State of Maine v. Ronald Paquin

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2020 ME 53
Docket: Yor-19-234
Argued: February 12, 2020
Decided: April 23, 2020
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.**
STATE OF MAINE
v.
RONALD PAQUIN
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Ronald Paquin appeals from a judgment of conviction for eleven
counts of gross sexual misconduct (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B)
(Supp. 1985),1 entered by the trial court (York County, Douglas, J.) following a
jury trial. Paquin contends that the court erred in (1) declining his request to
compel the State to obtain the victim’s criminal history on the second day of the
trial; (2) admitting expert testimony concerning the phenomenon of delayed
*
Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of this
opinion. See M.R. App. P. 12(a) (“A qualified justice may participate in a decision even though not
present at oral argument.”).
** Although Chief Justice Saufley participated in this appeal, she resigned before this opinion was
certified.
1 Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 has been amended many times since the criminal conduct at issue
occurred and is codified in its current version at 17-A M.R.S. § 253 (2018).
2
reporting by male victims of sexual abuse; (3) failing to rule sua sponte that the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred convictions on both Counts 5 and 30; (4) giving
a deficient “on or about” jury instruction on Count 31; (5) declining to allow a
police detective to testify about whether he perceived any inconsistencies
between two alleged victims’ respective versions of events; and (6) allowing
the State to dismiss Counts 27, 28, and 29 during the trial without his consent
rather than entering a judgment of acquittal on those counts.
[¶2] We agree with Paquin that the convictions on both Counts 5 and 30
violated his double jeopardy protections and we remand for dismissal of
Count 30. We also agree that the court erred in allowing the State to dismiss
Counts 27, 28, and 29 during the trial and therefore remand for entry of a
judgment of acquittal on those counts. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
see State v. Marble, 2019 ME 157, ¶ 7, 218 A.3d 1157, the jury rationally could
have found the following facts. In the early 1980s the victim was an altar boy
at the Roman Catholic Church in Haverhill, Massachusetts, where Paquin was a
priest. When the victim was nine or ten years old, Paquin, while discussing with
3
the victim a human sexuality class that Paquin was taking, told the victim that
“it was perfectly normal for men to touch each other.” At some point Paquin
committed a sexual act against the victim in Haverhill.
[¶4] Beginning in the winter of 1985, and continuing until just before he
turned fourteen, the victim made numerous trips to Kennebunkport with
Paquin, staying at a campground in Paquin’s camper or in the motel associated
with the campground. On those trips Paquin routinely provided the victim with
alcohol and committed sexual acts against him.
[¶5] In February 2017 the grand jury returned an indictment against
Paquin; as later amended, the indictment charged Paquin with fifteen counts
(Counts 1-13, 30-31) of gross sexual misconduct (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 253(1)(B), against the victim; and sixteen counts (Counts 14-29) of gross
sexual misconduct (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(A) (Supp. 1985), against a
second alleged victim.2 The case was tried to a jury on November 26-29, 2018.
During the trial, the court granted Paquin’s motion for a judgment of acquittal
on Counts 10-13, and the State dismissed Counts 27-29. The jury returned
verdicts of guilty on the remaining counts concerning the victim (Counts 1-9,
2 The convictions at issue in this appeal resulted from Paquin’s crimes committed against one
person, referred to in this opinion as “the victim.”
4
30-31) and not guilty on the remaining counts concerning the second alleged
victim (Counts 14-26). The court denied Paquin’s motion for a new trial.
[¶6] At the sentencing hearing, the court entered judgment in accordance
with the verdict and sentenced Paquin on each count to concurrent terms of
twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but sixteen years suspended, and three
years of probation. Paquin timely appealed and filed an application to appeal
from the sentence. On August 7, 2019, the Sentence Review Panel denied
Paquin leave to appeal from his sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] We discuss Paquin’s six assertions of error in turn.
A. Victim’s Criminal History
[¶8] In a chambers conference on the second day of the trial, Paquin’s
counsel raised the issue of his wish to cross-examine the victim using
nonspecific criminal history that the victim had disclosed in an arbitration
statement as part of his civil lawsuit against the Catholic Church. Counsel
acknowledged that all Paquin knew about the criminal history was based on
the arbitration statement. When the State objected, the court advised defense
counsel that “[y]ou can’t go on a fishing expedition before the jury. . . . I have to
5
base my ruling on [M.R. Evid.] 609,3 so do you know what [the victim’s]
conviction history is, what he was convicted of and for what?” Counsel
answered, “No.”
[¶9] Defense counsel then requested that the State produce the victim’s
criminal history as “something that should be discoverable in this case,
something that they should provide us.” The State objected on the ground that
it had already provided in discovery all of the information it had, and argued
that a request for discovery on the second day of trial concerning information
previously known to Paquin was “not appropriate.” The court sustained the
State’s objection and ruled that Paquin would not be allowed to inquire on
cross-examination about the victim’s self-reported convictions “unless
[counsel has] some specific information about his . . . criminal history.”
[¶10] Paquin acknowledges that “Maine’s discovery rules contain no
provision specifically requiring the production of the criminal history record of
a complaining witness who testifies at trial,” and he does not assert that the
State failed to produce any discovery explicitly required by M.R.U. Crim. P. 16
or by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),4 and its progeny. Rather, Paquin
3 Maine Rule of Evidence 609 governs the impeachment of a witness by evidence of a criminal
conviction.
6
urges us to hold that Rule 16 implicitly requires the State to produce the
criminal history of a complaining witness who testifies at trial because, he
argues, the State is always in constructive possession of that information and it
“is potentially impactful on the outcome of [the] trial.”5
[¶11] “We afford the trial court substantial deference in overseeing the
parties’ discovery . . . .” State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 8, 56 A.3d 1230. “Only
when the defendant can establish that the effect [of an alleged discovery
violation] is so significant as to deprive him of a fair trial will we vacate on that
basis.” Id. Furthermore, in considering Paquin’s discovery request made
during trial concerning a matter of which he was aware, the court was entitled
to consider the potential delay involved. See id. ¶¶ 5, 9. Without deciding if or
when the State is ever required to do so, we conclude that on this record the
trial court did not err in ruling that the State was not required to produce the
victim’s criminal history mid-trial.
[¶12] Maine Rule of Evidence 16(a)(2)(D), the automatic discovery rule
invoked by Paquin, requires the State to produce “[a] statement describing any
4We recently explained that “[t]he due process concepts articulated in Brady require the State to
disclose to the defendant evidence that is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
or because it is impeaching.” State v. Reed-Hansen, 2019 ME 58, ¶ 13, 207 A.3d 191 (quotation marks
omitted).
Paquin does not argue “that the State is required to produce such records of every witness, only
5
those, such as [the victim in this case], on [whose] testimony its case depends.”
7
matter or information known to the attorney for the State that may not be
known to the defendant and that tends to create a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt as to the crime charged.” (Emphasis added.) Here, Paquin
knew prior to trial that the victim had a self-reported criminal history. When
the court inquired: “And this was information that you received in discovery
earlier in the case?” counsel answered, “Sure.”
[¶13] Furthermore, Paquin made no showing that he requested from the
State or otherwise attempted to obtain the victim’s criminal record prior to
trial,6 and he proffered no specific dates of conviction or other information that
would allow the court to determine the admissibility of the purported
convictions pursuant to M.R. Evid. 609(a)-(b), such as whether they were
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or whether their elements
established dishonesty, see M.R. Evid. 609(a).
[¶14] In sum, given this record the court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to compel the State to obtain the victim’s criminal history during the
trial, nor in ruling that Paquin could not cross-examine the victim concerning
6 Paquin points to M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(c)(1), which requires the State to produce, upon the
defendant’s written request, specified items “that are material and relevant to the preparation of the
defense.” The record does not contain any such request from Paquin. Had he timely requested the
victim’s criminal history pursuant to the rule and the State declined to comply, the court would have
had the authority, in its sound discretion, to issue an appropriate order. See Corey v. Norman, Hanson
& DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, ¶ 17, 742 A.2d 933 (noting “the considerable discretion vested in the judge”
in making a discovery ruling (quotation marks omitted)).
8
his nonspecific, self-reported criminal history. See Silva, 2012 ME 120, ¶ 8,
56 A.3d 1230.
B. Expert Testimony
[¶15] The victim testified to sexual abuse that occurred between 1985
and 1988, more than thirty years before the charges resulting from that abuse
went to trial. He reached a settlement with the Catholic Church in 2010, and in
2011 he reported to the Maine Attorney General’s Office what had happened.
[¶16] At trial, the State sought to call an expert witness to testify that
victims of sexual abuse, particularly male victims, often disclose the abuse long
after it occurred, and to explain why that is so. Following a lengthy voir dire,
Paquin’s objection to the expert’s testimony, primarily on the ground that it
unfairly bolstered the victim’s credibility, was overruled. The court satisfied
itself that the State was not seeking to elicit the expert’s opinion concerning
why the alleged victims in this particular case delayed reporting, and it
excluded, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403, any reference by the expert, while
discussing delayed disclosure, to the abuser being a member of the clergy. The
expert then testified that “delayed disclosure is actually the norm . . . . It’s
9
almost expected given the statistics. . . . [M]en actually wait a great deal longer
to disclose abuse.” Paquin’s renewed objected was overruled.
[¶17] “Whether proffered evidence requires expert explanation is a
question left to the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Wyman, 2015 ME 1,
¶ 26, 107 A.3d 641. Maine Rule of Evidence 702 allows “[a] witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
[to] testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if such testimony will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
[¶18] We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that
the expert was qualified and could testify concerning a matter that would assist
the jury in understanding the evidence. See id.; Wyman, 2015 ME 1, ¶ 26,
107 A.3d 641. Furthermore, the court limited the risk of unfair prejudice to
Paquin by restricting the expert’s testimony to the subject of delayed disclosure
in general—as opposed to an opinion as to why the victim in this case may have
made a late disclosure—and excluding from the expert’s opinion the effect of
an abuser being a member of the clergy.7 See M.R. Evid. 403.
[¶19] That said, “[a]n expert opinion must be relevant to an issue in the
case.” State v. Napier, 1998 ME 8, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 869. The trial court’s
The expert testified that her employer “coordinate[s] . . . investigations of child sexual abuse in
7
Cumberland County.” We reject Paquin’s assertion that this testimony unfairly bolstered the victim’s
10
determination of relevancy is reviewed for clear error. Id. In this case, the
expert’s testimony regarding the phenomenon of delayed disclosure was not
relevant if, as Paquin contends, “There is no evidence that [the victim] delayed
disclosing his abuse.”
[¶20] We agree that the evidence does not establish as a certainty when
or to whom the victim made a first disclosure, but establishes only that he first
disclosed the abuse to Maine law enforcement authorities in 2011, and that he
had reached a settlement with the Church in 2010. However, at trial Paquin
accepted the premise that the victim had in fact made a delayed disclosure, and
he asserted it as a fact in objecting to the expert’s testimony:
[PAQUIN]: You know, we haven’t made an issue of the late
disclosure. Obviously, it’s out there . . . .
....
And so given that we didn’t highlight that, that we didn’t call
into question the late report, we don’t really think that it’s incredibly
credibility because the expert’s tangential connection to law enforcement “allowed [her] to sit as a
sort of human polygraph,” and the victim “[a]pparently . . . passed those truth-telling tests.” The
expert went on to say that her duties involved “forensic interviews of children” (emphasis added);
here, the expert testified that she had never met the victim, who, in any event, was forty-four years
old at the time of the trial. Given that evidence, we cannot conclude that the jury was led to believe
that the expert was vouching for the victim’s personal credibility.
11
probative at this point to have someone come in and testify as to a
late disclosure.
....
We want to avoid the suggestion that because of this failure
to disclose or delayed disclosure that there were other victims out
there in . . . this particular case.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶21] When the court ruled on his objection, Paquin did not take issue
with the court’s statement that
[b]ased on the testimony of both [alleged victims], it is clear there
has been a substantial delay in reporting these alleged events.
They . . . allegedly occurred in the late 1980s. The disclosure was
not made at the time. It was made a number of years later.
That delay has been referenced by counsel, by the defense
both in opening statement and as part of cross-examination of at
least [a detective who testified].
[¶22] Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 104(a), “[t]he court must decide any
preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is admissible.” Like the
court’s relevancy determination, a Rule 104(a) decision is reviewed for clear
error. Walton v. Ireland, 2014 ME 130, ¶ 12, 104 A.3d 883; see Napier,
1998 ME 8, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 869. Here, the court’s finding that “there has been a
substantial delay in reporting these alleged events,” a precursor to the expert’s
opinion being relevant and therefore admissible, was not clearly erroneous
12
given the evidence establishing when the abuse occurred and when the victim
first reported it to Maine authorities, coupled with Paquin’s implicit admission
that the victim’s report had been substantially delayed.
C. Double Jeopardy
[¶23] Paquin contends that the court’s entry of judgment on both
Counts 5 and 30 violates his constitutional double jeopardy protections.
U.S. Const. amend. V; Me. Const. art. I, § 8. Reviewing for obvious error because
this issue was not raised at trial, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b), we agree.
[¶24] In State v. Martinelli, discussing the constitutional double jeopardy
bar against “multiple punishments for the same offense,” 2017 ME 217, ¶ 5,
175 A.3d 636 (quotation marks omitted), we explained that
[b]ecause a person, by one act or transaction, may violate multiple
criminal laws, courts apply the Blockburger test to determine
whether the crimes enumerated by those multiple statutes are the
same offense for purposes of double jeopardy protections. See
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180,
76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). The test asks whether each statutory
provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. If each
statutory provision requires a unique proof of fact, the Blockburger
test is satisfied and there is no double jeopardy violation by
subsequent prosecutions or multiple punishments.
Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
13
[¶25] The indictment against Paquin charged:
Count 5: On or about between November 1, 1986 and
February 28, 1987, in Kennebunkport, YORK County, Maine,
RONALD PAQUIN, did engage in a sexual act with [the victim] . . . ,
not his spouse, who had not in fact attained his fourteenth birthday.
Count 30: On or about between December 1, 1986 and
December 31, 1986, in Kennebunkport, YORK County, Maine,
RONALD PAQUIN, did engage in a sexual act with [the victim] . . . ,
not his spouse, who had not in fact attained his fourteenth birthday.
To wit: Engaging in a sexual act in the form of direct physical
contact between the genitals of [the victim] . . . and the mouth of
RONALD PAQUIN.
[¶26] Paquin argues that although Count 30 requires proof of a specific
type of sexual act whereas Count 5 is satisfied by proof of any sexual act, the
two counts do not each “require[] proof of a fact that the other does not,” id.
(quotation marks omitted), because the jury could find that a single sexual
act—Paquin putting his mouth on the victim’s genitals in December 1986—
satisfied the State’s burden of proof on both counts. Put another way, only
Count 30 required proof of a unique fact, and if Paquin committed the crime
charged in Count 30, then he necessarily committed the crime charged in
Count 5.
[¶27] Accordingly, applying Martinelli, a judgment of conviction on both
counts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause unless the State proved at trial that
the convictions did not arise from “the same act or transaction.” Id. ¶ 9
14
(quotation marks omitted). As Paquin notes, the State did not. Although the
jury might have found that separate incidents formed the basis of its verdicts
on Counts 5 and 30, we cannot know that, and will not assume it.
[¶28] The trial court’s instruction following a note from the jury during
deliberations confirms this analysis. The note read: “Could we please get
clarification of the difference between charges 1 through 9 and charge
number 30 and then charge number 31?” The court answered the jury: “[A]ll
of those charges, Counts 1 through 9 and Counts 30 and 31, charge the same
offense. . . . So all of those charges involve the same crime.” (Emphasis added.)
Specifically concerning Count 30, the court correctly instructed that “the State’s
burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] particular type of
sexual act occurred and that it occurred within the date range specified in Count
30.” The double jeopardy problem arises because if the jury found that the State
met that exact burden of proof, nothing more was required for it to find Paquin
guilty on Count 5 as well.
[¶29] Because the Double Jeopardy Clause directs that Paquin cannot
stand convicted of both Counts 5 and 30, we remand for the dismissal of
Count 30. Resentencing on Count 5, as urged by Paquin, is not required because
15
each of the remaining ten convictions is for the same crime and resulted in
identical concurrent sentences.
D. Jury Instruction
[¶30] Count 31 charged:
On or about between June 1, 1988 and August 21, 1988 . . . RONALD
PAQUIN, did engage in a sexual act with [the victim] . . . , not his
spouse, who had not in fact attained his fourteenth birthday. To
wit: Engaging in a sexual act in the form of direct physical contact
between the anus of [the victim] . . . and the genitals of RONALD
PAQUIN.
The victim’s fourteenth birthday was the day following the last day charged in
Count 31. Consequently, in order to return a verdict of guilty on Count 31 the
jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that direct physical
contact between the genitals of Paquin and the anus of the victim occurred on
or before August 21, 1988.
[¶31] Concerning the indictment generally, the court instructed:
The indictment alleges that each offense was committed on
or about a specific period of time in each particular count. The
specific date of the alleged crime need not be proven. It is enough
if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense
charged was committed by the defendant and it happened
sometime within the dates suggested by the evidence of the case
with respect to each count.
The question of whether the offense was committed, not
when it happened, must be the principal focus of your inquiry;
however, you may consider any evidence of uncertainty as to the
16
dates of the alleged offense in deciding whether the offense was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .
[¶32] Paquin contends that the instruction was erroneous because it
allowed the jury to return a guilty verdict even if it found that a sexual act
occurred after August 21, 1988, when the victim had reached age fourteen.
Because Paquin did not object to the instruction at trial, we review it for
obvious error. State v. Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 24, --- A.3d ---. The obvious
error standard requires Paquin to show that “there is (1) an error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Even if these three conditions are
met, we will set aside a jury’s verdict only if we conclude that (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. n.6 (quotation marks omitted). We have said that
[a]n error regarding jury instructions is plain if that error is so clear
that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing
it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it. An
error affects a criminal defendant’s substantial rights if the error
was sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the
proceeding. In reviewing for obvious error, our ultimate task is to
determine whether the defendant received a fair trial.
State v. Lajoie, 2017 ME 8, ¶ 15, 154 A.3d 132 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
[¶33] In State v. Hodgdon, we found that an instruction functionally
identical to the one at issue in this case did not rise to the level of obvious error,
17
“considering the instructions as a whole, as we must do,” because “[t]he court
on several occasions informed the jury of the requirement that to return a guilty
verdict . . . [it] must find that the victim was under the age of fourteen years at
the time the offenses occurred.” 2017 ME 122, ¶¶ 11, 16, 164 A.3d 959. Here,
as in Hodgdon, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury, both orally and in
its written instructions, and specifically concerning Count 31, that it must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under the age of fourteen in
order to return a verdict of guilty. When the jury sent out a note asking about
Count 31, the court reemphasized that the State was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the victim “had not yet attained his 14th birthday.”
As we did in Hodgdon, we conclude that there is no obvious error demonstrated
on this record. See id. ¶ 16.
[¶34] That said, we noted in Hodgdon that the “on or about” instruction
commonly used in Maine courts8 is problematic, standing alone, when the
applicable statute requires the State to prove that the crime charged occurred
on or before a specific date in order to avoid a judgment of acquittal. Id. Such
is the case here, where the jury was required to return a verdict of not guilty if
it found that the sexual act charged in Count 31 occurred on or after
8 See Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-30 at 6-61 (2018-2019 ed. 2018).
18
August 22, 1988—the victim’s fourteenth birthday. Although we conclude that
the court’s instructions were not clearly erroneous when considered as a
whole, a better approach would have been for the court to make the specific
date limitation clear in its “on or about” instruction, in addition to stating the
“under age fourteen” requirement elsewhere in its instructions.9
E. Inconsistent Witness Statements
[¶35] When Paquin cross-examined a Kennebunkport police detective,
he asked, “When you interviewed the two alleged victims, did you notice any
inconsistencies in their stories? Did they match?” The State objected and the
following exchange took place at sidebar:
[PAQUIN]: Judge, he’s a trained detective. He can—he’s got the
ability to judge whether someone’s credible or not.
[STATE]: So, Judge, the State’s objection is he absolutely cannot
judge someone’s credibility. That’s the purview of the jury and the
jury alone. . . .
For example, without requiring that trial courts employ any particular language, the court in this
9
case could have made its instruction concerning Counts 1-9 and 30-31 more complete by saying
(modification in italics):
The indictment alleges that each offense was committed on or about a specific period
of time in each particular count. The specific date of the alleged crime need not be
proven. It is enough if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense
charged was committed by the defendant and that, concerning Counts 1-9 and Counts
30-31, each offense was committed before the alleged victim reached his fourteenth
birthday.
See supra ¶ 31.
19
[PAQUIN]: I’m asking for factual information regarding visits and
times and when people were there.
COURT: Is there a specific statement that you are seeking to
illuminate as inconsistent, or are you just asking generally?
[PAQUIN]: Kind of asking generally.
COURT: The objection’s sustained.
[¶36] “We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
for clear error or abuse of discretion.” State v. Tieman, 2019 ME 60, ¶ 12,
207 A.3d 618. It is well established that credibility determinations are within
the sole province of the jury. See State v. Sweeney, 2004 ME 123, ¶ 11,
861 A.2d 43 (“Questions that ask a witness to give an opinion of another
witness’s veracity are improper because determining the credibility of a
witness is the sole province of the fact-finder.”). Paquin argues that the
credibility of the alleged victims was not implicated by his question because he
was not asking the detective whether he believed one or the other, but rather
whether there were any inconsistencies in their accounts as a factual matter.
[¶37] Setting aside the issue of whether Paquin’s question called for an
improper credibility opinion, the court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining
the State’s objection because whether the detective discerned any
inconsistencies in the alleged victims’ accounts was of limited relevance given
20
Paquin’s opportunity to cross-examine them. See id. (“One witness’s opinion of
another witness’s truthfulness is not helpful to the jury when the jury has the
opportunity to hear both witnesses.”); M.R. Evid. 403. Paquin was then free to
highlight any perceived inconsistencies in their respective accounts during his
closing argument.
F. Dismissal of Counts 27-29
[¶38] Paquin finally contends that the court erred in allowing the State
to dismiss Counts 27-29 during the trial rather than entering a judgment of
acquittal on those counts. Those counts concerned the second alleged victim;
the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on all counts concerning the second
alleged victim that were submitted to it (Counts 14-26).
[¶39] After the second alleged victim testified, the State advised the court
in chambers that it would be dismissing Counts 27-29 “with regard to [the
second alleged victim] based on his testimony of not recalling.” The court
replied, “All right. Then Counts 27, 28 and 29 are dismissed.” When Paquin’s
counsel raised the question of whether Paquin’s consent to the dismissal was
required, the court advised: “[T]he State anticipated my thinking on this
because I would be disposed, unless they present a witness . . . to fill in the
blanks on Counts 27, 28 and 29, I would be dismissing those counts on a
21
judgment in response to [a motion for a judgment of acquittal] anyway, so it’s
sort of moot.” The court deferred ruling pending Paquin’s response to the
proposed dismissal, but said, “I’ve already indicated I’m likely to grant the
motion for judgment of acquittal on those three counts anyway. Whether
[Paquin] agrees or not, the evidence is not in the record at this point.”
[¶40] After the State rested its case-in-chief on the third day of the trial,
Paquin moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. In ruling on the motion,
the court again stated that “with respect to Counts 27, 28 and 29 . . . I would be
inclined to grant the motion for acquittal.” This exchange followed:
[STATE]: Judge, would have [sic] the Court consider it moot, then I
think we were waiting in chambers to determine if there would be
an objection to those dismissals, and I just want to make sure the
record’s clear that’s mooted then.
COURT: I haven’t heard an objection, so either way, 27 either—
either dismissal without objection or on the basis of [M.R.U.
Crim. P. 29]. Counts 27, 28 and 29 are dismissed.
[STATE]: Judge, the State would move orally to dismiss those
without objection.
COURT: 27, 28 and 29 are dismissed without objection.
The court later summarized its ruling, saying in part that the motion for
judgment of acquittal “is moot with respect to [Counts] 27, 28 and 29 and those
counts have been dismissed by agreement.”
22
[¶41] The State later filed a written dismissal for the stated reason:
“Probable cause established but insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt on those Counts.” The written dismissal inaccurately stated
that “[c]ounsel for the Defendant indicated on the record that the Defendant
does not object to the dismissal of these Counts.”
[¶42] Contrary to the written dismissal and the State’s expressed wish
“to make sure the record’s clear,” neither of Paquin’s attorneys ever expressly
said whether Paquin did or did not consent to the dismissals, although the State
is correct in arguing that they had multiple opportunities to do either. Pursuant
to M.R.U. Crim. P. 48(a), “a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without
the consent of the defendant.” The reason for the rule is that “dismissal of
charges after jeopardy has attached without the consent of the defendant raises
a serious double jeopardy problem.” 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal
Practice § 48.2 at IX-102 (Gardner ed. 1995).
[¶43] Beyond the potential violation of Rule 48(a), we conclude that
Paquin was in fact acquitted on Counts 27-29. “[A] defendant once acquitted
may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy
Clause.” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978). The Double Jeopardy
Clause is implicated “when it is plain that the [trial court] evaluated the
23
[prosecution’s] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to
sustain a conviction.” Id. at 97 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶44] The Supreme Court said in Scott that “the trial judge’s
characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the
action,” and explained that “a defendant is acquitted . . . when the ruling of the
judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution in the defendant’s
favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged.” Id. at 96-97 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Applying
Scott, the trial court’s characterization of its action on Counts 27-29 as a
dismissal does not control our analysis, see id. at 96; rather, we consider that
after the State proposed a dismissal due to insufficient evidence, the court
repeatedly said that absent a dismissal it would grant Paquin’s motion for
acquittal on those counts. The State then filed a written dismissal for the
explicit reason that there was insufficient evidence to support them.
[¶45] Because “the ruling of the judge . . . actually represent[ed] a
resolution in the defendant’s favor . . . of some or all of the factual elements of
the offense[s] charged” in Counts 27-29, the court’s action—although termed a
dismissal—acquitted Paquin on those counts. Id. at 97 (alteration and
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of
24
Counts 27-29 and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on
those counts.
G. Conclusion
[¶46] For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we (1) vacate the
judgment of conviction on Count 30 and remand for a dismissal of that count,
and (2) vacate the dismissal of Counts 27, 28, and 29 and remand for entry of a
judgment of acquittal on those counts. In all other respects we affirm the
judgment.
The entry is:
Dismissal of Counts 27, 28, and 29 vacated;
remanded with instructions to enter a judgment
of acquittal on Counts 27, 28, and 29. Judgment
of conviction on Count 30 vacated; remanded
with instructions to dismiss Count 30 with
prejudice. In all other respects, judgment
affirmed.
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant Ronald
Paquin
Kathryn L. Slattery, District Attorney, and Justina McGettigan, Dep. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District #1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
York County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-109
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY