State of Maine v. Ezra Leblanc-Simpson

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 109Docket: Cum-17-474
Argued: May 16, 2018
Decided: July 26, 2018
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
EZRA LEBLANC-SIMPSON
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] This appeal presents the question of whether a person who has
conditions of release set by a judicial officer can be convicted of violation of a
condition of release, 15 M.R.S. § 1092 (1)(B) (2017), for acts committed while
in jail after not securing release on bail. The Bail Code specifies that “[a]
condition of release takes effect and is fully enforceable as of the time the
judicial officer sets the condition . . . .” 15 M.R.S. § 1026(7) (2017). The Bail
Code also requires that the judicial officer shall provide the defendant with a
written statement of the conditions of release, 15 M.R.S. § 1026(5)(A) (2017),
and advise the defendant of “[t]he penalties for and consequences of violating
a condition of release,” 15 M.R.S. § 1026(5)(B)(2) (2017).
2
[¶2] Ezra LeBlanc-Simpson appeals from a judgment of conviction for
twelve counts of violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S.
§ 1092(1)(B), entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Cumberland County,
Mills, J.) following a bench trial. LeBlanc-Simpson challenges the application of
conditions of release to him while he remained incarcerated. He also contends
that he was not provided with adequate notice of the conditions of release or of
the penalties for violating conditions of release while he remained incarcerated,
as required by 15 M.R.S. § 1026(5) (2017).1
[¶3] Because the State presented insufficient evidence that
LeBlanc-Simpson was provided with notice of the conditions of release
applicable to him while he was in jail, we must vacate the judgment.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶4] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
trial court could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Beckwith, 2015 ME 72, ¶ 10, 117 A.3d 1049.
[¶5] On October 20, 2016, LeBlanc-Simpson was arrested and charged
with reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
1 LeBlanc-Simpson’s remaining contention—that his phone calls from jail were protected by both
the United States and Maine Constitutions—is not persuasive and we do not discuss it further.
3
§§ 211(1), 1252(4) (2017), criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon
(Class C), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 209(1), 1252(4) (2017), and two counts of violating a
condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2017). On
October 21, 2016, the State filed a notice joining LeBlanc-Simpson’s case with a
case against another person, making that person a co-defendant with
LeBlanc-Simpson. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 8(b).
[¶6] LeBlanc-Simpson made his initial appearance in court on
October 21, 2016. Cash bail was set by the court at $10,000 with conditions of
release. The conditions of release provided that LeBlanc-Simpson shall (1) not
use any alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs, (2) not possess any alcoholic
beverages or illegal drugs, (3) not possess any dangerous weapons, including,
but not limited to, firearms, (4) submit to searches of his person, vehicle and
residence, and, if applicable, to chemical tests at any time without articulable
suspicion or probable cause, and (5) have no direct or indirect contact with the
co-defendant.
[¶7] The conditions of release form was signed by the judge but was not
signed by LeBlanc-Simpson. The record from the trial does not include a
transcript of the initial appearance hearing or any other evidence addressing
whether or not, at that hearing, the judge specifically advised LeBlanc-Simpson
4
of the conditions of release or, as required by 15 M.R.S. § 1026(5)(B)(2), of
“[t]he penalties for and consequences of violating a condition of release . . . .”
[¶8] LeBlanc-Simpson did not post the required $10,000 bail and
remained in the Cumberland County Jail. Between November 7, 2016, and
December 12, 2016, while he remained in jail, LeBlanc-Simpson made
numerous telephone calls to the co-defendant.
[¶9] On April 7, 2017, the Cumberland County grand jury returned a
twelve-count indictment against LeBlanc-Simpson alleging twelve instances of
telephone contact with the co-defendant, constituting violations of his
conditions of release pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B). Pursuant to M.R.U.
Crim. P. 23(a), LeBlanc-Simpson waived his right to a jury trial and opted for a
trial before a judge.
[¶10] A two-day bench trial was held in October 2017. During the trial,
the State’s evidence included certified copies of (i) the docket entries, showing
LeBlanc-Simpson’s initial appearance in court on October 21, 2016, and (ii) the
conditions of release form signed by the judge at that proceeding. The evidence
at trial did not include the transcript or recording of the initial appearance
hearing or any document or testimony indicating that LeBlanc-Simpson was
5
advised of, made aware of, or acknowledged any of the conditions of release or
the consequences of violation of any of the conditions of release.
[¶11] The State did enter in evidence recordings of phone calls made by
LeBlanc-Simpson and played some segments of the relevant calls for the court.
The State also presented evidence identifying LeBlanc-Simpson as the caller
and the co-defendant as the person receiving the telephone calls.
[¶12] During one of the calls played for the court, the conversation
between LeBlanc-Simpson and the co-defendant suggested that both knew they
were not supposed to be talking to one another:
Co-defendant: “You should use somebody else’s to call. . . .”
LeBlanc-Simpson: “As long as we keep it relatively discreet here, I
don’t have a lot of options, I can’t really be put
in double jail”
Co-defendant: “Well I can”
[¶13] LeBlanc-Simpson was found guilty of all twelve counts of violating
a condition of release by having contact with his co-defendant. The court’s
findings were based on the docket entry and conditions of release form
showing that LeBlanc-Simpson appeared personally before the court for his
initial appearance and bail was set at $10,000 with conditions. The court also
found that the conditions of release were in effect at the times the violations
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occurred. The court acknowledged that the phone calls were not “threatening
in any way” towards the co-defendant but were merely about “someone who is
in jail and who’s not enjoying himself. And she was someone to talk to,
regardless of the fact that he was not supposed to talk to her.”
[¶14] LeBlanc-Simpson was sentenced to concurrent ten-month periods
of incarceration on each of the twelve counts of violating a condition of release,
to be served concurrently with his sentence in the underlying case for reckless
conduct with a dangerous weapon (Class C), criminal threatening with a
dangerous weapon (Class C), and two counts of violating different conditions of
release (Class E). LeBlanc-Simpson timely filed a notice of appeal of the
twelve-count conviction.2 M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶15] On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction after trial, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment to determine whether the fact-finder rationally could have found
each element of the charged offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 LeBlanc-Simpson also appealed the convictions entered against him in the underlying case, but
we affirmed those judgments. See State v. LeBlanc-Simpson, Mem-18-22 (Mar. 15, 2018).
7
State v. Cummings, 2017 ME 143, ¶ 12, 166 A.3d 996; State v. Murphy,
2016 ME 5, ¶ 5, 130 A.3d 401.
[¶16] LeBlanc-Simpson argues that the conditions of release order could
not apply to him because he had not posted bail and had not been released from
jail to make the conditions of release applicable. Contrary to LeBlanc-Simpson’s
argument, the Bail Code specifies, “A condition of release takes effect and is fully
enforceable as of the time the judicial officer sets the condition, unless that bail
order expressly excludes it from immediate applicability.” 15 M.R.S. § 1026(7).
The bail order introduced in evidence contained no such exclusion and thus, by
law, was effective when entered at the initial appearance hearing.
[¶17] To convict LeBlanc-Simpson of violating a condition of release, the
State was required to prove that (1) the defendant was granted pre-conviction
or postconviction bail and (2) the defendant, in fact, violated a condition of
release. See 15 M.R.S. § 1092 (2017).
[¶18] Violation of a condition of release is a “strict liability crime,”
15 M.R.S. § 1092(3), meaning that proof of a culpable state of mind is not
required to secure a conviction, see 17-A M.R.S. § 34(4-A) (2017). However, as
the State acknowledged at oral argument, for LeBlanc-Simpson to be convicted
of the charge of violation of a condition of release, the State was required to
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offer evidence and prove that LeBlanc-Simpson had prior knowledge of the
relevant conditions of release and that those conditions of release were
applicable to him while he remained incarcerated.
[¶19] The State’s acknowledgement that it had to prove that
LeBlanc-Simpson had notice of the conditions of release he was accused of
violating recognizes basic standards of due process. Those standards include
“notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence
and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an
impartial fact-finder.” Jusseaume v. Ducatt, 2011 ME 43, ¶ 12, 15 A.3d 714; In re
Chelsea C., 2005 ME 105, ¶ 16, 884 A.2d 97. “Persons engaged in activities
subject to state or local regulation are entitled to know with reasonable clarity
what they must do to engage in the regulated activities without violation of the
law . . . .” State v. McCurdy, 2010 ME 137, ¶ 17, 10 A.3d 686.
[¶20] In response to LeBlanc-Simpson’s assertion at trial that he had no
knowledge regarding the specific conditions that the court had imposed, the
State was required to present sufficient evidence showing that
LeBlanc-Simpson was given adequate notice of the conditions of release that
applied to him and, separately, that LeBlanc-Simpson was advised of the
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“penalties for and consequences of violating a condition of release.” See
15 M.R.S. § 1026(5).
[¶21] Although the State entered in evidence the conditions of release
form, the form was not signed by LeBlanc-Simpson, and does not indicate
anywhere on the form that LeBlanc-Simpson was provided notice of the
conditions. The record does include the docket entries showing that bail with
conditions was set at LeBlanc-Simpson’s initial appearance. The record does
not include a transcript of LeBlanc-Simpson’s initial appearance, so there is no
evidence that, at his initial appearance, LeBlanc-Simpson received actual notice
of the conditions of release. The record does include evidence of the phone call
made by LeBlanc-Simpson to the co-defendant, where they discuss that they
are not to have contact with one another. However, the phone call does not
establish what this belief was based on.3
3 The State entered in evidence two additional bail bonds that were entered against
LeBlanc-Simpson in a different case. These bail bonds also included conditions of no contact with the
co-defendant. There was no evidence presented at trial that these bail bonds remained in effect
between November 7, 2016, and December 12, 2016—the period when the alleged violations of
conditions of release occurred. The State did not seek to prove that the conditions referenced in
these other bail bonds were in effect during that time. Further, because the earlier bail order
contained the same no-contact condition as was imposed here, it would be speculative to find that
LeBlanc-Simpson’s apparent awareness of that condition was based on the bail order that the State
chose to use as the basis for this prosecution rather than on the earlier bail orders.
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[¶22] To establish that a defendant has received notice of conditions of
release, the State need not provide a transcript of the initial appearance or bail
hearing. Development of such transcripts may not be possible when bail is set
by a bail commissioner or after hours by other judicial officers. However,
where a transcript is not available, other evidence of a defendant’s knowledge
of conditions of release and the penalties for violation of one or more conditions
of release must be provided. That evidence might include a form signed by the
defendant signifying knowledge of the conditions of release or testimony of a
law enforcement officer, bail commissioner, or some other individual who may
have observed the process by which bail was set and the conditions of release
were imposed.
[¶23] Here, the record includes no evidence that when his conditions of
release were set during a routine courtroom proceeding, LeBlanc-Simpson was
notified of the conditions of release applied to him in this proceeding. Further,
when a court issues a bail order, section 1026(5)(B)(2) requires the court to
inform the defendant of the penalties for failing to appear and “[t]he penalties
for and consequences of violating a condition of release.” Notably, the statute
does not require the court to inform the defendant of the individual conditions
of release themselves. Therefore, in a case such as this, any inference that the
11
judge who issued the bail order complied with statutory requirements is
insufficient to support a finding that the defendant was put on notice of the
conditions of release, because even full compliance with section 1026(5) would
not have resulted in that notice.4
[¶24] Therefore, the State failed to meet its burden of proof, as the
evidence was insufficient to show that LeBlanc-Simpson was on notice of the
conditions of release.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
Lawrence C. Winger, Esq. (orally), Portland, for appellant Ezra LeBlanc-
Simpson
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and Jonathan T. Sahrbeck, Asst. Dist.
Atty. (orally), Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office, Portland, for
appellee State of Maine
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-1110
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
4 Because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law for the court to find that
LeBlanc-Simpson was on notice of the conditions of release themselves, we need not determine
whether an inference of regularity that the bail order was issued in the way prescribed by section
1026(5) would be a sufficient basis for a fact-finder to conclude that he was notified of the penalties
and consequences of a violation, or whether that information is necessary to prove a violation of
condition of release pursuant to section 1092. See State v. Lewis, 584 A.2d 622, 625 (Me. 1990)
(recognizing the “presumption of regularity which attaches to final judgments of convictions”).