of Maine v. Roland L. Cummings

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 143Docket: Ken-16-36
Argued: March 3, 2017
Decided: July 6, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ROLAND L. CUMMINGS
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] Aurele Fecteau, a ninety-two-year-old retiree living alone in his
own home in Waterville, was stabbed to death in his bed during a burglary.
Roland L. Cummings was found guilty by a jury of the murder, along with two
other crimes. Cummings appeals only from the judgment of conviction of
murder entered by the court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) after a trial in
which the State presented the murder charge on alternative theories—
intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder. Cummings
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he was
the person who committed the murder, and in the alternative, he argues that,
due to the evidence of sixteen stab wounds to Fecteau’s torso, the killing was
so certainly a knowing or intentional murder that the jury should not have
2
been instructed on depraved indifference murder. Thus, he contends that the
court erred in allowing the State to proceed on alternative theories. We affirm
the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Cummings appeals from the judgment of conviction of murder,
17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B) (2016). He does not challenge his additional
convictions of burglary of a dwelling (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4)
(2016), and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 353(1)(A), (B)(6) (2016).
[¶3] When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, the jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to the murder conviction. See State v. Maine,
2017 ME 25, ¶¶ 2, 28, 155 A.3d 871. On May 21, 2014, Cummings forced his
way into Fecteau’s home. Cummings knew Fecteau, who was the father of one
of his friends. Cummings stabbed Fecteau sixteen times in the torso, causing
his death; took money and jewelry; and fled. That night, Cummings sold two
pieces of the stolen jewelry and used a $100 bill stolen from Fecteau to
purchase drugs. He also paid a debt to an acquaintance for drugs using
half-dollar coins stolen from Fecteau’s home.
3
[¶4] One of Fecteau’s sons, after unsuccessfully trying to reach his
father by phone on May 22 and 23, went to his father’s house on May 23. He
discovered his father’s body, and the police began an investigation.
[¶5] In June 2014, Cummings was charged by complaint with a single
count of murder alleging intentional or knowing murder or depraved
indifference murder. See 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), (B). Later that month, he
was charged by indictment with murder, id.; burglary of a dwelling (Class B),
id. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4); burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), (B)(2)
(2016); and theft (Class C), id. § 353(1)(A), (B)(6).
[¶6] The court held a six-day jury trial from November 12 to 19, 2015.
The State’s case included testimony from a Maine Crime Lab DNA analyst, who
found Cummings’s DNA on the out-turned pockets of Fecteau’s pants and on
one of the rings stolen from Fecteau. After the State presented its case,
Cummings unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. See
M.R.U. Crim. P. 29(a). Cummings presented additional evidence but did not
testify. With the State’s consent, the court acquitted Cummings of the second
burglary count.
[¶7] Before the court instructed the jury, Cummings objected to the
proposed jury instructions on murder, arguing that the evidence could not
4
support a finding of depraved indifference, and he again moved for a
judgment of acquittal. The court overruled the objection and denied the
motion.
[¶8] The State and Cummings offered closing arguments, after which
the court delivered instructions to the jury orally and in writing. With respect
to the murder charge, the court instructed on the alternative theories of
intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder.
[¶9] The jury found Cummings guilty of murder, burglary of a dwelling,
and theft. Cummings moved for a new trial, and the court denied his motion.
See M.R.U. Crim. P. 33.
[¶10] After a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Cummings to life
imprisonment for murder, ten years’ imprisonment for burglary, and two
years’ imprisonment for theft, with the burglary and theft sentences to be
served concurrently with the murder sentence. The court ordered Cummings
to pay $4,500 to the Victims’ Compensation Fund to reimburse the fund for a
portion of the Fecteau family’s funeral expenses. Cummings appealed from
the judgment of conviction of murder and applied for review of his sentence.
5
See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2115, 2151 (2016);1 M.R. App. P. 2, 20. The Sentence Review
Panel denied his application for sentence review. State v. Cummings, No.
SRP-16-37 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Mar. 29, 2016); see 15 M.R.S. § 2152 (2016);
M.R. App. P. 20(f). We now consider Cummings’s appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence that Cummings Killed Fecteau
[¶11] Cummings first argues that there was insufficient evidence for
the jury to find him guilty of murder because his DNA was found only on a
stolen ring and on the pockets of pants recovered from Fecteau’s apartment—
not on Fecteau’s body—and his possession of stolen items cannot establish
that he killed Fecteau.
[¶12] “When reviewing a judgment for sufficiency of the evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State [to] determin[e]
whether the fact-finder could rationally have found each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maine, 2017 ME 25, ¶ 28, 155 A.3d 871(alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). We defer to all credibility
determinations and reasonable inferences drawn by the fact-finder, “even if
1 Section 2151 of title 15 was recently amended to reference the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal
Procedure. See P.L. 2015, ch. 431, § 26 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 15 M.R.S. § 2151(2)
(2016)).
6
those inferences are contradicted by parts of the direct evidence.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶13] Relevant here, a “person is guilty of murder if the person:
A. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being; [or]
B. Engages in conduct that manifests a depraved indifference to the value of
human life and that in fact causes the death of another human being.”
17-A M.R.S. § 201(1).
[¶14] On the record presented, there is more than sufficient evidence
from which the jury rationally could find, based on reasonable inferences
drawn from circumstantial and DNA evidence connecting Cummings with the
murder and burglary, that Cummings was the person who caused Fecteau’s
death. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A) (2016); Maine, 2017 ME
25, ¶ 28, 155 A.3d 871; see also State v. Belhumeur, 2015 ME 150, ¶ 6, 128
A.3d 646 (stating that the same standard of review is applied whether the
evidence is circumstantial or direct). The remaining question is whether
depraved indifference murder was properly submitted to the jury as an
alternative to intentional or knowing murder.
7
B. Alternative Charge of Depraved Indifference Murder
[¶15] Cummings argues that the sixteen stab wounds inflicted on
Fecteau were so likely to cause death that they could only have been inflicted
with the conscious object to cause death or with knowledge that death was
practically certain to result. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A).
He therefore contends that the evidence can demonstrate only intentional or
knowing murder—not depraved indifference murder, id. § 201(1)(B)—and
that because one or more of the jurors may have improperly found him guilty
based on depraved indifference, the conviction must be vacated for a lack of
unanimity.
[¶16] With respect to questions of law, including the construction of
statutes, our review is de novo. See State v. Kendall, 2016 ME 147, ¶ 14, 148
A.3d 1230; State v. Kimball, 2016 ME 75, ¶ 10, 139 A.3d 914. “A person acts
intentionally with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when it is the
person’s conscious object to cause such a result,” whereas “[a] person acts
knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person is
aware that it is practically certain that the person’s conduct will cause such a
result.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(1)(A), (2)(A). A person acts with “depraved
indifference to the value of human life” in Maine if the person’s “conduct,
8
objectively viewed, created such a high tendency to produce death that the
law attributes to him the highest degree of blameworthiness.” State v. Saenz,
2016 ME 159, ¶ 23, 150 A.3d 331 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶17] To find a defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder, “the
adjudicator must conclude that the defendant consciously . . . engaged in
conduct that he should have known would create a very high degree of risk of
death or serious bodily injury and it must also under the circumstances [have
been] unjustifiable for him to take the risk.” Id. (alterations in original)
(quotation marks omitted). “Put differently, death-producing conduct will
justify a verdict of guilty of depraved indifference murder if a jury could find
that that conduct was so heinous in the eyes of the law as to constitute
murder.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶18] The depraved indifference murder statute, section 201(1)(B), has
replaced a common law definition of murder that allowed a fact-finder to
convict a person of murder upon “proof of conduct which objectively evaluated
is characterized by a high death producing potential.” State v. Woodbury, 403
A.2d 1166, 1172-73 (Me. 1979) (quotation marks omitted). Depraved
indifference is derived from the concept of “implied malice,” which is distinct
from the state of mind characterized by the Criminal Code as recklessness
9
because recklessness requires a subjective awareness of a risk. Id. at 1172-73
& n.9.
[¶19] We have not construed depraved indifference as incorporating a
culpable mental state. Instead, we have construed section 201(1)(B) “to deal
with those few instances in which, although the defendant did not act
intentionally or knowingly, his conduct, objectively viewed, created such a high
tendency to produce death that the law attributes to him the highest degree of
blameworthiness.” State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me. 1980) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Thongsavanh, 2007 ME 20, ¶ 38, 915 A.2d 421 (“The
offense does not require evidence of a defendant’s subjective state of mind.”).
[¶20] Because direct evidence of a defendant’s intent or knowledge can
be difficult to obtain, the State may charge depraved indifference murder as
an alternative to intentional or knowing murder, in a single count, in cases
where the defendant’s intent is not known when the defendant is charged. See
State v. Hickey, 459 A.2d 573, 581-82 (Me. 1983); Lagasse, 410 A.2d at 540. If,
after the evidence has been presented, the evidence could not establish
depraved indifference murder, the court “may decline to instruct on the
depraved indifference charge.” Hickey, 459 A.2d at 582. When there are
disputed facts regarding the defendant’s knowledge or intent at the close of
10
evidence, however, the fact-finder must determine if the State has proved the
elements of either form of murder, whether based on an inference of the
defendant’s knowledge or intentions, or, in those cases where it exists, direct
evidence of the defendant’s state of mind; or based on an objective view of the
nature of the conduct. See, e.g., State v. True, 2017 ME 2, ¶¶ 1, 3, 21, 153 A.3d
106 (affirming a murder conviction pursuant to section 201(1)(A) or (B)
when the evidence showed that the defendant punched and kicked the victim
while another man stabbed the victim in the back of the neck and choked him
with a brake cable); State v. Erskine, 2006 ME 5, ¶¶ 6-7, 9-11, 889 A.2d 312(affirming a murder conviction pursuant to section 201(1)(A) or (B) when the
evidence showed that the victim suffered a head injury consistent with the use
of a hammer, found in the defendant’s apartment, on which the victim’s DNA
was discovered).
[¶21] Because depraved indifference murder may be charged and tried
as an alternative to intentional or knowing murder in a single charge, see
Erskine, 2006 ME 5, ¶ 19, 889 A.2d 312, a unanimous verdict can be reached
even if individual jurors disagree about whether the murder was an
intentional or knowing murder or a depraved indifference murder, id., as long
as the evidence presented to the jury is sufficient to support each of the
11
alternative theories, see id.; Maine, 2017 ME 25, ¶ 28, 155 A.3d 871. Each
juror, or the court as fact-finder in a jury-waived trial, thus determines
whether (1) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
acted knowingly or intentionally in killing another person; (2) the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct, although not undertaken
with the intent to kill or with knowledge that the conduct was practically
certain to cause death, demonstrated a depraved indifference to the value of
human life; or (3) the State failed to prove either theory beyond a reasonable
doubt. 17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A), (B).
[¶22] Contrary to Cummings’s argument, the repeated stabbing that is
reflected in the evidence here could be directly probative of whether
Cummings’s actions manifested a depraved indifference to the value of human
life. See id. § 201(1)(B). It was exclusively within the jury’s province to decide
whether Cummings intended to kill Fecteau, was aware that his conduct
would practically certainly result in Fecteau’s death, or killed Fecteau through
conduct manifesting a depraved indifference to the value of human life. See id.
§§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A), (B). As we have held, “the alternative theories
of committing murder, through either intentionally or knowingly causing the
death of another or by engaging in conduct that manifests a depraved
12
indifference to the value of human life and that in fact causes the death of
another, are permissible alternatives and not separate offenses.” Erskine,
2006 ME 5, ¶ 19, 889 A.2d 312. The jurors need not unanimously agree on the
theory of murder that they found was proved. See id.[¶23] The evidence presented here, taken in its entirety, could support
more than one theory of murder. Specifically, a juror could rationally find—
based on the evidence presented—that Cummings stabbed Fecteau repeatedly
(1) with the conscious object to cause Fecteau’s death, (2) with the knowledge
that Fecteau’s death was practically certain to result from his conduct, or
(3) without intent or knowledge but manifesting a depraved indifference to
the value of human life. 17-A M.R.S. §§ 35(1)(A), (2)(A), 201(1)(A), (B).
A juror finding that the stabbings did not demonstrate a knowing or
intentional murder could nonetheless find, for instance, that Cummings
intended to incapacitate Fecteau to facilitate the burglary, or had a frenzied
reaction to Fecteau waking up during the burglary, and repeatedly stabbed
him, which, “objectively viewed, created such a high tendency to produce
death that the law attributes to [the defendant] the highest degree of
blameworthiness.” Saenz, 2016 ME 159, ¶ 23, 150 A.3d 331 (quotation marks
omitted); see 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(B).
13
[¶24] In sum, depraved indifference murder was properly charged as
an alternative to intentional or knowing murder in a single count, see Erskine,
2006 ME 5, ¶ 19, 889 A.2d 312, and the evidence was sufficient to support any
of the alternative theories of murder. We discern no error in the jury
instructions or the resulting jury verdict and conviction.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau,
PLLC, Portland, for appellant Roland L. Cummings
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CR-2014-600
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY