State of Maine v. Nicholas E. Westgate

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2020 ME 74
Docket: Yor-19-215
Argued: January 9, 2020
Decided: May 26, 2020
Revised: June 23, 2020
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.*
STATE OF MAINE
v.
NICHOLAS E. WESTGATE
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Nicholas E. Westgate appeals from a judgment of conviction of five
counts of unlawful sexual contact, (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1)
(2020), and one count of visual sexual aggression against a child (Class C),
17-A M.R.S. § 256(1)(B) (2020), entered after a jury trial. We conclude that
Westgate received a fair trial with properly admitted expert testimony and a
clear guilty verdict. We affirm the judgment.
* Although Justice Alexander participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was
certified. Chief Justice Saufley also sat at oral argument and participated in the initial conference, but
she resigned before this opinion was certified.
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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the evidence admitted at trial,
viewed in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Graham, 2015 ME
35, ¶ 2, 113 A.3d 1102.
[¶3] During the month of June 2009, Westgate committed five separate
incidents of unlawful sexual contact and one incident of visual sexual
aggression, all against an eleven-year-old victim.
[¶4] In 2012, Westgate was charged by indictment with five counts of
unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1), and one count
of visual sexual aggression against a child (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 256(1)(B).
A. First Trial
[¶5] Following several motions to continue the dates set for jury
selection and trial, the court (York County, O’Neil, J.) held a three-day jury trial
in May 2014. On May 21, 2014, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.
Following this first trial, Westgate appealed, arguing that the trial court
provided deficient jury instructions. On September 20, 2016, we vacated the
jury’s verdict, agreeing that the jury was not properly instructed. We
determined that “[t]he trial court read the indictment to the jury but did not
specify what the elements of the criminal charges were, including the element
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that the victim must have been under the age of twelve when the conduct
occurred.” State v. Westgate, 2016 ME 145, ¶ 19, 148 A.3d 716.
B. Second Trial
[¶6] A second trial began in May 2017. After deliberations, the jury was
deadlocked. The court (Douglas, J.) discharged the jury and declared a mistrial.
C. Third Trial
[¶7] The third trial—the one at issue here—took place over three days
in October 2018. Prior to the trial, the court held a motion hearing addressing
the State’s motion in limine to introduce expert testimony. The proposed
witness was trained in the forensic interviewing of child victims and was the
program manager of the Children’s Advocacy Center of York County. The State
argued that because the victim had been interviewed by law enforcement, the
witness’s expertise would help the jury understand and evaluate the interview
methods used. The State indicated that it would not ask the expert witness to
testify as to whether the victim was telling the truth. The court granted the
motion in limine, allowing the witness to testify.
[¶8] On the first day of trial, the State’s witnesses testified that the victim
disclosed incidents of sexual acts to them. The witnesses also testified to the
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victim’s manifestations of anxiety, and other changes in her behavior, during
the summer when the incidents occurred.
[¶9] On the second day of trial, the State called its expert witness.1 The
expert testified that methods of interviewing child victims of sexual abuse had
evolved in the past decade.
[¶10] On the final day of the trial, Westgate testified that he never
sexually touched the victim. At the close of evidence, the court instructed the
jury—over Westgate’s objection—with the State-requested instruction on
lesser-included charges. The court instructed the jury,
If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every one of those facts, as I have just outlined them with respect
to each particular count, you must find Mr. Westgate not guilty of
that particular count or counts.
If you conclude with respect to any of the counts, any or all of
the counts in Counts 1 through 5, that the State has proven all but
the age, in other words, the State has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Nicholas Westgate intentionally subjected [the victim]
to sexual contact in . . . the summer of 2009 and at the time he was
three years—at least three years older than she was and she was
not his spouse, but the State has not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the offense or offenses occurred prior to her 12th
birthday but you find that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that for that count or counts that the unlawful
sexual contact occurred prior to her 14th birthday, then you would
convict Mr. Westgate of the lesser included offense of unlawful
1 Westgate did not cross-examine the witness and did not object to her testimony.
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sexual contact against a person under the age of 14 for that
particular count or counts.
On the other hand, if you find that the State has not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the facts required to be
proven as outlined above with respect to the lesser included
offense, including, without limitation, that the offense occurred
prior to [the victim’s] 14th birthday, then you must acquit
Mr. Westgate of the lesser included offense with respect to any
particular count or counts.
The court provided similar instructions as to Count 6.
[¶11] During its deliberations, the jury submitted notes with questions.
Specifically, the jury asked for written copies of the six charges, “to be clear on
each one.” Furthermore, the jury asked, “If we cannot agree on guilty for under
12, will we be then asked about the under 14 charge?” The court, after
conferring with Westgate and the State, provided the jury with the written
copies of the six charges and responded to the jury’s second question with the
word, “Yes.”
[¶12] After deliberating for approximately thirty minutes, the jury
returned a unanimous verdict finding Westgate guilty of all charges. The jury’s
verdict was delivered to the court as follows:
THE CLERK: Members have you agreed upon a verdict?
THE FOREPERSON: We have.
JURORS: Yes.
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THE CLERK: What say you, Mr. Foreperson, is the defendant
Nicholas Westgate guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful
sexual contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 1?
THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.
THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual
contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 2?
THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.
THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual
contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 3?
THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.
THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual
contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 4?
THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.
THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual
contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 5?
THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.
THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of visual sexual
aggression against a child whereof defendant stands charged in
Count 6?
THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.
THE CLERK: Mr. Foreperson, have you correctly report[ed] the
verdict?
THE FOREPERSON: I have.
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THE CLERK: So say you, Mr. Foreperson?
THE FOREPERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: So say you all?
JURORS: Yes.
After the verdict was read, the jury was polled at Westgate’s request. Westgate
made no objections at the reading of the verdict or at any other time before this
appeal.
[¶13] On February 5, 2019, the court sentenced Westgate to ten years’
imprisonment with all but sixty-eight months suspended on Count 5, with ten
years of probation, and concurrent sixty-eight-month sentences on the other
four counts of unlawful sexual contact (Counts 1–4). As to the charge of visual
sexual aggression, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of two years’
imprisonment. The court imposed $210 in fines.
[¶14] On February 7, 2019, the State filed a motion for correction or
reduction of sentence. The motion was continued and was later granted on
May 6, 2019. The court amended Westgate’s sentences for Counts 1 to 4 to
increase them from sixty-eight months to ninety-six months. The suspended
portion of the sentence on Count 5 was increased to ninety-six months. As to
Count 6, Westgate’s sentence was reduced to twelve months. Save for those
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alterations, Westgate’s sentence remained unchanged. Westgate timely
appealed on May 15, 2019. M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(2)(D).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶15] On appeal, Westgate argues that (A) the court erred in accepting
the jury’s verdict, (B) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, and
(C) the court erred in admitting the expert’s testimony. We address each
argument in turn.
A. Jury’s Verdict
[¶16] Westgate argues that the court erred by accepting the jury’s
verdict because, he contends, the verdict was ambiguous.2 Because Westgate
did not raise this issue in the trial court—indeed, his attorney contributed to
the court’s resolution of the jury’s questions3—we review for obvious error.
See State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶¶ 28-36, 895 A.2d 927; Clewley v. Whitney,
2 Westgate seems to characterize this error as a Sixth Amendment violation. Although we have
never addressed the issue, the United States Supreme Court has described the right to a particular
“level of verdict specificity” as a “due process right [rather] than one under the Sixth Amendment.”
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 634 n.5 (1991). Whatever the precise source of the right, however,
we see nothing problematic in the general proposition that “[i]f the evidence could have supported a
conviction for [more than one] offense, and there is nothing in the record to indicate which offense
was meant, a verdict of this type is unalterably ambiguous and a conviction on the greater charge
cannot stand.” State v. Baillargeon, 470 A.2d 915, 917 (N.H. 1983) (quotation marks omitted); see
United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 850 (1st Cir. 1990).
The court, the State, and Westgate all participated in developing—and all agreed to—the jury
3
instructions and the answers submitted by the court to the jury’s questions.
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2002 ME 61, ¶ 10, 794 A.2d 87. “To demonstrate obvious error, the defendant
must show that there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights.” State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 35, 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation
marks omitted). “Even if these three conditions are met, we will set aside a
jury’s verdict only if we conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the fairness
and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
[¶17] Westgate argues that the verdict here is ambiguous because the
jurors could have been referring to either the named counts or their
lesser-included charges. We disagree. When the jury asked for clarification of
the procedure for considering the lesser-included charge, the court instructed
the jurors that if they could “not agree on guilty under 12,” they would then “be
asked about the under 14 charge.” This instruction was sufficient to apprise
the jurors that, when the court asked if they had reached a verdict as to the
various charges “whereof the defendant stands charged,” they were being
asked for their verdict as to the named charges, not the lesser-included charges.
See United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 852-53 (1st Cir. 1990). Furthermore,
the transcript of the subsequent polling of the jury reflects no equivocation or
uncertainty on the part of any individual juror concerning which charges were
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being addressed. There was no obvious error. See Clewley v. Whitney, 2002 ME
61, ¶ 10, 794 A.2d 87.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[¶18] Here, Westgate alleges seven instances of misconduct. He objected
on two instances, and five went without objection.4 “The importance of
bringing alleged error, including prosecutorial misconduct, immediately to the
attention of the trial court is manifested in the standards of review for errors
that were objected to at trial and those that were unpreserved.” Dolloff, 2012
ME 130, ¶ 31, 58 A.3d 1032. When an objection has been made to a
prosecutor’s statements at trial, we review to determine whether there was
misconduct and, if so, whether the misconduct was harmless error. Id. ¶ 33.
[¶19] “When an objection has been made to a prosecutor’s statements at
trial, we review to determine whether there was actual misconduct, and, if so,
whether the trial court’s response remedied any prejudice resulting from the
misconduct.” Id. ¶ 32 (citations omitted).
[¶20] “Harmful error is error that affects the criminal defendant’s
substantial rights, meaning that the error was sufficiently prejudicial to have
4Westgate’s five arguments regarding prosecutorial misconduct on questions and arguments
made during closing to which he never objected are unpersuasive and we do not address them. Cf.
State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 25, 211 A.3d 205.
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affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 33 (quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted). “We determine the effect of error by looking to ‘the totality
of the circumstances, including the severity of the misconduct, the prosecutor’s
purpose in making the statement (i.e., whether the statement was willful or
inadvertent), the weight of the evidence supporting the verdict, jury
instructions, and curative instructions.’” Id. ¶ 33 (quoting United States v. De La
Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2010)). “[T]he State has the burden of
persuasion on appeal in a harmless error analysis.” Id. ¶ 39.
[¶21] Westgate first challenges the State’s argument during its closing
argument that the victim was eleven when the incident occurred and that she
has maintained this statement consistently over several years. Westgate
objected, contending that the prosecution’s argument appeared to be
witness-vouching. The court overruled the objection.
[¶22] As we have previously pronounced, prosecutors cannot vouch for
their witnesses. State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 33, 82 A.3d 86 (“A lawyer shall
not state a personal opinion as to . . . the credibility of a witness.” (quotation
marks omitted)). Here, because a prosecutor is free to comment on the
consistency of a witness’s testimony—just as the defense is free to comment on
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the inconsistency of a witness’s testimony—the prosecutor’s statement did not
constitute vouching. There was no misconduct.
[¶23] Westgate next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by asking him, during cross-examination, whether he attended the victim’s
mother’s funeral. Westgate objected and initially sought a curative
instruction—explaining that he could not attend the funeral because of bail
conditions restricting him from being near the victim. Westgate answered the
question by stating that he was unable to attend, never mentioning that his bail
conditions prevented him from attending. At sidebar, the prosecutor explained
that he sought to demonstrate that Westgate knew of the death of the victim’s
mother. Westgate then withdrew his request for a curative instruction. Here,
the prosecutor’s question regarding Westgate’s attendance at the funeral was
likely irrelevant and probably improper, but it was also insignificant because
Westgate gave an innocuous explanation as to why he did not attend the
funeral.
C. Expert Testimony
[¶24] Lastly, Westgate challenges the admission of the expert testimony
regarding forensic interviews of children. “We review a court’s foundational
finding that expert testimony is sufficiently reliable for clear error, and review
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for an abuse of discretion a court’s decision to admit an expert’s opinion after
finding it reliable.” State v. Maine, 2017 ME 25, ¶ 16, 155 A.3d 871 (citation
omitted). “A court abuses its discretion in ruling on evidentiary issues if the
ruling arises from a failure to apply principles of law applicable to a situation
resulting in prejudice.” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting State v. Bennett, 658 A.2d 1058, 1062
(Me. 1995)).
[¶25] At trial, the State presented expert testimony concerning the
protocols for interviewing child sexual abuse victims. Westgate argues that
there is a considerable risk that jurors interpreted the expert’s testimony as an
endorsement—from an experienced interviewer trained to identify sexually
abused children—that the victim was truthful. Westgate contends that the
unfair prejudice resulting from the expert’s testimony substantially
outweighed its relevance.
[¶26] “Expert testimony must meet a threshold level of reliability, and
must (1) be relevant in accordance with M.R. Evid. 401, and (2) assist the trier
of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” Id. ¶ 17
(quotation marks omitted). Here, the court provided a detailed analysis in
justifying its admission of the expert testimony. Specifically, the court stated,
[I]f an expert is properly qualified and the field of expertise is a
reliable field, then the [c]ourt must determine whether [it is]
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relevant and whether it would assist the jury in this case in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.
As to the first issue, as to whether the witness is properly
qualified in the fields, her reports and her testimony presented two
distinct but related areas of expertise or information; one having to
do with general psychological or neurological principles of
memory formation and recall, and the second having to do with
the—the developing practice of forensic interviewing, which
prescribes certain protocols and formats for questioning to elicit
in—or elicit from child victims of sexual abuse, perhaps physical
abuse but in this case sexual abuse, complete, consistent and
reliable answers.
[¶27] The trial court found that the witness was qualified as an expert in
the field of forensic interviewing and that forensic interviewing is an
established—though developing—field that has some reliability.
[¶28] Because the trial court properly analyzed the facts before it as they
related to the admissibility of the expert witness’ testimony, the court did not
clearly err in finding the State’s witness to be a qualified expert witness. See id.
¶ 21; see State v. Ericson, 2011 ME 28, ¶ 12, 13 A.3d 777 (delineating the indicia
of threshold reliability); see also State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Me. 1988)
(permitting expert testimony in part to explain timing and sequencing
inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony)
[¶29] Because the trial court determined that the expert’s opinion would
assist the jurors, the trial court’s determination as to the evidence it admitted
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was reasonable and within the bounds of its discretion. See Maine, 2017 ME 25,
¶ 20, 155 A.3d 871 (finding no error in a trial court’s admission of expert
testimony); see State v. Bickart, 2009 ME 7, ¶ 24, 963 A.2d 183; see also Black,
537 A.2d at 1156 (“Under the Maine Rules of Evidence [702], a qualified expert
possessing specialized knowledge may testify in order to assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”).
[¶30] As the trial court noted, forensic interviewing techniques may be
beyond the knowledge of the average juror. To that end, the court allowed the
expert’s testimony with respect to the questioning of the victim. However, the
trial court did not allow the witness to offer opinion testimony about either the
veracity of the victim’s testimony or whether the methodologies employed by
the prior questioners were scientifically valid methods of truth-seeking.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant
Nicholas E. Westgate
Kathryn L. Slattery, District Attorney, and Matthew Richwalder, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District #1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
York County Superior Court docket number CR-2012-1285
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY