State of Maine v. Taylor A. Pelletier

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2023 ME 74Docket: Som-23-54
Argued: October 3, 2023
Decided: December 14, 2023
Revised: January 18, 2024
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
TAYLOR A. PELLETIER
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Taylor A. Pelletier appeals from a judgment entered by the trial
court (Somerset County, Mullen, C.J.) following a jury-waived trial convicting
him of two counts of kidnapping with a dangerous weapon (Class A), two counts
of aggravated assault (Class B), one count of domestic violence threatening with
a dangerous weapon (Class C), and one count of domestic violence terrorizing
with a dangerous weapon (Class C). On appeal, Pelletier challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment, and the court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss for discovery and Brady violations. We affirm the judgment.
2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
[¶2] The trial court found the following facts, which are supported by
competent evidence in the record. See State v. Wilson, 2015 ME 148, ¶ 13, 127
A.3d 1234. In August 2021, Pelletier lived at a house in Fairfield with the victim
and three children. Pelletier had recently installed a home security system,
which consisted of several cameras and two digital video recorders (DVRs).
The cameras recorded, without audio, the events that occurred at the house on
the afternoon and early evening of August 15, 2021, and those recordings were
stored on the DVRs and admitted in evidence at trial.
[¶3] At about 3:30 p.m. on August 15, the victim arrived at the house in
her pickup truck. Pelletier came outside when she arrived. He was jealous and
suspicious of the victim, who he believed had just returned from visiting a male
friend. He told the victim to “get the fuck out of the truck now and get the fuck
inside.” The victim got out of the truck and went into the garage adjoining the
house, with Pelletier trailing close behind.
[¶4] Once inside the garage, Pelletier began to handle the victim
aggressively, and she fell onto the stairs leading from the garage into the house.
As the victim lay on the stairway, Pelletier brandished a pistol that he had been
3
carrying in his waistband and brought his face close to hers. Pelletier then
placed the gun back in his waistband, picked the victim up by her hair, and
directed her inside the house.
[¶5] Once inside, Pelletier pushed the victim onto the kitchen floor. She
remained there, behind a counter and out of view of the cameras, for about
fifteen minutes while Pelletier appeared to kick her and point his gun at her.
When the victim began to sit up so that her head appeared above the counter,
Pelletier became agitated, leaned down to speak to her, and then struck her
several times with the butt of his gun. She then tried to stand up but fell back
down to the floor. Pelletier continued to assault her for about five more
minutes.
[¶6] Pelletier then told the victim to get one of the children, who had
been sleeping in the truck while this initial assault occurred. She did so, and
when she came back into the kitchen, Pelletier lunged at her, grabbing the side
of her face and her neck. He held her there for a few moments, bringing his face
in so close to hers that they almost touched.
[¶7] Pelletier then let go of the victim. She walked backward out of the
kitchen as Pelletier advanced toward her. The victim’s left hand was extended
4
out toward Pelletier, and she held the side of her head with her right hand.
Pelletier backed her into a doorway.
[¶8] He began berating her and then punched her in the side of the face.
Pelletier punched the victim at least two more times while she tried to defend
herself by raising her arms and one of her legs. She struggled to stand and
briefly slumped against the door before successfully standing up. Pelletier
continued to berate the victim and raised his gun toward her in a threatening
manner while grabbing the side of her neck. The victim slumped against the
door again, and Pelletier brought his face close to hers while holding his gun
near her head. The victim eventually stood back up, but Pelletier grabbed her
neck and head and forced her back to the ground.
[¶9] At about 4:30 p.m., an hour after he began his attacks, Pelletier went
outside, leaving the victim sitting in the doorway. She remained there for about
forty minutes, while Pelletier and the children came in and out of the house
intermittently. At one point, Pelletier sat down across from the victim and
spoke with her. Throughout this period, Pelletier’s gun remained tucked in his
waistband, visible to the victim.
[¶10] At 5:08 p.m., when Pelletier and the children were outside, the
victim stood up and went to the bathroom. A few minutes later, Pelletier came
5
back inside, went into the bathroom, and began speaking with the victim. She
testified that he became “triggered” during their conversation and assaulted
her again, choking her until she “started seeing stars.” This last assault, which
was not captured on a camera, occurred sometime between 5:19 p.m. and
6:24 p.m.
[¶11] The victim then gathered the children and left the house around
6:40 p.m., about three hours after Pelletier had first attacked her in the garage.
At first, the victim was unable to start the truck because Pelletier had
disconnected the battery, but she quickly discovered the issue, reconnected the
battery, and drove off. She went to her grandparents’ house, where she
eventually spoke to a police officer who observed that she was crying, scared,
and had visible injuries.
[¶12] The victim testified that Pelletier told her repeatedly throughout
the incident that he was going to kill her. She also testified that the blows he
inflicted on her were painful and that she did not feel free to leave the house
during or between the attacks. The trial court found the victim’s testimony
credible and compelling.
6
B. Procedural History
[¶13] The State filed a criminal complaint against Pelletier on August 18,
2021, and on August 25, 2022, a grand jury indicted him on the following nine
counts:
Count 1: Kidnapping the victim and/or the three children with
a dangerous weapon, with intent to cause bodily harm
(Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3) (2021);1
Count 2: Kidnapping the victim and/or the three children with
a dangerous weapon, with intent to terrorize (Class A),
id. § 301(1)(A)(4);
Count 3: Domestic violence aggravated assault of the victim
with a dangerous weapon (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 208-D(1)(C) (2021);2
Count 4: Aggravated assault of the victim (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 208(1)(C) (2021);3
Count 5: Aggravated assault of a child (Class B), id.;
Count 6: Assault of a child less than six years old (Class C),
17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(B) (2021);4
1This version of the kidnapping statute was in effect until October 17, 2021, when it was
superseded by P.L. 2021, ch. 299, § B-1 (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A) (2021)).
2 This version of the statute defining the crime of domestic violence aggravated assault was in
effect until December 31, 2022, when it was superseded by P.L. 2021, ch. 647 § B-19 (codified at
17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1) (2023)). The statute has since been amended, but not in a way that affects
the present case. P.L. 2023, ch. 465, § 4 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 208-D(1)
(2023)).
3 The aggravated assault statute has remained the same since 2021. See 17-A M.R.S. § 208 (2023).
4 The assault statute has remained the same since 2021. See 17-A M.R.S. § 207 (2023).
7
Count 7: Domestic violence criminal threatening of the victim
with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 209-A(1)(A) (2021);5
Count 8: Domestic violence criminal threatening of a child with
a dangerous weapon (Class C), id.; and
Count 9: Domestic violence terrorizing of the victim and/or the
three children with a dangerous weapon (Class C),
17-A M.R.S. § 210-B(1)(A) (2021).6
Pelletier waived his right to a jury trial, and the court set a trial date for
September 22, 2022.
[¶14] On July 20, 2022 (before the State obtained the indictment),
Pelletier’s attorney sent a discovery request to the State for, inter alia, copies of
“any . . . recording (audio or visual) . . . which [is] material to the preparation of
a defense . . . , including any and all video and audio recordings”; “[a]ll
videotapes . . . relating in any way to the alleged offense”; and “[a]ny materials
or information within the scope of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
. . . including . . . information that may detract from the credibility or probative
value of evidence or testimony used by the government.” On August 3, 2022,
5 This version of the domestic violence criminal threatening statute was in effect until
December 31, 2022, when it was superseded by P.L. 2021, ch. 647, § B-22 (codified at 17-A M.R.S.
§ 209-A(1)(A) (2023)). The statute has since been amended, but not in a way that affects the present
case. P.L. 2023, ch. 465, §§ 7, 8 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A), (B)
(2023)).
6 This version of the domestic violence terrorizing statute was in effect until December 31, 2022,
when it was superseded by P.L. 2021, ch. 647, § B-24 (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(1)(C) (2023)).
8
Pelletier’s attorney sent an email to the prosecutor requesting “an exact copy
of what was seized from the house.” He stated that he had received twenty-six
videos that the State intended to use in its case-in-chief but had not received
any other videos that were recovered from the DVRs seized from Pelletier’s
residence. Pelletier’s attorney repeated his request on August 23, 2022.
[¶15] On September 19, 2022, three days before the scheduled trial date,
Pelletier filed a motion for discovery sanctions, stating that he still had not
received all the videos from the DVRs. He requested that either the indictment
be dismissed or the State be precluded from playing at trial any videos
recovered from the home. Following a hearing on September 22, 2022, which
had been scheduled as the original trial date, the court found that the State had
violated Rule 16 of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure. However, it
did not decide whether the State had violated its obligations under Brady,
noting that it had not had a chance to view the videos and therefore could not
determine whether they were exculpatory. The court declined to impose the
sanctions Pelletier requested and instead continued the trial until October 11
to allow the State time to provide the videos to Pelletier and to allow Pelletier
time to review the videos and prepare a defense. It invited Pelletier to renew
his motion if he viewed the videos as “being relevant and certainly if
9
determined to be exculpatory.” The court explained that if “the videos tend to
be exculpatory on one or more of the charges or impeaching as to one or more
witnesses, a more serious sanction may be in order.”
[¶16] The court held a bench trial on October 11 and 12, 2022. Following
the trial, Pelletier filed a motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment (the first
kidnapping charge) and a second motion for sanctions or a finding that the State
violated its obligations under Brady, or both. He argued that Count 1 should be
dismissed because it failed to allege the elements of kidnapping. He further
argued that the videos that had been disclosed because of the court’s
September 22, 2022, order were in fact exculpatory, and thus further sanctions
were warranted.7
[¶17] On January 12, 2023, the trial court issued a decision and
judgment. It made extensive factual findings based on the video evidence and
the trial testimony and found Pelletier guilty on multiple counts:
7 As a separate basis for finding a Brady violation, Pelletier also alleged that the State had failed
to inform him that the child who testified had made inconsistent statements prior to the bench trial.
However, the witness Pelletier had hoped would testify to this effect invoked his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, and the trial court denied Pelletier’s motion due to lack of evidence.
Pelletier does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
10
Count 1: Kidnapping the victim with a dangerous weapon with
intent to cause bodily harm (Class A);
Count 2: Kidnapping the victim with a dangerous weapon with
intent to terrorize (Class A);
Count 3: Domestic violence aggravated assault of the victim with
a dangerous weapon (Class B);
Count 4: Aggravated assault of the victim (Class B);
Count 7: Domestic violence criminal threatening of the victim
with a dangerous weapon (Class C); and
Count 9: Domestic violence terrorizing of the victim with a
dangerous weapon (Class C).
Counts 1 and 2 were merged, as were Counts 3 and 4. The trial court acquitted
Pelletier of all charges naming the children as victims (Counts 5, 6, and 8).
[¶18] The court also addressed Pelletier’s pending motions. It first
concluded that Count 1 of the indictment complied with Rule 7(c) of the Maine
Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure and therefore denied Pelletier’s motion to
dismiss that count. It also declined to issue further discovery sanctions, noting
that although some of the late-disclosed videos were exculpatory regarding the
charges involving the children, Pelletier had already been acquitted of those
charges and thus had not suffered any prejudice because of the State’s failure
11
to produce the videos in a timely manner. The trial court entered a judgment
of conviction, from which Pelletier timely appeals.8
II. DISCUSSION
[¶19] On appeal, Pelletier challenges his kidnapping conviction, arguing
that, to the extent that he restrained the victim, that restraint was incidental to
the other crimes he committed and therefore legally insufficient to constitute
kidnapping. He also argues that Count 1 of the indictment should have been
dismissed because it fails to allege that he restrained one person with the intent
to cause bodily harm to that same person, and thus does not allege the elements
of kidnapping. Finally, he argues that the severity of the State’s discovery and
Brady violations warranted dismissal of the kidnapping charges.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶20] “To decide whether the record contains sufficient evidence to
support a criminal defendant’s conviction, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could
rationally find each element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Hall, 2017 ME 210, ¶ 29, 172 A.3d 467. If a court finds specific facts in
8 Pelletier also sought leave to appeal from his sentence, but the Sentence Review Panel denied
his request. See State v. Pelletier, No. SRP-23-53 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Apr. 19, 2023).
12
reaching its verdict, “we review those findings for clear error and will uphold
them if supported by competent evidence in the record.” Wilson, 2015 ME 148,
¶ 13, 127 A.3d 1234. “We will not substitute our judgment for that of the
fact-finder unless it is the product of bias, prejudice, [or] improper influence, or
was reached under a mistake of law or in disregard of the facts.” Me. Farmers
Exch. v. McGillicuddy, 1997 ME 153, ¶ 12, 697 A.2d 1266.
[¶21] Under Maine law, a person is guilty of kidnapping if he “knowingly
restrains another person” with the intent to inflict bodily injury on that person
or terrorize that person or a third person. 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3)-(4). The
kidnapping statute defines “restrain” to include “restrict[ing] substantially the
movements of another person without the other person’s lawful consent or
other lawful authority by . . . [c]onfining the other person for a substantial
period . . . .” 17-A M.R.S. § 301(2)(C).
[¶22] A “substantial period” is not a specifically defined amount of time.9
See id. § 301. Instead, “the inclusion of the substantial period requirement in
the statutory definition of ‘restrain’ was intended to avoid having kidnapping
include conduct that was merely incidental to the commission of some other
9 We have held that a confinement as brief as thirty minutes satisfies the “substantial period”
requirement. See State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶¶ 2-3, 22-24, 58 A.3d 1023.
13
crime against the victim.” State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Me. 1980); see
also State v. Long, 577 A.2d 765, 766 (Me. 1990) (noting that the definition of
“restrain” used in the kidnapping statute “precludes a separate conviction for
kidnapping, a felony, based upon conduct that merely facilitates the
commission of other crimes”).
[¶23] Whether restraint is incidental to the commission of another crime
or culpable in and of itself is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality
of the circumstances. See, e.g., Estes, 418 A.2d at 1110, 1112-13. In our role as
an appellate court—confined to the factual record in front of us and without the
benefit of live witness testimony—we are loath to disturb a fact finder’s
determination that a defendant confined a victim for a substantial period. See
State v. Hofland, 2012 ME 129, ¶¶ 22-24, 58 A.3d 1023; Estes, 418 A.2d at
1112-13; State v. Owens, 638 A.2d 64, 64 (Me. 1994). But our deference is not
unlimited and, consistent with the applicable standard of review, we will vacate
a conviction if we cannot identify any competent evidence in the record that
supports the fact finder’s determination. See State v. Taylor, 661 A.2d 665, 666,
668 (Me. 1995) (vacating an attempted kidnapping conviction where restraint
was for only a brief period and for the sole purpose of attempting to sexually
assault the victim); see also Long, 577 A.2d at 766.
14
[¶24] Here, we see ample evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s specific finding that Pelletier restrained the victim for a substantial
period because the restraint lasted, as the trial court put it, “longer than the
time necessary to commit the assault against” her. While the restraint that
Pelletier exerted during his repeated violent assaults of the victim would be
insufficient on its own to support a kidnapping conviction, evidence in the
record indicates that Pelletier restrained the victim between the assaults as
well. Most significantly, after the defendant punched the victim repeatedly and
pointed his gun at her in the doorway, she sat there for about an hour. During
this time the defendant remained close by, with his gun prominently displayed
in his waistband. And when the victim dared to defy him by getting up and
going to the bathroom, he followed her and attacked her again. The trial court
could, and did, rationally rely on this evidence to conclude that Pelletier
restrained the victim for a substantial period.
[¶25] In addition, there were other brief moments between the assaults
when Pelletier took discrete actions to control the victim’s movement, such as
when he told her to get out of the truck and go inside, when he dragged her by
her hair into the house, when he told her to go back outside and get the child
who had been sitting in the truck, and when he disconnected the truck battery
15
to prevent her from leaving. Taken together, these acts could also support a
finding that Pelletier restrained the victim for periods beyond those involved
in the actual attacks.
[¶26] Given this competent evidence in the record indicating that
Pelletier confined the victim inside the house in a manner that was separate
and distinct from his brutal assaults, the trial court rationally found that
Pelletier “restrain[ed]” the victim as that term is defined in the kidnapping
statute.
B. Sufficiency of the Indictment
[¶27] Pelletier also challenges the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
Count 1 of the indictment. That count cites 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3) and
17-A M.R.S § 1604(5)(A) (2021)10 and reads:
On or about August 15, 2021, in Fairfield, Somerset County, Maine,
TAYLOR A. PELLETIER, with the use of a dangerous weapon, a
firearm, did knowingly restrain another person or persons, [the
victim and the three children], with the intent to inflict bodily
injury upon one or more of them. This conduct was committed
against a family or household member or members as defined by
19-A M.R.S. section 4002(4).
Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1604 has since been amended, though the amendments are not relevant to
10
the present case. See, e.g., P.L. 2023, ch. 316, § 12 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1604(5)(B) (2023)).
16
Pelletier argues that Count 1 is insufficient to charge kidnapping because the
relevant statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3), prohibits restraint of a person
with the intent to cause bodily injury to that same person, and Count 1 lists four
potential victims in the alternative to each other. According to Pelletier, this
language implies that he could have been convicted if the trial court found that
he restrained one of those people with the intent to harm another of them,
which is contrary to the statute. The State contends that the indictment is
“legally satisfactory” because it provided sufficient notice to Pelletier that he
was being charged with kidnapping the victim, the children, or any combination
of them.
[¶28] We review de novo a challenge to the legal sufficiency of an
indictment. See State v. Stevens, 2007 ME 5, ¶¶ 2-5, 912 A.2d 1229; State v.
Strong, 2013 ME 21, ¶¶ 12, 14-19, 60 A.3d 1286; State v. Solomon, 2015 ME 96,
¶ 9, 120 A.3d 661. Under Rule 7(c) of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal
Procedure, an indictment must be “a plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged.” When a
defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment,
[t]he test to be applied is whether a respondent of reasonable and
normal intelligence, would, by the language of the indictment, be
adequately informed of the crime charged and the nature thereof
in order to be able to defend and, if convicted, make use of the
17
conviction as a basis of a plea of former jeopardy, should the
occasion arise.
State v. Charette, 159 Me. 124, 127, 188 A.2d 898, 900 (1963).
[¶29] In this case, a person of reasonable, normal intelligence would
understand from reading Count 1 of the indictment that Pelletier had been
charged with kidnapping one or more of the people listed. The count directly
cites the relevant statute, which provides that a person is guilty of kidnapping
when he “knowingly restrains another person with the intent to . . . [i]nflict
bodily injury upon the other person.” 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3). The count
then recites those elements, charging that Pelletier “knowingly restrain[ed]”
the victim and the three children “with the intent to inflict bodily injury upon
one or more of them.” We concede that a person reading only the language in
Count 1, without reading the statute that it cites, might believe that Pelletier
could be convicted of kidnapping if the court found that he restrained one of
the people listed with the intent to inflict injury on another of them. But that
would not be a reasonable way to read Count 1 because Count 1 cites the
statute, which makes clear that the requisite restraint and intent must be
directed at the same person. Although the indictment certainly could have been
clearer, it did communicate “the essential facts constituting the crime charged,”
as it was required to. M.R.U. Crim. P. 7(c); cf. State v. Allison, 427 A.2d 471, 474
18
(Me. 1981) (“Proper grammatical construction [in an indictment], while always
preferable, is not always indispensable.”).
[¶30] Furthermore, as the court noted, “[t]here was no Motion For Bill of
Particulars filed by the three defense counsel that represented [Pelletier] at
various points in time, nor did there seem at trial that any confusion existed
concerning what [Pelletier] was charged with and who the alleged victims
were.”11 The fact that Pelletier did not request that the State clarify the
indictment before trial by requesting a bill of particulars further supports the
court’s determination that the indictment adequately stated the basis for the
charges.
[¶31] We hold that Count 1 of the indictment was not so flawed as to
deprive Pelletier of notice of the charge or an opportunity to defend himself or
to put him at risk of double jeopardy, and was therefore legally sufficient to
charge Pelletier with kidnapping.
11 A defendant may file a bill of particulars prior to trial at the close of discovery if “such discovery
is inadequate to establish a record upon which to plead double jeopardy, or to prepare an effective
defense because further information is necessary respecting the charge stated in the charging
instrument, or to avoid unfair prejudice.” M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(d).
19
C. Discovery and Brady Sanctions
[¶32] Finally, Pelletier argues that the court should have dismissed
Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment because the State failed to timely provide all
the videos that were recovered from the DVRs at Pelletier’s residence and
because those videos were exculpatory and therefore within the State’s
disclosure obligations under Brady. To be clear, the State had provided all the
videos that it intended to use in its case-in-chief and that showed the assaults
and interactions between Pelletier and the victim on the afternoon of
August 15, 2021. The State did not provide other videos from the DVRs
showing, for example, Pelletier outside with the children. The State
acknowledges that it violated the discovery rules but argues that the initial
continuance was a sufficient sanction.
[¶33] We review for an abuse of discretion the sanctions imposed by a
trial court to remedy a discovery or Brady violation. State v. Reed-Hansen, 2019
ME 58, ¶ 17, 207 A.3d 191. A court may impose any of the sanctions listed in
Rule 16(e),12 up to and including dismissal with prejudice, but the sanction
12 Rule 16(e) provides:
Sanctions for Noncompliance. If the attorney for the State fails to comply with
this Rule, the court, on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, may take
appropriate action, which may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the
following: requiring the attorney for the State to comply; granting the defendant
additional time or a continuance; relieving the defendant from making a disclosure
20
“should be tailored to the individual circumstances of each case, with a focus on
fairness and justice.” Reed-Hansen, 2019 ME 58, ¶ 10, 207 A.3d 191. We will
vacate a trial court’s choice of sanction only if it fails to remedy the violation to
such an extent that the defendant is deprived of a fair trial. State v. Poulin, 2016
ME 110, ¶ 28, 144 A.3d 574; State v. Matatall, 2018 ME 155, ¶ 7, 196 A.3d 1293.
[¶34] Here, although the State’s failure to produce the requested videos
until after the original trial date constituted a serious discovery violation, the
court’s choice of sanction sufficiently mitigated its prejudicial effect. In its
pretrial order of September 22, the court found that the State had violated the
discovery rules by failing to disclose all the videos. It imposed a continuance to
allow Pelletier and his attorney time to review the videos and prepare his
defense. They availed themselves of that opportunity and presented some of
those videos at trial. Because of the court’s sanction, the State’s late disclosure
of the videos did not prevent Pelletier from using them in his defense.
[¶35] As for the alleged Brady violation, Pelletier points out that the
court indicated that further sanctions might be appropriate if it found that the
required by Rule 16A; prohibiting the attorney for the State from introducing
specified evidence; and dismissing charges with or without prejudice.
M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(e).
21
late disclosed videos were relevant and exculpatory, and then, after viewing
those videos, did find “certain portions of the videos exculpatory regarding the
criminal charges involving the children.” But that finding did not necessitate
further sanctions, as Pelletier insists. As the court noted, it did not convict
Pelletier of any of the charges relating to the children. Pelletier therefore did
not suffer any prejudice because of the late disclosure of the exculpatory videos,
and further sanctions were not necessary to ensure a fair trial. See Poulin, 2016
ME 110, ¶¶ 28-34, 144 A.3d 574.
[¶36] Pelletier also argues that the State’s “lateness, carelessness, and
disregard” for its discovery obligations require the sanction of dismissal.
However, the court expressly found that the State did not act in bad faith.
Furthermore, Pelletier’s reliance on our holding in Reed-Hansen to support this
argument is misplaced. In that case, the court imposed the sanction of dismissal
to remedy a discovery violation and we affirmed based in part on evidence of
“slipshod” practices by the State. Reed-Hansen, 2019 ME 58, ¶¶ 17-19, 207 A.3d
191. But this case is procedurally different because the court here denied
Pelletier’s second motion for sanctions, while the court in Reed-Hansen granted
the defendant’s motion. See id. ¶¶ 7-8. Although evidence of the State’s motives
and carelessness might provide a basis for us to affirm dismissal under the
22
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we are not required to vacate when a
court comes to the opposite conclusion under different circumstances.
[¶37] We therefore conclude that the court here did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Pelletier’s second motion for sanctions for discovery
or Brady violations.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq. (orally), Bangor, for appellant Taylor A. Pelletier
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Shannon Flaherty, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Skowhegan, for appellee State of Maine
Somerset Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-816
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY