State of Maine v. Collin R. Giroux

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2015 ME 28Docket: Ken-13-577; Ken-13-581
Argued: February 10, 2015
Decided: March 17, 2015
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
COLLIN R. GIROUX
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Collin R. Giroux appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the
trial court (Marden, J.) following his guilty pleas to burglary (Class B),
17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(4) (2014); burglary (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A);
three counts of theft by unauthorized taking (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(4)
(2014); criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2014); and
violation of condition of release (Class E), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (2014). The
court also revoked Giroux’s probation imposed in an earlier case based on his
admission to violating probation.
[¶2] Giroux contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion made prior to sentencing to withdraw his pleas and his admission. See
M.R. Crim. P. 32(d). The motion was made on the ground that the discussion of
Giroux’s diagnosis of kleptomania in a presentence mental evaluation report
2
constituted new evidence of a mental abnormality that would be admissible,
pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2014), to raise a reasonable doubt as to his intent to
commit the crimes charged. The State contends that a diagnosis of kleptomania
cannot raise a reasonable doubt on the issue of intent. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶3] In 2012, Giroux was on probation as part of a sentence imposed in
2008 for burglary and theft convictions. That year, the State charged him with the
seven crimes listed supra and moved to revoke his probation. At Giroux’s request,
the State Forensic Service conducted two mental examinations, the first to
determine his competence to stand trial, and the second to address issues of
criminal responsibility and abnormal condition of the mind. See 15 M.R.S.
§ 101-D(1)-(2) (2014). The examiner concluded that Giroux was competent, able
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, and able “to engage in goal-directed,
planful behavior at the times of the current allegations.” In his report, the
examiner noted that
Mr. Giroux has been stealing things since he was a young teenager,
and possibly even before that. . . . [I]t appears that these thefts have
reflected a recurrent failure to resist impulses to steal objects that have
been of no real use to him. . . . Mr. Giroux’s pattern of stealing is
consistent with a DSM-IV diagnosis of Kleptomania.
[¶4] At a hearing held pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 11, Giroux waived
indictment, pleaded guilty to all of the new charges, and admitted to violating
3
probation. The plea agreement that he accepted included a thirty-month cap on
time to serve. Giroux’s counsel asked that the case be continued for sentencing,
and requested a third evaluation so that he could further explore the impact of
Giroux’s kleptomania on the court’s eventual sentence, saying:
[I]n the criminal responsibility [evaluation] there it was identified that
kleptomania is a real diagnostic phenomenon, it is abnormal, but it
does not rise to the level that it would negate the specific intent of the
offenses here. We have reviewed that and the defendant has made
that determination. . . . [W]e do want the opportunity to present that
phenomenon to the Court at . . . sentencing . . . to determine if it
would mitigate [the sentence imposed].
The court granted both requests.
[¶5] The presentence examination report was filed on January 23, 2013. It,
too, discussed Giroux’s diagnosis of kleptomania. On August 13, 2013, eight
months after he pleaded guilty, Giroux moved to withdraw his pleas and his
admission on the ground that the discussion of kleptomania in the third report
constituted new evidence of a mental abnormality that would be admissible to raise
a reasonable doubt as to his intent to commit the crimes charged.1 Following a
hearing, the court denied Giroux’s motion, finding that “appropriate analysis of
Maine statutes and decisions will not support the use of kleptomania as a defense
to the crime of theft.”
1
Title 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2014) provides: “Evidence of an abnormal condition of the mind may raise
a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a required culpable state of mind.”
4
[¶6] At sentencing, the court entered judgment and sentenced Giroux to an
aggregate of five years’ imprisonment, with all but two years suspended, and two
years of probation. In addition, the court partially revoked Giroux’s earlier
probation and imposed two years of the underlying sentence, to be served
concurrently with the new sentence. Giroux appealed from the conviction and the
revocation of his probation. We granted Giroux a certificate of probable cause to
proceed with the appeal from the revocation of probation and consolidated the two
appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] Whether to grant a request to withdraw a plea is within the sound
discretion of the trial court:
In general, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea, and we review a court’s decision to deny a motion to
withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. We do so primarily by
addressing four factors: (1) the length of time between entering the
plea and seeking to withdraw it; (2) the potential prejudice to the
State; (3) the defendant’s assertions of innocence; and (4) any
deficiency in the proceeding at which the defendant entered the plea
in accordance with M.R. Crim. P. 11.
State v. Newbert, 2007 ME 110, ¶ 16, 928 A.2d 769 (alterations, citation, and
quotation marks omitted).
[¶8] Considering the first factor, eight months elapsed between the Rule 11
hearing and Giroux’s motion to withdraw his pleas, weighing against Giroux’s
5
position.2 Concerning the second, the State did not point to any prejudice that it
would suffer by the delay, weighing in Giroux’s favor. Addressing the fourth
factor, Giroux did not, and does not, allege that there was any defect in the Rule 11
proceeding. On balance, Giroux falls well short of demonstrating an abuse of
discretion in the court’s decision unless the third factor—his assertion of
innocence—weighs decisively in his favor.
[¶9] In analyzing that factor, Giroux admits that he committed the acts
charged. He asserts that he is innocent of criminal conduct, however, because his
kleptomania prevented him from acting with the requisite intent.3 See 17-A M.R.S.
§ 38 (“Evidence of an abnormal condition of the mind may raise a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a required culpable state of mind.”); State v. Estes,
418 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Me. 1980) (“Evidence of abnormal condition of [the]
mind . . . if it creates a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the requisite
culpable state of mind will result in an acquittal. . . . [It] raises the question
2
In State v. Newbert, we noted that a three-month delay weighed against the defendant.
2007 ME 110, ¶ 16, 928 A.2d 769.
3
The crime of burglary is not committed unless a defendant “enters or surreptitiously remains in a
structure knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged to do so, with the intent to commit a crime
therein,” 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A) (2014), and conviction of theft by unauthorized taking requires that a
defendant “obtain[] or exercise[] unauthorized control over the property of another with intent to deprive
the other person of the property,” 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A) (2014).
6
whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed a crime at all.”).4
[¶10] Giroux’s argument fails because positive legislative action and our
precedent make clear that a person may have the required intent to commit a crime
even if he suffers from a compulsion to perform the prohibited act. Additionally,
Giroux knew of his diagnosis before he entered his pleas, weakening his assertion
that the third mental evaluation report constituted new information that would have
changed his decision to plead guilty.
A. Precedent
[¶11] In 1979, we said that
[i]nability to control one’s actions does not negate the existence of a
culpable mental state; rather, it serves as an excuse. . . . A person may
act knowing that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause a
forbidden result while lacking the capacity to refrain from causing the
result or without appreciating its wrongfulness.
State v. Ellingwood, 409 A.2d 641, 646 (Me. 1979) (citation omitted).
4
In State v. Estes, we explained that
[t]he Criminal Code does not undertake to define “abnormal condition of [the] mind”
because the phrase is one of common usage and understanding. . . . [T]he question is not
the precise nature of the abnormality but whether the abnormality, whatever its character,
raises a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant possessed the requisite culpable
state of mind for the particular offense charged.
418 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Me. 1980) (citation omitted). For purposes of this appeal, we assume, without
deciding, that kleptomania is an “abnormal condition of the mind.”
7
[¶12] Two years later, in considering whether evidence of drug withdrawal
could constitute an abnormal condition of the mind that might raise an issue as to a
defendant’s intent, we held that
an addict in [the defendant’s] state suffers from a “compulsion” to
obtain drugs. Existence of a compulsion, or a compelling need, does
not tend to negate a conscious purpose to cause certain results. Nor
does evidence of a compelling need tend to show that a defendant
lacked conscious awareness of the attendant circumstances of his
actions. In fact, evidence of a compelling need tends to confirm the
conclusion that defendant acted with awareness and with the
conscious object of fulfilling that need.
State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450, 455 (Me. 1981) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
[¶13] In State v. Abbott, we again addressed the impact of a compulsion on
a required mens rea in reviewing a murder case where a forensic psychiatrist
testified that the defendant had suffered a psychotic episode that made him feel
compelled to shoot his sons. 622 A.2d 723, 724 (Me. 1993). We held that
the expert psychiatric testimony presented by defendant was directed
to the issue of criminal responsibility and did not generate an issue
whether an abnormal mental condition bore on the culpable state of
mind. Testimony that defendant felt compelled to shoot his sons does
not bear on the determination whether defendant had the requisite
mental state. Compulsion “does not tend to negate a conscious
purpose to cause the result nor show that defendant lacked conscious
awareness of the circumstances of his actions.”
Id. at 725 (citing Mishne, 427 A.2d at 455).
8
[¶14] In light of our jurisprudence, the court correctly found that evidence
of kleptomania could not raise a reasonable doubt as to Giroux’s intent to commit
burglary and theft.
B. Legislative Action
[¶15] As we noted in Abbott, Giroux’s argument that he was compelled to
commit criminal acts would be properly considered in the context of an insanity
plea pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 39 (2014), which he did not enter.5 622 A.2d at
725. Even if he had, his argument would have carried weight only before 1986,
when the statute provided that a defendant could establish that he was not
criminally responsible by satisfying either of two tests: (1) a cognitive test, if the
defendant “lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct”; or (2) a volitional test, if the defendant “lacked substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 39 (1983).
Giroux’s assertion that because of kleptomania he was unable to stop stealing goes
directly to the volitional test.
[¶16] The volitional test was repealed in 1986, however, reflecting a
conscious decision by the Legislature to reject the defense that Giroux advances.
P.L. 1985, ch. 796, § 5 (effective July 16, 1986). The statement of fact
5
Title 17-A M.R.S. § 39(1) (2014) provides: “A defendant is not criminally responsible by reason of
insanity if, at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the criminal conduct.”
9
accompanying the repeal states the Legislature’s intent explicitly: “The bill
eliminates the volitional element of the insanity defense. . . . The elimination of
this ‘inability to control test’ from the insanity defense will leave only the
cognitive test.” L.D. 2397, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1986). The
Legislature’s explicit rejection of what one senator referred to during floor debate
as “the devil made me do it defense,” 2 Legis. Rec. 1431 (1986), compels a
conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Giroux’s
motion to withdraw his pleas, which relied on precisely that defense.
C. Giroux’s Knowledge of the Kleptomania Diagnosis
[¶17] Finally, Giroux knew that he suffered from a compulsion to steal and
that he had been diagnosed with kleptomania well before he entered his pleas. The
competency evaluation goes into great detail regarding his long-standing
compulsion to steal. The criminal responsibility evaluation repeated and expanded
on that discussion; made reference to a 2007 psychiatric discharge summary
reporting that “[Giroux] was agreeable to a trial of [a medication] as this has some
efficacy to treat Kleptomania”; and made a diagnosis: “Mr. Giroux’s pattern of
stealing is consistent with a DSM-IV diagnosis of Kleptomania.” Furthermore, at
the Rule 11 hearing Giroux’s counsel referred to the kleptomania diagnosis and
told the court that “it does not rise to the level that it would negate the specific
intent of the offenses here.”
10
[¶18] The presentence report, resulting from the third mental evaluation
conducted, does not add significant substance to those earlier discussions. Rather,
it summarizes them in an unsurprising conclusion: “Mr. Giroux’s lifelong pattern
of stealing, including his thefts at the times of the index offenses, appears to be the
direct result of his Kleptomania and his personality disorder.” Because at the time
he pleaded guilty Giroux was already well aware of his compulsion—for example,
he reported handcuffing himself to avoid stealing and reported contemplating using
a Taser on himself to combat the urge to steal—the kleptomania diagnosis did not
require the trial court to grant Giroux a discretionary withdrawal of his pleas.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Ronald W. Bourget, Esq., Law Offices of Ronald W. Bourget,
Augusta, for appellant Collin R. Giroux
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Fernand LaRochelle, Dep.
Dist. Atty., Kennebec County District Attorney, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
Ronald W. Bourget, Esq., for appellant Collin R. Giroux
Paul F. Cavanaugh II, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kennebec County District
Attorney, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Superior Court docket numbers CR-08-480, 12-534, 12-942
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY