Document Info

Filed Date: 4/12/2022

Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/14/2022

  • MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                                     Reporter of Decisions
    Decision: 
    2022 ME 24
    Docket:   Cum-21-313
    Argued:   March 8, 2022
    Decided:  April 12, 2022
    Panel:         STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.*
    STATE OF MAINE
    v.
    JOHN D. WILLIAMS
    MEAD, J.
    [¶1] On September 12, 2019, following a jury trial ending in a guilty
    verdict, the trial court (Cumberland County, Mullen, J.) entered a judgment
    convicting John D. Williams of murdering Somerset County Deputy Sheriff
    Corporal Eugene Cole and sentenced Williams to life imprisonment. 17-A M.R.S.
    § 201(1)(A) (2021); State v. Williams, 
    2020 ME 128
    , ¶¶ 1, 7, 22, 
    241 A.3d 835
    .
    We affirmed the judgment on appeal. Williams, 
    2020 ME 128
    , ¶ 1, 
    241 A.3d 835
    .
    [¶2] Williams now appeals from the court’s judgment (Mullen, C.J.)
    denying his motion for a new trial. The motion asserted that a disciplinary
    report concerning a member of the law enforcement team that arrested him
    constituted newly discovered evidence that could have been used as
    *   Although Justice Gorman participated in the appeal, she retired before this opinion was certified.
    2
    impeachment evidence at his trial. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 33. We conclude that the
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and affirm the
    judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    [¶3] In affirming Williams’s conviction on direct appeal, we concluded
    that “the trial court did not err in denying Williams’s motion to suppress as to
    his confession and [certain] other statements made [to State Police detectives].”
    Williams, 
    2020 ME 128
    , ¶ 53, 
    241 A.3d 835
    . Williams had moved to suppress
    those statements in their entirety on the ground that they were involuntarily
    made, in part because he was “fearful for his safety because he had been ‘beaten
    and pummeled’ by officers during his arrest.” Id. ¶¶ 20, 40 (alteration omitted).
    [¶4] In February 2021, Williams filed a motion for a new trial pursuant
    to M.R.U. Crim. P. 33 on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Asserting a
    violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963),1 Williams claimed that his
    right to due process was violated when the State failed to disclose before trial
    a disciplinary report concerning Maine State Trooper Tyler Maloon, a member
    of the law enforcement team that arrested him. Williams argued that the report
    1In Brady, the United States Supreme Court established that “a due process violation occurs when
    the government fails to disclose evidence that is favorable to an accused and material either to guilt
    or to punishment.” State v. Chan, 
    2020 ME 91
    , ¶ 15 n.8, 
    236 A.3d 471
     (quotation marks omitted).
    3
    could have been used as impeachment evidence concerning the degree of force
    used against him during the arrest.
    [¶5] The report, issued by the Maine State Police Office of Professional
    Standards and signed by the Deputy Chief of the State Police, imposed an
    eight-hour suspension on Maloon upon finding: “You failed to provide timely
    notice, through your chain of command of a potential act of misconduct and you
    failed to provide proper documentation of the conduct through reports and
    interviews.” In responding to Williams’s motion for a new trial, the State
    acknowledged that the referenced “potential act of misconduct” Maloon failed
    to initially report was another trooper striking Williams twice while
    handcuffing him—information known to defense counsel, the trial court, and
    the jury because Maloon testified to it at the motion to suppress hearing and
    again at trial.2 See Williams, 
    2020 ME 128
    , ¶ 44, 
    241 A.3d 835
    .
    [¶6] After reviewing in camera State Police records concerning Maloon’s
    discipline, the court denied the motion for a new trial:
    [T]he Court is left with the inescapable conclusion that a new trial
    should not be granted. It is difficult . . . to understand how Trooper
    Maloon’s discipline for violating an internal reporting process
    2  At oral argument, Williams acknowledged that prior to the motion to suppress hearing he was
    made aware of what Maloon had witnessed through two interview reports filed by a Maine State
    Police detective. Williams asserts only that he was not aware that Maloon had been disciplined for
    failing to immediately report what he had seen.
    4
    within the State Police could be considered as “exculpatory or
    impeachment evidence” and thus relevant or admissible at trial,
    especially when his trial testimony was arguably favorable to
    [Williams].
    . . . [T]he Court notes that the use of force at the time of
    [Williams’s] arrest was specifically testified to by Trooper Maloon
    first at the Motion to Suppress [hearing] and then at the trial. The
    fact that Trooper Maloon was disciplined is not evidence that
    would probably change the result of [Williams’s] trial. . . .
    With respect to the Brady/Giglio[3] test, the Court finds that
    the fact that the trooper was disciplined was not material because
    there is literally little to no possibility, much less probability, that if
    the defense had known about this evidence the result of the trial
    would have been different. The Court frankly agrees with the State
    when it argues that it makes no sense for [Williams] to attempt to
    impeach the one law enforcement witness who testified at trial to
    the use of force used against [Williams] at the time of his arrest.
    ....
    In conclusion, the Court finds no Brady/Giglio violation, and
    even assuming such a violation occurred, the Court finds no
    prejudice to [Williams].
    [¶7] Williams timely appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial.
    M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).
    3Giglio v. United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
    , 154 (1972) (holding that “[w]hen the reliability of a given
    witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting
    credibility falls within [the Brady] rule” (quotation marks omitted)).
    5
    II. DISCUSSION
    [¶8] Maine Rule of Uniform Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[t]he
    court on motion of the defendant may grant a new trial to the defendant if
    required in the interest of justice.” In general, “[m]otions for a new trial on the
    ground of newly discovered evidence are looked upon with disfavor, in light of
    the need for finality and for the preservation of the integrity of criminal
    judgments.” State v. Twardus, 
    2013 ME 74
    , ¶ 29, 
    72 A.3d 523
     (quotation marks
    omitted). “[W]e review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
    determination of whether [Williams] has met the necessary elements for an
    abuse of discretion,” recognizing that “[t]he trial court determines both the
    weight and the credibility to be attached to the newly discovered evidence.” 
    Id.
    (quotation marks omitted); see id. ¶ 32.
    [¶9] Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Brady,
    “A defendant’s due process rights are violated when the prosecution withholds
    evidence favorable to him.” State v. Nisbet, 
    2018 ME 113
    , ¶ 29, 
    191 A.3d 359
    (quotation marks omitted); see supra n.1.            The State’s obligation to
    produce such evidence “extend[s] to evidence that the defense could
    have used to impeach the prosecution’s key witnesses.”           United States v.
    Raymundí-Hernández, 
    984 F.3d 127
    , 159 (1st Cir. 2020).
    6
    [¶10] Because the newly discovered evidence asserted in Williams’s
    Rule 33 motion resulted from an alleged Brady violation, his burden required
    him to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements concerning the
    disciplinary report: “(1) [it was] favorable to [him] because it was exculpatory
    or impeaching; (2) [it was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or
    inadvertently; and (3) prejudice . . . ensued.” Nisbet, 
    2018 ME 113
    , ¶ 29,
    
    191 A.3d 359
    ; see Twardus, 
    2013 ME 74
    , ¶¶ 29, 32, 
    72 A.3d 523
     (stating that
    when a Brady violation is alleged “[t]he defendant retains the burden of proof”).
    Concerning the third element,
    [e]vidence is prejudicial when it is material—that is, the
    nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability
    that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different
    verdict. A reasonable probability exists when the likelihood of a
    different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the
    outcome of the trial.
    Nisbet, 
    2018 ME 113
    , ¶ 29, 
    191 A.3d 359
     (quotation marks omitted).
    [¶11] We conclude that the trial court was justified in finding that
    Williams failed to prove each of the three elements, and therefore no Brady
    violation occurred. As the court noted, a central argument Williams made to
    the jury—that his incriminating statements to State Police detectives were not
    truthful, but rather resulted from his desire to avoid further physical abuse at
    the hands of law enforcement officers—was supported, not refuted, by
    7
    Maloon’s testimony at trial that Williams had been struck by another trooper
    during his arrest, including once while he was handcuffed.4 The fact that
    Maloon had been disciplined by the State Police for not immediately reporting
    what he later testified to at the motion to suppress hearing and again at trial
    would not have added anything to Williams’s attempt to convince the jury that
    his confession was motivated by fear. As the court found, impeaching Maloon
    would have made “no sense” because it would have undermined in the eyes of
    the jury “the one law enforcement witness who testified at trial to the use of
    force used against [Williams] at the time of his arrest.”5
    [¶12] Accordingly, Williams failed to prove that the Maloon disciplinary
    report was “favorable to [him] because it was exculpatory or impeaching.”
    Nisbet, 
    2018 ME 113
    , ¶ 29, 
    191 A.3d 359
    . Because the report was not favorable
    to him in the first instance, Williams also failed to show a “reasonable
    probability” that the report, if admitted in evidence, would have produced a
    different verdict at trial. 
    Id.
     (emphasis omitted).
    4 Williams admitted shooting Corporal Cole; the theory of his defense was that the killing was not
    intentional or knowing. In support of that theory, defense counsel argued to the jury: “This was a
    man who was just trying to get his needs met. And you are . . . the ones who get to decide the reliability
    of what he told the officers.” One of the things Williams told State Police detectives was that he acted
    to “eliminate” Corporal Cole.
    5 The court thus found it “difficult . . . to understand” how the report would have been “relevant
    or admissible at trial.”
    8
    [¶13]        For these reasons, the court found that “[there was] no
    Brady/Giglio violation,” emphatically declaring that “there is literally little to no
    possibility, much less probability, that if the defense had known about this
    evidence the result of the trial would have been different.” That determination
    was not an abuse of the court’s discretion on this record, and we therefore
    affirm the court’s judgment denying Williams’s motion for a new trial. See
    Nisbet, 
    2018 ME 113
    , ¶ 28, 
    191 A.3d 359
    ; Twardus, 
    2013 ME 74
    , ¶ 32,
    
    72 A.3d 523
    .
    The entry is:
    Judgment affirmed.
    Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq. (orally), Lewiston, for appellant John D. Williams
    Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),
    Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
    Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2018-2275
    FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY